

## **Statement of Permission**

I give permission for public access to my thesis and for any copying to be done at the discretion of the archives librarian and/or the College librarian.

Signed: Meredith Crawford

May 25, 2006

The Past in the Present:  
The Emergence and Implications of a  
*“Montagsdemo Culture”* in Leipzig, Germany

by Meredith Crawford  
under the Direction of  
Professor Andrew Lass  
Professor Jens Christiansen

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Faculty of Mount Holyoke College  
in partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

European Studies Program  
Mount Holyoke College  
South Hadley, MA 01075

May 2006

## **Acknowledgements**

Throughout the two years that I spent on this project, many people supported and encouraged me. I want to first acknowledge the Lord God, who got me out of Vienna safely and provided for me in ways I couldn't provide for myself during my research in Leipzig. I love you and I ask that my life might glorify you. I am also appreciative to my parents for their love, support, and endless cups of tea. The Nikolaikirche Leipzig, particularly Reverend Christian Führer, inspired me to write about the demonstrations and the protest culture that emerged from them. The church, especially Waltraud and Sonia, gave me many valuable materials and insights on current events; likewise, I am grateful to all my informants for their opinions and insight. I am deeply grateful to Professors Andrew Lass, Holly Liu, Jens Christiansen and Kenneth Tucker Jr., for all of their help on this undertaking and for their support after my accident. I am particularly grateful to Professor Lass for the extensive advising. I also want to thank the girls in Daughters of Zion, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, and my roommates, Nadine Krause '07 and Marija Vulfs '09, for their support, encouragement and prayers.

### **Abstract**

In 2004, an economic recession and high unemployment, coupled with a welfare reform, *Hartz IV*, altering the money an unemployed individual received, sparked protests in several German cities, most notably in Leipzig, Germany, located in former East Germany. Although the 2004 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* (Leipzig Monday demonstrations) directly protested *Hartz IV*, they were the product of a Leipzig protest culture that claimed ancestry to the 1989 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*, which were a contributing factor to the fall of the Berlin wall. Subtly, these 2004 demonstrations revealed the problems of German reunification and Western influence in the former East Germany, because they highlight economic, political, and cultural differences that persist along the Cold War boundaries.

## Table of Contents

<b>Chapter 1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 2. The 1989 <i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> Movement.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Chapter 3. The 2004 <i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> Movement.....</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1. Background of 2004 <i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i>	
<i>Leaders</i> .....	29
3.1.1 Nikolaikirche.....	29
3.1.2 BüSo.....	30
3.2 Sociological Analysis of 2004	
<i>Montagsdemonstration Movement</i> .....	35
3.3 Anthropological Analysis of 2004	
<i>Montagsdemonstrationen Movement</i> .....	42
3.3.1 Friedensgebete.....	45
3.3.2 Montagsdemonstrationen.....	46
3.4 The Media.....	47
3.4.1 1989 <i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> (Diagram 1).....	49
3.4.2 2004 Anti-Hartz IV	
<i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> (Diagram 2).....	51
3.4.3 “ <i>Montagsdemo Culture</i> ” (Diagram 3).....	53
3.4.4 “Wessi-Ossi” Relations (Diagrams 4, 5 and 6)...	53
3.5 Photographic Analysis of the Movements.....	53
3.5.1 1989 <i>Montagsdemonstratione</i> .....	54
3.5.2 Comparative Analysis of the 1989 and 2004	
<i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> .....	57
3.5.3 2004 <i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> . ....	59
3.5.3.1 Absent from the 2004 Photographs.....	62
3.5.3.2 Significance.....	64
3.5.3.3 Media Representation of the	
“ <i>Montagsdemo Culture</i> ” .....	65
3.6 Conclusion.....	69

<b>Chapter 4. Reunification Fractures Exposed Through the 2004</b>	
<i>Montagsdemonstrationen</i> .....	<b>71</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	71
4.2 West German Protest Tradition.....	71
4.3 Economic Fractures.....	75
4.4 Role of Hartz IV.....	78
4.5 Political Fractures.....	81
4.6 Social Fractures.....	83
<b>Chapter 5 Loss of the “Montagsdemo Culture” Through</b>	
<b>Western Integration</b> .....	<b>90</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	90
5.2 Expectations.....	90
5.3 Splintered Opinions.....	93
<b>Chapter 6 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>95</b>
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	<b>99</b>
<b>Transcripts</b> .....	<b>128</b>

### **List of Diagrams**

<b>Diagram 1</b>	<b>Montagsdemonstrationen</b>	<b>103</b>
<b>Diagram 2</b>	<b>2004 Montagsdemonstrationen</b>	<b>104</b>
<b>Diagram 3</b>	<b>“Montagsdemo Culture”</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>Diagram 4</b>	<b>“Mauer Im Kopf:” “Ossi”</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>Diagram 5</b>	<b>“Mauer Im Kopf:” “Wessi”</b>	<b>107</b>
<b>Diagram 6</b>	<b>“Ossi/Wessi” Interaction</b>	<b>108</b>

