

**DACA and its Economic Impacts on Undocumented Immigrants**

by Irisa Lee

under the Direction of

Professor Michael Robinson

Professor James Hartley

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Mount Holyoke College

in partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Economics Department

Mount Holyoke College

South Hadley, MA 01075

May 2018

## **Abstract**

This study focuses on how the introduction of legalization impacted DACA eligible undocumented immigrants in comparison to the ineligible group. DACA is expected to increase wages and the propensity of the eligible immigrants to join the workforce but to also decrease school enrollment. A residual method is used to differentiate undocumented immigrants from legal immigrants. DACA eligible recipients are further identified by education, residency, and age requirements. I use OLS regression to analyze the change in labor market outcomes and use logistic regression to find the propensity of undocumented immigrants to be enrolled in school or to be in the labor force. I compare the results from 2011, before DACA was implemented, to results from 2016. I find that DACA eligibility improves wages and labor force participation for both men and women. School enrollment does drop, but there seems to be increased college enrollment, especially in states with in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants.

## **Acknowledgments**

I would like to thank Professor Michael Robinson for all his guidance in my research this past year. Not only did he give me helpful support with the research process and with econometric concepts, but he also suggested the initial idea for this study when all I knew was that I wanted to study immigration in economics. His advice has been invaluable in completing this project. I would also like to thank Professor James Hartley for serving on my thesis committee and for teaching the intermediate Macroeconomics class that inspired me to study economics. Thank you to Professor David Hernandez for serving on my thesis committee as well.

I am very grateful to the Economics Department for teaching and supporting me throughout my college career. I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Mathematics Department and for being so encouraging and helpful in my studies as well.

Lastly, I am thankful for my friends and family for all their encouragement. I am glad to have been in their company and am grateful for the good conversations I've had with them.

## Table Of Contents

	Page
<b>Chapter 1</b>	<b>Introduction..... 1</b>
<b>Chapter 2</b>	<b>Immigration History and Policies in the US..... 6</b>
<b>Chapter 3</b>	<b>Literature Review..... 12</b>
3.1	Immigrant impacts on the economy..... 13
3.2	Amnesty programs..... 17
3.3	DACA..... 21
<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>Data..... 26</b>
4.1	Empirical Strategy..... 26
4.2	Data and descriptive statistics..... 32
<b>Chapter 5</b>	<b>Regressions and Results..... 36</b>
5.1	Empirical Strategy..... 39
5.2	Potential concerns..... 52
<b>Chapter 6</b>	<b>Policy Implications..... 54</b>
<b>Chapter 7</b>	<b>Conclusion..... 59</b>
<b>Appendix.....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>95</b>

## List of Tables

	Page
<b>4.1</b>	<b>Percentage of DACA Eligible Population..... 61</b>
<b>4.2</b>	<b>Sample means of males, ages 18-35 in 2011 and 2016.....62</b>
<b>4.3</b>	<b>Sample means of females, ages 18-35 in 2011 and 2016..... 64</b>
<b>4.4</b>	<b>Sample means of high school age youths (ages 15-19) in 2011 and 2016.....66</b>
<b>4.5</b>	<b>Sample means of young adults (ages 18-25), all states, without Bachelor Degrees in 2011 and 2016..... 67</b>
<b>4.6</b>	<b>Sample means of young adults (ages 18-25), all states, without Bachelor Degrees that offered in-state tuitions in 2011 and 2016... 68</b>
<b>4.7</b>	<b>Sample means of young adults (age 18-25), all states, in the labor market in 2011 and 2016..... 69</b>
<b>5.1</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on undocumented men, ages 18-35.....36</b>
<b>5.2</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on undocumented women, ages 18-35..... 38</b>
<b>5.3</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility hourly wages for undocumented men..... 71</b>
<b>5.4</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hourly wages for undocumented women..... 73</b>
<b>5.5</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hours worked per week for undocumented men..... 75</b>
<b>5.6</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hours worked per week for undocumented women..... 77</b>
<b>5.7</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility participation for undocumented men..... 79</b>

<b>5.8</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on labor force participation for undocumented women.....</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>5.9</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on school enrollment for undocumented men.....</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>5.10</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on school enrollment for undocumented women.....</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>5.11</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on likeliness of living in poverty for undocumented men.....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>5.12</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on likeliness of living in poverty for undocumented women.....</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>5.13</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on undocumented men, ages 18-35.....</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>5.14</b>	<b>Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on undocumented women, ages 18-35.....</b>	<b>93</b>

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

As of this past year, the future of DACA, or the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals initiative, is very uncertain. President Obama introduced DACA in 2012, and the program allowed illegal immigrants who were brought into the country as children to apply for temporary authorization and defer potential deportation. Since its inception, almost 900,000 eligible immigrants have been approved for DACA. However, in 2017, the Trump administration unexpectedly announced that the program would be coming to an end. The last application and renewal deadline passed in the fall of 2017, but two lower courts have blocked the government from ending the program and the Supreme Court has declined to take up the case at the present time. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which is responsible for handing DACA, is not accepting any new requests but has re-opened renewing old applications for current DACA recipients since the rulings (Gonzales 2018). While lawmakers try to determine how this program can continue, it might be useful to consider how effective DACA has been for its recipients.

Unauthorized immigrants in the United States are disproportionately likely to be less educated and to be working in low-skilled jobs, according to the Pew Hispanic Center. Other factors, such as lower English proficiency and barriers to legal employment because of lack of documentation, also make it less likely for unauthorized immigrants to work in white-collar jobs. DACA offers a solution for this lack of documentation. Individuals who arrived in the US before they were 16 and are under 31, have continuously resided in the US since 2007, have not been convicted of felonies or misdemeanors, and meet the education requirement, can apply for DACA to receive temporary protection against deportation and work authorization. This eases many legal frictions that undocumented immigrants face, allowing them to obtain Social Security numbers and driver's licenses. This legalization should also improve employment opportunities for eligible immigrants by removing legal barriers to job opportunities.

It could also provide more incentive for eligible immigrants to further their schooling, in order to meet DACA eligibility, or to become more educated for higher-skilled jobs. A comparison study by Ping Zheng (2016) from before and after DACA was implemented, looks at whether these predictions have been true. She finds that DACA does not seem to have changed many labor market outcomes for the eligible group, but does find that there is an increased propensity to enter the workforce over continuing with college education. This is possibly due to the lack of incentive to invest in human capital since DACA does not provide a direct path to citizenship. However, DACA has now existed for at five

years, and it's possible that many expect it to exist for many more years. This may have impacted how young immigrants decide on their schooling since that study.

The announcement of the program's end was very recent and as of this writing, there are still 693,850 active DACA recipients, according to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Therefore this study will not directly analyze how the recent events have impacted undocumented immigrants. However, I will analyze whether the program has been effective in improving its recipients' lives overall. Previous studies on DACA were limited to data from 2014 but census data for 2016 is now available. Have the additional years that the program has been in existence changed DACA eligible immigrants' wage outcomes or their propensity to join the labor force over college education? While some argue that the program places high costs on states, DACA only affects a fraction of the immigrant population in the US, and an even smaller fraction of the American workforce, so the effect on the overall economy is likely minimal. This study will instead focus on the welfare of the illegal immigrant population and how the introduction of legalization impacted eligible immigrants. Understanding this will allow us to better understand the impacts of these policies, such as whether or not such policies should include a path to citizenship or whether more undocumented immigrants should be accepted into such programs.

This paper is an extension of the questions outlined by Zheng (2016), who finds that DACA has lowered the propensity of young eligible adults to enroll in

college but has otherwise has minimal effects. She conjectures that because there is no eventual pathway to citizenship, recipients have less of an incentive to invest in human capital. But as DACA recipients expect the program to be around for many more years to come, will that be as good as granting permanent residency? Because of the brevity of DACA's existence, earlier studies only had a few years of data to observe. Studies before this could only observe DACA's effect up to 2014, but this study will use data up to 2016. I will look at the significance of DACA eligibility on different labor market incomes as a proxy for DACA in years before and after the program began.

The empirical results of my study would indicate that DACA had no significant impact on any labor market outcome, from wages to labor force participation to high school enrollment. While it is possible that DACA has little effect after four years, which would be similar to Zheng's results, it is also possible that the lack of statistical significance is due to the difficulties of measuring the DACA eligible population. Therefore, it is still possible to estimate the direction of changes in different outcomes. I find that as DACA has continued to exist, certain labor market outcomes do seem to be improving for young undocumented immigrants. Labor force participation becomes more likely for example. However DACA still may not have any effect on wages and has mixed effects on schooling decisions of young adults.

In Section II, I will provide some background on immigration policy in the U.S. and describe how DACA came to be. In Section III, I will review economic

literature on immigration economics, with an additional focus on amnesty programs and DACA. Data is described in Section IV, and regression results follow in Section V. A discussion of policy implications will be in Section VI, and Section VII concludes.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Immigration History and Policies in the US**

In this section, I will introduce some of the literature on the history of immigration in the US, as well as relevant policies, laws, and demographic changes leading up to the instatement of DACA. The United States has had a relatively long history of immigration. Waves of immigration have transformed cities like New York City from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> to early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and large inflows of immigrants shape California's demography today. The United States is currently home to the world's largest immigrant population at over more than 43 million people, but the country does not always welcome immigrants with open arms.

There have been two main eras of mass migration: the Age of Mass Migration from Europe, from 1850-1920, and the recent ongoing mass migration of immigrants from Latin America and Asia (Abramitzky and Boustan 2016), starting from the 1960s. However, immigrants arrived in the country relatively free of restrictions in the Age of Mass Migration. Meanwhile, in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, many more restrictive immigration policies were enacted. While many immigrants continued to migrate, an increasing number arrived in this country "illegally". Studying the historical differences in these attitudes, as well as the

differences between the source countries, allow us to analyze economic questions: are more skilled or less skilled immigrants arriving; how well are immigrants assimilating; and what effects do immigrants have on the economy?

However, as the demographics of immigrants started changing, restrictions also began forming. By 1920, less than half of immigrants were coming from countries in Northern and Western Europe. Instead, more immigrants were arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe, who were also more likely to be young, unmarried, male, and short-term immigrants. Anti-immigration sentiment increased towards these “new immigrants”, as well as towards Asian immigrants. Acts such as the Chinese Exclusionary Act, the Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan, and a literacy test were all passed between the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In 1924, a quota system was enacted, drastically reducing the amount of immigrants coming to the U.S. The system’s quotas were country-specific and favored “old” source countries from Northern and Western Europe.

As world events continued to change, so did the demographics of immigrants after that. Despite the restrictions, more immigrants began to arrive from areas besides Europe. The Bracero program, which lasted from 1942-1964, gave millions of migrants from Mexico temporary work authorization. These “guest workers” largely participated in agricultural work. Cubans leaving the country during Castro’s rebellion, and refugees from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala also contributed to the growing number of arrivals from Latin

America. Refugees also arrived after the fall of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

The government's extensive regulations on immigration that we are familiar with today started with the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) of 1952. The INA codified immigration laws from across the country and established the means for deterring entry and removing "illegal" immigrants. Under the INA of 1965, the country-specific quota system changed. The capacity increased, but there was now a heavy preference for family members and people with certain skills. The quota system is still in place today. Each year, only 675,000 permanent residents are currently admitted, which a large portion still going to family-based immigration. This prioritizes immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR). Permanent employment based immigration is capped at 140,000 visas per year, over half of which is designated for highly skilled people. The demand for immigration is higher than the number of legal slots, which is why we now have a rise in illegal or unauthorized immigration. An estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the U.S. as of 2015. Since there are few spaces for other immigrants, citizenship is a long and pessimistic process for many undocumented immigrants, and many may be undocumented for quite a while.

According to estimates of undocumented immigrants today, Mexico is by far the largest source of undocumented immigrants, followed by Central America and Asia. Undocumented immigrants tend to settle in certain states, as opposed to

throughout the U.S., as immigrants usually tend to settle in ethnic or country-specific enclaves. Just four states (California, Texas, New York and Florida) have almost half of the U.S.'s undocumented populations. Although a vast majority of unauthorized male immigrants are working, they face barriers to legal employment (though some individual employers will hire in spite of the restrictions).

This is the scenario leading up to President Obama's executive order for DACA. Temporary work authorizations are not new and deferred deportations are not new, but the most effective methods of dealing with the changing immigrant populations have not been found. In particular, though, a large amount of energy is spent on controlling illegal immigration. Legislation for young undocumented immigrants has been proposed several times in the past decade or so, motivated in part by compassion for undocumented immigrants who had had grown up with the U.S. as their home. DACA recipients are sometimes referred to as DREAMers, which refers to the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act first introduced in 2001. Like DACA, it proposed to give children of illegal immigrants the chance for conditional and then eventual permanent residency. But it failed to pass Congress, and no other similar bill was passed until Obama's executive order for DACA.

Natives are often heavily concerned with how immigrants impact their communities and their economic situations. For instance, a study from the Center of Immigration estimates that the fiscal lifetime cost of an illegal immigrant,

which is the cost of the government services they use, outweighs the cost of deportation, suggesting that the U.S. should be removing more illegal immigrants (Camarota 2017). However these fears seem to be overinflated – after all, many unemployed U.S. citizens continue to claim government benefits and probably claim even more benefits at more frequent rates than undocumented immigrants would. Undocumented immigrants’ legal status prohibits them receiving a lot of government aid, such as food stamps or Social Security. In addition, many undocumented immigrants are still working and are still contributing to the economy.

These fears are still enough to prevent legislation from being passed, however. In 2014, the Obama administration introduced DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents) and an expanded version of DACA. Texas and 16 other states sued the Obama administration after this executive action, and in 2015, a federal judge in Texas blocked the program, citing that a constitutional violation with the programs’ extra costs on the state. The Supreme Court also backed this decision in 2016, putting an end to DAPA (Aguilar and Mekelburg 2016).

As I will discuss in the next section, negative impacts on native workers are often small. In fact, immigrants may even absorb most of the negative impacts. The studies above also do not account for the benefits that immigrants can bring, which would boost the economy’s growth. They also do not account for the fact that DACA recipients, once legalized, would also be able to pay taxes.

The Institute on Taxation and Economic policy estimates that that DACA eligible immigrants contribute up to \$2 billion in taxes each year. Research from the American Action Forum estimates that in 2016, the 380,000 DACA recipients contributed \$41.7 billion to U.S. GDP in output (Varas and Zafar 2017). Deporting the number of immigrants who are under DACA could cost between \$7 to 21 billion, and the U.S would be losing the income that DACA recipients contribute to GDP in addition to these costs (Varas and Zafar 2017). We can establish that DACA is not a harmful program to the U.S. as a whole; so instead this study will be analyzing how DACA has helped its eligible participants.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Literature Review**

In this literature review, I will first review literature on immigration and illegal immigration, as economic concerns are often a heated point of anti-immigration sentiment. There has been discussion about whether immigrants do compete for native jobs and lower wages or whether the country is able to adapt to more workers. I will discuss the points these authors make and present recent literature that recognizes that the skills of immigrants are important in considering their impact on the US labor market.

