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Developing a Framework for Nonviolent Resistance in Palestine

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INTRODUCTION

Inspired by the extraordinary events currently taking place in the Middle East, in a movement dubbed the “Arab Spring,” and by the continued failure of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, this paper aims to develop a new framework for nonviolent resistance and its application in Palestine. The nonviolent movements that ousted the entrenched dictators in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of 2011 reminded the world of the tremendous potential peaceful direct action has for affecting change. This potential is of particular interest in the case of Palestine, where alternative mechanisms of change have proved futile. Indeed, the nonviolent resistance that was used during the first Intifada led directly to the most auspicious attempt at peace yet: the Oslo Accords. When the terms of this agreement failed to be met by both sides, the Palestinians turned to violence. However, the violent tactics of the Al-Aqsa Intifada only led to a deterioration in conditions and a tightening of Israeli control in the West Bank. All subsequent attempts at peace talks have failed. Given the limited success of the brief period of mass, popular nonviolent resistance seen during the first Intifada, combined with the destructiveness of the violent second Intifada and ineffective political negotiations, this paper endeavors to use the history and theory of nonviolent resistance in order to explore its potential use in a sustained Palestinian movement in the future.¹

¹ The possibility of a campaign using mixed tactics (both nonviolent and violent) was discarded due to historical evidence and theoretical consensus on the ineffectiveness of such a strategy. As demonstrated in the case study of South Africa, a militant, violent campaign only serves to undermine peaceful direct actions. As scholar Stephen Zunes points out in *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*, “Terrorism has traditionally united the opposition, often making them more entrenched, while dividing the aggrieved population— in effect, the opposite of nonviolent action” (209). This effect can be seen even in the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Hamas’s continued launching of rockets into Israel has served as the justification for several military attacks and the continued blockade of Gaza, as well as the Israeli government’s claim that Palestinians are not truly dedicated to seeking peace.

In the case studies examined, a pattern quickly emerged: each movement took time to develop and mature, resulting in early less successful campaigns that transformed into subsequent more successful ones. This trend first appeared starkly in Gandhi's independence movement in India. A comparison of the earlier 1919 campaign to the later 1930-1931 struggle revealed clear changes in tactics and strategy. In case studies of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the Civil Rights movement in the United States these factors, and some new ones as well, reappear. While some factors played larger roles in certain movements than others, seven factors seemed to have large roles in determining the success or failure of a movement.

They are:

1. The level of organization of the leadership and the movements' structures
2. The extent to which participants were prepared for the actions they were about to undertake.
3. The direct articulation of reasonable and well-defined goals.
4. The careful strategic planning and implementation of actions specifically targeted at the weaknesses of the opponent and based on the strengths of the participants.
5. The use of tactics with mass appeal and mass applicability.
6. The ability to use the influence of several groups of people; those from the side of the oppressed *and* the oppressor, as well as the international community.
7. The widespread distribution of propaganda and effective use of publicity.

The existing literature on nonviolence theory reveals that, although these factors are not new, they have never been systematically examined as a "framework" of factors that influence a movement. Indeed, very few attempts have been made to determine the essential components of a campaign that can influence an outcome. However, most nonviolent theorists had at least

touched on several of these factors in their work. To support the claim that these factors are important, I survey the theoretical literature that exists to determine what experts have said on each factor. This paper does not suggest that, even under circumstances where all conditions are adapted perfectly to the intended struggle, these factors will guarantee success. Rather, it seeks to prove that systematic planning and taking into account these factors will make success more likely. Inherent in the somewhat ambiguous language of the factors is the notion that every campaign must be carefully targeted to fit the constituents involved. Accordingly, this paper lays out the framework generally and then attempts to examine it in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To begin with, the first Intifada is used as a sort of “controlled experiment” in nonviolent resistance in the Occupied Territories. Its successes and failures are evaluated for each respective factor. From this analysis and from suggestions made by practitioners of nonviolent action, proposals are offered for the future of nonviolence in Palestine.

The paper is divided into five sections. The introduction presents the relevant theorists who will be discussed and provides brief histories of my case studies. The first chapter deals with the first three factors listed above, detailed under the heading “Organization.” Leadership, preparation, and goals (the basic principles of the three factors) share characteristics in that they all deal with the way a campaign is organized and planned. The second chapter delves further into the mode of planning and also examines implementation, under the heading “Methods.” Both factors in this category, concisely stated as strategy and applicability, dictate the actual form that the campaign will take. The third chapter deals with “Communication.” Influence and propaganda, the two factors examined in this section, determine the direction the movement will take once it has begun. This is not to say that these factors should not be considered *prior* to the launch of the campaign, but that their influence will be most significant when the movement is

underway. Each of these factors is examined individually for the role it played in the case studies, in the theoretic literature, and in the first Intifada. Finally, the paper concludes by making suggestions for the future.

“Conflict and peace studies” is a rich and complex field, encompassing a wide variety of topics and foci. Nonviolent resistance in particular is a much more limited field of study, one that really only began to develop at the beginning of the twentieth century. With the work and activities of Mahatma Gandhi in India, the study of civil disobedience as a strategic defense mechanism, one that could offer an alternative to war, was born. Building on Gandhi’s theory, nonviolent resistance theory has now developed into a much more multi-faceted arena. In examining the prominent literature on the topic, three categories of scholars emerge. The first are “universalist theoreticians,” who develop a framework of nonviolence that can be utilized in a diverse array of cultures and situations. Prominent scholars in this field include Gandhi himself; Martin Luther King, Jr.; Gene Sharp; Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler; Richard Gregg; David Albert; and Theodore Paullin. For the purposes of this paper, the theories of the first two (Gandhi and Dr. King) will be discussed in the contexts of the movements they led. The rest will be examined for their theoretical contributions to the field.

A second category that warrants our attention are called the “culturalist theoreticians.” These scholars provide a conceptual framework of nonviolence to be applied in a specific cultural context. Given that this paper focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the examined literature focuses on nonviolent resistance in the Islamic and/or Arab world, including work written by Qamar-al Huda; Mohammed Abu-Nimer; Ralph Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad Ibrahim; Souad Dajani; Michael Bröning; and Stephen Zunes. Some of these scholars are writing

more about the broader compatibility of Islam and nonviolence, while others are examining case studies of Arab nonviolence (including Palestinian) to draw conclusions.

Lastly, the work of “practitioners” will be examined. These works are practical guides to conducting strategic nonviolent struggle. The examined practitioners are George Lakey; Martin Oppenheimer; and Virginia Coover, Ellen Deacon, Charles Esser, and Christopher Moore. These writers have contributed veritable “handbooks” and “manuals” for organizing, implementing, and executing strategic nonviolent direct action. Given the instructional nature of these works, they will not be used as theoretical support in the paper but rather guide the paper’s concluding suggestions for the future of Palestinian nonviolent resistance.

Review of Literature

It seems appropriate to begin this literature review with a discussion of the work of Dr. Gene Sharp. Truly embodying the universalist method, Dr. Sharp has written extensively on his broad theory of nonviolence. His most thorough examination into this field was conducted for his doctoral dissertation, a three-volume “bible” of nonviolence called *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. This book, written in 1973, remains a seminal and groundbreaking study of strategic nonviolence. His subsequent prolific body of work has been no less influential. The spotlight has recently been shone upon him and the organization he founded, The Albert Einstein Institute, for the influence of his work in the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Long before this, however, his framework was utilized in struggles in Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Iran, Venezuela, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania, and countless other countries.

Through such works as *Social Power and Political Freedom, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential, From Dictatorship to Democracy,*

and *Civilian Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System*, as well as his aforementioned dissertation, Sharp has developed one of the most comprehensive theories of strategic nonviolence. His theory is founded upon the central idea that “Unless the sources of power of dominant groups are restricted or severed, or the sources of power of weaker groups are mobilized or strengthened, or unless both happen, the subordinated and oppressed groups inevitably remain in essentially the same relative power position.”² Breaking nonviolent tactics down into three categories, protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention, Sharp provides a list of 198 specific methods of resistance. He also carefully examines the “dynamics of nonviolent action,” discussing such aspects of the struggle as laying the groundwork, organizing the leadership, maintaining solidarity and discipline, and utilizing multiple sources of influence. This framework remains flexible and general, as Sharp explicitly provides that each campaign will have to be adjusted for the particular circumstances under which it is being conducted. Indeed, this tailoring is an essential aspect of his theory, which places heavy emphasis on targeting the weaknesses of one’s opponents and utilizing the strengths of the resistance population.

Peter Ackerman was a protégé of Dr. Sharp and modeled much of his work after Sharp’s theory. In their book *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, however, Ackerman and his co-author Christopher Kruegler take this work one step further, providing 12 concrete “principles” which they argue are necessary for a successful campaign. The foundational premise of their theory, as stated in the first chapter of the book, is: “the quality of the strategic choices made by nonviolent protagonists matters to the

²Gene Sharp and Joshua Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential* (Boston : Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 28.

outcome of nonviolent struggle.”³ As obvious as this statement may seem, they argue, historically it has not been adequately considered. Their twelve principles, the most relevant of which will be discussed throughout the paper, are broken down into three categories: principles of development, principles of engagement, and principles of conception. “[c]onformity with... [the] broad recommendations [of these principles] will tend a nonviolent struggle toward success,” they state, although the principles must be adapted to the contexts of an individual struggle.

Richard Gregg’s *The Power of Nonviolence* actually predates both Sharp and Ackerman’s work and continues to be referenced by countless peace and conflict resolution scholars. Gregg’s work differs from the aforementioned scholars’ in that it is more philosophical than practical. Where Sharp and Ackerman’s works detail concrete steps and principles that should be taken in nonviolent resistance campaigns, Gregg explains the mechanisms of power and influence that make nonviolent action function. Posing such questions as “How is Mass Nonviolence Possible?” (chapter 5), Gregg analyzes the psychological and moral aspects of this technique. However, the final chapters of his book also discuss the need for training and offer advice on how to conduct it.

David Albert (*People Power: Applying Nonviolence Theory*) and Theodore Paullin (*Introduction to Nonviolence*) both are short booklets on nonviolence theory. Paullin’s work explores both the moral and pragmatic justifications for nonviolence and also provides a basic analysis of factors determining the success of a campaign. Albert’s work elaborates on Sharp’s theory, posing some initial questions which nonviolent strategists should consider while planning their actions.

³Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 1994), 2.

Many of the culturalists, in contrast, concern themselves with establishing the compatibility of Islam and nonviolence. In *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, Qamar-al Huda compiles ten essays by various Arab authors on topics ranging from the Qur'anic use of war rhetoric to "Enhancing Skills and Capacity Building in Islamic Peacemaking." The main purpose of this book is to establish not only a relationship between Islam and peace building, but also to show that Islam is historically and philosophically inclined towards peaceful conflict resolution. Mohammed Abu-Nimer conducts a similar survey in his book *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice*, but offers a more direct connection to nonviolence theory and also employs the use of a case study of the Palestinian Intifada to support his claims.

In another collection of essays, *Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East*, editors Ralph Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad Ibrahim explore issues such as nonviolence as a *creed* versus nonviolence as a *policy*, the essential character of nonviolence, and the question of the "scope of applicability" of nonviolent struggle in the Arab world. Featuring articles on the philosophical underpinnings of Muslim nonviolence ("The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action" by Chaiwat Satha-Anand) as well as case studies of nonviolent resistance in Arab history and in the Occupied Territories, the book concludes that nonviolence has had an important role in the history of the Middle East, but that planned, strategic campaigns (with an emphasis on training and discipline) should be the aim in the future.

Souad Dajani and Michael Bröning's work differ from the other culturalists examined here in that their books are devoted entirely to nonviolence in Palestine. Bröning's book *The Politics of Change in Palestine: State Building and Non-Violent Resistance* focuses heavily on the influence of different internal groups in Palestinian nonviolent resistance, examining both the

past and present state of civil disobedience in the Occupied Territories. Dajani, in *Eyes Without Country*, examines historical and theoretical frameworks of nonviolent resistance in Palestine but also offers suggestions for the future.⁴ This book, however, was published in 1995, many years before the second Intifada, when conditions on the ground differed greatly from those that exist today.

Finally, the culturalists are rounded out by another collection of essays, *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective* edited by Stephen Zunes, Lester Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher. The only article of interest for the purposes of this paper, however, is “Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North Africa” by Stephen Zunes.⁵ Zunes is an acclaimed scholar of nonviolent resistance who has written extensively on its application in many different cultural contexts, without making broader generalizations. Zunes’ intention in this short article is to prove that nonviolent resistance has been a tactic widely utilized throughout Middle Eastern history.

Published in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, respectively, *A Manual for Direct Action* by Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey, *Strategy for a Living Revolution* by George Lakey, and *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution* by Virginia Coover, Ellen Deacon, Charles Esser, and Christopher Moore offer practical guidance in such areas as cultural preparation, structural organization, strategy planning, instilling discipline, conducting training, building parallel institutions, maintaining solidarity, and promoting one’s cause. In assessing the future of Palestinian nonviolent resistance, this paper will draw upon the guidance offered in these handbooks in order to offer concrete and practical suggestions.

⁴Chapter 5: “Assessing Strategic Directions: Prospects for a Strategy of Nonviolent Civilian Resistance”

⁵An excerpt from Dajani’s *Eyes Without Country* is also published in this collection.

This paper attempts to draw upon lessons from all three schools of thought, as well as from historical lessons learned, to develop a methodological framework for nonviolent resistance. This methodological framework will then be applied to the Palestinian case, using the Intifada as the first controlled case study. To conclude, suggestions will be made for the future potential of nonviolence in Palestine. My approach uniquely draws on a wide array of sources and systematically examines the proposed framework in the Palestinian context. It synthesizes the main influential factors of nonviolent resistance that have emerged in the past century through trial and error and through the evolution of the intellectual contributions to nonviolent theory. Ackerman and Kruegler attempt to do something similar in *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* but retain their adherence to the universalist mode of thinking and do not attempt to apply it to any current struggle. Dajani's *Eyes Without Country* is the closest work in the existing literature that attempts to outline a future strategy for nonviolence in the Occupied Territories. However, published in 1995, this book is somewhat outdated. My work attempts to create a new universalist framework, designed with the specific purpose of promoting culturalist applications and concludes with a practitioners examination of Palestine, both past and present.

Brief Histories of Examined Case Studies

The Independence Movement in India

Gandhi is undoubtedly the most influential non-violent leader of the 20th century. His influence can be seen throughout numerous countries and decades. His mass, peaceful resistance movements in India were arguably the largest contributing factor to the end of British rule in the country. Although Gandhi's *satyagraha* (his term for nonviolent struggle) was based in a firm ideological dedication to the ethics of nonviolence, it was also practical. He saw the two as intertwined; morality had no meaning unless it governed life in every way. Furthermore,

campaigns of *satyagraha* were undertaken with both strong ethical foundations and strategically targeted methods. For Gandhi, *satyagraha* was the only path towards a free and prosperous India.

The basis of *Satyagraha*, developed by Gandhi over a long period of time, is Truth. Indeed, one of the translations of the word is “insistence on truth.”⁶ In Gandhi’s own words “Truth alone triumphs. There is no dharma [duty] higher than Truth. Truth always wins.”⁷ This commitment to Truth defined Gandhi’s life and philosophy (in fact his autobiography is titled “The Story of My Experiments with Truth”). A religiously devout Hindu, the Mahatma equated Truth with God; as man can never know the true God, he can never know absolute Truth, which means he must always keep an open mind to the opinions and positions of others. This inability to know absolute Truth also implies that man is not capable of inflicting just punishment. Hence it excludes the use of violence.

This is the second essential, and directly related, basis of *satyagraha*: the notion of *ahimsa*, usually translated as non-violence. Gandhi rejected this translation, arguing that *ahimsa* is “not merely a negative state of harmlessness but it is a positive state of love, of doing good even to the evil-doer...” and that “...there is no way to find Truth except by the way of non-violence.”⁸ The ultimate conclusion of this theory was that *ahimsa* (love and/or non-violence) is the means, and Truth is the end.

The theory of *satyagraha* articulates clearly defined, strategic steps and actions, as well as a strict code of conduct. This code of conduct includes self-reliance; personal initiative’s propagation of objectives, strategy, and tactics; constant analysis and progression of the

⁶Krishnalal Shridharani, *War without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and its Accomplishments* (Rahway, New Jersey: Quinn & Boden Company, Inc., 1939), 4.

⁷Rudrangshu Mukherjee, *The Penguin Gandhi Reader* (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 130.

⁸Quoted in Joan Bondurant, *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1967), 24 and 18.

movement; examination of weaknesses; persistent attempts to reach a compromise (including possible reduction of demands) but a refusal to surrender essentials; and insistence on full agreement upon a settlement.⁹ However, the most fundamental concept governing the actions of *satyagrahis* is that of self-suffering. Gandhi saw self-suffering as the most effective way to tap into the moral conscious of both one's opponent and the public. Self-suffering is also seen as the antithesis of violence, because violence is defined as inflicting harm on another. Self-suffering in the forms of enduring violence without retaliation, submitting willingly to arrest, and surrendering of property during confiscation were just a few of the types of self-suffering advocated by Gandhi.

Discontent in India had been growing for several years before the *satyagraha* campaign of 1919. India had been a huge supporter of the Allied forces in the First World War, supplying massive amounts of money, materials, weapons, and manpower. In exchange, Britain promised that Dominion Status would be granted, and most believed this effort would be the ticket to home-rule in India. The end of the war however, saw an entirely different reality. India was denied any part of the war booty, was refused entry to the League of Nations, and, most insulting of all, Britain reneged on her promise of Dominion Status. Furthermore, Indian soldiers were returning from the trenches of Europe with tales of horrible mistreatment and discrimination. With the war boom over, unemployment skyrocketed, and wages were reduced. Members of every caste and class were seething with a rage that threatened to boil over at any moment.

