About our cognitive processes: computational verses embodied
This thesis discusses two distinct cognitive theories in philosophy of mind. In 1975, Jerry Fodor proposed the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH). This hypothesis essentially offers a computational theory of mind. It states that our cognitive processes proceed like physical computers, in which we employ an internal representational system for computation. Moreover, he claims that this representational system is literally a language of thought, consisting of syntax and semantics for representing things out there in one’s head. On the other hand, in 1972, Hubert Dreyfus proposes the Embodied Cognition (EC) that completely contradicts the LOTH. The EC suggests an embodied solution. By virtue of having a human body, agents are always situated in the environment, given direct access to the physical world. In this case, the EC denies any computational process or any internal representational system. In this thesis, I attempt to defend the LOTH against the EC. I discover that the EC can be refuted by the LOTH, simply because the embodied cognitive processes require computational processes of some kind as well. The upshot is, our cognitive processes are necessarily computational.