I will then be looking at economic literature specifically related to amnesty programs. Amnesty is one of the tools commonly used in immigration policy, which grants unauthorized citizens legal status and sometimes a pathway to citizenship. In particular, the US has only had one major amnesty program in 1986, IRCA. We can use IRCA to analyze how amnesty benefits immigrants, and we can use it to gain insight about DACA, which is similar, even if not quite the same. Lastly, this will lead us to economic literature on DACA. The literature in this area is small, which is understandable given that DACA has only existed for several years. I will be focusing on four different empirical studies that have focused on outcomes on undocumented immigrants.

### **3.1 Immigrant impacts on the economy**

Among the many reasons for anti-immigration sentiment, one of the largely cited reasons is economic competition. Especially among less educated native workers, there is a tendency to believe that immigrants compete with them for the same jobs and lower wages. A fair amount of economic literature is dedicated to understanding what impacts increased immigration has for the U.S. economy, so these studies can offer some perspective on how the entrance of DACA eligible workers impacts natives' labor market outcomes. Though some find negative effects, a majority of studies find that immigrants only have a small impact on natives' labor market outcomes, if at all.

The Mariel boatlift of 1980, which brought a large number of Cubans to Miami offered a chance to study the effects of immigrants on Miami's labor market. Card (2001) compares log wages and unemployment rates in the years following the boatlift. Outcomes are separated by race and are also compared to comparison cities. He finds that unemployment rate of whites and blacks does not seem to have been negatively impacted, and few changes in labor market outcomes seem to be due to immigration. It is possible that Miami was able to absorb this 7% population increase because industries changed to accommodate more labor or that native workers moved out of the area.

A landmark study by George Borjas (2003) analyzes whether immigrants harm employment opportunities of native workers. He regresses labor market outcomes on the immigrant shares of population, with fixed effects on education,

experience, and the time period to see if immigrant shares have any effect on earnings and time worked. Borjas corrects for the mobility of natives moving out of the area by instead using 32 different experience and education groups, which wouldn't change from moving from one area to another. Using this specification, he finds that immigrants do have a negative impact on native workers: immigrants increased the labor supply of men from 1980 to 2000 by 11%, and native wages fell by 3.2% on average, with differing decreases depending on education groups.

Borjas later expands on this by jointly modeling wage demands and native migration decisions (Borjas 2006). The negative effects of immigration are often mitigated because native workers respond by moving out, so Borjas attempts to link the same parameters explaining the spatial correlation of wages and immigration to those affecting native migration rates. His regressions find that higher immigration does tend to cause some natives to move out, proving that the true harm on wages by immigration is underestimated.

However, a number of other studies have challenged the premises that Borjas' findings were based on. One important consideration in understanding immigrant impacts on the labor market is assimilation. How well do immigrants integrate into the U.S. labor market, and how substitutable are they with native workers? Earlier literature found strong wage assimilation for immigrants (Hatton 2014), and Borjas (2003) seems to imply that, controlling for education and experience, immigrants assimilate well.

But while looking at the connection between immigration and wage inequality, Card (2009) uses wage models and cross-city and time series comparisons to note that there is a detectable difference between immigrants and native workers. Although some education groups are more substitutable (high school drop-outs and high school educated), there are still differences in elasticity among immigrants and natives within education groups. Because immigrants aren't perfect substitutes, the threat of economic competition is weakened. While Card concludes that there is a small rise in wage inequality because of immigration, this is within the labor force as a whole, not within the native workforce.

In addition, it may be wrong to think about a growing number of immigrants taking a fixed number of jobs in the country. Lewis (2017) presents three different theoretical models and comparisons of labor statistics to show that capital stock and jobs will change with immigration. In the periods examined by Borjas, both capital stock and number of jobs were increasing, so even if the labor supply was increasing, so was labor demand. The better model to consider is one that compares the relative numbers of different kinds of workers (skilled and unskilled), and how the skill ratios change in a country with immigration.

Immigrants tend to be concentrated either in the highly skilled or low skilled end of workers. Illegal immigrants are more likely to be unskilled. Basso, Peri, and Rahman (2017) examine how the change in immigration and the changes of skills in the labor market, especially considering more technology and

skill-based technological change are affecting the labor market. They studied how foreign workers respond to the rise of automation and computerization, and whether the employment impact from computerization for natives differ if there are larger inflows of immigrants in the area. Looking at 1980-2010, they construct variables for “computer-intensive productive growth”, capturing the productivity growth associated with computer intensity of a sector. Using this, the researchers construct a model economy with immigrant flows three basic factors of production: computer capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor. They simulated changes in equilibrium due to exogenous decreases in the price of computer capital and found that technological progress attracts more immigrants, both skilled and unskilled. Due to the change in the skills, with more unskilled immigrants taking manual-service jobs, polarization of the labor market for natives is reduced. Earnings increase for the middle class and immigration improves skills of natives. Pandey and Chaudhuri (2017) model different counterfactual scenarios using census data for the U.S. and Canada and find similar results. Immigrants increase the wages of those in the skilled sector, and since the increased labor force lowers prices, real wages improve for all even if nominal wages fall for some. As lawmakers continue to focus on what kinds of immigrants to legally allow, such as policies to attract high skilled workers, understanding the skill mix of our labor markets becomes important.

Because we can see that immigrants have little or no negative effects on native workers, I will not be analyzing the cost of DACA on the native labor force

or in the aggregate U.S. economy. A little over 1 million workers are estimated to be eligible for DACA, but this represents just a fraction of the illegal immigrant population, and is an even smaller fraction of the total U.S. labor force. It's unlikely that DACA has any serious countrywide impacts or fiscal costs. Undocumented immigrants are even less likely to be substitutes for native workers, being much more likely to be less educated and being more likely to be working in the "shadow economy" or in unofficial jobs. However, as some of these studies have pointed out, immigrants themselves can take on the negative effects of immigration in an area. So while this literature is important in understanding immigration economics, this study will instead focus on the welfare of undocumented young immigrants.

### **3.2 Amnesty programs**

Given the sentiment among the population to reduce immigration, there have been few amnesty programs in the United States and fewer economic studies on them. Amnesty programs are those that offer legalization to unauthorized migrants. Exact terms vary; some programs are temporary while others can offer a pathway to citizenship in the country. DACA, for instance, only grants temporary legal residence but does not offer its recipients citizenship, only renewals for DACA status. The literature provides understanding of how specific policies and the structure of amnesty programs change economic outcomes for immigrants.

We can compare these effects against the structure of the DACA program and its impacts.

Much of the existing literature on the subject in the U.S. is centered on the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. IRCA was an attempt to resolve illegal immigration conflicts during the Reagan administration, and the act affected approximately three times as many people as DACA does now. It granted permanent residency status to illegal immigrants who had been in the country for at least six years, while simultaneously increasing border control to deter illegal immigration. Unlike DACA, IRCA gave immigrants a chance to get citizenship but it still offered the opportunity for economists to study the effect of legalization on the illegal immigrant population.

First of all, was IRCA effective? The broad goal of the program was to decrease undocumented immigration. A large portion of the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population is Mexican, so studies that focus on Mexican migrants are important to policymaking. Using a multivariate migration rate model and data from the Mexican Migration Project, Altangerel and Ours (2017) analyzed the effectiveness of IRCA in achieving its policy goals. They also used a mixed proportion hazard model to analyze how the age of migration and the duration of first trips changed for Mexican migrants after IRCA. IRCA reduced the likelihood of males to migrate, but only for legal migrants. On the other hand, the authors found that there was little change in migration dynamics for undocumented

immigrants. Border control and employer sanctions, both of which would be more costly to implement, were not effective in reducing migration.

This study implies that undocumented immigrants may migrate regardless of policy changes, and that other factors like the hope of more job opportunities may be driving the move. Based on the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Border Patrol data, the number of apprehensions of undocumented immigrants only dropped the year immediately after IRCA (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). Apprehensions, which can be a proxy for illegal immigrant flows, began increasing again afterwards. Estimated immigration inflows are the highest when the U.S economy is booming (Orrenius and Zavodny 2017)

Multiple studies attempted to model an optimal amnesty program. If governments have a policy goal of reducing immigration, Chau (2001) suggests that providing some amnesty can be beneficial rather than harmful. In her model of the economy, in which the labor supply consists of native workers, foreign workers, and illegal workers, suggests that strong enough costs of illegal workers (such as employer sanctions against hiring unauthorized immigrants or more border control) can decrease illegal immigration. However, since it would be difficult to credibly back all threats of deportation, amnesty could also be beneficial since increasing the number of workers who can legally pay taxes essentially helps pay for immigration control measures.

Epstein and Weiss (2009) create a model in which there are a certain number of migrants entering. There is a cost to legalizing illegal immigrants, and

apprehending immigrants afterwards is associated with a different cost. Governments want to minimize the cost of illegal immigration, subject to the constraints of their allocated budget. Thus, an optimal time to amnesty can be determined. Changing the terms of the amnesty program also changes the results. Delayed amnesty, which grants amnesty only to those who can prove residency for some number of years, limits the benefits an illegal workers can earn before receiving amnesty. However, the host country is probably more favorable to naturalization. Limited amnesty, on the other hand, only grants workers a permit to remain for a limited time and lessens the incentive to migrate. This may have some relevance to DACA since the program, like limited amnesty, is temporary. However, both studies use theoretical models and without empirical data, the actual effects are unknown.

In this study, we will be looking at the effects of DACA on undocumented immigrants, and similarly, there are studies that look at the effects of legalization on workers after IRCA. Among Mexican men who were legalized, legal status greatly improved occupational mobility. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2000) defined this as workers who were initially in “low” ranked occupations move to higher ranked ones, depending on human capital, earnings, and a penalty for being undocumented. With data on Mexican men before and after legalization, the study finds that legalization creates new opportunities in higher occupations for these workers. Chi (2014) studies how legalization for Mexican immigrant men through marriage through natives affects their earnings. The study found there

was a positive earnings premium, which supports the idea that legalization is beneficial to recipients. If these results hold in our current situation, then DACA recipients may also find that they have many more new opportunities because of the program. However, this effect may not be as strong for DACA, as the studies report that English capabilities also contributed to occupation changes but DACA recipients are more likely to be fluent in English already.

### **3.3 DACA**

Deferred action, or delaying deportation of unauthorized immigrants, is not a new concept. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for the enforcement of immigration laws in the U.S., has been practicing “prosecutorial discretion” since the mid 1970s, meaning Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) usually chooses to prioritize their limited resources on “persons who pose a serious threat to public safety or national security” (Bono 2015). This is similar to the amnesty models estimated earlier (Epstein and Weiss 2009). Then since it is not feasible to deport every illegal immigrant, would it be more beneficial to have immigrants contributing to the economy? And since many undocumented immigrants who arrived as children do not have plans to leave the country, will this program make them better off?

Since DACA has only been in effect for a few years, there are few economic studies on the subject. Like this study, the research has been focusing on welfare improvements for DACA recipients. Anecdotally and through surveys

(Wong et al. 2017), DACA recipients find that the program helps their economic integration, from having more job opportunities to opening credit cards at banks. Economic studies analyze whether these welfare effects are true across the U.S. population.

Nolan Pope (2016) examines how DACA affects eligible immigrant's labor market outcomes, specifically how likely they were to be working, if there was a change in their income, and if they were more likely to be in school or have a GED. Using a difference-in-differences approach to ACS data from 2005 to 2014, he finds that DACA appears to have led to an increase in employment and an increase in earnings for those in lower income-distributions. Educational outcomes were unaffected. DACA likely did not change the incentive to work, considering undocumented immigrants have an especially high propensity to work (Borjas 2016), but the increase in employment and earnings would reflect better opportunities after obtaining work authorization.

Pope addresses possible selection bias because of how individuals respond to surveys before and after DACA. However, because Pope uses only a few specifications to define DACA eligible immigrant, the sample of eligible individuals may be too broad for this question. Compared to several other estimates of the undocumented population and the number of DACA eligible immigrants from the Migration Policy Institute and the Pew Research Center, the number of illegal immigrants is around 11 million, over 1 million of which are eligible (1.9 million as of 2016). The ratio of eligible to ineligible immigrant

workers in Pope's study is 1:3 however, compared to about 1:11 by other such estimates, which would suggest that the DACA eligible group is far too large.

Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2016) also explored the impacts of authorization from DACA with two different studies. In the first, the authors also study the effects of DACA on schooling and labor market effects. Like Pope, they use a difference-in-differences approach, but with Community Population Survey (CPS) data rather than ACS data that Pope uses. They compare between a pre-DACA and post-DACA period with a dummy variable and distinguish eligible individuals based on eligibility requirements. Their results found that DACA reduced the probability of school enrollment by 11.7 percentage points while also being associated with a 9.5 percentage point increase in employment likelihood. Men in particular experienced significant reduction in school enrollment. Prior to DACA, undocumented youth may have only continued schooling as an alternative to working, since schools often have less restrictive legal requirements. With the legalization from DACA then, it is likely that these undocumented workers no longer have to resort to this alternative and move into the workforce.

In their second study in that same year, Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2016) turned their perspective to the effects of DACA on the poverty of undocumented immigrants. Again using a difference-in-differences approach, this time with ACS data, they find that DACA reduced the likelihood of life in poverty for undocumented individuals by 38%. The study used data from 2013 and 2014, one and two years after DACA began. Because there is no variable in

either source of data that identifies individuals as legal or unauthorized, these results may have some selection bias. However, Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman may have further issues with selection bias. While they do distinguish certain individuals by whether or not they meet DACA requirements, they just focus on predictors of ethnicity and citizenship status. In both studies, they are especially focused on Mexican non-citizens. While immigrants from Mexico do make up a large portion of DACA recipients, their sample may still be too broad. Zheng (2016) points out that they are looking at the effects on all immigrants, even though DACA eligibility is included as an explanatory variable.

In her own study of the effects of DACA, Zheng (2016) looks at empirical data from the ACS to study welfare improvements from DACA. She examines wage differences, likeliness to have health insurance, and likeliness to be in school. Instead of using a difference-in-differences approach, Zheng uses OLS regressions on data from 2011 and 2014 and then compares the two results. Zheng concluded that there was no evident wage gap between eligible and ineligible men. DACA led to little change for most of these outcomes, but did lead to a reduced propensity to attend college, especially for males.