Sensing this volcano of discontent, Britain passed the Rowlatt Act in an attempt to quell any uprisings. These laws reduced, and in some cases eliminated, the rights to free speech, free press, and freedom to assemble. It also authorized the arrest and imprisonment of any person deemed "dangerous to the state" (allowing for the use of preventative detention) for an indefinite

⁹adapted from Ibid., 38-9.

period, without trial, and without possibility of appeal.¹⁰ Gandhi had campaigned strongly for support of the British in the war and felt personally responsible for misleading the Indian people into the trap of British duplicity. Sensing the force of the people's vexation, Gandhi called upon the country to offer a *satyagraha*. Demonstrations, meetings, and protests were held throughout the country.

The British government responded harshly with mass arrests, vicious beatings, and the imposition of martial law in some areas. The massacre of Jallianwala Bagh, in which upwards of 1,500 peacefully assembled Indians were slain, also occurred during this time. In reaction to such violence, protester's nonviolence broke down in many places after the first few days of the campaign. Buildings were burned, telegraph lines cut, and both English and Indian officers were killed. Less than a month into the *satyagraha*, Gandhi demanded an end to the campaign and went on a fast to repent for his failure.

By 1930, Gandhi had successfully led smaller campaigns of *satyagraha* throughout India and had a more developed plan of action for a mass movement. After a period of nationwide reflection on the failure of the 1919 effort, Indians became reinvigorated with the notion of nonviolence by the smaller examples of Gandhi's success. *Satyagrahas* in Bardoli and Ahmedabad had resulted in favorable outcomes for its participants, with gains such as higher wages, lower taxes, and greater community unity. Additionally, a new wave of young political organizations was gaining influence in the Indian political mosaic. These groups were nationalistic, often guided by socialism, and by 1928 existed in almost every city and town in India.¹¹ Many of these groups called on Gandhi to revitalize the *satyagraha* campaign. Gandhi sensed the time was ripe for action and this time he was prepared. A letter containing the

¹⁰Mary King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action* (Paris, France: UNESCO, 1999), 42.

¹¹Shridharani, *War without Violence: A Study of Gandhi's Method and its Accomplishments*, 132.

grievances of the people, details of the intended actions to be taken, and an ultimatum was delivered to Lord Irwin, then Viceroy. Beginning with a symbolic march to the sea, Gandhi led millions of Indians in a yearlong campaign against the British. A wide array of direct actions was utilized, such as demonstrations, boycotts, and other forms of noncooperation. Throughout the campaign action remained almost completely nonviolent.

After one year of continued activities, Lord Irwin announced a meeting in London to discuss possible constitutional reforms in India. Gandhi was invited, negotiations began, and the resulting Gandhi-Irwin pact included modifications to the salt regulations, amnesty to those convicted of offenses involved with civil disobedience, withdrawal of restraining ordinances that had been implemented during the movement, and restoration of confiscated properties.¹² The settlement also made references to a further discussion on constitutional reforms to be held at a later date.

Ultimately, the promises made in the Gandhi-Irwin pact went unfulfilled, and resistance resumed. However, the renewed campaign lacked the enthusiasm and drive of the first year. Also lacking were specific aims (beyond self-rule) as had been present previously. However, the success of the *satyagraha* of 1930-1931 should not be judged by the failure of a floundering imperial Britain to meet its commitments. The important aspect of the pact is that it was signed out of the British desire, and many would say need, to end the effective and immense resistance movement that was taking place in India.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa

¹²Ibid., 98-99.

Nonviolent resistance in South Africa was, as one theologian suggests, “probably the largest grassroots eruption of diverse nonviolent strategies in a single struggle in human history.”¹³ The struggles of this nonviolent movement and the strategies used by its leaders were a direct continuation of Gandhi’s methods. The South African movement in many ways mirrored the resistance movement in India, establishing an emerging pattern in the conditions leading up to successful opposition movement and the factors contributing to that success. As in India, an unsuccessful campaign in the 1950s was followed by a later and successful one.

The organizational structure of the first movement, the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign, was clearly influenced by Gandhian methods. The full blueprint of resistance was set forward by an appointed Joint Planning Council was as follows:

- Issuance of an ultimatum
- Establishment of set and significant start date
- Rigid organizational structure
- Selection of one highly symbolic act to defy
- Strategic assessment and selecting of other specific laws to defy
- 3 step plan of action: selected and trained persons begin in large city centers, then increased participants and locations, and finally mass action on a country-wide scale.¹⁴

On June 26th, 1952 (commemorating a National Day of Protest that had been held on this date two years earlier), dedicated volunteers, under the supervision of trained leaders committed various of acts of civil disobedience, including entering locations without permits, defying

¹³Walter Wink, *Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa: Jesus' Third Way* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: New Society Publishers, 1987), 4.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 99-104.

curfew, and sitting in or entering “white-only” or “European-only” railway seats, waiting rooms, and post offices.

The campaign started strong, following the blueprint for a gradual but steady increase in numbers. By October, the first stage of the resistance was complete, groups throughout the large city centers had defied the laws, and the movement had already spread to some smaller towns. Within the first hundred days of the campaign, six thousand volunteers defied apartheid laws, and by the end 8,500 had volunteered and been arrested.¹⁵ However, even at the peak of the resistance, participation levels varied widely from region to region. The response in the Western Cape was limited, probably due to the lack of organization among the African migrants. Another significant population in that area was the Coloureds, mixed individuals with both European and African heritage who enjoyed marginally more legal rights and privileges than the blacks. This limited advantage made them reluctant to participate in the movement and increased the fracturing of the non-white populations. Overall, however, the movement seemed to be showing great promise and growth. It was just at this time, when the momentum was picking up steam and the prospect of large-scale resistance was on the horizon that a series of violent riots broke out.

While no direct connection can be made between these riots and the resistance movement, the Government used the riots to justify a brutal crackdown to suppress the nonviolent campaign. Conservative estimates give thirty-four Africans dead following a series of four riots across the country.¹⁶ Although the causes of these outbursts are unknown (many suggest the use of government *agent provocateurs*), the effect was a dampening of the spirit of

¹⁵David Welsh, *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 110.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 133-137.

the resistance. It is clear that not all South Africans were convinced that a nonviolent strategy was the most effective form of action against white oppression.

In March 1960, two peaceful rallies, organized by the Pan Africanist Congress (the PAC), ended in tragedy. In Sharpeville, a huge demonstration at a police station ended in 69 deaths and nearly 200 injured. Later that day in Langa, thousands gathered themselves at the police station to offer themselves for arrest. When the police refused, the crowd dispersed, reconvening in the evening for a mass rally. Again the police attacked, leaving 3 dead. The ANC (African National Congress) and PAC called for March 28th to be a day of mourning, which resulted in the largest strike in the country up to that point. In response, the government declared a state of emergency, giving authorities the power to ban public gatherings and meetings and to detain people. The Unlawful Organisations Act was also passed quickly through Parliament, banning both the ANC and the PAC. These events convinced many resistance leaders that the time for nonviolent methods of resistance had passed and Umkhonto we Sizwe (commonly referred to as MK), a militant wing of the ANC, was established.

The MK embarked on a violent, militant crusade against the institution of apartheid, mostly through bombings of government buildings. However, this violent campaign proved to be even more ineffective than the earlier nonviolent one. Leaders were quickly caught and imprisoned and, as several scholars have pointed out, the armed struggle “may have harmed the movement, weakening the nonviolent campaigns... and justifying the repression of all resistance efforts.”¹⁷ While the militant campaign was designed to supplement nonviolent actions, it served only to undermine them, “inviting further government repression [and resulting] in a loss of

¹⁷Lester R. Kurtz, "The Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa (1912-1992)," International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, <http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=29> (accessed 11/19/2011, 2011), 2.

support by some Africans as well.”¹⁸ Furthermore, as Dr. Stephen Zunes points out in his analysis of apartheid resistance, the threat of a small group of underfunded, unorganized black militants was never serious against the most powerful and well-equipped army on the continent. Some violence also began to erupt in the townships, the most extreme example being the Soweto Uprising, which prompted a harsh reaction from the authorities and resulted in more than 60 fatalities.

At the same time that these violent campaigns were proving their ineffectiveness, nonviolent resistance leaders were working to improve conditions in the townships by organizing local councils, rallies, and strikes to protest grievances such as rent and service cost hikes. The Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO) succeeded in canceling rent hikes and preventing metered water charges in one township, while a boycott threat in another prevented the leveling of the Walmer township. These are just a few of the many local nonviolent resistance campaigns that took place throughout the country during the 60s and 70s.

These small scale examples reminded people of the possibility of nonviolent resistance and of the success it can have. These movements were a kind of ground-up approach to nonviolent resistance. Although focusing on small areas and local issues, the ultimate aim of the leaders of these civic campaigns was much greater. As activists Popo Molefe stated: “Are we fighting for lower rents to stretch our poverty wages a bit further? We must see the increasing rents, bus fares and electricity charges as being only the smoke. Our work must be geared to extinguishing the fire which causes the smoke.”¹⁹ That fire was apartheid.

¹⁸ Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz and Sarah Beth Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements : A Geographical Perspective* (Malden, Mass. : Blackwell, 1999), 204.

¹⁹Quoted in Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, "A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict," in , 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 347.

This marked the launch of the far more successful campaign of the 1980s, which was characterized by a consolidation of leadership, the building of alternative institutions, and mass, popular noncooperation. Boycotts, strikes, “stay-aways,” mass demonstrations, marches, flag burning, graffiti, worship services, memorials and anniversaries, singing and slogans, symbolic clothing (colors of the banned ANC), funeral marches and orations as occasions for protest, alternative press and advertising, public declarations (such as The Freedom Charter), and student movements were all used during this campaign.²⁰

Initially, the government met these new resistance techniques with a combination of brutal repression and superficial concessions. They declared states of emergencies, deployed military personnel into the townships to terrorize and intimidate protesters, arrested thousands of participants, banned organizations and leaders, and censored any media coverage of the resistance. Even as they installed these new measures of oppression, they also tried to pacify black rage. New houses, apartment buildings and schools were constructed, and a few roads were paved. But as the then Chief of Police Intelligence later recalled, “People just didn’t want apartheid anymore... They were not prepared to be suppressed any longer.”²¹ Eventually, the regime crumbled to internal and external pressure exerted by nonviolent resistance methods and the apartheid system came to an end.

Building on the work of Gandhi, the resistance campaigns in South Africa proved that nonviolence could be successful as a pragmatic approach to ending oppression. The ideological influences of one very powerful man was not the only factor in determining the success of such a movement. It further proved that this method could be used for more than just the ousting of an imperial power. Internal policies of nations could be changed through these tactics as well. It

²⁰Kurtz, *The Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa (1912-1992)*, 4-5.

²¹Quoted in Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 363.

also showed the significance of the international community in such conflicts (through the implementation of international sanctions) and reinforced the importance of using strategic, well-organized tactics.

The Civil Rights Movement in the United States

Halfway across the world, another fight against internal oppression of a black minority also demonstrated the incredible power of nonviolent resistance. The African American Civil Rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 60s utilized many of the most successful tactics that were used in India, and many that later proved to be effective in South Africa, to end segregation and gain basic civil rights for African Americans. Drawing heavily on Gandhian philosophy and methods, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led African Americans in one of the most effective and efficient nonviolent struggles in history. Indeed, so successful was the campaign, that its techniques are still replicated throughout the world to this day. Where the previous case studies focused on a comparison between early unsuccessful campaigns and later successful ones, this study is structured differently. The movement began in the 1950s, and while not completely unsuccessful, did not affect the scale of change that was hoped. The 1960s saw a maturation of the movement, a more militant approach to nonviolence, and overall growth and development throughout all aspect of the operations.

The resistance campaign of the 1950s began by focusing most of its efforts on legal tactics. The most obvious example, of course, is *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (1954), in which the Supreme Court ruled that “separate but equal” schools were unconstitutional, overturning a prior Supreme Court ruling. This was a significant and symbolic win for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) lawyers and many felt

hopeful that the strategy of legal suits against segregation could be effective in ending Jim Crow laws. However the Supreme Court ruling encountered massive resistance by white southerners and the desegregation of schools proved to be easily delayed. Indeed, apart from a few dramatic incidents in the later year of the 1950s, desegregation in Southern schools played a small role even in the resistance movement of the 1960s. In fact, in Alabama, no school desegregation of any kind would occur until 1963, nearly a decade after the *Brown* ruling, when 21 black students (of a pool of 293,476) attended their first class with whites.²² It seemed that regardless of any grandiose rulings by the highest court in the land, places where racial discrimination was deeply ingrained in the culture and society would not change.

However, in the same state's capital city, Montgomery, legal action was combined successfully with a mass direct action campaign to effect policy change at a local level. The NAACP was careful about the cases it chose to represent, often cherry picking only those that it felt had the greatest chances for a victory. This meant that clients were carefully vetted and disputes originating in rural areas (where white resistance was strongest) were avoided.²³ So when Rosa Parks, a distinguished, well-educated, black woman, a “‘Southern lady’ in every respect - except for her color”²⁴ was arrested in the bustling urban center of Montgomery for refusing to give up her seat on a bus to a white person on December 1st, 1955, the NAACP saw their chance for an ideal test case against the Southern segregated bus system. Less than one year later, in November of 1956, the Supreme Court ruled that bus segregation in state and local laws was unconstitutional. However, during that one-year battle in the courts, a simultaneous battle

²²Andrew B. Lewis, *The Shadows of Youth: The Remarkable Journey of the Civil Rights Generation* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 20.

²³Ibid., 18.

²⁴George Hendrick and Willene Hendrick, *Why Not Every Man?* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2005), 181.

was being undertaken in the streets of Montgomery, led by a charismatic leader by the name of Martin Luther King Jr.

While not singularly responsible for the victory of bus desegregation in the city, the Montgomery bus boycott was nonetheless effective both in its strategic use of nonviolent methods and as convincing evidence for the strength of such methods. The bus boycotts was, in many ways, a model nonviolent campaign. However, although there were a few replications throughout the country, the boycott movement failed to take hold on a broader scale during the 1950s. This was, in part, due to the fact that the boycotts “did not work well where blacks were a small part of the population with little collective purchasing power or against business that relied little on black dollars. And since they needed universal participation to be effective, boycotts were unsuited to places without strong-community wide organizations [such as the churches in Montgomery].”²⁵ New forms of direct action, ones that did not rely on the economic influence of whites or total community support, had to be developed in order for the influence of the movement to spread.

In the beginning of 1960, in Greensboro, North Carolina, four students participated in an act of noncooperation that would change the course of history. At the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University this small group of black students decided to sit at a “whites only” lunch counter. They would ask to be served and when refused and asked to leave, would remain in their seats. This act was called a “sit-in.” What these four young men did not know was that groups of students across the South had been discussing the possibility of similar activities, and training was being carefully conducted to prepare for action. When news spread about the incident in Greensboro, the leaders of the resistance movement moved quickly. Soon,

²⁵Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 311.

sit-ins were being staged across the country with thousands of students participating and many being arrested.

Soon after the sit-in movement began, a new tactic was devised and implemented: the freedom rides. This act of civil disobedience was actually not an act of defiance against any law but was, in fact, an exercise in a legally mandated right. In 1946, the Supreme Court had ruled that segregated seating on interstate bus lines was unconstitutional. However, this decision had never been enacted, and these lines remained racially separated. In true Gandhian fashion, a notice and ultimatum was delivered to the Justice Department, FBI, President, and Greyhound and Trailways Bus Companies, demanding that the law be implemented and explaining the plan to seat blacks in white seating areas on these buses if the demand was not met. This was yet another new element in the resistance campaign, as it presented a direct challenge to the federal government. The bus routes were carefully planned; housing and legal aid was arranged at various points, and mass meetings were held to inform people about nonviolence and what to expect in areas that the buses would pass through.²⁶ This method of protest was a further development, in that it was dramatic and received huge amounts of media attention, especially once white extremists began attacking the buses and their passengers. The cross-state routes of the rides also served to dramatize the action.

Lastly, the most dramatic tactic of all was implemented: mass marches. Used periodically throughout the movement in the 1960s (as it was in Nashville in 1960), the popularity of marches grew rapidly, culminating in two massive rallies: the March on Washington in 1963 and the March from Selma to Montgomery in 1965. In 1963, in response to an increase in assassinations and bombings of civil rights leaders, a quarter of a million people marched through the center of

²⁶James H. Laue, *Direct Action and Desegregation 1960-1962: Toward a Theory of the Rationalization of Protest* (Brooklyn, New York: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1989), 99.

the nation's capital calling for freedom and equality.²⁷ Dr. King's historic "I Have a Dream" speech was delivered here and served not only to rally the crowd but indeed elevated him from the role of a civil rights leader to that of the nation's moral leader. The scale of this event was amplified by the intense media coverage it received. Over five hundred cameramen and correspondents from the major networks covered the event.²⁸

The latter march, while not as heavily attended, was significant not only for its symbolism but also for the national response to it. Dr. King and 250 other demonstrators were arrested on the first of February 1965. Thousands protested the lock up of the new Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and police responded with a vicious arrests and violence. Spurred by the police brutality, King called for a 54-mile march from Selma to Montgomery, clearly fashioning it around Gandhi's Salt March. Severe abuses by the police against the marchers on the first day, well documented by the media coverage arranged by the resistance leaders, mobilized the masses. When, two days later, a second march began, solidarity marches sprang up around the country, and over 1000 protesters picketed in front of the White House. This second march was also stopped, and a white minister who was participating in the marches received a lethal blow to the head. The death of a white pastor shocked the nation and forced the President into action. The President issued a televised statement to Congress that black voting laws had to be changed and signed an executive order dispatching nearly 2,000 member of the Alabama National Guard to protect the marchers in their third attempt. Thousands joined as the procession made its way along the route and by the time the protesters reached the state capitol building in Montgomery, around 25,000 people had gathered there.²⁹

²⁷King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 154-5.

²⁸William G. Thomas, "Television News and the Civil Rights Struggle: The Views in Virginia and Mississippi," (November 3, 2004) (accessed November 20, 2011).

²⁹King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 161.

The civil rights movement in America was one of the most effective and efficient nonviolence campaigns in history. Drawing on successful techniques from the past and applying strategically planned methods to the unique situation, leaders in 1950s and 60s America were able to design a campaign tailored to the plight of the African Americans and directed at the weaknesses of the Southern segregationists. Having the charismatic Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. was important, but it was the dedication, perseverance, and meticulous organization of the movement and its leaders that truly set apart the struggle for civil rights in America.

