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dc.contributorPenn, Michael
dc.contributorHagen, Daniel
dc.contributor.advisorVavova, Katia
dc.contributor.authorMehta, Rani
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-11T17:35:39Z
dc.date.available2015-05-11T17:35:39Z
dc.date.issued2015-05-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10166/3632
dc.description.abstractThis paper is an in-depth philosophical account of niceness. It examines what it is to do nice acts and be nice people, if we have a moral obligation to be nice people or to do nice acts, and if there are cases where the nice thing to do conflicts with the good thing to do. I use concepts such as caring about others and responding to the expected feelings or desires of others to construct definitions for the nice person and the nice act. I use a case study and some non-traditional accounts of the supererogatory to determine that it is not morally obligatory to be nice or to do nice acts. I then use my definition of nice acts and nice people to explain why it is sometimes wrong to be nice.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipPhilosophyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectphilosophy of nicenessen_US
dc.subjectniceen_US
dc.subjectnicenessen_US
dc.subjectethicsen_US
dc.subjectphilosophyen_US
dc.subjectmoralityen_US
dc.titleThe Philosophy of Niceness: Is It Good To Be Nice?en_US
dc.typeThesis
dc.date.gradyear2015en_US
mhc.institutionMount Holyoke College
mhc.degreeUndergraduateen_US
dc.rights.restrictedpublicen_US


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