Zheng's study uses a residual method to define an undocumented and DACA eligible group, as I will do in this study. This study will follow the structure in Zheng's paper by comparing OLS regressions between two different years. However, Zheng's regressions simplify education; she does not make a large distinction between education levels, only including whether or not the

eligible group has received an associate degree or not. My study will contribute to this literature by confirming whether or not the trends found in these papers continued as years passed, since these studies occurred almost right after DACA was introduced.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Data**

#### **4.1 Empirical strategy**

In this study, I will be comparing data between two years to evaluate the effects of DACA, using individual-level data from the American Community Survey (ACS) PUMS in 2011 and 2016. The 2016 data is the most recent post-DACA data; therefore it is the most relevant for the purpose of this study of the effects of DACA. I will be using 2011 as a comparison year, as that is the year before the executive order. The ACS, an ongoing survey from the Census Bureau, provides information about households and individuals in the U.S. Surveys are sent out monthly and are made available each year. The ACS Public Use Microdata Sample files (PUMS) are a sample of these responses.

Like Zheng, this study assumes that all eligible undocumented immigrants are affected by DACA, whether or not they are actually in the program. Because ACS data does not follow the same individuals from year to year, but includes responses from different individuals each year, I will be using pooled cross section data rather than a difference-in-differences approach. Comparing between the two reference years will still show whether variables changed as a result of the policy.

The survey asks a wide scope of questions, including questions about wages, income, whether or not an individual is in the labor force, number of hours worked per week, and education status. Some of the information has been changed for confidentiality (such as not providing specific incomes after a certain level), but still contain most population and housing characteristics. The ACS also has information on the individuals who answer the survey and can help me determine who may be an unauthorized immigrant and is DACA eligible. The ACS includes several questions that are related to immigration, such as whether or not the individual is foreign-born, whether or not they are citizens, and what was their year of entry into the country.

In order to estimate the undocumented immigrant population, I use a residual method that restricts our sample depending on characteristics that would likely identify an individual as unauthorized. This method is based on the one by Jeffrey Passel, at the Pew Hispanic Center and has been used in several other economic studies afterwards (Borjas 2016, Zheng 2016). The specification I used is based off of the one used by Borjas (2016).

A legal immigrant is defined as:

- 1) Foreign-born (not native)
- 2) Arrived before 1980
- 3) Is a citizen
- 4) Receives Social Security, SSI, Medicaid, Medicare, or military insurance
- 5) Is a veteran or is in the Armed Forces

- 6) Works in the government
- 7) Was born in Cuba
- 8) Is in an occupation that requires licensing

Immigrants who arrived before 1980 were likely legalized during IRCA, since the minimum residency requirement for IRCA was six years. Those born in Cuba are also legal permanent residents, under the Cuban Adjustment Act (1966). Undocumented immigrants would not be able to receive government welfare benefits, serve in the armed forces, nor would they be able to work in the government, which identifies foreign workers as legal immigrants. Similarly, it would probably be difficult for unauthorized immigrants to have jobs that require some form of licensing, such as nurses or lawyers, without having official documentation. Knowing who legal immigrants are also lets us know who isn't legal. Non-native workers who don't meet the legal immigration specifications are assumed to be undocumented immigrants.

I further limit the sample to identify DACA eligible undocumented immigrants, based on the requirements recipients must meet. They include:

- Being under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012
- Having entered the U.S. prior to age 16 and resided in the U.S. since 2007
- Being in school, have graduated, or honorably discharged from the Armed Forces
- Must not have been convicted of a felony or significant misdemeanors

I define DACA eligibility based on ages, time of entry, age of entry (estimated by age and year of entry), and the educational requirement. DACA eligible

immigrants must have been younger than 30 in 2011, and were younger than 36 in 2016. The education requirement also limits this sample to those either in school, have a high school diploma, or have a high-school equivalent such as the GED. These criteria are incorporated into a dummy variable that will be used in the following regressions.

The empirical sample is limited to those from age 15-35 to better capture the effects of DACA, since recipients must be under age 36 in 2016. These same aspects are also analyzed for the undocumented ineligible immigrants in the same age group. According to previous studies, DACA allows more young adults to move into the workforce and leave school so I will first analyze changes in different labor market aspects related to work and wages. I use OLS regressions on different labor market outcomes such as wages, hours worked per week, propensity to be living in poverty, and labor force participation rates, in each year. The ACS data provides us with hours worked per week and yearly wage earnings. My estimate of hourly wage is constructed by yearly wage divided by hours worked per week, for 52 weeks. This is assuming that workers work every week of the year. Labor force participation is defined as those who are in the civilian work force, including those unemployed. I will measure those living as poverty as those whose income are below the poverty line, and those in near poverty as those with incomes up to 1.5 times the poverty level, as defined by Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman (2016). If DACA allows undocumented immigrants to move into higher-paying jobs, we should see a raise in wage earnings and a decrease in the

likeliness to be living in or near poverty. Hours worked per week would be expected to increase if DACA eligible immigrants start to work more.

Control covariates include age, gender, race, educational attainment (level of schooling attained or being currently enrolled in school), marital status, and English proficiency. Labor market data for females is often less consistent than it is for males, so these main regressions will be separated by gender. Race ratios of undocumented immigrants differs from that of the general population, which a significantly large portion of undocumented immigrants being Hispanic or Asian. Different industry sectors, such as agriculture, managerial positions, services, and production, are also analyzed to see if DACA changed the type of jobs that immigrants hold, and to control for differences in wages. Immigrants who aren't fluent in English are often limited to unskilled labor, so language proficiency helps immigrants move into better jobs and has a sizeable positive effect on earnings (Hatton 2014).

DACA recipients also face changing opportunity costs to school. On one hand, legalization may incentivize young unauthorized adults to continue their education and invest in their human capital, so that they can work in more highly skilled jobs after graduation. Because of DACA's minimum education requirement, more immigrants may be motivated to finish high school. On the other hand, they would also trade-off time they could be spent working and earning money. As predicted by previous studies, the opportunity cost of increased schooling is too high when there is no certainty that DACA will lead to

permanent residency. Now that it has been long enough for a DACA eligible immigrant in 2011 to finish a typical four-year undergraduate degree, this study will see if this trend is still the same. I will separate analyses on high school and college enrollment, using logistic regressions for both. Explanatory variables include age, race, English proficiency, and gender.

Additionally, Zheng (2016) uses a separated analysis for states that offered in-state tuition to undocumented students. Tuition costs can be prohibitive to attending college, so states with lower in-state tuitions might see a larger enrollment. States that offer in-state tuition to undocumented students have been defined as those that have explicitly passed legislature providing it, although individual universities can often still choose to provide it with or without these laws. States that have provided in-state tuition from before 2011 to 2016 are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Utah, and Washington. States that passed in-state tuition after 2011 but provided it in 2016 include Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon.

It is possible, though, that there isn't a strong link between in-state tuition and school enrollment for undocumented students. Universities can often individually offer in-state tuition, even in states that do not offer it. States that offer in-state tuition probably already have more lenient policies towards immigrants and undocumented students, so employment regulations probably aren't as strict either. Thus both education and work could be viable options for

undocumented immigrants. However it is still possible that this specification can help explain trends in schooling and labor force participation rates and will be analyzed in this study.

#### **4.2 Data and descriptive statistics**

As mentioned earlier, the residual method used to identify whether an immigrant is likely to be legal or not has been refined from studies over the year. This method, as well as other research centers' demographic methods, has been used to estimate the size of the illegal immigrant population in the country since unauthorized individuals are unlikely to reveal information like legal status that could lead to their removal. As of 2016, the total immigrant population in the U.S. was estimated to be 43.7 million by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). The Pew Research Center estimates that the undocumented immigrant population was 11.3 million in 2016, and out of that population, the MPI states that there are 1.9 million of unauthorized immigrants eligible for DACA (although the number of approved individuals was around 800,000).

All the data from sample statistics are listed in tables in the Appendix. In the ACS data used here, there are a total of 3,112,017 individuals observed in 2011, and 3,156,687 individuals observed in 2016. After identifying who is likely to be unauthorized we have the following samples for each year. 2016 sees a steep decline in number of observations, perhaps due to a difference in how recipients chose to identify themselves after authorization. If we limit the populations to

those from 18-35, like in Table 4.1, we can see that the numbers become more similar and the ratios of eligible and ineligible look more similar. The 2011 dataset may capture a much larger number of younger individuals, and since due to age and residency requirements, there is unlikely to be any increase in younger eligible immigrants. The mean age of males in the DACA eligible sample increases by 2 years between 2011 and 2016, while there are only small changes in natives and ineligible immigrants in the same age group. There has also been a slight decrease in the number of estimated illegal immigrants in the U.S. from 2011 to 2016, from 11.5 to 11.3 million (Passel and Cohn 2017), and this is also reflected by a small decrease in the undocumented population.

Sample means of men ages 18-35 can be found in Table 4.2 and sample means for women ages 18-35 is in Table 4.3 in the appendix. DACA eligible individuals do have specific characteristics that set them apart from both natives and ineligible immigrants. The entry ages of the eligible group are lower than the ineligible group (ages 6 to 8 for those who are DACA eligible, age 17 for ineligible). DACA eligibility requirements mean that immigrants who arrived at age 17 would not have been qualified for DACA. The younger entry age of the eligible group means they've spent more of their lives in the U.S. and some of those characteristics show in the sample means. The most noticeable is that 10% of DACA eligible immigrants are poor in English, which is much lower than the 37% in the ineligible group in 2011.

The original demographics of race between the immigrant groups are similar, with Hispanic immigrants making up over 60% of the group. The eligible group has a much higher propensity to be in school than the ineligible group however, with 51.4% of the eligible group enrolled in school compared to 15.0% in the ineligible group in 2011. If we compare between the 18-25 year old age group, which controls for the larger number of older ineligible immigrants in their 30s in the workforce, the gap is still wide (60.4% versus 33.9%). The ineligible group works more hours per week on average, although the proportion of high school graduates in that group is lower than the eligible group's.

From sample statistics alone, we can observe some changes between the two reference years. Wages for DACA eligible immigrants, both estimated hourly wages and yearly wages, increase from 2011 to 2016. This could represent a shift of more individuals into the workforce than before, especially since the percentage of DACA eligible immigrants in the workforce increases from 64.5% to 78.7% between the two years. Wages for all groups did go up however, perhaps because of the economy recovering after the recession, so this increase may have an upward bias. At the same time, previous studies findings that DACA recipients are more likely to leave school is also true from the sample means. The female eligible group had a slightly smaller decrease (from 57.6% to 48.7%) than the male eligible group (51.4% to 41.6%) but there is still a downward trend for both.

Noticeable trends between the years are the changing racial demographics and shifting trends in schooling of the ineligible undocumented population.

While Hispanic individuals make up the majority of undocumented immigrants in 2011 and 2016, the share of Hispanic ineligible immigrants decreases in 2016. The share of illegal immigrants who are Asian is increasing, to over a quarter of the total estimated undocumented population. Since the racial demographic of DACA eligible immigrants does not change as much between the two years, this shows an influx of new illegal immigrants between the two years.

While school enrollment drops for the eligible group ex post, the opposite occurs for the ineligible group. The sample mean of ineligible immigrants enrolled in school increases from 2011 to 2016. Among the 18-25 year old group in particular, school enrollment increases and a larger fraction of ineligible immigrants are graduating from high school and college. These statistics may indicate a change in expectations for the ineligible group, to increase their schooling in case DACA expands in the future, or because they want to invest more in their human capital. They may also be turning to schooling for the same reasons DACA eligible workers did before receiving legalization – because it is an alternative with less risk of employer sanctions or deportation.

## Chapter 5

### Regressions and Results

**Table 5.1**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**undocumented men, ages 18-35**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
Log of hourly wages	0.076*** (0.021) [0.035, 0.117]	0.117*** (0.029) [0.059, 0.174]	42,162	0.320
Log of yearly wages	0.067*** (0.023) [0.022, 0.113]	0.173*** (0.032) [0.109, 0.236]	42,162	0.355
Hours worked per week	-0.438* (0.265) [-0.958, 0.082]	1.139*** (0.373) [0.408, 1.869]	44,583	0.137
	<i>(odds ratios)</i>			
Labor force participation	1.232*** (0.063) [1.114, 1.363]	1.599*** (0.127) [1.368, 1.868]	53,897	0.211
School Enrollment	3.070*** (0.156) [2.779, 3.393]	0.929 (0.071) [0.800, 1.079]	53,897	0.364

**Table 5.1**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**undocumented men, ages 18-35 (Continued)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
College Enrollment: <i>Full</i>	0.653*** (0.074) [0.523, 0.815]	1.219 (0.222) [0.853, 1.741]	8,079	0.286
<i>In-state (both 2011 and 2016)</i>	0.803 (0.128) [0.587, 1.095]	1.827** (0.473) [1.101, 3.933]	3,954	0.250
<i>In-state (2016 only)</i>	0.790 (0.232) [0.444, 1.405]	0.589 (0.271) [0.239, 1.450]	1,129	0.384
High School Enrollment	3.889*** (0.374) [3.221, 4.695]	0.645*** (0.097) [0.481, 0.867]	6,758	0.378
Living in poverty	0.610*** (0.032) [0.550, 0.676]	0.871* (0.073) [0.740, 1.025]	53,897	0.065
Living in near poverty	0.707*** (0.032) [0.647, 0.772]	0.650 (0.254) [0.302, 1.396]	53,897	0.073

Note: The tables present the point estimates of the coefficient of DACA eligibility on the dependent variables listed in the far-left column. The 2016 column shows the change between 2011 and 2016. The age group analyzed was 18-35 years old, with 35 being the upper age limit for DACA. College samples analyze the 18-25 year old age group while high school enrollment is limited to 15-19 year olds. Labor force outcomes estimated either by OLS regression or logistic regression with odds ratios for variables with binary outcomes. Odds ratios are compared against ineligible undocumented immigrants. Standard errors are in parenthesis and 95% confidence levels are in brackets. Statistical significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.2**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility**  
**on undocumented women, ages 18-35**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
Log of hourly wages	0.119*** (0.029) [0.062, 0.177]	0.169*** (0.042) [0.087, 0.251]	24,317	0.253
Log of yearly wages	0.125*** (0.034) [0.058, 0.193]	0.258*** (0.049) [0.162, 0.354]	24,317	0.289
Hours worked per week	-0.175 (0.357) [-0.875, 0.525]	1.988*** (0.505) [0.997, 2.978]	25,726	0.143
	<i>(odds ratios)</i>			
Labor force participation	1.292*** (0.063) [1.174, 1.422]	1.408*** (0.103) [1.221, 1.624]	45,332	0.073
School Enrollment	2.848*** (0.160) [2.551, 3.180]	0.966 (0.080) [0.821, 1.136]	45,332	0.306
College Enrollment <i>Full</i>	0.666*** (0.087) [0.515, 0.861]	1.206 (0.247) [0.808, 1.802]	7,549	0.286
<i>In-state tuition (both 2011 and 2016)</i>	0.908 (0.695) [0.614, 1.344]	1.250 (0.401) [0.667, 2.344]	3,690	0.306
<i>In-state tuition (2016 only)</i>	1.032 (0.300) [0.584, 1.822]	0.602 (0.270) [0.250, 1.452]	1,132	0.261