The First Palestinian Intifada

Although isolated incidents of Palestinian resistance to occupation have occurred since the shift in conditions following the 1967 War, these efforts did not take the form of a mass, organized movement until the late 1980s, when the first Intifada was launched. The zenith of the uprising was the years 1988 to mid-1990. During this two and a half year period, innovative and effective nonviolent tactics were utilized. During the period following this, however, several factors contributed to an unraveling of the movement and a shift towards armed struggle.

Several factors contributed to the adoption of a nonviolent approach in the late 1980s in Palestine. Scholar Mary King identified three developments that led to the first Intifada:

(1) a strengthening of civil society prepared the way for popular involvement; (2) a group of intellectual activists introduced innovative symbols through joint Israeli-Palestinian committees, ideas of coexistence, and a view that both Israelis and Palestinians have rights over the land they contest; (3) and external influence led to a reexamining of the reasoning and methods for challenging military occupation.³⁰

Much of the spread of the ideals and tactics of nonviolence can be attributed to the work of Mubarak Awad (although many others were working for the same cause), a Palestinian activist

³⁰Mary King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance* (New York : Nation Books, 2007), 1-2.

and intellectual who founded the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence. Awad was very active in the years leading up to the start of the first Intifada, conducting workshops and lectures and distributing handouts and pamphlets throughout the West Bank.

Despite the preparations for nonviolent resistance, “[t]he uprising began spontaneously, with no central organizing element.”³¹ In response to a series of violent events that took place at the end of the year 1987, mass demonstrations broke out throughout the occupied territories. Although the catalyst of the uprising is often purported to be an auto collision that occurred in the Gaza strip on December 9, 1987, any number of violent episodes in the last month of that year could be considered the start of the uprising. What was remarkable was the speed and extent to which the demonstrations spread. Indeed, according to the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) Spokesperson Department, from the year 1988 to 1989, the number of “contentious events” (including stone throwing, demonstrations, mass gatherings, and tire burning and excluding incidents of firearms, bombs, firebombs, arson, grenades, etc) nearly doubled.³²

Following in the footsteps of Gandhi, the organizers of the uprising released a document, often referred to as “The Jerusalem Paper,” in February 1988, outlining the steps to be taken during the campaign. Listed in ascending order according to the severity of expected punishment, the document

...calls for a progression of nonviolent action steps moving from methods of protest or persuasion, such as conferences, marches, sit-ins, and demonstrations, to more severely punishable methods of noncooperation, such as strikes and boycotts, and finally proceeding to nonviolent interventions, such as refusal to submit to Israeli bureaucracy- in the form of disobeying orders, resigning from jobs, withholding taxes and payments for water and electricity- establishing underground printing presses, and most serious, burning the identity cards that were obligatory to pass through Israeli checkpoints.³³

³¹Aryeh Shalev, *The Intifada : Causes and Effects* (Jerusalem, Israel : Boulder, Colo. : Jerusalem Post ; Westview Press, 1991), 65.

³²Eitan Y. Alimi, *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada : Political Opportunities, Framing Processes and Contentious Politics* (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007), 123.

³³King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 198.

The paper continues by espousing Gandhian ideals such as self-sacrifice, appeals to the morality of both the oppressor and the international community, and the need for careful planning, training, and organization.

During the years 1988 and 1989, the Palestinians used both traditional and new forms of nonviolent resistance. Strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations were frequent, organized on a wide-scale by the United National Command of the Uprising (UNCU), as well as on a smaller scale by the local committees. Nonpayment of taxes and resignations from posts also occurred. The Palestinians utilized innovative methods of resistance such as the renaming of streets and schools, the use of donkeys and mules when roads were blocked, and the use of graffiti, children's games, music, poetry, dance, and puppetry. In one particularly brilliant campaign, the Palestinians attempted to implement a different time zone from their Israeli neighbors.³⁴

The Israelis responded harshly to these new methods of resistance. Demonstrations were dispersed with tear gas and live ammunition, all schools and universities were closed, curfews were implemented, and shops participating in strikes were broken into and trashed. Palestinians wearing watches running on the alternative time had their wrists broken. Far from breaking the will of the Palestinians, these brutal punishments garnered them support from the international community and increased internal solidarity and further development of the resistance. For example, instead of looting shops the army had broken into, volunteer welders would come to fix the locks and groups of young boys would bring the shop owner new keys.³⁵

For the first two and a half years of the uprising, the movement remained almost entirely nonviolent. Gene Sharp estimates that approximately 85 percent of the resistance was nonviolent. The other 15 percent was largely “‘limited violence,’ such as stone throwing or petrol

³⁴Ibid., 226-7.

³⁵Ibid., 234.

bombs...”³⁶ This shifted in the later years of the Intifada. Nonviolent methods were gradually abandoned and the resistance petered out in the early 1990s.

A full analysis of the First Intifada must mention the various advances that were made as a result. Firstly, channels of dialogue were opened. The United States began a cautious, yet still significant, relationship with the PLO. In 1991, Palestinians and Israelis sat down together to discuss a resolution for the first time in the history of the conflict, and by 1993, the Oslo Accords, then seen as extremely promising agreement, had been reached. One reason for Israel’s new willingness to negotiate can be at least partly attributed to another accomplishment of the resistance: the increased cost of occupation. As Palestinian activist Mazin Qumsiyeh points out:

The cost of the uprising to Israel was huge. Even by May 1988, it was estimated that in the first three months of the uprising government revenues declined by 30 percent compared to the similar period the year before, expenses rose dramatically... tourism plummeted and Israeli exports tumbled...³⁷

And lastly, the Intifada turned international attention to the severity of the problem in the Occupied Territories. The uprising put the Palestinian issue back on the global agenda.

³⁶Gene Sharp, "The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 1 (Autumn, 1989): pp. 3-13, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537242>, 3.

³⁷Mazin B. Qumsiyeh, *Popular Resistance in Palestine : A History of Hope and Empowerment* (London ; New York : Pluto Press : Distributed in the United States of America by Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 157.

Chapter 1: ORGANIZATION

This chapter discusses three components central to the organization of a movement: leadership, preparation, and goals. Leadership refers not only to the most high-level organizers but also to the hierarchical structure built to coordinate resistance actions. Alternative structures are also discussed under this heading, as they require strong leadership in order to form and run effectively. Preparation can be broken down into two subsets: discipline and understanding. Participants in a nonviolent movement must be trained to instill discipline in nonviolent techniques and also to foster an understanding of the fundamentals of this method. The last factor, goals, must be focused and strategic, clear and concise. This chapter will discuss the historical and theoretical foundations of each of these factors, as well as the form they took during the first Intifada.

1. The level of organization of the leadership and the movement's structures

In History

Leadership was critical in all three of the case studies examined. In the case of Gandhi's movement in India, the first important aspect to note is the force of the man himself. Labeled "a half naked fakir" by Churchill and Mohatma (Great Soul) by his followers, Gandhi divided his opponents and united his adherents. His influence has often been compared (even by Gandhi himself) to that of the prophets, and he was certainly worshipped with a near religious fervor during his lifetime. Men with that kind of power rarely come along, and it is even more rare for that power to be directed towards good. Dictators and tyrants can be listed by the dozen, but the list of leaders who devoted their life to the well-being of others is a short one. The uniqueness of

Gandhi himself and his influence on the movement in India cannot and should not be underestimated.

But Gandhi's charisma alone was not what made the movement successful. Gandhi strongly advocated the need for civic institutions to be built alongside any peaceful resistance movement. His work in India included not only the leading of marches, boycotts, strikes, and other direct action but also the formation of community centers, schools, clinics, and other social institutions. After the failure of his 1919 campaign, he also decided "it would be necessary to create a band of well-trying, pure-hearted volunteers who thoroughly understood the strict conditions of Satyagraha. They could explain these to the people, and by sleepless vigilance keep them on the right path."³⁸ While this is a significant development for the second factor (preparation), it was the establishment of this group of dedicated followers to lead the campaigns that most greatly altered the internal organization of Gandhi's movement.

The South African anti-apartheid movement drew heavily on this lesson of the importance of infrastructure. In the townships of South Africa, resistance leaders began establishing street and area committees as an alternate form of governance to the government sanctioned councilors. People's courts were established to take care of disputes and crimes; cooperatives, community clinics, legal resource centers and advice offices also offered services for the government's failing social institutions. The National Education Crisis Committee was formed to encourage school boycotts and provide alternative education programs to those students who chose to participate in them.³⁹ All of these efforts resulted in townships that were "ungovernable" by the government but had instead become democratically governed by and for

³⁸Quoted in Bondurant, *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, 82.

³⁹Dene Smuts and Shauna Westcott, *The Purple Shall Govern* (Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press, Center for Intergroup Studies, 1991), 18.

the people. The formation of alternative structures can be a crucial step in a nonviolent campaign.

Leadership organization was also an important component of the South Africa movement. The resistance effort was encouraged by the formation of a new opposition group, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which united people from more than 500 different organizations across the country. Civic organizations, churches, women and student groups, labor unions, and more were represented. There were several factors contributing to the strength of the UDF and its opposition efforts. One was the influence of old ANC leaders, most of whom were imprisoned on Robben Island, on the young leaders of the new fight. Young rebels who were imprisoned for short-term sentences had the chance to mingle and learn from the best and brightest of the older generation. One Islander described the atmosphere on Robben as “an institution of politicians.”⁴⁰ This new generation of leaders departed from their prison sentence with a new sense of dedication to the cause and a new inspiration for a united, popular, nonviolent effort.

Ultimately, the success of the 1980s campaign in South Africa was due in large part to the skillful organization of the movement and the leadership’s emphasis on infrastructure support. In the early 1980s, violence in the townships reached a new high. Frustration with the state appointed councils in these areas erupted into full-fledged attacks. People considered informants to the regime were driven from their homes and sometimes brutally slaughtered. By May of 1985, 257 councilors had resigned, and authority in the townships was in shambles.⁴¹ Far from bringing liberation, this violence sparked harsh crackdowns, the declaration of states of emergency, and military oppression. In response, the UDF called for a new kind of activism. The

⁴⁰Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 349.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 352.

new slogan adopted was “From Mobilization to Organization.” The group called on its members and supporters to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the corrupt governance system with “alternative structures.”⁴² This new initiative sparked the true beginning of the successful nonviolent campaign.

The importance of the organization of the South African resistance movements was given attention in both campaigns; however the 1980s campaign incorporated the organization not only of its leaders and participants (as was done in the 1950s), but also of the society within which the protests were to take place. The use of civic organizations, broad unity across religious, ethnic, racial, and class lines, and alternative institutions allowed for the resistance to continue even in the face of the brutality of oppression, imprisonment of its leaders, and the chaos of military crackdowns. Through the institution of street and area committees, order was kept even after the imposed governance structure collapsed. Students were able to boycott schools and still receive education from alternative learning organizations. Price lists were distributed and enforced to black storeowners, so that prices would not be raised during consumer boycotts of white-owned stores. This careful organizing in preparation for and during the civil disobedience actions of the campaigns allowed for their success.

The success of the Civil Rights Movement in America was contingent on the use of viable and proven effective methods utilized from the beginning and maintained throughout the movement. One of these was the effective organization of the movement’s leadership and its support of alternate structures. The leaders of the struggle astutely assessed that the most effective way to organize would be to utilize an already preexisting community structure; namely, the church. The church was an ideal mechanism for the movement. It was not seen as an elite institution in society (allowing access to all classes of the black community), it was not

⁴²Ibid., 354.

politically specific, was economically autonomous from white society, and had resources and networks for effective communication and the distribution of information.⁴³ The community leaders were all ministers and it was with the enlistment of their help that the “Montgomery Improvement Association” was formed and Martin Luther King, Jr. (a new minister in the city) appointed its leader.

Another significant role the Church played throughout the movement was in organizing the alternative structures that allowed so many blacks to participate in the Montgomery boycott. On the first boycott day, it is estimated that 90% of some 50,000 blacks refused to ride the buses. The extent of participation may be largely attributed to the agreement reached with the black owned taxi companies: on the first day, they charged \$0.10 (the cost of bus fare) for all destinations.⁴⁴ Reduced taxi fares continued throughout the boycott and an extensive carpool network was also established. Sympathetic white employers were asked to provide rides for their black employees. And when local auto insurance agencies threatened to cancel the insurance plans of taxis assisting in the boycott, organizers arranged for Lloyd’s of London to underwrite the coverage instead.⁴⁵

Over time, leadership of the movement developed significantly, for example with the rise of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and more cross-organization cooperation. Many groups, including the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the NAACP all worked together to mobilize publicity and monetary and legal support in response to the violence the freedom riders faced in

⁴³King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 114.

⁴⁴Hendrick and Hendrick, *Why Not Every Man?*, 184.

⁴⁵King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 115.

the 1960s.⁴⁶ Although this specific cooperation was short-lived, links between the many groups were instrumental in the perpetuation of the movement.

In the Literature

Nonviolent theorists have written extensively on the importance of leadership and organization in movements and some have also stressed the utility of alternative structures. As mentioned previously, alternative governance and structures was a key component of Gandhi's theory and practice of nonviolence. However, he had little to say about the internal organization of a movement and wrote little about the leadership structure necessary for effective campaigning. Perhaps in response to this omission, many of Gandhi's contemporaries focused heavily on leadership roles and organization. Richard Gregg emphasizes the importance of participants being able to "receive instruction from their leaders in how to proceed."⁴⁷

Nonviolence expert Stephen Zunes has also written about the importance of alternative structures not only for the propagation of the movement itself but also as a influential factor in post-revolutionary state building, writing that "The creation of alternative structures provides moral and practical underpinnings for efforts aimed at bringing about fundamental social change."⁴⁸

Gene Sharp puts great emphasis on the importance of leadership and organization, but says little about alternative structures. In keeping with his commitment to a universalist framework, he also avoids any suggestion of the forms such organization should take, writing, "Regardless of the precise form which organization takes in a particular conflict situations -- and that subject merits detailed study -- the importance of organization for effective nonviolent

⁴⁶Laue, *Direct Action and Desegregation 1960-1962: Toward a Theory of the Rationalization of Protest*, 109.

⁴⁷Richard Bartlett Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence* (London : J. Clarke, 1960), 152.

⁴⁸Stephen Zunes, "Nonviolent Action and Human Rights," http://mehr.org/nva_hr.htm (accessed 4/16/2012, 2012).

action remains of high priority.”⁴⁹ He does, however, detail the responsibilities and qualities of leadership, including planning strategy, negotiating with opponent, encouraging participation, promoting discipline, and recommending steps as the movement progresses.

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler also highlight the importance of organization, listing their second “principle” of strategic nonviolent conflict as being to “develop organizational strength.”⁵⁰ They break the resistance organization down into three strata: the leadership, the operational corps, and the broad civilian population. For the support of the factor currently under discussion, only the first two categories are of concern. Ackerman and Kruegler stress depth of leadership, best cultivated by a hierarchical structure, with clear lines of succession established and knowledge of the basic strategy extending down throughout the organization. The middle stratum, the operational corps, has four key functions, summed up concisely as: communication to the population, instruction and support for the population, the intelligence arm for the leadership, and mobilization for highly specialized operations.⁵¹

In terms of nonviolence in Islam, Mohammed Abu-Nimer argues that the very composition of an Islamic society is conducive to establishing effective leadership. He reflects on nonviolent workshops he conducted in the Middle East in the past, explaining that Muslim participants suggested the use of local imams and ‘umdahs (religious and community leaders, respectively) as leaders in such a scenario. Indeed, Abu-Nimer concludes, “these leaders have been conducting mediation and arbitration and helping to resolve conflict peacefully every day

⁴⁹Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston : P. Sargent Publisher, 1973), 480.

⁵⁰Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 23.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 27-28.

for hundreds of years.”⁵² He also points out that “perhaps the most important nonviolent groundwork for the Intifada was the development of alternative structures.”⁵³

In the Intifada

One of the most remarkable outcomes of the Intifada was indeed the sophisticated alternative structures that formed to cope with Israeli oppression. Unprecedented curfews were implemented by the Israeli army during the Intifada, but these only served to foster a sense of unity and solidarity among the Palestinians. “Committees outside of curfewed areas collected food donations, while those inside restricted areas took responsibility for distribution. Health teams based their treatment on the assumption that residents must be prepared to withstand the situation for a long period of time.”⁵⁴ Even individual apartment buildings would organize various missions, including food supply, first-aid, and shelter for “wanted” activists or from settler attacks.⁵⁵ When the Israeli military closed all the schools, popular education committees, taught by volunteers, were conducted. As the school closures continued, the leadership took on a supportive role in the organization of such education efforts. There were, for example, women’s committees to provide childcare, provisions committees for providing food to needy areas, and health care, transport, intellectual, agricultural, and youth committees.⁵⁶

At first, decentralized local committees took the lead in guiding the uprising. Stephen Zunes argues that groundwork for the Intifada had already begun to be laid in the 1970s, when Palestinians began to mobilize and participate in grassroots organizations. “In areas such as

⁵²Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam : Theory and Practice* (Gainesville, FL : University Press of Florida, 2003), 86-87.

⁵³Ibid., 131.

⁵⁴King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 221.

⁵⁵Alimi, *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada : Political Opportunities, Framing Processes and Contentious Politics*, 135.

⁵⁶Qumsiyeh, *Popular Resistance in Palestine : A History of Hope and Empowerment*, 140.

healthcare, agricultural relief, voluntary work, and women's issues, these grassroots committees quickly attracted the support of the local communities... these grassroots committees later became the basis for the proliferations of the local popular committees that first emerged to administer the Intifada."⁵⁷ From these committees, the United National Command of the Uprising (alternately called Unified National Leadership Command of the Uprising) emerged to coordinate actions. The Command was formed by the four main "secular-nationalist factions" in the Occupied Territories: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP).⁵⁸

In the beginning, this fracturing worked as an advantage for the organizers of the resistance. The Command was formed as a coalition between factions, which allowed it to be multi-pronged, egalitarian in resource and power allocations, and resilient in the face of imprisonment of leaders. However, the representation of such a broad range of factional ulterior interests throughout the leadership also made the group prone to internal disputes and prevented the adoption of a central, coherent message and style. The ad hoc nature of the selection of individuals to participate in the Command also meant that it had no established hierarchical structure, meeting location, or decision-making procedures. This allowed it to remain under the radar and for many members to evade arrest, but also made it difficult, indeed at times impossible, to coordinate actions, goals, and messages. As the movement grew, and Israeli tactics of combating it evolved, the disadvantages of the uncoordinated internal leadership body began to negatively influence the effectiveness of the campaign.

