The Physical Perspectivism Theory of Personal Identity

Abstract

Given that people go through such drastic changes in both appearance and the mind, it is a wonder that we are able to re-identify individuals across periods of time. This curiosity raises the main question of this project: What constitutes identity? In this thesis, I introduce and defend a theory of personal identity that I call physical perspectivism. This theory names point of view to be the mark of identity, meaning that we are able to re-identify an individual based on whether their point of view is the same from one moment to the next. I claim that point of view is independent of mental states: you can have the same first-hand perspective even if your personality or memories change. Your point of view is not experience, but the thing that experiences. The physical aspect of the theory is the emphasis on the neurological events in the brain that I claim are identical to point of view. To evaluate and demonstrate physical perspectivism's virtues, I discuss thought experiments and theories proposed by John Locke, Bernard Williams, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. I analyze each theory and show that none provides satisfactory answers to difficult questions of identity. I demonstrate how the theory fits many common intuitions regarding existence, particularly anticipation of survival. I also show how physical perspectivism is resistant to classic thought experiments meant to complicate matters of identity, namely Derek Parfit’s division case. I conclude that due to these merits and my own intuitions, physical perspectivism is worth further exploration.