**Table 5.2**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility**  
**on undocumented women, ages 18-35 (Continued)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
High School Enrollment	3.187*** (0.342) [2.581, 3.934]	0.766 (0.129) [0.551,1.067]	5,959	0.426
Living in poverty	0.584*** (0.032) [0.524, 0.652]	1.125 (0.094) [0.956, 1.325]	45,332	0.152
Living in near poverty	0.756*** (0.038) [0.685, 0.834]	1.050 (0.078) [0.907, 1.215]	45,332	0.172

Note: The tables present the point estimates of the coefficient of DACA eligibility on the dependent variables listed in the far-left column. The 2016 column shows the change between 2011 and 2016. The age group analyzed was 18-35 years old. College samples analyze the 18-25 year old age group while high school enrollment is limited to 15-19 year olds. Labor force outcomes estimated either by OLS regression or logistic regression with odds ratios for variables with binary outcomes. Odds ratios are compared against ineligible undocumented immigrants. Standard errors are in parenthesis and 95% confidence levels are in brackets. Statistical significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

## 5.1 Empirical results

Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 list the coefficients of DACA eligibility on different dependent variables for men and women, respectively. The results show that DACA does improve wages and labor force participation, while there did seem to be a decline in high school enrollment. This would indicate that because it has become easier for DACA eligible immigrants to obtain better, higher paying jobs, they decide to stop enrolling in school and work more. Within the different education outcomes, there is an increase in college enrollment however. Evidence

for DACA's effects on poverty is weak but it does not seem that DACA greatly change the odds of living in poverty.

The 2011 column shows the scale of the effect of DACA eligibility on dependent variables for variables found by OLS regression. The 2016 column shows the change in the size of the effect between 2011 and 2016. For example, DACA eligible men earned 7.6% more than undocumented immigrants as a whole in 2011, and they earned 11.7% more than that in 2016. This means they earn 19.3% more than undocumented immigrants in total in 2016. Effects on variables with binary outcomes are shown as odds ratios for the two different years. For men in 2016, the coefficient of 1.599 indicates DACA eligible individuals are 59.9% more likely to be in the labor force than other undocumented immigrants in 2016. Detailed regressions for hourly wages, labor force participation, hours worked per week, school enrollment, and poverty levels are shown in Tables 5.3 – 5.12 in the appendix.

I will first analyze men's results from Table 5.1. The first two rows of the tables present the effect of DACA eligibility on wages, separated by hourly and yearly wages. DACA eligible immigrants were already earning more in 2011, probably due to education and better English skills. They earn even more in 2016, 11.7% more hourly and 17.3% more yearly. This suggests that after they received legalization, DACA eligible individuals were able to move into higher paying jobs. They no longer had to fear deportation and were not limited to employers who were willing to hire unauthorized immigrants. Their language skills and

educational background, which are fairly similar to natives, made them qualified for higher-paying jobs and DACA allowed them to obtain such jobs.

Row 3 displays the effect of DACA eligibility on hours worked per week. In 2016, DACA eligible immigrants worked 1.139 more hours each week. Not only did DACA help eligible immigrants get higher paying jobs, it also helped them work a little bit more, according to the data. Practically, that is not a large difference but does indicate that easing labor market frictions helped individuals work more, as expected.

Previous studies found a tradeoff between school enrollment and labor force participation. This seems to be the case as well. DACA eligible immigrants were 59.9% more likely to be in the labor force after legalization. Meanwhile, school enrollment drops, so that DACA eligible individuals are no longer more likely to be enrolled in school. Some may have only enrolled in school because universities and colleges are often more tolerant of lack of legal status, as opposed to many employers. For those individuals, legal status gave them the freedom to leave school and move in to the workforce instead.

Interestingly, the change in school enrollment is different when differentiating between college and high school enrollment. The sixth row shows the odds ratio of college enrollment for 18-25 year olds, which is the typical age range for undergraduate college enrollment. Contrary to the decreased school enrollment overall, DACA eligible men were more likely to enroll in college in 2016. Though the effect is not statistically significant, the confidence interval

shows that there is a positive shift. By 2016, DACA has existed for four years, which is enough time for DACA recipients in high school to graduate and enroll in college. These younger DACA recipients probably graduated from high school and enrolled in college with the expectations of improving their skills for future jobs. Sample means showed that only about 3% of DACA eligible immigrants graduated from college in 2011, as there was no rush to join the workforce when it was not possible to legally work anyways. But now younger DACA recipients have the expectation of being able to work after college and may be more willing to invest in their human capital to earn more post-graduation. These long-term expectations might not have been apparent in earlier studies with fewer years of data.

I also analyzed differences in college enrollment between those living in states with or without in-state college tuitions. Zheng (2016) had previously conjectured that lower in-state tuition might be an incentive for DACA eligible youth to enroll in college rather than join the workforce. Though she found no significant effect on the different samples, I also tested for any possible differences to test whether this result was still true two years later. In states that had offered in-state tuition both before and after DACA, college enrollment actually increased significantly. DACA eligible immigrants in those states were 82.7% more likely to go enroll in college. However, in states that had only provided in-state tuition after DACA began, college enrollment did not have any significant change in college enrollment. The timing of in-state tuition legislation

and DACA probably affected how young eligible immigrants planned for their future. Those that could expect lower costs from in-state tuition while still in high school would probably be more likely to apply for college, which is the difference reflected between the two samples of states with in-state tuition.

Meanwhile, high school enrollment odds fell after DACA's introduction, which is shown in the seventh row. These results were drawn from the 15-19 year old age group. It seems unusual that the odds decreased, given DACA's educational requirement. According to the USCIS, the number of new DACA requests has decreased each year since the program began. Those who haven't already received status by 2016 may have no incentive to go to high school, since it is possible that they have been rejected or have no plans to apply. It may also be possible that young adults are choosing to fulfill the education requirement and obtain their GED in alternative ways. The drop in the odds of eligible immigrants being more likely to enroll in school may also be because the ineligible group is increasing their school enrollment. Some may be trying to further their education in order to qualify for a future expansion of the program or new immigration legislation.

The last two rows of Table 5.1 turn to measures of DACA eligibility on the odds of being in poverty or near poverty. These outcomes should be linked to changes in wage outcomes: if DACA increased wages for eligible immigrants, they would then be less likely to live in poverty because of their new higher income. But the results are ambiguous; the odds of living in poverty increase,

although it is only weakly significant. The chances of living in near poverty, which was defined as having an income below 1.5 times the poverty line, decrease but this result is statistically insignificant. Since these estimates are from individual incomes, not family incomes, the results may not be a good reflection of poverty. Young undocumented immigrants may still be living with their parents and other family members. If they are enrolling in school full-time, they may not be earning as much of an income as well.

The results for women are shown in Table 5.2. They also see an increase in wages, by 16.9% hourly and 25.8% yearly. They work 1.9 hours more per week and are 40.8% more likely to be in the labor force by 2016. The results for schooling are similar to those of men, with decreased school enrollment but increased college enrollment, especially in states with in-state tuition. The results are not statistically significant, although the confidence interval does show a positive shift for the full sample and for the states with in-state tuition from 2011 to 2016. It is possible that women may be more likely to leave school and enter the workforce to take care of their family. Having the protection from deportation from DACA may provide security to women to either enter or leave school.

This first specification only includes DACA eligibility coefficients, with no other interactions. I also analyzed the results with a full range of interaction terms, which control for differences in factors such as schooling, race, and occupational industry between the DACA eligible and ineligible groups. The effects of DACA eligibility on different variables using this specification are

found in Tables 5.13-5.14 in the appendix. Once full interactions are added, the eligibility coefficient itself loses statistical significance in many of the variables. The interaction terms are still jointly significant, and they show that DACA has different effects on different demographics.

For example, school enrollment decreases for those who are DACA eligible and living in poverty. Now that they can legally obtain work, they probably leave school in order to work at a stable job. For DACA eligible men, being educated significantly reduces the likeliness of living in poverty. Being enrolled in school means eligible men are only 54.6% as likely to be living in poverty as other undocumented immigrants after legalization. Better-educated immigrants were probably able to take advantage of higher skilled work once they received legal status. Women who were DACA eligible and enrolled in school were also significantly more likely to be in the labor force, 86.4% more likely. With legal status, they could simultaneously hold jobs and stay in school with much more ease.

This second specification seems to highlight how important education is for the main results that we see. The education requirement may be the reason we see welfare improvements. This could be an important detail for policymakers considering conditions for amnesty, suggesting that making education a requirement could be more helpful for undocumented immigrants. It could also change the proportion of high and low skilled immigrants in the work force.

I will first analyze men's results from Table 5.1. The first two rows of the tables present the effect of DACA eligibility on wages, separated by hourly and yearly wages. Although wages overall still increased between the two reference years, the estimates suggest that hourly wages fell by 15.3% and yearly wages fell by 4.4% after the policy was enacted. This seems to run contrary to the idea that DACA eligibility should improve wages, since eligible immigrants should be able to obtain higher paying jobs. One possible reason for this negative impact on wages is because of an increased labor supply. If authorization increased the number of previously unauthorized immigrants into the labor market, then this increase would have a downward pressure on wages for the immigrant laborforce. It seems unlikely though that this would have decreased wages this much because a relatively small number of people join the labor market because of DACA. We can note that eligibility does not have a statistically significant effect before DACA was implemented either, so the results remain ambiguous

Changes in hours worked per week are reported in the third row. In 2011, DACA eligible meant that individuals worked about 4 hours less each week than the ineligible group. By 2016, this was no longer true: DACA eligible individuals worked about 2.6 more hours each week four years after the program started. This increase in the number of hours worked implies that the introduction of work authorization made eligible immigrants more comfortable in the workforce. Legal status, or the lack of, does not actually prohibit unauthorized immigrants from working. Some employers will hire undocumented immigrants regardless of

possible sanctions, either because employers can disregard employee regulations or because undocumented immigrants can fill jobs that natives often do not take. However, this process still is not easy, and they could suffer poor working conditions without regulations. If undocumented immigrants are caught working illegally this could lead to punishment and deportation. Having legal work status would make the process of finding a job much less risky for the eligible group and in turn, they begin to work more.

That outcome does seem to be reflected in increased labor force participation in the years after DACA. The fourth row shows the odds ratios for labor force participation. Before DACA, the eligible group was only around 50% as likely to be in the labor force. The odds of being in the labor force increased after DACA, to about 76%. The labor supply of undocumented immigrants is very inelastic (Borjas 2016) and the propensity for undocumented immigrants to be working is already high., which may explain why there was only a modest increase in these odds. Still, the increase in the odds ratio reinforces the idea that legal work status makes it easier to join the workforce.

Previous studies believe that there may have been a trade-off between employment and schooling after DACA was introduced; schooling decreased after DACA was introduced because eligible immigrants could more easily work instead. Looking at the point estimates in Table 5.1, this seems to be the case as well. The fifth row shows the odds ratio of school enrollment. In 2011, the eligible group was twice as likely as other undocumented immigrants to be

enrolled in school. But in 2016, the likelihood falls to 78%. The confidence intervals for labor force participation and school enrollment also shift in the expected directions; labor force participation odds shift up while school enrollment odds shift down. Even without statistically significant findings of past studies still seem to be true for 2016.

Interestingly, the effects are somewhat different when separating school enrollment by college and high school enrollment. The sixth row shows the odds ratio of college enrollment for 18-25 year olds, which is the typical age range for undergraduate college enrollment. DACA eligible men were significantly less likely to enroll in college before DACA, only 29.4% as likely to be enrolled as other undocumented immigrants. But after DACA, they became 28.9% more likely to be enrolled in college. By 2016, DACA has existed for four years, which is enough time for DACA recipients in high school to graduate and enroll in college. These younger DACA recipients probably graduated from high school and enrolled in college with the expectations of improving their skills for future jobs. Sample means showed that only about 3% of DACA eligible immigrants graduated from college in 2011, as there was no rush to join the workforce when it was not possible to legally work anyways. But now younger DACA recipients have the expectation of being able to work after college and may be more willing to improve their skills to earn more once they graduate from college. These long-term expectations might not have been apparent in earlier studies with fewer years of data.

I also analyzed differences in college enrollment and labor force participation between those living in states with or without in-state college tuitions. Zheng (2016) had previously conjectured that the lower tuition might be an incentive for DACA eligible youth to enroll in college rather than join the workforce. Though she found no significant effect on the different samples, I also tested for any possible differences between these states to test whether this was still true two years later. The coefficient of DACA eligibility on college enrollment between all states, states that have offered in-state tuition in both 2011 and 2016, and states that only offered in-state tuition after 2011 but before 2016 is reported in Table 5.1. The odds increased in all three of the sample groups, but the odds were not greater than one in the sample of states that only offered in-state tuition after 2011. Meanwhile the odds were even greater in the sample of states that had offered in-state tuition before and after DACA was introduced, compared to the full sample. The timing of in-state tuition legislation probably affected how young DACA eligible immigrants planned for their future. Those that could expect lower costs from in-state tuition while still in high school would probably be more likely to apply for college, which is the difference reflected between the two samples of states with in-state tuition.

It's also possible that there is not as much of a trade-off between labor force participation and school enrollment in states that have offered in-state tuition for 2011 and 2016. This is because states that have offered in-state tuition throughout the years are probably also more likely to have large immigrant

populations and to have more lenient policies towards undocumented immigrants. Results of odds for labor force participation for the college-age undocumented groups between these three samples is shown in Table 5.6. The labor force participation odds are higher in those states than both the full sample and states that offered in-state tuition later, and the odds increased from 2011 to 2016. However odds for the full sample and the other in-state tuition sample had falling odds. But since none of the estimates are statistically significant for any of the samples, we cannot determine the true effect of in-state tuition legislation on labor force participation.