⁵⁷Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements : A Geographical Perspective*, 55.

⁵⁸King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 205.

But the Command was not the only body taking a leadership role in the Intifada. The PLO, while having nothing to do with the launching of the movement, asserted more and more control over the resistance as time passed. The initial intention of the activists organizing the movement to keep the PLO on the periphery was thwarted, as the men in Tunis saw an opportunity to increase their power, wealth, and legitimacy. There was already a disconnect between the political party and the people it claimed to represent. As one scholar pointed out:

A wide generation gap existed between the Palestinian leadership-in-exile -- most of whom had been engaged unsuccessfully in the Palestinian national struggle for 30 years or so... -- and the thousands of young Palestinians, mostly unemployed, who had known no other existence than the stifling restriction of refugee camps and Israeli overlordship.⁵⁹

The Intifada began as a spontaneous movement and decentralized local committees quickly took up the task of organization. Years of occupation had led to the development of many community institutions, and these resources were efficiently mobilized to assist in the resistance. Despite the build up of civil society, power in the occupied territories was fragmented. Several groups vied for leadership positions and the PLO, exiled to Tunisia, was not yet recognized as a legitimate governing body by the international community. The disorganized leadership and power struggles taking place internally eventually played a huge role in downfall of the Intifada.

2. The extent to which participants were prepared for the actions they were about to undertake

In History

Reflecting on the unsuccessful 1919 campaign, Gandhi concluded that the people of India had not been sufficiently prepared to offer *satyagraha* and determined that if he were to attempt

⁵⁹Edgar O'Ballance, *The Palestinian Intifada* (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1998), 25.

such actions in the future, participants would have to be fully educated and informed about the deeper implications of a nonviolence movement. He also decided “it would be necessary to create a band of well-trying, pure-hearted volunteers who thoroughly understood the strict conditions of Satyagraha. They could explain these to the people, and by sleepless vigilance keep them on the right path.”⁶⁰ Through this process of attempt and failure, Gandhi amended his process of launching mass nonviolent resistance and began the building of a corps of *satyagrahis* who were carefully educated and rigorously trained with regard to the practice of *satyagraha* and its underlying precepts.

Volunteer *satyagrahis* underwent training courses for methods of direct action and, particularly, crowd control. Strategic methods were meticulously selected, analyzed, and planned. Gandhi drew up a detailed pledge in collaboration with the All-India Congress to be undertaken by all those offering *satyagraha*. Volunteers traveled throughout the country, educating the people and distributing pamphlets and other propaganda on the techniques and deeper meaning of civil disobedience and non-cooperation.

The historical example that most convincingly argues for the importance of this factor is the Civil Rights movement. The nonviolence of the first bus boycott campaign in Montgomery can be largely attributed to the extensive training sessions that were conducted throughout the operation. Gandhi’s methods were not only employed in the boycott, but also carefully explained by experts who came in from around the country to offer their expertise. Bayard Rustin and Glenn Smiley worked tirelessly with Martin Luther King, Jr. to educate him on the use of nonviolent resistance and also held workshops and seminars for Montgomery blacks. Skits and dramatizations were acted out portraying Gandhi’s struggle and techniques of nonretaliation.⁶¹

⁶⁰Quoted in Bondurant, *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, p. 82.

⁶¹King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 116-126.

But the training did not end simply with the techniques needed for the boycott. Post-campaign preparations were also undertaken to train blacks on how to handle white harassment upon resumption of bus riding. Once the desegregation process began to take place, ministers were dispersed throughout the buses, especially during rush hour, to reinforce nonviolence.⁶²

In Nashville, students trained with Reverend James Lawson, an expert and one of King's mentors on nonviolence. His in-depth knowledge of nonviolent tactics as well as his emphasis on the importance of organization allowed him to launch the largest and most disciplined sit-in of 1960, directly following the Greensboro sit-in. Rev. Lawson eloquently demonstrated the importance of training:

You cannot go on a demonstration with 25 people doing whatever they want to do. They have to have a common discipline. And that, that's a key word for me, that the difficulty with nonviolent people and their efforts is that they don't recognize the necessity of fierce discipline and training. And strategizing. And planning. And recruiting and doing the kinds of things that you do to have a movement. That can't happen spontaneously, it has to be done systematically.⁶³

Later in the campaign, the Freedom Rides continued the practice of careful training and organization throughout their implementation. The Riders were carefully recruited and underwent significant training on nonviolence (both the practice and the philosophy).

The extensive training that was undertaken by participants throughout the various phases of the movement was unprecedented. Nonviolence experts, many of whom had traveled to India to learn directly about Gandhian techniques, were deployed throughout the country to conduct workshops and information sessions for potential participants. Resisters were carefully recruited and selected, only the most well disciplined being chosen for initial direct action. Moreover, as was seen in Montgomery, training did not stop with pre-campaign preparations. Workshops were held throughout the resistance process and training was also provided for handling the challenges

⁶²Ibid., 127.

⁶³*A Force More Powerful*, DVD, directed by Steve York (United States: York Zimmerman, 2000).

that would come with change. This comprehensive training process, instilling both understanding and discipline in the resisters, allowed the movement and its participants to maintain nonviolence to a remarkable degree from the beginning of the movement to the end.

In the Literature

“Advocates of non-violence must start in the same way as violent revolutionaries to build their forces through persuasion and education.”⁶⁴ So states Theodore Paullin in his book *An Introduction to Non-Violence*. Indeed, the need for training to establish both discipline in and understanding of nonviolent techniques is advocated by nearly every nonviolent theorist. It lies at the core of many of their philosophies. Richard Gregg goes so far as to say; “The failures and apparent futilities of nonviolent resistance in the past have been due, very largely, to lack of discipline, as well as to lack of understanding of the full implications and requirements of the method.”⁶⁵ He justifies this position by arguing that actions are most effective when actors understand the meaning and purpose of their acts and can relate them to the attainment of a higher purpose. Gregg devotes the last two chapters of his book to the need for training and suggestions for how to conduct it.

Ackerman and Kruegler also emphasize the necessity of maintaining discipline, listing it as number nine in their list of principles. To participate in a nonviolent struggle, they say, people must “keep their behavior within a certain *modus operandi* for the duration of the campaign. They need to know what behavior is expected, in specific terms, and why it is essential to strategic success.”⁶⁶ Gene Sharp adds, “In well prepared campaigns, clear instruction will be

⁶⁴Theodore Paullin, *Introduction to Non-Violence* (Philadelphia : The Pacifist Research Bureau, 1944) , 58.

⁶⁵Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, 70.

⁶⁶Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 42.

issued to the general population and to particular groups that are asked to carry out specific acts of resistance and defiance in disciplined ways.”⁶⁷ He also emphasizes, “Discipline is crucial... Resisters and the general grievance group [also] need to understand *why* the campaign needs to remain strictly nonviolent.”⁶⁸ He advocates a wide array of educational tactics, including pamphlets, public meetings, speeches, debates, house-to-house canvassing, and workshops. Most crucially, he argues, resistance leaders must have extensive knowledge and experience with nonviolence and pass this wisdom down to as many resisters as possible.

The Islamic model of nonviolence also stresses understanding and discipline. Mohammed Abu-Nimer and Qamar-al Huda see these characteristics as inherent in the religion and therefore claim that Muslims are prime candidates for the proper implementation of nonviolent training. Abu-Nimer argues, “Islamic religious identity provides an effective basis for recruiting people to join a nonviolent campaign by nurturing strong identity and discipline.”⁶⁹ Qamar-al Huda devotes the entire last chapter of his book to “Enhancing Skills and Capacity Building in Islamic Peacemaking.” Focusing on the training of religious leaders, Huda emphasizes that training and workshops be adaptable to different social and economic conditions in specific communities. By catering to the nuances of the constituencies each religious leader represents, activists more effectively can communicate their message to the local leadership who will guide the struggle on the ground.

Other culturalist theorists have used the Intifada as a primary example of how lack of discipline and understanding in a population can have negative effects on a nonviolent movement. Indeed, scholar Philip Grant argues that, even in 1990, the lack of understanding among the participants was apparent: “[t]here is a pervasive lack of conviction by the resisters

⁶⁷Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 493.

⁶⁸Ibid., 392.

⁶⁹Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam : Theory and Practice*, 182.

that nonviolent struggle will bring them victory. This doubt stems mainly from a lack of education in the advantages of nonviolent struggle.”⁷⁰ Zunes adds that “adherence to nonviolent methods was never totally uniform nor disciplined.”⁷¹

In the Intifada

In the early 1980s, workshops, lectures, literature, and experimental applications of nonviolence began to emerge. Encouraged by the efforts of men such as Mubarak Awad, Jonathan Kuttab, and Sari Nusseibeh, the idea of nonviolence as a form of struggle spread. Impeded every step of the way by the Israeli government, these men, and many more like them, began giving information about and instruction for direct action and noncooperation to Palestinians. Nonetheless, the Intifada erupted spontaneously, not spurred on directly by the nonviolent activists in the region.

“Once the intifada erupted, the activists intellectuals and leaders in Palestinian factions began organizing to focus the energies of the populace and put to use the knowledge of nonviolent struggle that had been spreading in the territories for years.”⁷² However, apart from the efforts prior to and directly following the outbreak of the Intifada, training efforts seem to decrease significantly, if not disappear completely, as the movement progressed. This is not altogether surprising, given the extreme measures that were taken by the Israeli army to prevent any opportunity for Palestinians to gather or communicate. Israel has focused great energy and resources on controlling and limiting movement in the Occupied Territories, a situation which has become all the more restrictive since the early 2000s, but which undoubtedly was relevant

⁷⁰Ralph Crow, Philip Grant and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East* (Boulder : L. Rienner Publishers, 1990), 69.

⁷¹Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements : A Geographical Perspective*, 63.

⁷²King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 205.

during the first Intifada. A mere six months into the Intifada, in May 1988, Mubarak Awad was arrested and deported from the West Bank. The extensive curfews imposed, not to mention other restrictions on movement, undoubtedly greatly hindered the movement's ability to continue training efforts after the Intifada began.

Another factor that contributed to the failure of the first Intifada was the fact that the leadership of the PLO disagreed about violence vs nonviolence. The assassination of Abu Jihad, the founder of Fatah and one of the organization's greatest advocates of nonviolence, in 1988 was a severe blow to those advocating nonviolent methods. The PLO was reluctant to give up its call for armed struggle and therefore framed the nonviolence campaign as a "prelude to armed uprising."⁷³ Guidance from Tunisia always maintained that resorting to the use of arms was a viable option. As Gene Sharp points out, this position can "constitute a great temptation for the resisters... to use violence."⁷⁴ Although this temptation is always present, a lack of commitment to nonviolence from the leadership will only increase its likelihood.

In part due to these mixed messages, and also attributable to the spontaneous nature of the uprising, the population was inadequately prepared to develop a full-scale civil disobedience campaign. Many Palestinian scholars concluded that the general population simply did not have enough understanding of the fundamentals of nonviolence to escalate the campaign to the necessary intensity.⁷⁵ It wasn't only the general population that was under prepared, but also the leadership, which failed to plan for the event of all the intellectual activists trained in nonviolence being imprisoned or deported, as became the case by 1990. Once this happened,

⁷³Ibid., 282.

⁷⁴Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 392.

⁷⁵Ibid., 238.

“operatives in Tunis unfamiliar with nonviolent struggle composed [the Command]”⁷⁶ and the calls for civil disobedience subsided.

3. The direct articulation of reasonable and well-defined goals

In History

While Gandhi placed great importance on the clear articulation of reasonable goals in the form of an ultimatum, he did not take this step in his 1919 campaign. The 1919 *satyagraha* did have an objective: the dismantling of the Rowlatt Act. However, in the later 1930-1931 campaign, Gandhi was careful to make his demands well publicized not only to resisters but also to the British government. This came in the form of a letter to the Viceroy. Gene Sharp points out that “although in the second quarter of the twentieth century the overall goal in the struggle of Indian nationalists against the British Empire was independence for India, the specific objectives of the 1930-1931 campaign as formulated by M. K. Gandhi were eleven limited and concrete demands that he believed, if gained would bring India closer to self-governance.”⁷⁷

The power of this factor was displayed in full effect during the American Civil Rights movement. This movement is known almost as much for its many small victories as for its overall achievements. Rosa Parks, the Little Rock nine, and the Freedom Rides are remembered to this day as landmarks in the struggle for Civil Rights, yet their ultimate goals were not all that far-reaching. The Montgomery Bus Boycotts, one of the most symbolic nonviolent struggles in history, was fighting not for universal equality but for the desegregation of buses. While this was no small order for an Alabaman city in the 1950s, the limits of the demands nonetheless highlight the significance this factor played in the resistance. In a mass meeting called for on the

⁷⁶Ibid., 239.

⁷⁷Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 474.

night of Mrs. Park's conviction, the Montgomery Improvement Association (the leadership body formed to organize the boycott) compiled their list of demands. Wired to the owners of the bus line the next morning, they were:

- That bus drivers treat passengers with courtesy.
- That black riders be seated from the back forward and white riders from the front to the back, with no seats reserved for whites or blacks.
- That black drivers be hired for routes predominantly serving black passengers.⁷⁸

In the case of the Civil Rights movement, the importance of well-defined goals appears to be something that the resistance leaders understood from the very beginning. This is likely due to the heavy influence of Gandhian theory on Martin Luther King, Jr. and other prominent figures in the leadership. This model of issuing clear and modest demands was replicated across the South throughout the following two decades. Often the goal was simply for a law already in place to be enforced (as was seen during the Freedom Rides). Furthermore, these small victories fueled the movement, encouraging more participants and campaigns and, eventually, farther reaching goals. Without these smaller campaigns, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would not have been passed.

In the Literature

While many nonviolent theorists have emphasized the importance of establishing and clearly communicating goals, few have focused on the importance of assessing the attainability of a movement's goals. Nonetheless, selecting reasonable goals is undeniably influential in determining not just the ultimate success of a campaign, but also its ability to sustain actions over time. Ackerman and Kruegler say it best:

⁷⁸Hendrick and Hendrick, *Why Not Every Man?*, 189.

The concept of 'freedom' is inspiring to millions. As an ultimate strategic objective, though, it is not highly functional because it lacks specificity... objectives should be concrete and specific enough to be achievable within a reasonable time frame... the resisting population will need progressive victories in order to grow in confidence, stay committed to the overall strategy, and measure its own performance.⁷⁹

Gene Sharp adds, "The terminology used in stating objectives should not be subject to wide interpretations."⁸⁰ He further stresses the importance that once goals are set, they not be changed (neither raised nor lowered) during the struggle.

Michael Bröning discusses this factor in his assessment of current boycotting campaigns in Palestine. The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement stresses a "right-based approach" over a "solutions-based struggle," in that it frames its ends in terms of human rights rather than concrete objectives. Critics have questioned the choice to ignore practical solutions and have pointed out a perceived lack of political vision on which the movement is based. The Palestinian National Assembly's boycott of goods produced in Israeli settlements on the other hand, maintains a commitment to the two state solution and "seems to have resulted in substantial political and economic consequences"⁸¹ in comparison to the BDS campaign. Sari Nusseibeh, director of al-Quds University in Jerusalem, summarized, "The problem of BDS is that their vision is anything but clear. What does BDS aim for?"⁸²

Theorists have also discussed the role this factor played in the Intifada. Souad Dajani explains that the Palestinian failed to formulate clear priorities and objectives. While he admits that this may have given them an advantage with flexibility of tactics, he ultimately concludes

⁷⁹Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 24-25.

⁸⁰Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 474.

⁸¹Michael Bröning, *The Politics of Change in Palestine : State-Building and Non-Violent Resistance* (London ; New York : Pluto Press, 2011) (accessed 3/14/2012 1:37:38 AM), 153.

⁸²Quoted in *Ibid.*, 159.

that “...sacrificing strategy to tactics proved costly: Palestinians eventually found themselves simply responding to Israeli measures as they occurred...”⁸³

In the Intifada

In January 1988, several prominent members of the local resistance leadership held a press conference for international media. During this event, fourteen demands were presented. It is important to note the careful omission of any mention of a threat to Israel, any demands for all of historic Palestine or insistence on Jerusalem as the capital, and any reference to the refugee question. The exclusion of these notoriously contentious issues suggests an acknowledgement by the leadership of the necessity for reasonable goals. Despite these omissions, however, the demands were still far-reaching and broad, unlikely to be achieved without direct actions carefully targeted at each one individually. The focus of the resistance failed to be targeted at these stated objectives, and indeed, the public seemed largely unaware of any other, or any more specific, aim than “national independence.”

An examination of these fourteen points reveals the broad scope of the demands. The first and second, calling for recognition of and compliance to international law (the Fourth Geneva conventions) and UN security resolutions (605 and 607) are problematic in the very fact that they imply something that Israel has never admitted: that the occupation is illegal. The first point furthermore calls for an overall Israeli policy shift (“to stop applying the iron fist policy”). Even these first demands are lofty and, to many Israelis, simply irrelevant. The document does not stop there, however. Some of the following demands are actually more realistic and feasible goals for a nonviolent resistance of the type seen in the Intifada, such as the release of prisoners arrested during the uprising (#3), the return of certain exiled Palestinians (#4), the cancellation of specific

⁸³Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements : A Geographical Perspective*, 56.

taxes (#9), and the removal of restrictions on building permits (#12). These demands alone would constitute an ambitious, but possibly achievable, set of goals.