Meanwhile, the high school enrollment odds fell after DACA's introduction, which is shown in the seventh row. The age group analyzed here was 15-19 year old undocumented immigrants. It seems unusual that the odds decreased, given DACA's educational requirement. According to the USCIS, the number of new DACA requests has decreased each year since the program began. Those who haven't already received DACA status by 2016 may have no incentive to go to high school, since it is possible they have already been rejected. It may also be possible that high school enrollment drops as young immigrants choose to fulfill the education requirement and obtain their GED in alternative ways.

The last two rows of Table 5.1 turn to measures of DACA eligibility on the odds of being in poverty or near poverty. These outcomes should be linked to changes in wage outcomes: if DACA increased wages for eligible immigrants, they would then be less likely to live in poverty because of their new higher

income. But since there was no significant explanatory effect of DACA eligibility on wages, it follows that there is not much explanatory effect for odds of living in poverty either. The DACA coefficient suggests a 41.1% higher chance of living in poverty, which reflects the negative point estimates for wage change found earlier. But like wages, neither the estimates from before or after DACA are statistically significant. Since these estimates are from individual incomes, not family incomes, the results may not be a good reflection of poverty either. Young undocumented immigrants may still be living with their parents and other family members. Results for living in near poverty, which was defined as having an income below 1.5 times the poverty line had similar but also insignificant effects.

The results for women are shown in Table 5.2 and 5.3, for the effects of DACA eligibility on the same outcome variables. As opposed to the men's results, most of the DACA eligibility coefficients are not statistically significant in 2011, making it more difficult to understand how DACA might have impacted undocumented women. The one variable that is significant at the 1% level is school enrollment, with DACA eligible women being 2.6 times more likely to be enrolled in school than other undocumented women. They were also 60.2% more likely to be enrolled in high school, though this result has weaker statistical significance. Ex ante, both odds dropped. Young DACA eligible immigrants were still 10% more likely to be enrolled in high school, and the 97.3% odds of being enrolled in school for the 18-35 year old group is still high, but still much less than before.

Just from looking at point estimates, labor force participation unexpectedly decreases between 2011 and 2016, which runs contrary to the men's results. The confidence intervals only suggest an increase in noise, rather than a decrease in the labor force participation odds overall, so the point estimates may not be accurate. Since DACA gives the same benefits to all recipients, the lack of significance in results reflects the differences choices women may make in employment and schooling. For instance, women may be more likely to leave school and the workforce to take care of their family. Having the protection from deportation from DACA may provide security to women to either enter or leave the work force and school.

## **5.2 Potential concerns**

The lack of any significant explanatory effect for DACA eligibility in 2016 raises some concerns. A major concern in this study is measurement error: the inability to separate DACA eligible individuals from those who actually have active DACA status created more noise in the results in 2016. While the USCIS provides the exact number of current DACA recipients each year, there is no information to indicate who recipients are in the census data. This study, as well as previous studies on DACA, is only able to estimate who can receive DACA based on its requirements. But not all who apply are accepted, and not all who are eligible even apply. The MPI estimates that there are 1.9 million eligible individuals as of August 2017. The current number of active recipients is 693,850,

and was around 800,000 at its highest. This means at about 58% of the DACA eligible population, or more, did not receive authorization.

In this study, the empirical method uses DACA eligibility as a proxy for DACA. However, it is possible that DACA would have no effect on different labor market outcomes then, because in fact, nothing changed for some of the eligible population. This increases the noise in the results and makes it difficult to find statistical significance in the results. However this also means that the point estimates shown in the results probably reflect the direction of the changes, although the effect may see a downward bias due to the lack of change for the non-recipient portion of the population.

Pope (2016) also points out that due to the survey-response nature of the data, results may not be as accurate if DACA influences how individuals answer census questions. It is technically illegal for unauthorized immigrants to be working so labor force participation or hours worked per week may be underreported. Individuals may have felt more comfortable indicating the true number of hours worked after DACA's introduction. Therefore the increase in number of hours worked might just reflect a change in survey responses rather than a true change in employment. If so, hours worked per week and labor force participation estimates may be upward biased ex ante.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Policy Implications**

We know now that DACA did not continue uninterrupted and that the announcement of the program's end was met with much opposition. Given the protest over DACA's end, what would happen if this program were completely rescinded? The most immediate effect would be the loss of deferred deportation and work authorization, and many aspects such as educational attainment and hours worked per week would return to how they were before DACA started.

The program does not seem to have improved wages for recipients, nor has it made them less likely to be living in poverty. However it has reduced many of the legal frictions of being in the labor force. Re-introducing legal restrictions to employment would make it difficult for the DACA recipient group to keep their jobs or to find new ones. DACA recipients would probably start working less again once it becomes illegal for them to do so. Having DACA would have formerly allowed some to obtain high-skilled jobs that require licensing, such as nurses and teachers, but enforcement of employer sanctions may force them to leave such professions if DACA is gone. Labor force participation would also decrease as people leave their jobs, so the economy will lose output from the now unauthorized DACA recipient population.

Since odds of school enrollment decreased after DACA was introduced, it's possible that DACA recipients return to school. But they may lack incentive to do so; now that it's even clearer that they might not have a future in this country, what is the point in investing in their human capital again? If anything, rescinding DACA without a similar replacement program would reduce the incentive to go to school for all undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants may have enrolled in school more in hopes of receiving legalization in the future; losing that motivation would probably reduce the odds of being in school. Doing away with the program would not be beneficial for the lives of the undocumented population if these predictions were true.

What can be improved in future programs or in future iterations of DACA? During the Obama administration, two expansions of the program were already introduced but were eventually blocked in court. One was an expansion of the original program that relaxed the residency and age requirements so that immigrants who arrived before 2010 and those over 31 would be able to apply. This version of the program would probably have led to similar outcomes for undocumented immigrants as DACA had. Educational requirements would have been unchanged so the portion of the undocumented immigrant population receiving work authorization probably would have been just as educated.

The other program, DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents) simply extends legalization to unauthorized parents of children who are U.S. citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents. The premise of

this program seems to be mostly humanitarian, especially for parents of young children. The labor market outcomes would be different from DACA. These immigrants would be much older, would have established jobs, and would not be very likely to return to school. They likely would not introduce much economic competition if they continue to work their established job.

The outcomes of a program expansion would depend on the population that the government wants to admit. Recently, the U.S. has had a preference towards admitting skilled immigrants. By increasing the educational requirement needed to obtain work authorization, the country could find more skilled workers within its own undocumented immigrant population. The country could easily increase its labor supply in general by increasing the number of undocumented immigrants eligible for legalization. This would create a program of a similar size to IRCA.

Another question is whether future amnesty programs should be temporary or permanent, or in other words, whether or not the program should include opportunities for legal residency and citizenship. Even though DACA is an uncertainty and must be renewed every two years, DACA eligible individuals may come to expect renewal if they have already been renewed once. Having longer-term expectations of legalization seems to motivate younger undocumented immigrants to invest in their human capital. This could be beneficial if the government is trying to raise the proportion of high-skilled workers within the U.S. labor supply. And as earlier studies on IRCA found,

which was a permanent amnesty, such programs has limited effects on the number of undocumented entries (Orrenius and Zavodny 2012). Restrictions that require long-term residency would probably guard against a sudden influx of undocumented immigrants. The Pew Research Center has also noticed that the undocumented immigrant population has stabilized since 2009, suggesting that neither DACA nor the strengthening U.S. economy has motivated more people to migrate. Future discussions should discuss how amnesty could improve life for undocumented immigrants rather than on how to keep new migrants away.

Future research should continue to refine the method for finding DACA recipients in population data. Since DACA is not immediately given to all eligible immigrants, and the application costs time and money, the sample of DACA recipients is smaller than the DACA eligible population. All the studies on DACA so far, including this one, have probably been looking at samples that are too broad. In order to give better policy advice, it would be extremely helpful to isolate the effect of work authorization on the different labor market outcomes analyzed here. Statistical significance would allow us to give better policy recommendations because then we explain the practical significance of DACA. With results now, we are limited to estimates in the direction of the changes.

Further studies could also analyze how well DACA eligible immigrants assimilate into the U.S. labor market after receiving authorization. Supporters of DACA and DACA recipients themselves often argue that DACA recipients are not very different from native –born American citizens. They have grown up in

the United States since children with the same standards of education, but are separated by a lack of legal status. If they are more similar to native-born Americans, then are they substitutable for native workers? Are DACA recipients competing with natives more than other undocumented immigrants? If future programs expand to a much larger scale, such as to giving authorization to a few million immigrants during IRCA, then this aspect will become much more important. Much larger numbers of immigrants will be moving into the legal workforce across the country, all at once, so understanding labor supply and demand might change will need to be considered. Knowing how easily DACA recipients would assimilate can help predict changes in native and immigrant labor markets.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Conclusion**

DACA has been one of the most prominent immigration policies in recent years, especially since U.S. legislation has seldom offered legalization and protection from deportation. The attempts to end the program have made many stop and reconsider whether this has been a beneficial program. I find that while DACA may not raise wages and reduce poverty among undocumented immigrants, it does seem like DACA did help them work more before. This meant an increased likelihood of being in the labor force and an increase in hours worked each week. There may even be evidence that DACA improves the likelihood of undocumented men going to college.

This paper reveals new perspectives on how granting legal status can affect different labor market outcomes for young adult especially as this program becomes increasingly established. This will be important to understanding how unauthorized immigrants will be impacted by DACA in the future. To improve the welfare of undocumented immigrants, how should programs be changed or expanded? While measurement and identification methods still have room to be improved, this study and other existing studies can still shed some light on how to answer questions like these. It seems that the current DACA program will

continue as is, but immigration policy in the country could certainly see change in years to come.

## Appendix

**Table 4.1**  
**Percentage of DACA Eligible Population**

	2011	% eligible out of undocumented Individuals	2016	% eligible out of undocumented Individuals
<b>Undocumented (total)</b>	125,482	---	116,660	---
<b>DACA eligible</b>	13,367	10.65	7,520	0.06

**Table 4.2**  
**Sample means of males, age 18-35 in 2011 and 2016**

	<b>2011</b>		
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>In the labor force:</b>	0.714	0.645	0.824
<b>Employed</b>	0.607	0.530	0.760
<b>Unemployed</b>	0.107	0.115	0.065
<b>Estimated hourly wages (\$)</b>	13.11	8.03	13.28
<b>Total wage income (\$)</b>	21,551	9,796	23,232
<b>Hours worked per week</b>	37.9	34.8	39.8
<b>Living in poverty</b>	0.137	0.202	0.229
<b>Living in near poverty</b>	0.215	0.359	0.385
<b>Age</b>	25.8	22.0	28.2
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.128	0.647	0.627
<b>Black</b>	0.141	0.081	0.059
<b>Asian</b>	0.025	0.164	0.199
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.297	0.514	0.150
<b>Educational Attainment:</b>			
<b>Didn't finish high school</b>	0.137	0.100	0.404
<b>High school grad</b>	0.307	0.583	0.206
<b>Some college</b>	0.371	0.285	0.179
<b>College graduate</b>	0.185	0.032	0.211
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.005	0.102	0.371
<b>Major industry sector:</b>			
<b>Professional/Management</b>	0.239	0.135	0.236
<b>Production</b>	0.257	0.263	0.345
<b>Services/Retail</b>	0.420	0.496	0.333
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.023	0.052	0.072
<b>Married</b>	0.257	0.138	0.419
<b>Observations</b>	<b>297,722</b>	<b>3,853</b>	<b>25,994</b>

**Table 4.2**  
**Sample means of males, age 18-35 in 2011 and 2016 (Continued)**

	<b>2016</b>		
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>In the labor force:</b>	0.739	0.787	0.805
<b>Employed</b>	0.677	0.741	0.775
<b>Unemployed</b>	0.062	0.046	0.030
<b>Estimated hourly wages (\$)</b>	15.42	11.06	18.35
<b>Total wage income (\$)</b>	27,054	18,726	32,742
<b>Hours worked per week</b>	38.6	37.8	40.56
<b>Living in poverty</b>	0.115	0.127	0.187
<b>Living in near poverty:</b>	0.182	0.249	0.297
<b>Age</b>	26.1	24.6	28.3
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.146	0.763	0.505
<b>Black</b>	0.126	0.050	0.063
<b>Asian</b>	0.031	0.107	0.290
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.273	0.416	0.199
<b>Educational Attainment:</b>			
<b>Didn't finish high school</b>	0.112	0.060	0.307
<b>High school grad</b>	0.299	0.646	0.178
<b>Some college</b>	0.365	0.256	0.193
<b>College graduate</b>	0.223	0.038	0.322
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.004	0.090	0.279
<b>Major industry sector:</b>			
<b>Professional/Management</b>	0.249	0.149	0.291
<b>Production</b>	0.253	0.343	0.339
<b>Services/Retail</b>	0.428	0.458	0.307
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.020	0.039	0.055
<b>Married</b>	0.248	0.236	0.424
<b>Observations</b>	<b>305,434</b>	<b>3,272</b>	<b>21,921</b>

**Table 4.3**  
**Sample means of females, age 18-35 in 2011 and 2016**

	<b>2011</b>		
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>In the labor force:</b>	0.719	0.564	0.545
<b>Employed</b>	0.628	0.260	0.469
<b>Unemployed</b>	0.090	0.104	0.076
<b>Estimated hourly wages (\$)</b>	11.75	7.30	12.03
<b>Total wage income (\$)</b>	16,592	6,786	12,497
<b>Hours worked per week</b>	32.9	30.1	34.9
<b>Living in poverty</b>	0.198	0.261	0.299
<b>Living in near poverty</b>	0.289	0.429	0.435
<b>Age</b>	25.8	21.9	28.4
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.125	0.645	0.521
<b>Black</b>	0.139	0.084	0.064
<b>Asian</b>	0.024	0.174	0.279
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.354	0.576	0.181
<b>Educational Attainment:</b>			
<b>Didn't finish high school</b>	0.090	0.078	0.310
<b>High school grad</b>	0.230	0.523	0.194
<b>Some college</b>	0.423	0.353	0.212
<b>College graduate</b>	0.258	0.046	0.284
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.005	0.071	0.359
<b>Major industry sector:</b>			
<b>Professional/Management</b>	0.406	0.250	0.314
<b>Production</b>	0.067	0.094	0.134
<b>Services/Retail</b>	0.477	0.564	0.480
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.006	0.027	0.030
<b>Married</b>	0.318	0.198	0.565
<b>Observations</b>	<b>290,920</b>	<b>3,136</b>	<b>21,784</b>

**Table 4.3**  
**Sample means of females, age 18-35 in 2011 and 2016 (Continued)**

	<b>2016</b>		
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>In the labor force:</b>	0.738	0.659	0.549
<b>Employed</b>	0.685	0.607	0.503
<b>Unemployed</b>	0.053	0.052	0.047
<b>Estimated hourly wages (\$)</b>	13.59	10.65	15.22
<b>Total wage income (\$)</b>	20,678	11,437	17,103
<b>Hours worked per week</b>	34.0	32.9	35.8
<b>Living in poverty</b>	0.165	0.220	0.243
<b>Living in near poverty</b>	0.246	0.364	0.343
<b>Age</b>	26.2	24.3	28.3
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.148	0.734	0.408
<b>Black</b>	0.124	0.060	0.063
<b>Asian</b>	0.031	0.125	0.373
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.317	0.487	0.221
<b>Educational Attainment:</b>			
<b>Didn't finish high school</b>	0.076	0.053	0.217
<b>High school grad</b>	0.221	0.590	0.164
<b>Some college</b>	0.404	0.298	0.223
<b>College graduate</b>	0.300	0.600	0.396
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.004	0.066	0.265
<b>Major industry sector:</b>			
<b>Professional/Management</b>	0.416	0.267	0.375
<b>Production</b>	0.069	0.110	0.128
<b>Services/Retail</b>	0.472	0.587	0.447
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.006	0.010	0.022
<b>Married</b>	0.311	0.289	0.552
<b>Observations</b>	<b>290,920</b>	<b>3,136</b>	<b>21,784</b>

**Table 4.4**  
**Sample means of high school age youths (age 15-19) in 2011 and 2016**

<b>2011</b>			
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.940	0.852	0.831
<b>Age</b>	16.3	16.6	16.7
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.177	0.684	0.628
<b>Black</b>	0.156	0.059	0.065
<b>Asian</b>	0.030	0.159	0.190
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.007	0.074	0.136
<b>Female</b>	0.468	0.450	0.449
<b>Observations</b>	<b>133,642</b>	<b>3,271</b>	<b>4,484</b>

<b>2016</b>			
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.949	0.905	0.881
<b>Age</b>	16.3	16.6	16.6
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.196	0.730	0.565
<b>Black</b>	0.128	0.043	0.068
<b>Asian</b>	0.034	0.140	0.230
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.006	0.068	0.166
<b>Female</b>	0.471	0.435	0.447
<b>Observations</b>	<b>128,262</b>	<b>1,322</b>	<b>3,098</b>

**Table 4.5**  
**Sample means of young adults (age 18-25), all states,**  
**without Bachelor Degrees in 2011 and 2016**

<b>2011</b>			
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.544	0.590	0.312
<b>Age</b>	20.9	20.8	22.0
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.152	0.632	0.594
<b>Black</b>	0.158	0.084	0.072
<b>Asian</b>	0.027	0.180	0.215
<b>Have an associate's degree</b>	0.056	0.035	0.035
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.005	0.079	0.383
<b>Female</b>	0.477	0.449	0.415
<b>Married</b>	0.089	0.122	0.213
<b>Observations</b>	260,229	5,594	11,965

<b>2016</b>			
	<b>Natives</b>	<b>DACA eligible</b>	<b>DACA ineligible</b>
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.533	0.573	0.478
<b>Age</b>	21.0	21.3	21.5
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.183	0.727	0.455
<b>Black</b>	0.143	0.056	0.085
<b>Asian</b>	0.032	0.127	0.310
<b>Have an associate's degree</b>	0.065	0.042	0.036
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.005	0.053	0.264
<b>Female</b>	0.474	0.439	0.444
<b>Married</b>	0.081	0.144	0.162
<b>Observations</b>	246,345	3,406	9,320

**Table 4.6**  
**Sample means of undocumented young adults (age 18-25),**  
**without Bachelor Degrees, in states that offered in-state tuitions**  
**in 2011 and 2016**

	<b>2011</b>			
	<b>In-state tuition offered in 2011 and 2016</b>		<b>In-state tuition only offered after 2011</b>	
	Eligible	Ineligible	Eligible	Ineligible
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.439	0.110	0.543	0.179
<b>Age</b>	21.6	22.6	21.3	22.6
<b>Race</b>				
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.778	0.783	0.572	0.669
<b>Black</b>	0.043	0.036	0.177	0.128
<b>Asian</b>	0.098	0.114	0.137	0.116
<b>Have associate's degree</b>	0.034	0.036	0.058	0.049
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.106	0.468	0.090	0.415
<b>Female</b>	0.418	0.290	0.416	0.348
<b>Married</b>	0.146	0.222	0.163	0.200
<b>Observations</b>	<b>1,457</b>	<b>3,194</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>887</b>

	<b>2016</b>			
	<b>In-state tuition offered in 2011 and 2016</b>		<b>In-state tuition only offered after 2011</b>	
	Eligible	Ineligible	Eligible	Ineligible
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.502	0.223	0.443	0.257
<b>Age</b>	21.8	22.3	21.8	22.0
<b>Race</b>				
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.844	0.671	0.692	0.595
<b>Black</b>	0.031	0.060	0.121	0.146
<b>Asian</b>	0.077	0.174	0.062	0.115
<b>Have associate's degree</b>	0.055	0.041	0.086	0.054
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.065	0.353	0.054	0.328
<b>Female</b>	0.418	0.349	0.430	0.364
<b>Married</b>	0.167	0.215	0.181	0.165
<b>Observations</b>	<b>1,143</b>	<b>2,101</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>783</b>

**Table 4.7**  
**Sample means of young adults (age 18-25), all states,**  
**in the labor market in 2011 and 2016**

	2011		
	Natives	DACA eligible	DACA ineligible
<b>In the labor force:</b>	0.635	0.579	0.599
<b>Estimated hourly wages (\$)</b>	7.41	6.95	7.88
<b>Hours worked per week</b>	30.5	31.3	35.3
<b>Age</b>	21.2	20.9	22.2
<b>Female</b>	0.490	0.452	0.431
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.143	0.622	0.531
<b>Black</b>	0.148	0.085	0.069
<b>Asian</b>	0.030	0.186	0.266
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.525	0.604	0.339
<b>Educational Attainment:</b>			
<b>Didn't finish high school</b>	0.138	0.104	0.361
<b>High school grad</b>	0.293	0.510	0.191
<b>Some college</b>	0.458	0.351	0.309
<b>College graduate</b>	0.111	0.035	0.139
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.005	0.077	0.340
<b>Age of entry</b>	---	8.5	17.0
<b>Married</b>	0.097	0.120	0.215
<b>Observations</b>	<b>292,738</b>	<b>5,794</b>	<b>13,892</b>

**Table 4.7**  
**Sample Means of young adults (age 18-25), all states,**  
**in the labor market in 2011 and 2016 (Continued)**

	2016		
	Natives	DACA eligible	DACA ineligible
<b>In the labor force:</b>	0.659	0.684	0.540
<b>Estimated hourly wages (\$)</b>	8.77	9.48	7.96
<b>Hours worked per week</b>	31.5	33.3	34.7
<b>Age</b>	21.3	21.3	21.9
<b>Female</b>	0.488	0.442	0.448
<b>Race:</b>			
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.171	0.712	0.538
<b>Black</b>	0.133	0.055	0.076
<b>Asian</b>	0.037	0.139	0.386
<b>Enrolled in school</b>	0.507	0.591	0.487
<b>Educational Attainment:</b>			
<b>Didn't finish high school</b>	0.116	0.079	0.213
<b>High school grad</b>	0.299	0.509	0.207
<b>Some college</b>	0.453	0.372	0.362
<b>College graduate</b>	0.132	0.041	0.218
<b>Speak poor English</b>	0.004	0.051	0.220
<b>Age of entry</b>	---	6.4	17.3
<b>Married</b>	0.087	0.142	0.166
<b>Observations</b>	<b>283,942</b>	<b>3,550</b>	<b>11,921</b>

**Table 5.3**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**hourly wages for undocumented men**

	2011		Change in 2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.814*** (0.053)	0.838*** (0.054)	0.201** (0.078)	0.227*** (0.082)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.150** (0.061)		0.137 (0.089)
Black	-0.147 *** (0.034)	-0.172*** (0.030)	-0.091** (0.041)	-0.093** (0.043)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.195** (0.086)		0.123 (0.133)
Asian	0.034 (0.021)	0.036 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.030)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.064 (0.074)		-0.052 (0.110)
Age	0.049*** (0.001)	0.049*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Enrolled in school	-0.543*** (0.019)	-0.554 *** (0.021)	-0.076*** (0.027)	-0.134*** (0.030)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.097 (0.071)		0.314*** (0.103)
High school graduate	0.031** (0.015)	0.029* (0.016)	0.002 (0.023)	0.0196 (0.024)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.121 (0.097)		0.004 (0.150)
Some college	0.152*** (0.018)	0.128*** (0.019)	0.012 (0.027)	0.006 (0.029)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.223*** (0.083)		-0.105 (0.129)
College graduate	0.709*** (0.021)	0.684*** (0.022)	-0.050* (0.030)	-0.063** (0.031)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.053 (0.118)		-0.122 (0.175)

**Table 5.3**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**hourly wages for undocumented men (Continued)**

	2011		Change in 2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Poor English	-0.145*** (0.013)	-0.156*** (0.014)	0.008 (0.020)	0.014 (0.021)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.173*** (0.053)		-0.082 (0.079)
Married	0.099*** (0.012)	0.089*** (0.012)	0.033* (0.017)	(0.021) (0.018)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.131*** (0.046)		0.013 (0.061)
Service	-0.074** (0.032)	-0.067** (0.089)	-0.127** (0.049)	-0.130** (0.053)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.088 (0.099)		0.057 (0.146)
Agriculture	-0.273*** (0.037)	-0.252*** (0.039)	-0.143** (0.057)	-0.159*** (0.061)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.232* (0.121)		0.243 (0.179)
Production	0.049 (0.032)	0.060* (0.034)	-0.061 (0.049)	-0.102 (0.103)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.102 (0.103)		0.087 (0.149)
Managerial/Professional	0.022 (0.033)	0.045 (0.035)	-0.048 (0.050)	-0.270** (0.107)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.270** (0.107)		0.095 (0.155)

(1) Number of observations: 42,162. Adjusted R-squared: 0.3203

(2) Number of observations: 42,162. Adjusted R-squared: 0.3232

Note: The table shows detailed results from an OLS regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35. Interactions with a time dummy were used to obtain the marginal effects from 2016. The base education level is less than high school and the base occupation group is federal employee, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.4**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**hourly wages for undocumented women**

	2011		Change in 2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.230*** (0.082)	0.237*** (0.085)	0.254** (0.120)	0.292** (0.125)
Eligible for DACA	0.119*** (0.029)	0.237 (0.226)	0.169*** (0.042)	-0.529 (0.332)
Hispanic	-0.027 (0.027)	-0.043 (0.029)	-0.023 (0.039)	-0.033 (0.042)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.055 (0.079)		0.101 (0.120)
Black	-0.019 (0.036)	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.124** (0.053)	-0.098* (0.056)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.171 (0.108)		-0.135 (0.167)
Asian	0.055** (0.024)	0.067** (0.028)	0.017 (0.037)	0.008 (0.039)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.188** (0.092)		0.079 (0.144)
Age	0.059*** (0.002)	0.059*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)
Enrolled in school	-0.357*** (0.024)	-0.362*** (0.026)	-0.112*** (0.034)	-0.146*** (0.037)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.071 (0.095)		0.405*** (0.136)
High school graduate	0.060** (0.026)	0.068** (0.028)	-0.044 (0.041)	-0.034 (0.043)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.105 (0.144)		0.227 (0.211)
Some college	0.209*** (0.029)	0.180*** (0.030)	0.044 (0.043)	0.061 (0.045)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.143 (0.126)		-0.117 (0.184)
College graduate	0.587*** (0.031)	0.569*** (0.032)	0.006 (0.045)	0.005 (0.047)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.105 (0.157)		0.070 (0.224)

**Table 5.4**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**hourly wages for undocumented women (Continued)**

	2011		Change in 2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Poor English skills	-0.258*** (0.023)	-0.264*** (0.024)	0.037 (0.035)	0.037 (0.036)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.132 (0.101)		-0.004 (0.148)
Married	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.073*** (0.019)	-0.001 (.026)	0.001 (0.028)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.059 (0.062)		-0.013 (0.084)
Service	-0.001 (0.050)	0.010 (0.054)	-0.181 ** (0.075)	-0.229*** (0.081)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.061 (0.152)		0.341 (0.225)
Agriculture	-0.286*** (0.066)	-0.250*** (0.071)	0.022 (0.103)	-0.034 (0.109)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.269 (0.201)		0.417 (0.329)
Production	0.219*** (0.053)	0.247*** (0.058)	-0.099 (0.082)	-0.130 (0.087)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.223 (0.171)		0.233 (0.249)
Managerial/Professional	0.250*** (0.051)	0.279*** (0.055)	-0.157** (0.077)	-0.204** (0.082)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.183 (0.157)		0.350 (0.231)

(1) Number of observations: 24,317. Adjusted R-squared: 0.2534

(2) Number of observations: 24,317. Adjusted R-squared: 0.2552

Note: The table shows detailed results from an OLS regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, on women ages 18-35. Interactions with a time dummy were used to obtain the marginal effects from 2016. The base education level is less than high school and the base occupation group is federal employee, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.5**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hours worked per week for undocumented men**

	2011		Change in 2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	34.770*** (0.670)	35.107*** (0.691)	0.962 (1.007)	1.034 (1.042)
Eligible for DACA	-0.438* (0.265)	-4.220*** (1.915)	1.139*** (0.373)	2.678 (2.878)
Hispanic	-0.760*** (0.251)	-1.275*** (0.269)	-0.179 (0.361)	-0.073 (0.387)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		3.702*** (0.760)		-0.656 (1.129)
Black	-1.630*** (0.359)	-1.962*** (0.383)	-0.693 (0.517)	-0.516 (0.547)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.906*** (1.092)		-1.004 (1.691)
Asian	-2.075*** (0.266)	-2.108*** (0.279)	-0.739** (0.370)	-0.817** (0.384)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.177 (0.946)		1.788 (1.403)
Age	0.241*** (0.017)	0.245*** (0.017)	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.009 (0.025)
Enrolled in school	-8.817*** (0.244)	-8.618*** (0.2730)	0.657* (0.347)	0.138 (0.387)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.175 (0.901)		-0.223 (1.310)
High school graduate	0.675*** (0.188)	0.425** (0.196)	-0.327 (0.294)	-0.035 (0.308)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.413 (1.232)		-2.393 (1.903)
Some college	0.786*** (0.231)	0.709*** (0.241)	-0.227 (0.345)	-0.282 (0.360)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.106 (1.049)		-0.321 (1.634)

**Table 5.5**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hours worked per week for undocumented men (Continued)**