However, the true scope of the Intifada's goals was revealed by other demands: the withdrawal of the Israeli army from all Palestinian population centers (#5), an inquiry into the behavior of soldiers and settlers and the implementation of punitive measures against them (#6), the cessation of all settlement activity and the return of all confiscated lands (#7), restraint from any act which would change the "status quo" in Jerusalem (#8), a lifting of restrictions on any and all political freedoms and the making of provisions for free municipal elections (#10), and a change to agricultural and industrial policies (#13). Lastly, the fourteenth point essentially demands the establishment of the PLO and the PNC as official popular political bodies, a step which, for many Israelis at the time, was akin to granting the Palestinians their own autonomous state. These demands were wide-ranging and extremely progressive for their time. While none of these goals can be deemed unreasonable, it is the combination of them, and the lack of focus, which caused them to be unrealistic. Furthermore, as the power shifted from the locally led Command to the PLO, the exiled party abandoned the fourteen points and instead sought to increase their political power and legitimacy.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ "The Palestinians' Fourteen Demands." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17, no. 3 (Spring, 1988): pp. 63-65.

Chapter 2: METHODS

Two key factors under the category of methods are strategy and mass applicability. It is a fundamental tenet of modern nonviolence theory that resistance campaigns should be strategic, with means designed carefully to most effectively achieve the desired ends. These means also need to be selected to ensure that the largest number of participants can take part in the actions, although the importance of this factor has been more heavily debated in the theoretic literature. Both factors played major roles in the case studies examined and are widely discussed by theorists. Their influence in the Intifada is more complex.

4. The careful and strategic planning and implementation of actions specifically targeted at the weaknesses of the opponent and based on the strengths of the participants

In History

Gandhi was the first to formulate concrete nonviolent actions that could be taken in a strategic nonviolent campaign. The steps of *satyagraha* were laid out by Krishnalal Shridharani, a follower of Gandhi and a participant in his campaigns against the British, in his book *War without Violence*. He laid out the pattern of *satyagraha* as follows: negotiations and arbitration, agitation, demonstrations and the ultimatum, self-purification, strike and general strike, picketing, dhurna (sit-down strikes), economic boycott, non-payment of taxes, hizrat (mass emigration), non-cooperation, ostracism (of non-participants), civil disobedience, assertive *satyagraha* (the taking over of government positions), and parallel government (establishing a new sovereignty). He specified that after strikes and general strikes the progression is less clear, and many steps may occur simultaneously. Additionally, Gandhian theory emphasized the use of

strategic implementation of nonviolent direct action, meaning that each conflict must be individually assessed to determine which tactics are most practical.

In a dramatic display of targeted tactics, a symbolic opening act for the 1930 campaign— a 200-mile march to the sea— was mapped and carefully planned. The Salt Act was selected by Gandhi as a target of British policies both for practical and symbolic reasons. This act made the government the sole producer and distributor of salt. On a practical level, the Salt Act penalized the poorest Indians and put a government monopoly and tax on something essential for life. On a symbolic level this act represented a fundamental injustice implemented by a foreign government that was unwelcome and unrepresentative.⁸⁵ The march was to be the signal for the rest of the nation to launch the resistance. Towns along the route of the march were visited beforehand by a dedicated volunteer, who instructed their inhabitants on the methods and power of *satyagraha*, encouraged them to take up constructive action and civil disobedience, and informed them of the imminent arrival of Gandhi and his loyal marchers. Pamphlets were distributed with instructions on how to manufacture salt and how to conduct further acts of nonviolent resistance.

The sheer size of the country and the population of India was an important consideration for Gandhi when devising tactics. The British had to spread resources thin in order to cover the many areas of the country engaging in civil disobedience and noncooperation. Gandhi's call to "fill the jails" was an obvious attempt to exploit the large number of India resisters. As one British official put it, "You can't go on arresting people forever... not when there are 319,000,000 of them."⁸⁶ Tactics that targeted economic, social, political, and moral weaknesses of Britain were skillfully utilized in the 1930 campaign. Additionally, the strengths of the Indian

⁸⁵King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, p. 151.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 47.

people, such as the size of their numbers and the background of their religion, folklore, and traditions were called upon during the later resistance movement.

Strategic implementation of tactics was also seen to some degree in South Africa. In 1985, massive non-cooperation was occurring throughout the country. One of the largest and most effective forms it took was economic boycott. A young and charismatic leader, Mkhuseleli Jack, led the Consumer Boycott Committee. He convinced consumers in Port Elizabeth to stop buying at white-owned stores. This tactic was particularly successful because it targeted one of the primary weaknesses of the South African regime: the 20% white minority was fully dependent on the non-white majority for economic sustainability. While defying apartheid laws, as was done in the 1950s, was an effective way to mobilize the black community, resistance leaders quickly realized that it was having little to no effect on the people who could make change happen, namely, the white population. During the later campaign, the biggest weakness of the white community was targeted: their economic dependence on the non-white population. Consumer boycotts, strikes, and “stay-aways” directly affected the middle class of white South Africans. Their choice of tactics aroused sympathetic feelings in many of the whites and made the prospect of black majority rule less frightening.

The strength of the Nashville sit-ins during the Civil Rights movement was due in part to the strategic use of other nonviolent tactics in combination with direct action. When the home of a prominent black member of the Nashville community was bombed, resistance leaders capitalized on the situation, organizing a march for later that same day. By noon, over 1,000 people had gathered to march and by the end of the procession, there were over 4,000.⁸⁷ And it wasn't just in Nashville that strategic tactics were being implemented. Gandhi's call to “fill the jails” was heard repeatedly throughout the sit-in campaigns.

⁸⁷Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 325.

Furthermore, the use of the church in the movement was not only an example of effective use of preexisting structures (as discussed previously), but also targeted the weaknesses of the opponent (the inconsistencies between segregation and the Southern sense of justice, honor, and history) and the strengths of the participants (a preexisting sense of faith and of community). Furthermore, as was demonstrated in the boycotts, financial pressure was used effectively when it was economically viable. When it was not, new tactics were developed tailored to different weaknesses, such as the freedom rides challenge of blatantly unconstitutional local and state laws. The marches were planned and implemented when participation levels were reaching all-time highs or when dramatic events served to mobilize the masses (as in Nashville after the house bombing).

In the Literature

One of the most significant developments in the literature of nonviolence theory is the evolution of nonviolent movements from a general idea to an almost military-like operation. Strategy is now seen as a key component in the designing of a successful movement. The shift in focus is most obvious in a comparison of Gandhi's philosophies to the contemporary nonviolent expert, Gene Sharp.

Ackerman and Kruegler encompass this factor into three separate principles: attack opponents strategy for consolidating control; assess events and options in light of levels of strategic decision making; and adjust offensive and defensive operations according to the relevant vulnerabilities of the protagonists.⁸⁸ Noticeably lacking in their list, however, is the importance of examining not only the opponent's weaknesses but also the resistance group's

⁸⁸Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* 23.

own strength. They address this only by stating “a preliminary task for the strategist... is to create an inventory of the struggling population’s general capabilities.”⁸⁹

The importance of targeting the opponent’s loci of control and sources of power is directly noted by Sharp: “It will be highly important to evaluate accurately the opponent’s and one’s own strengths and weaknesses, and to take these into account in the formulation of strategy and tactics.”⁹⁰ Thus, Sharp does not neglect to mention the importance of evaluating one’s own position during planning. Still, one of his key points is the targeting of what he calls the opponent’s “pillars of support” and “sources of power.” His extensive writing on the politics of power is an in-depth study of how to evaluate one’s opponent’s position in local society and the global community and, consequently, how to alter it.

In a short pamphlet on applying nonviolence theory, David Albert provides a list of questions that should be asked when planning the strategy of a movement. They include: What institutions, people, and ideologies stand in the way of your achieving your goals? What specifically are the sources of their social power? Are there actions or directions that might be taken which could limit these sources of power more effectively? Who are your potential allies (both foreign and domestic)? Do the allies you specifically aim at mobilizing have enough potential power to effect the changes you seek?⁹¹ Questions such as these are a good way to begin the level of strategic analysis necessary to meet the requirements of this factor.

In the Intifada

⁸⁹Ibid., 34.

⁹⁰Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 505.

⁹¹David H. Albert, *People Power: Applying Nonviolence Theory* (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1985), 57-58.

During the Intifada, the resistance movement was innovative and thoughtful in its selection of nonviolent tactics. However, ultimately, many tactics were selected in *response* to Israeli oppression measures, rather than with the purpose of *targeting* Israeli support structures. Indeed, Israel's weaknesses did not seem to factor into the leadership's decision making much, if at all. The Palestinians' strengths, on the other hand, were utilized in novel and effective ways. A prime example of this was when "the rote learning to which the Palestinians had been exposed under Jordanian or Egyptian education systems became... an asset in transmission. Long passages [from the Command's leaflets] were committed to memory and dictated to other youths..."⁹²

The Palestinians' novel use of nonviolent resistance tactics during the first Intifada has been written about extensively. However, little has been said about the effectiveness of these tactics in targeting Israeli weaknesses. In reflecting on the Israeli response to the uprising however, the conclusion could be drawn that the very use of nonviolence struck at Israel's vulnerability. The entire history of Israel has been mired in violent conflict. Generations are marked by the wars they lived through and fought in. Israel is commonly touted as one of the most powerful armies in the world, but, in a classic case of political jiu-jitsu,⁹³ it is this very strength that made them so ill equipped to handle a popular, nonviolent uprising. The Israeli response in the early months of the uprising was uncoordinated and disproportionate, and it frequently undermined the regime. Eventually, Israel developed more effective preventative and reactive techniques to nonviolent resistance, but the fact remains that the military establishment was unprepared for the unexpected. Although it may have been unintentional, the use of peaceful protests did indeed strike at an Israeli weakness, in the form of their military strength.

⁹²King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 226.

⁹³See Communication chapter for description of this term, coined by Gene Sharp.

5. The use of tactics with mass appeal and mass applicability

In History

One of the advantages of Gandhi's theory was that it did not exclude anyone from participating. You did not need to be a high-minded intellectual or a member of an elite social class in order to be a *satyagrahi*. All men and women could and should seek Truth and therefore all daily life could and should be governed by *ahimsa*. In this way *satyagraha* was able to give power to the powerless. Perfect compliance with *ahimsa* was neither achieved nor expected during the resistance movement, however its importance as the fundamental precept governing all action was constantly stressed and reiterated by Gandhi and his followers.

Even at the very beginning of the 1919 campaign, the ability to utilize vast number of resisters was implemented. A day was set for a nationwide *hartal*, a form of strikes involving complete cessation of work for the purposes of mourning and protest. Gandhi's instructions were for every man, women and child in India to stop all daily activity and observe a fast for twenty-four hours. Overall involvement is said to have reached millions, in all parts of India and across gender, class, age and religious lines. In Bombay City alone there were reported to have been six hundred active *satyagrahis* organizing the protests.⁹⁴ Pledges were made to exercise non-cooperation with the laws and to refrain from violence. Noncooperation and other nonviolent action took place throughout the entire country.

This advantage was used to its fullest in the 1930 campaign. Thousands joined Gandhi's salt march and within days of their arrival at the sea, people across India were making their own salt, in direct contradiction to the targeted law. This was only the beginning of the mass movement that spread like wildfire throughout the country. Continuing and building upon a

⁹⁴Bondurant, *The Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, 76.

campaign Gandhi had been advocating for years, those involved in the resistance shed their Western-produced clothes in favor of *khadi* or “home-spun,” clothing made from hand spun material. The wearing of this kind of clothing not only became a kind of uniform for the *satyagrahis*, symbolizing their participating in the movement, but the spinning wheel became a national symbol of resistance. This boycotting of Western cloth was accompanied by many other means of economic boycott. Press releases were made, daily bulletins posted, and widespread distribution of propaganda continued. *Hartal* was again undertaken, positions in official offices were resigned, demonstrations and picketing took place, and non-payment of taxes was implemented.

The Civil Rights campaign evolved over time with the realization of the importance of widely applicable tactics. The boycotts, while strategically viable in Montgomery, could not be universally applied. Nor was withholding of patronage from white-run industries always an appealing option for economically struggling blacks. The later campaigns, particularly the sit-ins and marches, could be utilized anywhere, and participated in by anyone. Within two months of the first sit-in in 1960, 35,000 students had “stood up against the laws of segregation by sitting down.” By the end of 1960, this number had doubled and nearly 4,000 had been arrested.⁹⁵ The sit-ins changed the nature of the resistance campaign. Instead of simply withholding patronage, as was done during the boycotts, protesters were disobeying laws they believed to be unjust. Not only that, but the restrictions of the boycotts, such as the need for nearly full participation and certain economic conditions, were absent from the sit-ins. Anyone could participate and this direct action could be taken anywhere that had segregated public facilities (essentially everywhere in the South). The rapid spread of these tactics throughout the country is evidence of the impact such applicability can have on the development of a movement.

⁹⁵King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 135.

In the Literature

There is some contention in nonviolence theory over the importance of this factor. The disagreement has arisen mostly over the question of a trained corps versus untrained masses. Some theorists, including Gene Sharp, have argued that smaller numbers of very well trained activists is better than large numbers of untrained activists. He maintains that disciplined actions carried out by a small group of resisters will eventually motivate more people to become involved in the resistance, in the end leading to a larger campaign. He also acknowledges that “in order to have a significant political impact... disobedience and noncooperation often need to take the form of mass action.”⁹⁶ Paullin stresses the importance of large numbers in assessing what contributes to the success or failure of nonviolent campaigns, while failing to elaborate on how to achieve such widespread participation.

The very inclusion of the “broad civilian population” in Ackerman and Kruegler’s three strata of a movement’s organizations structure (as discussed previously) indicates the necessity of this factor. They state: “Nonviolent strategists must think exhaustively and creatively about their relationship to their social surroundings, and the degree to which they or their operatives are likely to garner popular support, by virtue of the many groups and institutions they have access to or whose basic interests they are seeking to defend.”⁹⁷ Logically, the mobilization of the broadest sector of the population will be achieved if tactics are easily understandable to and implementable for the average member of the oppressed group.

Michael Bröning, in his analysis of the politics of change in Palestine, discusses this factor in the context of the modern movements taking place in the country. With reference to

⁹⁶Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 35.

⁹⁷Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 29.

current campaigns, such as the protests against the Wall taking place in Bi'lin and Ni'lin, he points to the “occasionally elitist character of [nonviolent resistance]” and acknowledges that current nonviolent organizers in Palestine recognize that if a broader objective of complete dismantling of the barrier were to be achieved, “it would have to be based on an exponential rise in the number of protesters over an extended period of time, mobilising virtually tens if not hundreds of thousands of protesters.”⁹⁸ In the context of the Intifada, Zunes explains,

“...it [has] long been argued that a successful strategy for the national liberation of the Palestinian people must involve... the maximal utilization of the overwhelming numerical majority of Palestinians within the occupied territories...”⁹⁹

However, it appears that this too was not a hugely decisive factor in the Intifada. This may be due to that fact that casual everyday actions in the Occupied Territories can be seen as acts of resistance, making the use of tactics with mass appeal and applicability inevitable.

In the Intifada

In analyzing the use of widely applicable tactics in the Intifada, it is important to remember that not only dramatic actions constitute resistance. In his analysis of the uprising, Abu-Nimer points out that “For Palestinians to gather the wild herb z’atar (thyme), a key ingredient for their cooking, was an act of resistance. The Israelis prohibited gathering the herb because the presence of Palestinians in the hills posed a security risk.”¹⁰⁰ The point he is driving at is that seemingly mundane, daily tasks become overt forms of disobedience in a situation like that of Occupied Palestine. Taking this into consideration, it should be of little surprise that the factor of utilizing tactics of mass appeal and applicability was not a significant contributor to the downfall of the Intifada. Even with no consideration of the demographics, a resistance movement

⁹⁸Bröning, *The Politics of Change in Palestine : State-Building and Non-Violent Resistance*, 160.

⁹⁹Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements : A Geographical Perspective*, 48.

¹⁰⁰Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam : Theory and Practice*, 139.

in Palestine can inherently draw on all sectors of the population. When actions as commonplace as collecting an herb, or even just leaving one's house, constitute disobedience to the oppressor, participation is unlikely to be a problem.

Chapter 3: COMMUNICATION

The use of publicity and propaganda, and its ability to garner support for the resistance from multiple constituencies, are essential aspects of a nonviolent resistance campaign. These two factors, propaganda and influence, have historically been factors that have determined the outcome of movements. They also remain fundamental tenets of almost every nonviolence theory in existence. Without careful consideration of these two factors, the likelihood of success decreases, as we will see in the case of the Intifada.

6. The ability to use the influence of several groups of people; those from the side of the oppressed *and* the oppressor, as well as the international community

In History

While this factor did not significantly alter the outcome of the resistance movement in India, as a prominent figure in the international community, Britain had a strong interest in maintaining its image as a country that upheld justice and human rights. Reports of massacres, police brutality, and suspension of basic civil rights were not received well by either the Brits or their allies. Strong dissent at home at the reactions of the government to the peaceful protests in colonial India proved to carry some weight.

In South Africa, this factor played a much more obvious role. Sympathy for nonviolent resisters began to rise in the white British population of South Africa. This, combined with the success of the nonviolent campaigns, had the effect of drawing increasing numbers of both black and white supporters of the resistance movement. The further attempts of the government to quell the resistance, often using excessive force, also alienated the international community. South Africa had come to military dominance in the region through the support of its Western

Allies, and, despite verbal condemnation of apartheid, little international action was taken to put an end to it. However, an outpouring of sympathy for the peaceful resisters in the 1980s shifted international rhetoric to international action.

Calls for international divestment, boycotts, and sanctions had gone mostly unheard up until the 1980s. The unarmed resistance coupled with the regime's brutal countermeasures caused Britain, the U.S., Japan, and Canada to enact restrictions and sanctions in 1986. International bankers refused to roll over new loans, and many major companies divested. The same year, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the "Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa," which called for negotiations to end apartheid and establish a non-racial democracy. The international pressure, both social and economic, forced many of the country's ruling white elites to realize the need for a change in the system. This conversion of the "other side" was the last nail in the coffin for apartheid.

As early as 1985, white industrialists had been meeting with resistance leaders. But it was not only the business class that had begun to see the need for change. Despite the inclusion of many whites in the resistance movement and the support of many middle class whites whose businesses and livelihoods had been damaged by the boycotts and strikes, the impact of the opposition had not yet reached the ruling class. The economic sanctions imposed by the international community exerted their influence on all classes of white South African society. This changing tide of public opinion was likely what eventually forced the government into the negotiations of the early 1990s that ultimately resulted in the end of the apartheid system.