College graduate	4.110*** (0.263)	3.661*** (0.273)	-1.188*** (0.378)	0.976** (0.392)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		3.204** (1.509)		-0.817 (2.232)
Poor English	-0.284* (0.165)	-0.256*** (0.171)	0.161 (0.256)	0.213 (0.267)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.486 (0.675)		-1.538 (0.996)
Married	0.846*** (0.149)	0.739*** (0.154)	-0.032 (0.221)	-0.198 (0.23)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.536*** (0.573)		0.795 (0.761)
Service	-1.923*** (0.413)	-1.637*** (0.438)	-0.196 (0.633)	-0.218 (0.678)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-2.187* (1.291)		0.568 (1.876)
Agriculture	3.106*** (0.472)	3.106*** (0.498)	1.518** (0.736)	1.589 (0.783)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.283 (1.561)		-0.552 (2.306)
Production	-1.637*** (0.415)	-1.683*** (0.439)	1.249** (0.635)	1.205* (0.680)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.067 (1.325)		-0.257 (1.912)
Managerial/professional	-2.281*** (0.427)	-2,183*** (0.452)	0.133 (0.648)	0.174 (0.692)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-1.056 (1.376)		0.341 (1.985)

(1) Number of observations: 44,583. Adjusted R-squared: 0.1367

(2) Number of observations: 44,583. Adjusted R-squared: 0.1398

Note: The table shows detailed results from an OLS regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35. Interactions with a time dummy were used to obtain the change in effects from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school and the base occupation group is federal employee, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.6**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hours**  
**worked per week for undocumented women**

	2011		Change in 2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	30.390*** (0.986)	30.658*** (1.019)	0.639 (1.459)	0.690 (1.509)
Eligible for DACA	-0.175 (0.357)	-2.496 (2.760)	1.988*** (0.505)	0.471 (4.046)
Hispanic	0.216 (0.325)	-0.378 (0.349)	-0.434 (0.485)	-0.233 (0.499)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.739*** (0.968)		-0.647 (1.458)
Black	-0.309 (0.439)	-0.425 (0.469)	0.658 (0.638)	0.742 (0.677)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.250 (1.324)		0.075 (2.035)
Asian	-0.723 (0.323)	-0.522 (0.338)	-0.022 (0.453)	-0.145 (0.470)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-2.443** (1.127)		0.890 (1.745)
Age	0.280*** (0.280)	0.289*** (0.025)	0.004 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.036)
Enrolled in school	-6.942*** (0.294)	-6.679*** (0.319)	-1.741*** (0.417)	-2.317*** (0.453)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-1.963* (1.156)		4.075** (1.660)
High school graduate	0.826*** (0.313)	0.507 (0.330)	-0.307 (0.485)	0.062 (0.515)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.739 (1.751)		0.204 (2.557)
Some college	1.003*** (0.340)	0.708** (0.356)	0.270 (0.513)	0.302 (0.537)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.950* (1.524)		-1.515 (2.220)
College graduate	4.306*** (0.365)	3.739*** (0.378)	0.140 (0.538)	0.509 (0.556)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		5.294*** (1.903)		-4.985* (2.707)

**Table 5.6**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on hours worked per week for undocumented women (Continued)**

Poor English	-1.156*** (0.275)	-1.040*** (0.285)	0.133 (0.418)	-0.013 (0.434)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.211 (1.193)		1.111 (1.761)
Married	-1.084*** (0.216)	-1.463*** (0.226)	-0.619** (0.314)	-0.601* (0.330)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		3.655*** (0.749)		-0.963 (1.015)
Service	-4.790*** (0.611)	-4.680*** (0.651)	0.667 (0.925)	0.692 (0.988)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-0.206 (1.856)		-0.144 (2.766)
Agriculture	2.129*** (0.813)	2.567*** (0.868)	-0.69 (1.261)	-0.918 (1.337)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-3.439 (2.455)		2.12 (4.047)
Production	-0.136 (0.667)	-0.199 (0.708)	0.756 (1.002)	0.871 (1.068)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.748 (2.090)		-1.876 (3.064)
Managerial/professional	-2.428*** (0.627)	-2.172*** (0.668)	0.107 (0.940)	-0.078 (1.004)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		-1.642 (1.916)		1.511 (2.837)

(1) Number of observations: 25,726. Adjusted R-squared: 0.1434

(2) Number of observations: 25,726. Adjusted R-squared: 0.1489

Note: The table shows detailed results from an OLS regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35. Interactions with a time dummy were used to obtain the change in effects from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school and the base occupation group is federal employee, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.7**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on labor force participation for undocumented men**

	2011		2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.572*** (0.070)	0.603*** (0.077)	0.652** (0.123)	0.703* (0.137)
Eligible for DACA	1.232*** (0.063)	0.532*** (0.117)	1.599*** (0.127)	0.765 (0.280)
Hispanic	1.597*** (0.090)	1.610*** (0.104)	1.158* (0.099)	1.059 (0.102)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.894 (0.122)		1.478* (0.322)
Black	1.166** (0.088)	1.171* (0.100)	1.105 (0.126)	1.148 (0.145)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.958 (0.177)		0.827 (0.257)
Asian	0.835*** (0.048)	0.886* (0.056)	1.085 (0.090)	1.019 (0.092)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.722** (0.107)		1.492 (0.367)
Age	1.071*** (0.004)	1.070*** (0.004)	1.010 (0.006)	1.010 (0.006)
Enrolled in school	0.168*** (0.008)	0.151*** (0.042)	0.789*** (0.054)	0.777*** (0.058)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.258*** (0.312)		1.393 (0.318)
High school graduate	1.099** (0.052)	1.316** (0.060)	1.220*** (0.093)	1.260*** (0.108)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.831*** (0.302)		1.167 (0.329)
Some college	1.383*** (0.074)	1.330*** (0.080)	1.349*** (0.112)	1.266** (0.117)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.493*** (0.212)		1.355 (0.320)
College graduate	2.267*** (0.146)	2.259*** (0.158)	1.187* (0.112)	1.174 (0.120)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.478* (0.349)		0.635 (0.227)

**Table 5.7**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on labor force participation for undocumented men (Continued)**

Poor English	0.967 (0.041)	0.944 (0.042)	1.064 (0.073)	1.064 (0.077)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.056 (0.155)		1.032 (0.266)
Married	1.638*** (0.069)	1.597*** (0.071)	1.006 (0.065)	0.980 (0.067)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.251 (0.184)		1.195 (0.266)

(1) Number of observations: 53,897. Pseudo R-squared: 0.2110

(2) Number of observations: 53,897. Pseudo R-squared: 0.2137

Note: The table shows detailed results of odds ratios from logistic regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35.

Interactions with a time dummy were used to observe the change in effect from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.8**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on labor force participation for undocumented women**

	2011		2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.385*** (0.041)	0.421*** (0.046)	1.209 (0.192)	1.212 (0.197)
Eligible for DACA	1.292*** (0.063)	0.849 (0.849)	1.408*** (0.103)	0.709 (0.277)
Hispanic	1.002 (0.047)	1.008 (0.051)	1.201*** (0.083)	1.131* (0.083)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.803 (0.117)		1.717** (0.380)
Black	1.691*** (0.116)	1.824*** (0.137)	0.914 (0.092)	0.851 (0.092)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.578*** (0.114)		1.744* (0.552)
Asian	0.688*** (0.032)	0.710*** (0.034)	1.069 (0.069)	1.033 (0.070)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.728** (0.117)		1.4
Age	1.063*** (0.004)	1.062*** (0.004)	0.993 (0.005)	0.9936*** (0.005)
Enrolled in school	0.414*** (0.017)	0.398*** (0.018)	0.822*** (0.049)	0.779*** (0.051)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.096 (0.161)		1.864*** (0.425)
High school graduate	1.319*** (0.053)	1.331*** (0.057)	0.932 (0.059)	0.956 (0.065)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.359 (0.264)		1.106 (0.341)
Some college	1.781*** (0.081)	1.647*** (0.080)	1.007 (0.070)	1.050 (0.077)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.066*** (0.345)		0.716 (0.189)
College graduate	2.002*** (0.098)	1.903*** (0.097)	0.714 (0.074)	1.055 (0.079)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.956*** (0.730)		0.477** (0.173)

**Table 5.8**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on labor force participation for undocumented women (Continued)**

Poor English	0.605*** (0.021)	0.583*** (0.021)	0.915* (0.050)	0.946 (0.053)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.285* (0.196)		0.704 (0.164)
Married	0.382*** (0.012)	0.366*** (0.012)	0.918* (0.044)	0.903** (0.046)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.608*** (0.168)		0.966 (0.144)

(1) Number of observations: 45,332. Pseudo R-squared: 0.0734

(2) Number of observations: 45,332. Pseudo R-squared: 0.0753

Note: The table shows detailed results of odds ratios from logistic regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35.

Interactions with a time dummy were used to observe the change in effect from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.9**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on school enrollment for undocumented men**

	2011		2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	105.263*** (15.367)	72.827*** (9.719)	2.666*** (0.551)	3.830*** (0.734)
Eligible for DACA	1.509*** (0.083)	2.001*** (0.256)	1.222** (0.099)	0.783 (0.783)
Hispanic	0.224*** (0.013)	0.124*** (0.008)	1.163* (0.104)	1.407*** (0.133)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		2.462*** (0.343)		1.019 (0.223)
Black	0.811*** (0.062)	0.817** (0.065)	1.435*** (0.164)	1.391*** (0.163)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.897 (0.168)		0.747 (0.231)
Asian	1.279*** (0.071)	1.268*** (0.073)	1.048 (0.084)	1.084 (0.090)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.430** (0.243)		1.148 (0.312)
Age	0.826*** (0.004)	0.834*** (0.007)	0.956*** (0.007)	0.944*** (0.007)
Poor English	0.374*** (0.025)	0.297*** (0.019)	1.028 (0.106)	0.917 (0.090)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.868 (0.139)		1.456 (0.367)
Married	0.483*** (0.025)	0.497*** (0.027)	1.087 (0.082)	0.978 (0.076)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.824 (0.109)		1.858*** (0.334)

**Table 5.9**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on school enrollment for undocumented men (Continued)**

Living in poverty	1.934*** (0.095)	1.991*** (0.100)	1.361*** (0.098)	1.402*** (0.103)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.570*** (0.060)		0.679** (0.117)

(1) Number of observations: 53,897. Pseudo R-squared: 0.3638

(2) Number of observations: 53,897. Pseudo R-squared: 0.3679

---

Note: The table shows detailed results of odds ratios from logistic regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35.

Interactions with a time dummy were used to observe the change in effect from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.10**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on school enrollment for undocumented women**

	2011		2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	105.383*** (14.938)	74.935*** (9.864)	1.582** (0.316)	2.191*** (0.412)
Eligible for DACA	1.703*** (0.100)	2.652*** (0.427)	1.173* (0.101)	0.973 (0.240)
Hispanic	1.132*** (0.018)	0.213*** (0.014)	1.132 (0.105)	1.231** (0.119)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.359* (0.231)		0.928 (0.928)
Black	1.187** (0.094)	1.199** (0.097)	0.959 (0.113)	0.969 (0.117)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.724 (0.164)		0.985 (0.350)
Asian	1.285*** (0.073)	1.316*** (0.076)	0.968 (0.078)	0.965 (0.080)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.703** (0.365)		1.119 (0.368)
Age	0.833*** (0.004)	0.840*** (0.004)	0.977*** (0.007)	0.968*** (0.007)
Poor English	0.467*** (0.031)	0.348*** (0.022)	0.976 (0.975)	0.955 (0.091)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.962 (0.187)		0.737 (0.246)
Married	0.355*** (0.017)	0.377*** (0.018)	1.024 (0.069)	0.921 (0.065)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.866 (0.104)		1.649*** (0.281)

**Table 5.10**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on school enrollment for undocumented women (Continued)**

Living in poverty	1.150*** (0.056)	1.153*** (0.059)	1.394*** (0.098)	1.443*** (0.106)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.615*** (0.067)		0.628*** (0.106)

(1) Number of observations: 45,332. Pseudo R-squared: 0.3338

(2) Number of observations: 45,332. Pseudo R-squared: 0.3363

---

Note: The table shows detailed results of odds ratios from logistic regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35.

Interactions with a time dummy were used to observe the change in effect from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.11**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on likeliness of**  
**living in poverty for undocumented men**

	2011		2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.653*** (0.074)	0.633*** (0.075)	0.819 (0.147)	0.846 (0.156)
Eligible for DACA	0.610*** (0.032)	0.683 (0.178)	0.871* (0.073)	1.411 (0.668)
Hispanic	1.299*** (0.073)	1.262*** (0.078)	0.866* (0.074)	0.891 (0.082)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.171 (0.187)		1.146 (0.329)
Black	1.099 (0.085)	1.132 (0.095)	0.878 (0.103)	0.809* (0.101)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.810 (0.187)		2.361** (0.927)
Asian	1.023 (0.061)	1.040 (0.066)	0.093 (0.093)	1.049 (0.093)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.865 (0.159)		1.692 (0.559)
Age	0.980*** (0.004)	0.981*** (0.004)	1.008 (0.006)	1.007 (0.006)
Enrolled in school	2.178 (0.104)	2.588*** (0.137)	1.168** (0.083)	1.12 (0.086)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.441*** (0.070)		0.546** (0.164)
High school graduate	0.820*** (0.031)	0.74*** (0.031)	0.994 (0.064)	0.997 (0.070)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.570** (0.285)		0.394*** (0.138)
Some college	0.542*** (0.026)	0.505*** (0.027)	1.081 (0.083)	1.144 (0.094)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.716*** (0.270)		0.585** (0.158)
College graduate	0.497*** (0.029)	0.437*** (0.027)	1.566*** (0.135)	1.737*** (0.157)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		4.409*** (1.117)		0.324*** (0.131)

**Table 5.11**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on likeliness of living in poverty for undocumented men (Continued)**

Poor English	1.408*** (0.048)	1.423*** (0.051)	1.099* (0.063)	1.088 (0.065)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.824 (0.116)		1.330 (0.304)
Married	1.262*** (0.042)	1.297*** (0.045)	0.767*** (0.041)	0.762*** (0.042)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.806 (0.106)		1.147 (0.226)
Service	0.509*** (0.023)	0.521*** (0.027)	0.813*** (0.057)	0.793*** (0.142)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.906 (0.106)		1.309 (0.257)
Agriculture	0.830*** (0.054)	0.872** (0.061)	0.775** (0.083)	0.762** (0.086)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.600** (0.138)		1.003 (0.417)
Production	0.518*** (0.025)	0.540*** (0.029)	0.688*** (0.052)	0.667*** (0.054)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.691** (0.105)		1.377 (0.336)
Managerial/professional	0.530*** (0.028)	0.540*** (0.030)	0.649*** (0.051)	0.621*** (0.052)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.948 (0.151)		1.738 (0.441)

(1) Number of observations: 53,897. Pseudo R-squared: 0.0646

(2) Number of observations: 53,897. Pseudo R-squared: 0.0683

Note: The table shows detailed results of odds ratios from logistic regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35.