The Civil Rights campaign in the 1960s also benefited from the inclusion of parties that had been excluded in earlier actions. One of the most instantly recognizable differences in the sit-ins, as compared with the previous boycotts, was the participation of whites alongside blacks.

It took only one white student's sitting with a group of black students at an all-white lunch counter to make a statement about cross-racial solidarity. Whites could participate in these acts of civil disobedience, and their participation and subsequent suffering galvanized much needed white support. The segregationists could no longer call the civil rights movement a black vs. white issue.

Influence was also exerted on the members of law enforcement during this movement. Local government was often the entity enforcing the segregation laws and the resistance movement often found ways to pull in their support. During the second attempt at the Selma to Montgomery March, fearing a repeat of the bloodshed that had occurred during the first procession, Dr. King ordered the march to continue until the police barricade was reached, at which point the group would turn around. Upon reaching the barricade, Dr. King led the marchers in prayer and song. As the group prayer ended and the column of protesters swung around to return from the direction they came, the line of state troopers suddenly parted and withdrew to the sides of the road.¹⁰¹ During the Nashville march, a peaceful but massive group got the mayor to concede his belief that lunch counters should be desegregated. The next day, the local newspaper ran with the blaring front-page headline, "INTEGRATE COUNTERS - MAYOR."¹⁰² This march, and the many that followed, shifted public opinion about the civil right movement. For example, the peaceful nature and massive participation in the March on Washington solidified the legitimacy of the struggle in the minds of Americans, both black and white.

In the Literature

¹⁰¹King, *Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action*, 160.

¹⁰²Ackerman and DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 327.

Consensus on the importance of this factor is universal in nonviolent theory, although the extent to which it should be used is up for some debate. Gandhi's belief in nonviolence as a successful means of struggle was founded upon this factor. Ironically, however, it played a small role in the success of his campaigns in India. Nonetheless, the strength of nonviolence is often attributed to its ability to arouse feelings of sympathy and solidarity in all the involved, and sometimes even uninvolved, parties. Paullin explains that during the evolution of nonviolent theory and practice, "the principle developed that the acceptance of suffering was an effective method of winning the sympathy and support of disinterested parties in a dispute and that their moral influence might go far in determining its outcome."¹⁰³ Gregg goes even further, stating that "we must learn how to persuade not only our active opponents but also those who are indifferent, those who are curious spectators, and our children and ourselves."¹⁰⁴

Gene Sharp calls this factor "political jiu-jitsu," because to gain the support of hostile or uncommitted parties, the resisters must use the opponent's strength (in the form of their repression) against them, effectively turning it into their greatest weakness. In addition to the moral conflicts that arise with the brutal oppression of peaceful protesters, Sharp points out that

When severe repression is directed against nonviolent actionists who persist in the struggle with obvious courage and at great cost, the actionists' persistence makes it difficult for the opponent to claim he has acted to 'defend' or 'liberate' the people concerned. Instead, it will be seen that the opponent could not win obedience and support on the basis of the merits of the regime and its policies and has therefore in desperation sought to induce submission by severe measure. He is seen as *unable* to rule without extreme repression.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Paullin, *Introduction to Non-Violence*, 31.

¹⁰⁴Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, 140.

¹⁰⁵Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 681.

However, Sharp is also careful to warn against too much reliance on the assistance of outside parties and says that political jiu-jitsu should “play an auxiliary role of backing up the main struggle...”¹⁰⁶

Ackerman and Kruegler again incorporate this factor into multiple principles, the most notable being “cultivate external assistance and alienate opponent from expected bases of support.”¹⁰⁷ They go on to warn, as do many theorists, that the support of third parties can be important, but it cannot and should not be counted on. This is where disagreement begins to emerge over this factor. Some argue that if third party support is offered it should be accepted with open arms. However, practitioner theorists occasionally argue that accepting outside help from certain constituencies will weaken the movement internally and strengthen the opponent’s ability to delegitimize it.¹⁰⁸ The historical evidence, however, supports the hypothesis that external assistance aids the resistance effort more than it hurts it.

Culturalists have also written about the importance of multiple sources of resistance to ensuring a successful movement. Zunes adds to his list of requirements for a “successful strategy for the national liberation of the Palestinian people”:

...a usurpation in the morale of major segments within the Israeli occupation forces to such a degree that they can no longer reliably serve as the enforcement mechanism for continued Israeli rule... [and] ...the creation of sufficient sympathy for the Palestinian cause in the United States and other Western nations which currently provide the necessary economic, military, and diplomatic support for continued Israeli occupation so that such support can no longer be guaranteed.¹⁰⁹

He goes on to state that insufficient energy was spent on causing internal Israeli dissent during the first Intifada. Grant agrees, stating, “[A] missing factor necessary for the successful use by

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 663.

¹⁰⁷Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 23.

¹⁰⁸See Martin Oppenheimer and George Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action* (Philadelphia : Friends Peace Committee, 1964).

¹⁰⁹Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements : A Geographical Perspective*, 48.

the intifada of nonviolent struggle is an understanding of how it might influence the Israelis.”¹¹⁰

Indeed it seems unarguable that the failure to rally internal Israeli support and shifting international opinions heavily influenced the outcome of the uprising.

In the Intifada

Participation among Palestinians during the Intifada was widespread and does not appear to have been an obstacle to the uprising. On the other hand, support from outside sources, most notably the Israelis and the international community, was not sufficiently targeted and therefore hindered the development of the nonviolent movement. At the outset of the Intifada, however, it does not appear that the significance of this factor was lost on the leadership. Using the example of South Africa, the resistance “situated Palestinian civil and political rights within the arena of widening international norms of human rights.”¹¹¹ Indeed, progress was undeniably made with respects to the international community’s views on Palestine. This case offers an excellent example of Sharp’s so called political jiu-jitsu:

Often, the superior military force of the Israeli army worked against it... [Israeli attacks on peaceful protesters] sharpened the image that the Israeli military is an army fighting civilian population that struggle for its political rights of self-determination. Unquestionably, the Palestinians’ effort to present their struggle as defiance against unjust authority easily resonated with cultural themes so prevalent in the West.¹¹²

The framing of the conflict in this way made it clear who was the victim in the Intifada. These efforts to draw international support proved successful in the beginning of the Intifada. The most notable evidence of this is the commencement of US-PLO dialogues. Prior to the Intifada, the US had refused to recognize the legitimacy of the PLO as a representative body. The

¹¹⁰Crow, Grant and Ibrahim, *Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East*, 71.

¹¹¹King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 3.

¹¹²Alimi, *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada : Political Opportunities, Framing Processes and Contentious Politics*, 154.

Intifada, and more specifically the tactics utilized in it, shifted the American approach to negotiations in the region.

Unfortunately, several changes took place in the later years of the movement that undermined the progress that had been made in the international arena. Internally, the focus of the campaigns moved away from nonviolence, alienating members of the international community who quickly sided with Israel in the face of Palestinian attacks. Perhaps even more important, however, was the launching of the Gulf War. This shifted the focus on the region away from the Palestinians' plight and onto the newly occupied Kuwait. To make matters worse, Yasser Arafat's decision to support Saddam Hussein turned international opinion against the Palestinians.

The international community was not the only external group from which the Palestinians needed to draw support. One of the defining characteristics of nonviolence is its ability to draw support and sympathy from the opponent's side. To this end, the Palestinians adopted the rhetoric of their oppressors, using the Jewish story of David and Goliath to contextualize the struggle. Several of the Command's earlier pamphlets addressed the Israeli public directly. Leaflet 10, for example, declared "acclaim those freedom-loving people, and those progressive forces in Israel, who have supported us in our struggle for our right of return, our right to self-determination..."¹¹³

These attempts saw limited success. Alimi points out that "growing numbers of Israeli peace groups and left-wing political parties slowly yet gradually engaged in scrutinizing Israeli repressive measures, while also promoting dialogue with the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian State."¹¹⁴ Ultimately, however, Palestinians failed to have an effect on the broader

¹¹³Quoted in *Ibid.*, 150.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*

Israeli population. King points out that “The prevailing, official Israeli view held that the Intifada was a ‘war’ that must be won,”¹¹⁵ and that most Israelis considered the Intifada as merely a military continuation of the 40-year war the Arabs had been waging against Israel. Indeed, when Gene Sharp visited the West Bank mid-1989, he advocated a dramatic shift in strategy:

He recommended appealing to the human sensibilities of the Israelis, ‘which Jews have often demonstrated elsewhere and in which they have believed.’ This approach could ‘make it more possible for sympathetic Israelis both to oppose the repression of nonviolent Palestinians and support the Palestinians’ right to independence.’¹¹⁶

The influence of those from the side of the oppressor is an important aspect of many theories of nonviolence. Realizing the direness of the situation that was unfolding in Palestine in 1989, Sharp called upon the Palestinian resistance leaders to implement it. Unfortunately, his advice went mostly unheeded. Although resistance leaders initially seemed aware of the importance of drawing in external support, their efforts to do so, both with the international community and the Israelis, ultimately failed. Given the immense international support Israel relies on, and the fierce patriotism of the general population, this factor is all the more important for successful Palestinian nonviolent resistance.

7. The widespread distribution of propaganda and the effective use of publicity

In History

The sheer size of India made the distribution of propaganda difficult for Gandhi. Nonetheless, his use of it proved vital to his efforts. The 1919 campaign opened the Indian people’s minds to the possibility of nonviolent resistance, paving the way for a more effective and widespread propaganda campaign leading up to the Salt *Satyagraha*. The time period

¹¹⁵King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*8.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, 275.

between the two also allowed for a better information and propaganda dispersal. The use of media by Gandhi and his followers, both at home and abroad, was extensive during the second movement. Foreign press was invited to every major planned event, daily bulletins were posted throughout India with messages of successful actions and positive results, Gandhi personally oversaw the editing and publishing of several *satyagraha* periodicals and magazines.

Furthermore, the attempts by the British to label this material seditious only backfired. By censoring it, the government made mere possession of such work an act of non-cooperation, which only furthered its production and distribution.

However, it was in the Civil Rights campaign in the United States that the true potential of this factor is seen. The increase in publicity, while partly due to better organization by resistance leaders, was also largely influenced by the change from quiet techniques to the drama of sit-ins, freedom rides, and mass marches. Indeed, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. summed up the importance of this shift in an interview on NBC's Meet the Press in April of 1960. The moderator suggested that boycotts might be a better tool of resistance than sit-ins and arrests. Dr. King responded: "I think, sometimes it is necessary to dramatize an issue because many people are not aware of what is happening... and I think the sit-ins serve to dramatize the indignities and the injustices and the dissatisfaction among the Negroes with the whole system of segregation."¹¹⁷

Another important factor in the influence of the media was the fact that the movement was occurring right at the time that the television was becoming a household item. This allowed for widespread dispersal of propaganda, particularly important with the strength of Dr. King as a public speaker, as well as the broadcasting of images such as those from the first Selma to Montgomery March attempt, in which police are seen siccing dogs and water hoses on protesters. The media very effectively broadcasted images of white brutality against defiant but peaceful

¹¹⁷ York, *A Force More Powerful*

white and black students. The images of cigarette butts being burned into the arms and backs of well dressed, polite, and non-retaliating youth served aroused immense sympathy and support throughout the nation. The media went wild with these types of images and the shock value they provided, combined with the inspiring nature (and strategic wording) of the resistance's rhetoric, mobilizing still more participants.

The media was used as an extremely effective tool during this movement, a development that can be attributed both to an improvement in leadership capabilities and to an increase in the dramatic nature of the tactics. Pictures, videos, speeches, and articles from and about the resistance dominated the news media of the time. The change in tactics from the subdued boycott to the symbolic and overt sit-ins and marches allowed media to be utilized in new ways. The images from these campaigns are so emblematic that they are frequently used to represent struggles for freedom and equality, as well as injustice and brutality to this day.

Internal communication of the resistance was another component of the movement that was greatly facilitated by the incorporation of existing community Church structures. In Montgomery, this system was first developed and applied; from the pulpits, the message of the campaign was reinforced and morale was boosted every week during Sunday church service. Mimeographs owned by the churches were used to print and distribute flyers, a "phone tree" starting from the phones in the churches, was used to reach nearly every home in Montgomery that had a telephone. Church bulletins were used to post notices and updates and church halls were ideal places for meetings and trainings. The effectiveness of this method of communication caused it to be replicated across many campaigns, where churches were often established as the "headquarters" of the resistance, serving as the central hub from which all messages and communications were distributed.

In the Literature

As Richard Gregg points out, in the case of nonviolent resistance against a brutal enemy “If there are onlookers, the assailant soon loses... poise... [W]ith the audience as a sort of mirror, he realizes the contrast between his own conduct and that of the victim.”¹¹⁸ He continues, “Any considerable struggle in which one side rigidly sticks to nonviolent resistance with any degree of success makes wonderful news. It is so unusual and dramatic.”¹¹⁹

Ackerman and Kruegler cover both aspects of this factor in their book, stating,

Swift and accurate communication are also necessary to authenticate instructions, to counter enemy propaganda, and generally to inform and bolster the fighting forces. Communications to the world outside the conflict are no less important, with images carried by print and broadcast media playing a key role in interpreting the conflict for outsiders and in motivating third party involvement.¹²⁰

Much emphasis has been put on publicity and communicating the message of a resistance movement to the outside world. Missing from much of the theoretic literature, however, is the importance of an internal communications systems and the use of propaganda material among the resisting population. There is a significant gap in both universalist and culturalist theories on this aspect of a nonviolent campaign. Gene Sharp has devoted little attention to the topic of communication within a movement. He does, however, mention the importance of generating “cause-consciousness” leading up to a campaign.¹²¹

The implementation of this factor was hugely influential during the first Intifada. Abu-Nimer argues that “Most coverage did not accurately reflect either the scope or thrust of the

¹¹⁸Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, 45.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 79.

¹²⁰Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict : The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 31.

¹²¹Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 473-475.

Intifada. Media coverage... obscured the nonviolent dimension of the Intifada.”¹²² Indeed, as will be discussed below, media coverage could have been more effectively utilized during the uprising, and a flaw in the resistance was lack of consistency and clarity of the messages in internal publications and propaganda.

In the Intifada

Communication in the Intifada became a central issue to organizers, due to the Israeli tendency to adopt a “divide and conquer” technique in the territories. The Palestinians quickly settled on leaflets as the primary means of communication between the resistance leadership and the population. This was a relatively effective method for several reasons. Firstly, due to the fluidity in the Command, leaflet writers were nearly impossible to track. Indeed, “each time Israel announced it had arrested the writers of the leaflets, a new leaflet came out.”¹²³

Distribution occurred through a number of means. Piles of the pamphlets were placed in public places, content was graffitied on walls and read on public radio stations (broadcast both from within Palestine and abroad), and newspapers, both Palestinian and Israeli, often reprinted them in full.

In the end, it was not so much the method of communication that failed as the content of those communications. Reflecting both the internal disagreements within the Command, as well as the insistence of the PLO to call for “all means of struggle,” the leaflets “often contradict[ed] previous statements and sometimes [were] internally illogical...”¹²⁴ In one example, two versions of a leaflet were released calling for different actions (one a long-term strike and the other short-

¹²²Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam : Theory and Practice*, 138.

¹²³Alimi, *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada : Political Opportunities, Framing Processes and Contentious Politics*, 137.

¹²⁴King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 210.

term). The inability of the leadership to agree on the complete adoption of nonviolence, and the escalation of this disagreement as the PLO became further involved, ultimately led to weak rhetoric and unclear, oftentimes downright confusing, instructions.

At the beginning of the uprising, the PLO had played a peripheral role. Pamphlets got the approval from Tunis, but suggested changes were often ignored by the Command. Once the resistance movement began gaining momentum, however, the PLO began claiming more and more responsibility for the actions on the ground and asserted its control over the Command. Refusing to abandon the call for “all forms of struggle,” the leadership disagreed over its message, which began to be reflected in the leaflets distributed. The will of the people to remain nonviolent also began to wane, and “there was an intensification of more violent tactics employed by the Palestinians... by 1990.”¹²⁵

The Intifada turned international attention to the severity of the problem in the Occupied Territories. At the start of the Intifada, the Command, supremely aware of the importance of international involvement in the Palestinian cause, framed the uprising as a “genuine, self-sustained, collective endeavor of a deprived people fighting against an unjust authority to gain recognition of its national rights and aspirations... Fully aware of the uprising’s symbolic aspects, and the nature of their proclaimed goals, grassroots activists adapted their behavior to convey their message to the outside more effectively.”¹²⁶

Ultimately, however, the Palestinians’ ability to properly publicize their resistance was hindered by two significant developments: first, by 1989, Israeli repression had adapted to the previously unfamiliar forms of resistance, becoming more effective and covert. Alimi elaborates:

¹²⁵Ruth Margolies Beitler, *The Path to Mass Rebellion : An Analysis of Two Intifadas* (Lanham, Md. : Lexington Books, 2004), 128.

¹²⁶Alimi, *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada : Political Opportunities, Framing Processes and Contentious Politics*, 146-153.

The new policy for controlling the Intifada [in late 1989] involved a systematic attempt by the military forces to keep away from main streets and population centers, to avoid engaging in clashes with Palestinians in their population centers. Instead, Israel began to rely more on the use of covert modes of repression... the new policy's central facet was the large-scale and frequent use of undercover squads within the territories.¹²⁷

Without the spectacle of oppression, acts of resistance became less dramatic and, therefore, less effective publicity for the struggle.

Second, the Israeli's high level of control over the Occupied Territories allowed them to seal it off from international reporters and journalists and censor outgoing information. King explains that Israeli censors attempted to "control media coverage of the intifada by restricting access to the Palestinians or expelling foreign news correspondents who disobeyed their ground rules."¹²⁸ Indeed, a New York Times article that ran in the beginning of March 1988, "Israel Curbs Coverage of the West Bank," explained that Israel was attempting to close the entire West Bank to journalists.¹²⁹ By using undercover squads and other techniques of less visible repression, combined with censoring of the press covering the uprising, the Israelis were able to quell much of the media coverage of the struggle and to divert international interest in the conflict.

¹²⁷Ibid., 132.

¹²⁸King, *A Quiet Revolution : The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*, 6.

¹²⁹Allen Cowell, "Israel Curbs Coverage of the West Bank," *The New York Times*, March 5, 1988.

Conclusion: LOOKING AHEAD

Preliminary Recommendations

On the basis of the historical case studies examined above, as well as the survey conducted on the existing theoretical nonviolent literature, I have formulated some preliminary recommendations for the future of nonviolent resistance in Palestine. The following suggestions reflect some of the steps that I believe are necessary to best facilitate the formation of a successful resistance campaign. In thinking about the future of nonviolent resistance in Palestine, it is essential to consider not only history but also the present conditions on the ground. While there is undoubtedly value in looking at the first Intifada, those events occurred decades ago. Since then, a second Intifada, much more violent than the first, has been waged, and Israel's entrenchment in the West Bank has become all the more complex, even as they withdrew forces from Gaza. The occupation has taken on a new character in the 21st century and the possibility of a peace settlement appears farther away than ever. The Oslo Peace agreements that followed the first Intifada were a catastrophic failure which, combined with many subsequent disappointing attempts at negotiations, has left Palestinians disillusioned with the peace process.

Indeed, the common defense of the two-state solution is becoming more fallacious every day. Although still touted by both Israel and most of the international community as the desired end goal, Israel's continued settlement expansion into the West Bank has made an autonomous Palestinian state a near impossibility. Further impeding progress towards a resolution is the corruption of the PLO, the continued skirmishes with the Gaza strip, the political schism between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and the increasingly influential radical Israeli right. These obstacles, and many more, pose considerable problems when thinking about the use of nonviolent direct action in Palestine. As proven throughout history and firmly established in

theory, an abstract goal of independence is unrealistic and ineffective. Given the past failures and the public's distrust of the government, negotiations also seem an undesirable objective at present. The current situation on the ground puts Palestinians at an insurmountable disadvantage at the negotiating table, not to mention that the PLO has already established a precondition for the resumption of peace talks: the halt of settlement expansion.

When discussing courses of action for resistance leaders, George Lakey writes, "It is much better to develop our strength through noncooperation focused on clearly defined, limited goals."¹³⁰ Sharp offers more specific advice on the selection of such goals, advising, "The key is to select an issue that symbolizes the general grievance, or is a specific aspect of the general problem, that is least defensible by the opponents and almost impossible to justify."¹³¹ With even a preliminary analysis of the current facts on the ground, one issue arises almost immediately that fulfills Sharp's requirements: the settlements. Universally condemned by the international community, ruled illegal under international law, and highly controversial even within Israel itself, the settlements and their continued expansion symbolize the fundamental problem underlying the entire conflict: land.

But even this remains an abstract goal. Is the main objective to remove all the settlements in the West Bank? This is unrealistic and sets the movement up for failure. Is it only the halting of settlement expansion? This could be a phase of the campaign, but this objective is too limited and would be unlikely to inspire enough participants for the kind of movement necessary to achieve real policy change. The best scenario is something in between, something attainable but significant. Sharp further recommends the use of "phased campaigns" in order to strengthen the

¹³⁰George Lakey, *Strategy for a Living Revolution* (San Francisco,: W.H. Freeman and Co, 1973), 127.

¹³¹Sharp and Paulson, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle : 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, 474-5.

resistance population and weaken the opponent. In fact, the very structure of the settlement issue lends itself well to such a movement.

The settlements can be separated into several categories. “Small settlements” are any with 500 residents or fewer (44 settlements, not including those in Jerusalem). The second category is “medium settlements” and includes those with populations between 500 and 1000 (24 settlements, not including those in Jerusalem). The third category, “large settlements,” constitutes any settlement with populations between 1000 and 5000 residents (41 settlements, not including those in Jerusalem). And lastly “settlement blocs” refer to settlement with 5,000 residents or (12 settlements, not including those in Jerusalem). Outposts are a distinct category as they are unsanctioned by Israel and technically illegal even under Israeli law (it is estimated that there are around 100 such outposts).¹³²

The objectives and phases of such a campaign could follow as such:

Overall Objective: The dismantlement of all outposts and specific designated settlements and the halting of settlement expansion in the West Bank (as established by the Green Line).

Phase 1: The dismantlement of all outposts with populations less than 100 residents built on 70% or more of land designated as privately owned by Palestinians.¹³³

Phase 2: The dismantlement of outposts with populations over 100 residents built on 70% or more of land designated as privately owned by Palestinians.¹³⁴

Phase 3: The dismantlement of all remaining outposts.

Phase 4: The evacuation and dismantlement of all small settlements.

¹³²All data used is from 2010 and was published online by the Israeli human rights group B'tselem and was gathered from statistics published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

¹³³For example, Beit El East, Mitzpe Ha'ai, Derech Ha'avot, Palgei Mayim, Gilad Farm, Neve Erez, and Ofra North East (Americans for Peace Now, Facts on the Ground Map).

¹³⁴For example Givot Hashish and Haresha. Migron also falls under this category, although it was ordered evacuated and dismantled by Israeli High Court in August 2010 and deadline was set for end of March 2012. Current agreement by Israeli army with settlers has residents relocating 2km from original location (still East of the Green Line). No evacuations or demolitions have begun as of mid March 2012.

Phase 5: The evacuation and dismantlement of all medium settlements.

Phase 6: The halting of expansion in large settlements, settlement blocs, and all settlements in East Jerusalem.

The recommendations for the implementation of the remaining factors will be made in relation to the campaign outlined above. This is done not only for the purpose of limiting scope, but also to highlight the importance of a strategic campaign targeted at reasonable and well-defined goals. In response to the question of the importance of launching such a focused campaign, as opposed to focusing on a broader issue such as independence or negotiations, Dr. Sharp stated that it was “absolutely necessary.”¹³⁵ This is not to suggest that this is the only, or even best, possible objective for a nonviolent resistance campaign. Rather, it should be seen as a model that could be used in the planning of any such movement.

Taking into account the failures of the first Intifada, it is obvious that leadership is one of the aspects of nonviolent resistance that most needs to be improved in Palestine. While the PLO is no longer exiled in Tunis and now enjoys at least relative legitimacy in the eyes of Israel and the international community, it is not necessarily the strongest candidate to take on the leadership of such a movement. Distrust of the Palestinian Authority runs deep in the Occupied Territories, and corruption is rampant. Similarly, Hamas seems an unlikely and undesirable choice for leadership, given its penchant for violent methods and the ostracism it faces from Israelis and the broader global community. The schism that divides these two governmental bodies is further evidence that official political parties’ involvement in leading the resistance campaign should be kept to a minimum as much as possible.

At the same time, the current Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, is a much stronger advocate of nonviolent methods than his predecessor, Yasser Arafat. Indeed, during his recent

¹³⁵Gene Sharp, interviewed by Liana Simonds, Albert Einstein Institute, January 19, 2012.

bid at the UN for recognition of Palestine, Abbas made a speech to the Central Council of the PLO in Ramallah explaining that his plan for establishing a Palestinian state did not simply rely on the will of the UN. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Abbas stated, “I insist on popular resistance, and insist it is an unarmed popular resistance so no one misunderstands us. We follow the example demonstrated in the Arab Awakening, which says ‘Selmiya, Selmiya,’ ‘Peaceful, peaceful.’”¹³⁶ Such a speech, and similar sentiments that have been expressed to the public, indicate a commitment to nonviolent means that was absent in the exiled PLO of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

This shift in ideology could be an important element in building a more effective campaign in the future. The first Intifada proved that keeping the PLO in a peripheral role was the most effective strategy, an objective that will be more attainable in an environment of politicians sympathetic to the means and importance of popular struggle. Efforts should be made by any leadership body to reach out the PA and keep them abreast of all decisions, but also to communicate the necessity of limiting its involvement. The internal popular committees that formed in the first Intifada proved much more effective than politicians in planning and orchestrating resistance tactics.

In fact, several recent examples prove the strength such local committees can have in nonviolent resistance. Most famously in the villages of Bil’in and Budrus, the communities united to organize strategic nonviolent direct action and noncooperation against the construction of Israel’s separation wall and, through their efforts, succeeded in having its course altered. Similar strategies are used daily in villages throughout the West Bank, such as Nil’in, Nabi

¹³⁶quoted in Gopin, Dr M. and Abu Sarah, Aziz. "President Abbas Calls for a Palestinian Spring in September " +972 Magazine. August 12, 2011. Accessed 03/13/2012. <http://972mag.com/president-abbas-calls-for-a-palestinian-spring-in-september/20637/>.

Saleh, and Beit Ummar. While these activities have been well organized and carefully planned, there had been little effort to link them.

This has recently begun to change. In 2010, resistance leaders from several of the aforementioned villages, as well as a few others who had been waging nonviolent resistance, came together to form the Palestinian Popular Resistance Movement (PPRM). This committee was formed as “an umbrella organization that will coordinate and support local popular committees that already exist in Palestine’s smallest villages.”¹³⁷ The overall goal of the committee was to expand Palestinian resistance on a nationwide scale. In the summer of 2011, the committee organized a three-day conference. “While conferences are nothing new to Palestine... the impetus for this conference had a new angle—to bring together activists from around the West Bank, Jerusalem, (and Gaza by phone) to present to each other, discuss, and plan different aspects of the growing popular resistance.”¹³⁸ However, while the PPRM has been successful in supporting local campaigns, the movement has failed to catch on (as evidenced by the movement’s failure to achieve their goal of expanding on a nation-wide level).

The *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution* states, “The organizational framework we have found to be most [effective] is small groups linked together in a voluntary ‘life center’ and/or network...”¹³⁹ Such a network should: communicate information and ideas; develop a network-wide analysis, vision, and strategy; be a channel for groups to challenge and discuss the merits of other member groups’ actions; provide aid (financial or physical) for local groups in crisis situations; do outreach to new people on a national level; and make decisions on wider

¹³⁷“New Popular Resistance Movement Emerges in Palestine, ” The Palestine Monitor, June 18, 2011. Accessed 3/13/2012. <http://www.palestinemonitor.org/?p=866>.

¹³⁸“Popular Resistance Conference | Palestine Solidarity Project ” Accessed 3/13/2012. <http://palestinesolidarityproject.org/popular-resistance-conference/>.

¹³⁹Virginia Coover, *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution* (Philadelphia, PA : New Society Press, 1985), 211.

policy.¹⁴⁰ From a preliminary analysis, the PPRM seems to be communicating ideas and information effectively and facilitating discussions between groups. Areas to improve on include developing an overall vision and strategy, reaching out to the broader community (beyond just the few villages in the alliance), and making decisions on wider policies. The amount of aid this group is providing to local groups is difficult to determine.

As was exemplified in the Civil Rights campaign, utilizing existing networks is an excellent way to organize a movement. Accordingly, the PPRM should be built up as a stronger leadership body. Lakey and Oppenheimer offer some specific advice that could be considered:

1. Establish clear lines of authority, responsibility and decision-making.
2. Appoint or elect persons in charge of such jobs as publicity, office management, transportation, communication, training, supplies, finance, etc.
3. Line up special resource persons such as workshop leaders, legal counsel, and public relations specialists.
4. Set up a simple bookkeeping system to keep financial affairs in order.
5. Establish a written discipline or some set of principles or constitution. Participation in activities and membership in the leadership should be contingent upon acceptance of established rules, without exception.¹⁴¹

Rules and procedures of succession should also be carefully considered and clearly stated, in the nearly inevitable event that leaders are arrested (as has already been the case for members of the PPRM). It is important to have a highly trained corps of specialists (preferably 30-40 people) who can be dispatched throughout the West Bank to administer workshops and other forms of training.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 215.

¹⁴¹Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, 47-8.

For such an effort to be effective, it must be systematic, hierarchical, and disciplined. Although information on the current activities of the PPRM is limited, to say nothing of the nearly nonexistent information on its organizational structure, it offers a foundation upon which leadership can be elaborated. In addition to fostering resistance actions, it is also important for this body to facilitate the formation of alternative structures. This should not be hard in a society that has been dealing with suffocating oppression for decades. Parallel institutions, local community groups, and neighborhood networks are already strong throughout the villages of Palestine. The job of the PPRM is to offer support (in the form of aid, supplies, and channels of communication) to such groups, as well as to encourage the formation of new ones where needed.

The importance and necessity of training for a nonviolent resistance movement cannot be understated. Discipline and understanding among the resistance population will foster unity, strength, and solidarity and will make direct action most effective. It seems inevitable that such activities would have to be kept secret and be done underground to avoid Israeli repression. The task of organizing and conducting such training falls, at least initially, on the leadership. This means, of course, that the leadership must be well-versed in the theory, tactics, dynamics, and challenges of nonviolent resistance, but also that they must have an efficient way of transferring that knowledge down through the ranks. In the event that the higher ups are detained or otherwise rendered inaccessible, leaders on a more local level must be equipped to shoulder the burden of maintaining discipline and progressing the campaign. In the case of the proposed resistance movement, three main populations should be targeted for specialized training techniques; local leaders, the general population, and, for reasons that will be addressed later, the Palestinian Authority.

The first step in such a process is to establish understanding and discipline within the leadership group itself. Establishing steadfast principles to which the movement is committed is the most effectively way to develop such understanding. Principles should be clearly stated in written form and easily and widely accessible to the resistance population, the opponent and the international community (a PPRM website available in English, Hebrew, and Arabic would be a good start for dissemination of this and other kinds of important information). Furthermore, the principles should be decided upon by consensus. A constitution that is voted upon by all members is an example of an effective way to establish such a framework. The movement must remain committed to such principles without exception and must insist upon commitment from its members and participants. A written pledge that can be signed by participants has been utilized effectively in the past. A tally counter on the website of how many pledges have been made at any given time can be an effective way to communicate the growing strength of a movement. Once these principles are established and understood, training can commence.

The first group that must be trained is local leaders. This includes, but is not limited to, religious figures, community organizers, local political figures (for example, mayors), school principals and teachers, and prominent social figures. Anyone who holds a position of authority or enjoys high social standing can be considered a potential local leader. Such training could similarly take place at an institutional level, in villages that have groups and programs already in place that could be utilized for such campaigns (community centers for example). The more leaders that are trained, the more quickly and effectively the message and methods can spread. For example, in any given village 10-30 people (depending on the size of the town) may be selected to participate in nonviolence workshops. These workshops should focus not only on fostering discipline and understanding in its participants, but also in instructing them on how to

communicate this message most effectively to their constituents, and, in some cases, how to conduct workshops themselves. Specialized trainers from the leadership should be dispatched to various villages throughout the West Bank, focusing first on areas with prior experience in such resistance tactics (to gain training experience and practice) and then to areas that may need more rigorous instruction.

Oppenheimer and Lakey identify five primary reasons training should be conducted: to practice skills, understand your opponent, build up morale, get rid of tensions, and make for more democracy.¹⁴² Accordingly, all training methods should be designed with these targets in mind. For example, a workshop program that would incorporate all of these components might involve role-playing exercises, informational sessions on the settlers and their beliefs, discussions of past examples of successful nonviolent resistance, team-building and trust games, and a voting process to establish workshop “captains” to lead small group activities.

Training is also necessary for the general population, but cannot, for practical purposes, take the form of mass workshops. Instead, a tremendous propaganda effort must be undertaken to distribute information to as wide a public as possible. This will be elaborated upon in the discussion of publicity efforts. There are some communities, however, where workshops and courses can be offered to a wider audience. In the case of Palestine, with its tremendous population of young people, schools and youth centers can be ideal locations for such efforts. If possible, nonviolence should be incorporated into the curriculum of high schools and colleges. The *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution* offers detailed course designs and specifies the difference between peace and conflict studies courses and nonviolent social change courses. The latter type uses a training approach to link consciousness raising and action and to incorporate experiential learning directed at the participants. It is developed based on the group’s perceived

¹⁴²Ibid., 64-65.

needs with a focus on learning skills.¹⁴³ Such a course should be loosely designed by the leadership, the teacher must undergo training, and the content must be adaptable according to the students' circumstances. A final project at the end could be presented to parents and other community members in order to further spread the knowledge gained.

Lastly, a conscious effort must be made to reach out to the Palestinian Authority and to conduct special training with prominent members. Workshops in this case are discouraged because the role of such leaders should remain peripheral. However, seminars and information sessions, or ideally a multiple day conference, would be an effective way to build understanding among the political leadership of the dynamics of the impending movement. Special attention should be given to highlighting the areas in which the PLO can help, for example resource collection and distribution, channels of communication, and assistance with facilitating media access and production. A focus should also be put on communicating the necessity of the "people's movement" aspect of the resistance (something advocated by Abbas himself) and building a comprehensive understanding of the objectives of the campaign. Public pledges by public officials and politicians to the principles of the movement would also be an excellent way to garner support and reinforce commitment.

Both history and theory demonstrate that extensive training efforts are vital to conducting a strong campaign of nonviolent resistance. It stands to reason that a greater understanding of the dynamics of such tactics and an ability to maintain discipline during their implementation will immeasurably increase the chances of success. This process starts at the top of the leadership, but it is essential that it be transferred down through all levels of the resistance group. As leaders are detained, new ones must be prepared to take their place and to take up the banner of nonviolent

¹⁴³Coover, *Resource Manual for a Living Revolution*, 182.

direct action. The volatility of the occupation in the West Bank only reinforces the necessity of such efforts.

The use of effective tactics was implemented quite well during the first Intifada. The most important step in planning for any such action in the future will be a careful consideration of the weaknesses and strengths of each group involved. In this case, our resistance population is the Palestinians of the West Bank, our opponent population is the West Bank settlers and their supporters, and important third parties are the broader Israeli population, the United States, the EU, and other Arab states. A discussion of how to best engage the third parties will be conducted during discussions of utilizing multiple sources of influence and publicity and propaganda. A very preliminary assessment will be provided of the strengths and weaknesses of the other two groups (the Palestinians and the settlers), followed by some specific suggestions for possible methods.