Interactions with a time dummy were used to observe the change in effect from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school and the base occupation group is federal employee, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.12**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on likeliness of**  
**living in poverty for undocumented women**

	2011		2016	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.926 (0.111)	0.962 (0.119)	0.719* (0.132)	0.699* (0.131)
Eligible for DACA	0.584*** (0.032)	0.624 (0.183)	1.125 (0.094)	1.134 (0.530)
Hispanic	1.607*** (0.092)	1.582*** (0.097)	0.851* (0.071)	0.871 (0.078)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.080 (0.194)		0.981 (0.275)
Black	1.288*** (0.100)	1.344*** (0.113)	0.636*** (0.076)	0.609*** (0.077)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.787 (0.188)		1.400 (0.559)
Asian	0.820*** (0.049)	0.812*** (0.052)	0.951 (0.081)	0.932 (0.083)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.040 (0.215)		1.321 (0.434)
Age	1.009** (0.004)	1.01*** (0.004)	1.015** (0.006)	1.013** (0.006)
Enrolled in school	1.265*** (0.061)	1.472*** (0.078)	1.302*** (0.093)	1.300 (0.100)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.380*** (0.066)		0.887 (0.242)
High school graduate	0.756*** (0.032)	0.69*** (0.031)	0.911 (0.062)	0.870* (0.063)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.049		1.242 (0.433)
Some college	0.490*** (0.024)	0.454*** (0.024)	0.795*** (0.062)	0.838** (0.070)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.728*** (0.300)		0.860 (0.253)
College graduate	0.456*** (0.026)	0.418*** (0.025)	1.246*** (0.106)	1.314*** (0.116)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		3.191*** (0.850)		0.773 (0.311)

**Table 5.12**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on likeliness of living in poverty for undocumented women (Continued)**

Poor English	1.683*** (0.064)	1.653*** (0.066)	0.976 (0.059)	1.014 (0.064)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.326* (0.210)		0.692 (0.173)
Married	0.313*** (0.011)	0.307*** (0.012)	0.810*** (0.045)	0.814*** (0.048)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.342** (0.173)		1.108 (0.207)
Service	0.469*** (0.017)	0.459** (0.018)	1.012 (0.058)	1.054 (0.065)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.098 (0.119)		0.849 (0.144)
Agriculture	0.598*** (0.058)	0.582*** (0.060)	0.834 (0.834)	0.871 (0.145)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		0.934 (0.294)		0.746 (0.443)
Production	0.313*** (0.021)	0.305*** (0.022)	0.776** (0.084)	0.784* (0.090)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.150 (0.272)		0.933 (0.332)
Managerial/professional	0.294*** (0.016)	0.272*** (0.016)	0.917 (0.072)	0.979 (0.082)
<i>x DACA eligibility</i>		1.499*** (0.234)		0.697 (0.165)

(1) Number of observations: 45,332. Pseudo R-squared: 0.1517

(2) Number of observations: 45,332. Pseudo R-squared: 0.1556

Note: The table shows detailed results of odds ratios from logistic regression on pooled two-year cross-sectional data from 2011 and 2016, ages 18-35.

Interactions with a time dummy were used to observe the change in effect from 2011 to 2016. The base education level is less than high school and the base occupation group is federal employee, which has been omitted from the sample. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.13**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**undocumented men, ages 18-35**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
Log of hourly wages	-0.135 (0.150) [-0.430, 0.159]	-0.153 (0.226) [-0.596, 0.289]	42,162	0.323
Log of yearly wages	-0.320* (0.165) [-0.644, 0.004]	-0.044 (0.248) [-0.541, 0.442]	42,162	0.359
Hours worked per week	-4.220** (1.915) [-7.974, -0.466]	2.678 (2.878) [-2.962, 8.319]	44,583	0.140
	<i>(odds ratios)</i>			
Labor force participation	0.532*** (0.117) [0.345, 0.819]	0.765 (0.280) [0.374, 1.57]	53,897	0.214
School Enrollment	2.001*** (0.256) [1.557, 2.571]	0.783 (0.159) [0.526, 1.165]	53,897	0.368
College Enrollment: <i>Full</i>	0.294*** (0.092) [0.160, 0.544]	1.289 (0.641) [0.486, 3.417]	8,079	0.293
<i>In-state (both 2011 and 2016)</i>	0.226*** (0.126) [0.076, 0.671]	1.449 (1.220) [0.278, 7.553]	3,954	0.363
<i>In-state (2016 only)</i>	0.374 (0.272) [0.090, 1.560]	0.936 (0.955) [0.126, 6.924]	1,129	0.397

**Table 5.13**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility on**  
**undocumented men, ages 18-35 (Continued)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
High School Enrollment	2.933*** (0.712) [1.823, 4.722]	0.798 (0.161) [0.292, 1.361]	6,758	0.381
Living in poverty	0.683 (0.178) [0.410, 1.138]	1.411 (0.668) [0.963, 1.302]	53,897	0.068
Living in near poverty	1.059 (0.244) [0.673, 1.664]	0.650 (0.254) [0.302, 1.396]	53,897	0.076

Note: The tables present the point estimates of the coefficient of DACA eligibility on the dependent variables listed in the far-left column. The age group analyzed was 18-35 years old, with 35 being the upper age limit for DACA. College samples analyze the 18-25 year old age group while high school enrollment is limited to 15-19 year olds. Labor force outcomes estimated either by OLS regression or logistic regression with odds ratios for variables with binary outcomes. Odds ratios are compared against ineligible undocumented immigrants. Standard errors are in parenthesis and 95% confidence levels are in brackets. Statistical significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

**Table 5.14**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility**  
**on undocumented women, ages 18-35**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
Log of hourly wages	0.237 (0.226) [-0.206, 0.681]	-0.519 (0.332) [-1.169, 0.131]	24,317	0.255
Log of yearly wages	0.221 (0.264) [-0.297, 0.738]	-0.552 (0.387) [-1.310, 0.207]	24,317	0.292
Hours worked per week	-2.496 (2.760) [-7.906, 2.914]	0.471 (4.046) [-7.460, 8.401]	25,726	0.147
	<i>(odds ratios)</i>			
Labor force participation	0.849 (0.216) [0.515, 1.399]	0.708 (0.277) [0.328, 1.526]	45,332	0.075
School Enrollment	2.652*** (0.427) [1.934, 3.635]	0.973 (0.240) [0.599, 1.576]	45,332	0.336
College Enrollment <i>Full</i>	0.659 (0.078) [0.335, 1.296]	0.700 (0.379) [0.242, 2.023]	7,549	0.290
<i>In-state tuition (both 2011 and 2016)</i>	1.334 (0.695) [0.481, 3.708]	0.209 (0.205) [0.030, 1.435]	3,690	0.312
<i>In-state tuition (2016 only)</i>	1.359 (0.998) [0.322, 5.730]	0.390 (0.419) [0.048, 3.204]	1,132	0.265

**Table 5.14**  
**Empirical results of estimating the effect of DACA eligibility**  
**on undocumented women, ages 18-35 (Continued)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared</b>
High School Enrollment	1.602* (0.411) [0.969, 2.649]	1.101 (0.471) [0.476, 2.547]	5,959	0.430
Living in poverty	0.624 (0.183) [0.350, 1.110]	1.134 (0.530) [0.730, 1.039]	45,332	0.156
Living in near poverty	0.661 (0.174) [0.395, 1.107]	1.029 (0.425) [0.458, 2.312]	45,332	0.175

Note: The tables present the point estimates of the coefficient of DACA eligibility on the dependent variables listed in the far-left column. The age group analyzed was 18-35 years old, with 35 being the upper age limit for DACA. College samples analyze the 18-25 year old age group while high school enrollment is limited to 15-19 year olds. Labor force outcomes estimated either by OLS regression or logistic regression with odds ratios for variables with binary outcomes. Odds ratios are compared against ineligible undocumented immigrants. Standard errors are in parenthesis and 95% confidence levels are in brackets. Statistical significance: \*\*\* 1%, \*\* 5%, \* 10%.

## REFERENCES

- Abramitzky, R., & Boustan, L. P. (2016). Immigration in American Economic History. doi:10.3386/w21882
- Aguilar, J., & Mekelburg, M. (2016, June 23). U.S. Supreme Court Tie Deals Blow to Obama's Immigration Order. Retrieved October 16, 2017, from <http://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/23/supreme-court-rules-obamas-immigration-order>
- Altangerel, K., & Ours, J. C. (2017). U.S. Immigration Reform and the Migration Dynamics of Mexican Males. *De Economist*, 165(4), 463-485. doi:10.1007/s10645-017-9311-x
- Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Antman, F. (2016). Can authorization reduce poverty among undocumented immigrants? Evidence from the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. *Economics Letters*, 147, 1-4. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.001
- (2016). Schooling and labor market effects of temporary authorization: Evidence from DACA. *Journal of Population Economics*, 30(1), 339-373. doi:10.1007/s00148-016-0606-z
- Basso, G., Peri, G., & Rahman, A. (2017). Computerization and Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the United States. doi:10.3386/w23935
- Bono, M. (2015). When a rose is not a rose: DACA, the DREAM act, and the need for more comprehensive immigration reform. *Thurgood Marshall Law Review*, 40(2), 193-222.
- Borjas, G. (2006). Native Internal Migration and the Labor Market Impact of Immigration. *The Journal of Human Resources*, 41. doi:10.3386/w11610
- Camarota, S. A. (2017, August 3). Deportation vs. the Cost of Letting Illegal Immigrants Stay. Retrieved April 01, 2018, from <https://cis.org/Report/Deportation-vs-Cost-Letting-Illegal-Immigrants-Stay>
- Capps, R., Fix, M., & Zong, J. (2017). The Education and Work Profiles of the DACA Population. *Migration Policy Institute*.

- Card, D. (2009). Immigration and Inequality. NBER Working Paper #14683. doi:10.3386/w14683
- Chi, M. (2015). Improved legal status as the major source of earnings premiums associated with intermarriage: Evidence from the 1986 IRCA amnesty. *Review of Economics of the Household*, 15(2), 691-706. doi:10.1007/s11150-015-9305-x
- Chau, N. (2001). Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 19(3), 604-634. doi:10.1086/322075
- Gang, I. N., & Yun, M. (2006). Immigration Amnesty and Immigrants Earnings. *Research in Labor Economics Immigration*, 273-309. doi:10.1016/s0147-9121(07)00007-6
- Gonzales, R. (2018, February 14). 2nd Federal Court Blocks Trump From Rescinding DACA. Retrieved February 05, 2018, from <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/13/585597527/second-federal-court-blocks-trump-from-rescinding-daca>
- Hanson, G. H., Scheve, K. F., Slaughter, M. J., & Spilimbergo, A. (2002). Immigration and the U.S. Economy: Labor-Market Impacts, Illegal Entry, and Policy Choices. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. doi:10.2139/ssrn.296108
- Hatton, T. J. (2014). The economics of international migration: A short history of the debate. *Labour Economics*, 30, 43-50. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2014.06.006
- Kossoudji, S. A., & Cobb-Clark, D. (2000). IRCAs Impact on the Occupational Concentration and Mobility of Newly-Legalized Mexican Men. *Journal of Public Economics*, 13, 81-98. doi:10.2139/ssrn.166541
- Lewis, E. (2017). How Immigration Affects Workers: Two Wrong Models and a Right One. *Cato Journal*, 37(3), 461-472.
- López, G., & Krogstad, J. M. (2017, September 25). Key facts about unauthorized immigrants enrolled in DACA. Retrieved from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/25/key-facts-about-unauthorized-immigrants-enrolled-in-daca/>
- Newman, R. (2018, January 30). 'Dreamers' are good for the economy. Retrieved February 04, 2018, from <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/dreamers-good-economy-204616866.html>

- Orrenius, P. M., & Zaovdny, M. (2012). The Economic Consequences of Amnesty for Unauthorized Immigrants. *Cato Journal*, 32(1), 85-106.
- Orrenius, P. M., & Zavodny, M. (2017). Unauthorized Mexican Workers in the United States: Recent Inflows and Possible Future Scenarios. *Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Papers*, 2017(1701). doi:10.24149/wp1701
- Pandey, M., & Chaudhuri, A. R. (2017). Immigration-induced effects of changes in size and skill distribution of the labor force on wages in the U.S. *Journal of Macroeconomics*, 52, 118-134. doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.03.003
- Passel, J. S., & Cohn, D. (2017, April 25). As Mexican share declined, U.S. unauthorized immigrant population fell in 2015 below recession level. Retrieved April 05, 2018, from <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/as-mexican-share-declined-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-population-fell-in-2015-below-recession-level/>
- Passel, J. S., & Cohn, D. (2016, November 03). Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Workforce Stable After the Great Recession. Retrieved from <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/11/03/size-of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-workforce-stable-after-the-great-recession/#>
- Pope, N. G. (2016). The Effects of DACAmentation: The Impact of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals on Unauthorized Immigrants. *Journal of Public Economics*, 143, 98-114. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.014
- State & Local Tax Contributions of Young Undocumented Immigrants. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://itep.org/state-local-tax-contributions-of-young-undocumented-immigrants/>
- Varas, J., & Zafar, U. (2017, December 21). Estimating the Economic Contributions of DACA Recipients. Retrieved April 04, 2018, from <https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/estimating-economic-contributions-daca-recipients/>

Warren, R., & Kerwin, D. (2015). Beyond DAPA and DACA: Revisiting Legislative Reform in Light of Long-Term Trends in Unauthorized Immigration to the United States. *Journal on Migration and Human Security*, 3(1), 80-108. doi:10.14240/jmhs.v3i1.45

Wong, T. K., Rosas, G. M., Luna, A., Manning, H., Reyna, A., O'Shea, P. Wolgin, P. E. (2017, August 28). DACA Recipients' Economic and Educational Gains Continue to Grow. Retrieved November 14, 2017, from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2017/08/28/437956/daca-recipients-economic-educational-gains-continue-grow/>

USCIS, 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-executive-actions-immigration>

Zheng, Ping (2016). Three Empirical Studies on Undocumented Immigrants in the U.S (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest (10128244)

Zong, J., Zong, J. B., Batalova, J., & Hallock, J. (2018, February 27). Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States. Retrieved from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states>