The strengths of Palestinians that are most conducive to engaging in a mass, popular, nonviolent struggle (as evidenced by past movements and campaigns, as well as by the author's own experience living in Palestine) are their sense of solidarity, perseverance, nationalism, and religious dedication. All of these characteristics lay an excellent foundation for potential participants. Palestinians are a proud people with a strong sense of identity and a universal cause that unites them. A resistance campaign must play on these features. Emphasis on the importance of unity is important, as is a framing of the movement as a fight to defend human dignity. The inherent compatibility of Islam with nonviolence theory should also be highlighted. Framing training, publicity, and strategy with these themes in mind will allow the leadership to draw from the population's greatest strengths.

Other, more concrete, skills should also be considered. As was seen in the Intifada, the Palestinian educational system of rote learning (and the emphasis on memorization when learning Surahs of the Qur'an) has given the population a tremendous ability to remember long passages, a skill that will be very useful for transmitting information in the case that other channels of communication are cut. Palestinians have also had to develop great resourcefulness as a result of the Israeli regime's restrictions, a skill that will be invaluable when repression increases in response to the resistance.

On the other hand, Palestinians are incredibly emotionally invested in the struggle for a homeland, which can mean both passion and rashness. Tactics that are done in a group setting and involve disengagement with the opponent (such as sit-ins, strikes, and boycotts) may be the most effective for preventing tempers from flaring. The greatest weakness that the Palestinians will face, however, is Israel's ability to divide and isolate. The West Bank has become an archipelago of Palestinian enclaves surrounded on all sides by Israeli roads, checkpoints, walls, fences, and settlements. Communication alone is challenging, to say nothing of transportation. Tactics that can be carried out in smaller groups (such as villages and towns) will be much more effective than methods that require huge numbers to have an impact. Palestinians have become innovative in overcoming transportation and communication obstacles, but restrictions will inevitably increase as the movement progresses.

The strengths of the settlers are less easy to pinpoint. They are a diverse population, and their reasons for being in the West Bank span from a belief that they are on a biblical mission to simple economic necessity. The settlers residing in the outposts (as opposed to the larger settlements) are nearly 100% ideologically motivated. Their strengths, similar to the Palestinians' are also their religious devotion and their nationalism. However, both types of

settlers, ideological and economic, are frequently well armed. At this stage, this factor should be considered a strength that, through careful application of political jiu-jitsu, could be transformed into a weakness. While military violence can be accepted as an expected response, civilian attacks on peaceful protesters will inevitably evoke strong condemnation by the public. Lastly, the greatest strength of all settlers, regardless of their motives, is the tremendous support they receive from the Israeli regime.

Their greatest weaknesses are their questionable legal status, both under Israel and international law, and widespread condemnation of their presence in the West Bank, both among the Israeli public and in the international community. Additionally, the settlements and their expansion run in direct contradiction to the advancement of a two-state solution, an arrangement advocated, at least officially, by the Israeli government. A campaign against the settlers must therefore consist primarily of dramatic tactics that draw attention to the issues. Highly visible and visually stimulating methods (utilizing colors and symbols for example) will be most effective and a means of widely broadcasting images and videos will be essential. The focus on the settlements will allow increased external support, as all countries except Israel maintain the illegality of these structures. Israel's legal justification for expansion is based on ancient laws and elaborate explanations. A legal campaign alongside direct action, as was done in the Civil Rights movement in the United States, might be an effective way to target this weakness.

Gene Sharp breaks down nonviolent resistance into three broad categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. In *The Power of Nonviolent Action* he devotes an entire volume to "The Methods of Nonviolent Action," listing 198 specific tactics that can be utilized. Oppenheimer and Lakey provide a basic series of questions that should be considered before choosing a tactic:

1. Is it clearly related to the issue?
2. Are the people it will inconvenience really the people heavily involved in the injustice?
3. Is there a chance of direct confrontation between the campaigners and the opponent?
4. Does the tactic put a major part of the suffering which is inevitable in social change upon our shoulders, rather than upon innocent bystanders?
5. If direct action involve violation of the law, are demonstrators prepared to accept the penalties in order to make the point?

If the answer to these questions is yes, they state, the tactic is worth trying.¹⁴⁴ Using these guidelines loosely, in combination with consideration of strengths and weaknesses, the following tactics from Sharp's list have the potential to be effective methods of resistance in the proposed campaign:

- **Protest and Persuasion:** public speeches; letters of opposition or support; signed public statements; slogans, caricatures and symbols; banners, posters and displayed communication; leaflets, pamphlets and books; newspapers, journals, records, radio and television; displays of flags and symbolic colors; wearing of symbols; creation of new signs and names; symbolic reclamations of territory; fraternization; singing; marches; assemblies of protest or support.¹⁴⁵

These sorts of public displays are critical for highlighting the means and objectives of the campaign. The use of colors and images can also facilitate solidarity in the resistance population, playing on the Palestinians' existing strength of unity. A clearly and loudly stated emphasis on the nonviolent nature of the movement in the form of public speeches, leaflets, and media

¹⁴⁴Oppenheimer and Lakey, *A Manual for Direct Action*, 83.

¹⁴⁵Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 117-173.

communiqués provide the opportunity to turn the settler's violent oppression into a weakness through moral and political jiu-jitsu.

- **Noncooperation:** social boycott; consumers' boycott; national consumers' boycott; international consumers' boycott; suppliers' and handlers' boycott; traders' boycott; refusal of impressed labor; professional strike; strike by resignation; refusal of assistance to enforcement agents; refusal of assemblage or meeting to disperse; sitdown; civil disobedience of "illegitimate" laws.¹⁴⁶

Boycotts are a well-established practice in the Occupied Territories. Indeed, a boycott of goods produced in the settlements is already in effect in the West Bank and similar campaigns are spreading throughout Europe and the United States. Expanding such boycotts to suppliers, handlers, and traders will have a greater economic effect on the settlement populations. Strikes can be utilized in the event of a settlement that is dependent upon Palestinian labor for construction. This tactic would be most effective if implemented during the phase of the campaign aimed at halting expansion.

- **Intervention:** self-exposure to the elements; reverse trial; nonviolent harassment; nonviolent raids; nonviolent invasion; nonviolent interjection; nonviolent obstruction; nonviolent occupation; alternative communication system; stay-in strike; overloading of administrative systems; seeking imprisonment.¹⁴⁷

These are the most dangerous methods and the ones that must be undertaken with the utmost caution by those most highly experienced and well trained in nonviolence. These methods carry the most risk of extremely violent reprisals and involve the most direct confrontation with the opponent. Only extremely disciplined participants should attempt nonviolent raids, invasions,

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 183-347.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 357-435.

interjections, obstructions, and occupations. The action must be meticulously planned and knowledge of the opponent's weapons supplies should be extensive. Other methods in this category however, such as reverse trial, seeking imprisonment, and nonviolent harassment carry less risk of bodily harm but a great risk of long-term detentions. Participants in such actions should be prepared and willing to accept the potential punishments.

These are only a few of the methods of nonviolent resistance that could be considered for such a campaign. A much more thorough examination of strengths and weaknesses is absolutely necessary prior to a more comprehensive brainstorming process of methods. Tactics should be evaluated not only by the aforementioned questions, but also for their relevance to the stated objectives, their potential for success, their visibility to multiple constituents, intended and unintended potential consequences, and the most appropriate participants. Responses to different outcomes should be planned to prevent the campaign from falling into the same trap as the first Intifada; simply responding to repression. Direct action must be proactive, strategic, and pragmatic.¹⁴⁸

The ability to garner support from various groups is a key element of nonviolent resistance. In the case of the West Bank, this effort will have to be mostly conducted through publicity and propaganda. Therefore, they are inextricably linked when discussing prospects for a future movement. There are three key constituencies from which the resistance campaign should seek to draw influence; the general Palestinian population, liberal and moderate Israelis, and the international community. Propaganda and publicity must be adjusted for each targeted

¹⁴⁸ The use of stone-throwing has been consciously omitted from the list of potential tactics as neither Gene Sharp nor the author consider this a nonviolent tactic. An active debate around stone-throwing exists among the activists in Palestine, but within the framework outlined here it is not considered a nonviolent act.

group, taking into consideration a wide variety of differences between the societies. Accordingly, media strategies to sway the opinions of each individual group will be considered.

In planning propaganda to utilize influence from the general Palestinian population, a focus needs to be put on developing strategies not only regarding content, but also how to deal with the restrictions on communication that already exist (for example censorship and monitoring by the Israeli army) and that are bound to worsen as the movement progresses. As we saw during the first Intifada, garnering mass participation is not a huge obstacle among a population like the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Discontent is rampant and solidarity in opposing the occupation is universal. Rather, the important objectives of a propaganda campaign in support of the anti-settlement movement should be:

1. To spread knowledge and understanding of nonviolent methods and ideals

This could be done through a variety of methods. Information on seminars and workshops about nonviolent methods could be communicated in propaganda. Additionally, the propaganda itself could disseminate such information. For example, a comic book of the story of the Montgomery Bus Boycotts has recently been translated into Arabic. *Martin Luther King wa Qusat Montgomery* (*Martin Luther King and the Story of Montgomery*) is a translation of a similar book distributed during the Civil Rights movement as a means of propaganda, and it appeared in the crowds of protesters in Tahrir Square during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.¹⁴⁹ Such a publication communicates not only an example of the tactics of nonviolent resistance but also its potential for achieving change.

2. To clearly state the limited goals of the movement

¹⁴⁹Sylvia Rohr. "Comic Heroes of the Egyptian Revolution: How Martin Luther King found His Way to Tahrir Square," *Pittsburg Post Gazette*, February 20, 2011. Accessed 3/15/2012. <http://old.post-gazette.com/pg/11051/1126410-109.stm>.

It is absolutely essential that the participants understand the goals that they are fighting for. Communicating the importance of a limited campaign is also important. For example, a pamphlet could be distributed that featured an explanation of the phases of the campaign and the specific objectives in each phase. Additionally, information about the settlements and an explanation of why they are being targeted (featuring maps and statistics) should also be included.

3. To provide guidance for actions

To achieve this end, pamphlets similar to those issued during the first Intifada could be issued. The difference being of course that these would carry a unified message agreed upon by the leadership body. For example, a call for a sit-in on occupied lands in specific villages might be issued. Such actions would be organized by local committees, but carried out in multiple locations simultaneously, a coordination that would be facilitated by messages issued from the PPRM.

4. To foster a sense of unity

Such pamphlets would also let protesters know that they are not alone in the struggle. The knowledge that other Palestinians are enduring the same hardships and fighting for the same cause even on opposite sides of the West Bank will strengthen resolve and encourage protesters to maintain nonviolence (a sort of collective peer pressure).

5. To build morale

With unity comes strength. Information about success stories can also be an excellent means of propaganda. Indeed, Lakey states that “propaganda of the word” is not enough. It will also be necessary to spread “propaganda of the deed,” highlighting the actions being carried out in the

movement.¹⁵⁰ If one campaign is losing momentum, the knowledge that another campaign achieved even limited victories can be enough to reinvigorate a faltering struggle. Nonviolent resistance is almost always a long, drawn out process and it can take years, even decades, to achieve one's goals. Over such a long span of time constant morale boosts will be vital to sustaining the movement.

6. To strengthen internal networks

One danger of having many small campaigns taking place relatively independent of each other is the potential for fracturing. Having a strong unified leadership will lessen the likelihood of this, but it can also be reduced by building connections between the separate offensives. For example, if one village is planning an aggressive campaign of noncooperation, people from neighboring villages (perhaps ones that don't have their own settlement struggle) can be motivated to lend their support (by means of manpower or medical and food aid, for example). Such cooperation will be facilitated by effective propaganda emphasizing the importance of solidarity and support.

While this kind of planning is essential, it is irrelevant without a carefully devised strategy for disseminating such information. This is even more critical in Palestine, where Israeli control can cut off a village in a matter of minutes. Innovative and varied means of communication need to be established and it will be critical to attempt to anticipate possible ways that such channels can be severed. Working closely with Palestinian cell phone and Internet providers (Paltel, Jawwal, and Hadara) could provide information on the potentials both for deactivation by outside forces and for alternative measures. However, as the Internet shut down in Egypt in 2011 proved, modern technology should not be relied upon exclusively. The distribution of pamphlets was easier during the time of the Intifada, before the establishment of hundreds of checkpoints throughout the West Bank. This is where the rote memory skills may

¹⁵⁰Lahey, *Strategy for a Living Revolution*, 102.

come in handy. Messages may have to be transmitted by word of mouth in the event of a military clamp down. Radio stations broadcast from outside the Territories may also be an option worth considering.

Propaganda is essential for garnering internal support, but publicity will be the key for drawing in external influence. Simply the maintenance of nonviolence in the face of oppression can have this effect, but only if broadcast for Israel and the international community to see. The potential for this is something that has increased exponentially by the advent of modern technology. Cell phone cameras, hand held video recorders, and social media sites all facilitate the spread of the kind of powerful images of nonviolent resistance that have been so effective in the past. Even in the current uprising in Syria, where the regime has done everything in its power to censor media and keep journalists out, leaked videos of brutality have appeared almost daily.

Discipline is absolutely essential for the successful utilization of publicity to foster support. This is especially true in Israel, where fear about the radical and violent nature of the Palestinians has been cultivated, particularly in the years following the second Intifada. The proposed campaign is at an advantage because the public opinion in Israel is against the settlements. In fact, in 2010 the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem reported that

A survey of the Israeli general public and Israeli settlers taken in early March shows three-fifths of the Israeli public (60%) support "dismantling most of the settlements in the territories as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians." ...This is the lowest level of strong opposition to dismantling settlements recorded by the Truman Institute for the 26 surveys in which this question has been asked since 2001.¹⁵¹

International condemnation of the settlements has also reached a new high. For example, the EU recently ruled that goods produced in the settlements cannot be considered Israeli (and therefore

¹⁵¹Alvin Richman. "Israeli Public's Support for Dismantling Most Settlements has Risen to a Five-Year High," World Public Opinion.org, April 15, 2010. Accessed 3/15/2012.
<http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/659.php>.

such products “cannot benefit from a trade deal giving Israel preferential access to EU markets”).¹⁵² The international community also recognizes the settlements as illegal under international law and some countries consider them war crimes under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

These developments highlight the different aspects of the struggle that should be emphasized in publicity campaigns aimed at the two groups (Israelis and the international community). Israel does not acknowledge that the settlements are illegal and remains vague on the legality of many of the outposts. However, the settlements are now seen within Israel as one of the main obstacles to peace, so this sentiment should be exploited. This could be done by emphasizing an overarching objective of the campaign as improving conditions for negotiations. Similarly, the human dignity aspect of the struggle should be highlighted, appealing to the ‘human sensibilities of the Israelis’ referred to by Sharp during the first Intifada.

The publicity targeted at the international community, on the other hand, would benefit strongly from an emphasis on human rights, international law, and civil liberties. The environmental degradation of the land caused by such settlements could also be used to garner support. Framing the struggle as a fight against the disregard of established laws, as was done in the Civil Rights movement in the United States, will make it easier for countries with economic or diplomatic relationships with Israel to support the resistance effort. The motivation of an eventual peace agreement can also be effective in such instances, as it allows the struggle to be seen as mutually beneficial for both sides.

¹⁵²Ian Black and Rory McCarthy. "UK Issues New Guidance on Labelling of Food from Illegal West Bank Settlements," The Guardian, December 10, 2009. Accessed 3/15/2012.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/10/guidance-labelling-food-israeli-settlements>.

The Palestinians did not sufficiently use propaganda and publicity during the first Intifada as a means of garnering support. In today's globalized world, the importance of this is even more pronounced. As was seen in South Africa, internal and international influence can be incredibly important in achieving success. Both the content and the means must be considered during the planning of information dissemination and the strategy must be carefully adapted to accommodate the differences between the many constituent communities.

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I attempted to develop a universal framework for success of non-violent resistance and to look at its practical application in the specific cultural context of Palestine. The field of nonviolence theory is still a relatively new one, offering the opportunity for scholarship and exploration of novel ideas. In my first case study of the Gandhian movement in India, changes in organization, preparation, strategy, tactics, propaganda, publicity and goals arose as significant contributors to the success of the 1930-1931 campaign, relative to the 1919 one. Similar factors emerged in the South African anti-apartheid movement and the Civil Rights struggle in America. The consistencies throughout these case studies were reinforced by the existing theoretic literature, which, taken collectively, supported my developing framework. However, in none of these works did I find the information consolidated or practically applied.

The first Intifada offered an example to retrospectively test the framework, as it provided moments of both success and failure in nonviolence. As the movement's flaws became apparent, means for improvement were also revealed. Although making recommendations for a future movement is a daunting task, my goal was not so much to provide a blueprint as to provide a prototype. Based on recent events, it appears that non-violent campaigns, carefully planned and executed, hold vast potential for affecting real change.

Such change is necessary in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The current conditions are unsustainable and the conflict seems to have reached an impasse. Attempts at negotiations have failed, violent resistance efforts have proved futile, even detrimental, to the advancement of the Palestinian cause, and, with the constant expansion of the settlements, the situation is growing more intractable by the day. However, as our case studies demonstrate, strategic nonviolent resistance may offer solutions. Already its power is being observed on a small scale in villages throughout the West Bank. Examples of successful legal and direct action campaigns are igniting a new spark in Palestinians, as shown by the formation of new resistance committees and growing weekly protests.

Just as Gandhi, King, and the ANC observed growing national fervor for change and capitalized on it, I saw such potential while living in Palestine during the summer of 2011. Attitudes seem to be changing, spurred on by the success of the Arab Spring. The time is ripe for activists in Palestine to begin the real process of planning. This paper attempts to provide an example of how such planning could be conducted at a preliminary level. To begin with, establishing strong leadership and functioning alternative structures, conducting training and educational campaigns, and establishing concise and limited goals will facilitate an effective movement. Carefully selected tactics are essential and propaganda and publicity must be targeted to garner the most support possible from the broadest constituency. Spontaneous popular resistance on a large scale has been attempted and has failed, as has a nonviolent campaign marred by acts of terror and violence. Traditional diplomatic negotiations have also been futile. It is time to try something new and history has demonstrated the potential for strategic nonviolence.

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