### List of Images

<b>Image 1</b>	<b>October 9, 1989 Montagsdemonstration</b>	<b>109</b>
<b>Image 2</b>	<b>“Visafrei bis Hawai”</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Image 3</b>	<b>Police Brutality 1</b>	<b>111</b>
<b>Image 4</b>	<b>Police Brutality 2</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>Image 5</b>	<b>Police Brutality 3</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>Image 6</b>	<b>Two Youths</b>	<b>114</b>
<b>Image 7</b>	<b>Friedensgebet</b>	<b>115</b>
<b>Image 8</b>	<b>Gathering Outside Nikolaikirche</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>Image 9</b>	<b>Outside Rathaus</b>	<b>117</b>
<b>Image 10</b>	<b>2004 Crowd Shot 1</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>Image 11</b>	<b>2004 Crowd Shot 2</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>Image 12</b>	<b>“2004 Leipziger Montag Proteste”</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>Image 13</b>	<b>Picture of Signs Carried</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>Image 14</b>	<b>Blue Banner Photo</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>Image 15</b>	<b>Participant Gathering</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Image 16</b>	<b>2004 Montagsdemonstration</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>Image 17</b>	<b>Oskar Lafontaine 1</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>Image 18</b>	<b>Oskar Lafontaine 2</b>	<b>126</b>



## Chapter 1

### Introduction

In the summer of 2004, I had just completed an internship in Baden-Württemberg and was supposed to visit a friend and some family in Switzerland for a couple weeks. However, three days before I was set to travel, my friend backed out of the plans we'd made. Suddenly finding myself with extra time, I decided to travel to Leipzig earlier than planned. I ducked down to Switzerland, saw my relatives and headed to Leipzig via Vienna. While in Vienna, my camera, wallet, and passport were stolen. Having only a few hundred Euros that my parents wired to me and a temporary passport, I arrived in Leipzig.

The next morning, I headed to the *Nikolaikirche* (St. Nicholas Church)<sup>1</sup> for *Gottesdienst* (church service). At the end of the service, the pastor, Christian Führer, invited everyone to coffee in the *Gemeindehaus* (community house). Prior experience with German churches taught me that such coffees were a great way to meet people and make friends. While looking for the *Gemeindehaus* entrance, I met Anna, a British graduate student, who was also looking for the

---

<sup>1</sup> I use the English translations of German words/phrases that are widely used in English-speaking literature and resources and are therefore generally accepted in academia and contemporary media as being the English equivalent.

*Gemeindehaus*. We found the coffee, and after everyone came in and settled down around the long, boardroom-style table, the pastor asked Anna, me, and a man from Frankfurt to introduce ourselves. In my introduction, I mentioned that I was in Leipzig to research the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. The coffee then began with Führer and the west German (a *Frankfurter '68er*, I later learned who had been part of the Frankfurt radical student protest movement in 1968) talking about the economic situation, but from there it became a lively and heated discussion about what was to be done about it. Anna leaned over and whispered to me, “We’re watching history be made.”

Throughout the summer of 2004, the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Federal Republic of Germany) experienced a widespread economic crisis. This economic crisis mirrored economic recessions in the United States and the European Union; however, the German recession was more acute than the others, and east Germany bore the brunt of it. High unemployment rates characterized this economic crisis: 8.4% in the former West<sup>2</sup> Germany, 18.5% in the former East and 10.5% overall (Walker et al. 25 Aug. 2004). In contrast, the 15-member EU had 8.0% unemployed and the US had 5.5% unemployed (Walker et al. 25 Aug. 2004).

Adding to the strain of high unemployment was *Hartz IV*, an unemployment aid reform which the German government created in July and

---

<sup>2</sup> West/East denotes that I am referring to the status quo (political and cultural) before October 3, 1990 (Reunification Day) and also denotes value judgments made by Germans since reunification. I use west/east to refer to the present day regions of Germany that were once West Germany or East Germany. I also use western/eastern when referring to people who live in the regions of present day Germany that were once West Germany or East Germany.

would become effective on January 1, 2005. Through this reform, the government stagnates the amount of money that an individual or family receives from *Arbeitslosengeld II* (Unemployment Money II)<sup>3</sup> insurance and combines it with *Arbeitslosenhilfe* (Unemployment Help),<sup>4</sup> eliminating the latter. This amount decreases with each passing year that the individual remains unemployed. The reforms also propose to evaluate each family situation individually before distributing the allotted money and to assign each unemployed person a case worker, who would help them find work quickly. Furthermore, the government considers the lifestyle (including house size) of the unemployed person(s), and if deemed necessary by the case worker or government, the unemployed persons may be forced to relocate or give up their extravagant lifestyle. Through *Hartz IV*, the government offers unemployed persons under the age of 25 a chance to improve or gain new job skills/training/qualifications (Die Bundesregierung 17. Aug. 2004).

The discussion in the *Nikolikirche Gemeindehaus* held me spellbound as I watched the pastor unite politics and religion. The *Frankfurt 68er* had traveled to Leipzig to speak with Führer about the possibility of working together on either side of the former border to protest *Hartz IV* and the economic situation. Führer and the *Nikolaikirche* gained fame in 1989 through their large role in the 1989

---

<sup>3</sup> *Arbeitslosengeld II* (Unemployment Money II) is insurance money distributed after an individual or family had been unemployed for 12 months and lasts up to 48 months. During their first year of unemployment, unemployed persons would receive a flat amount of money (*Arbeitslosengeld*) that is unaffected by *Hartz IV* reforms (Die Bundesregierung).

<sup>4</sup> *Arbeitslosenhilfe* (Unemployment Help) is welfare money distributed by the government after an individual or family has been unemployed for 12 months and lasts up to 48 months.

*Montagsdemonstrationen*. These demonstrations began in September 1989 as a movement to reform the social sphere in the *DDR* and amassed widespread participation from nearly all sectors of society. The *Nikolaikirche* was instrumental in this movement's origins and in sustaining it. Many people consider the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* successful because it was a mass-demonstration movement in the former *Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)*, German Democratic Republic or East Germany) that ended peacefully and is credited in part with the opening of the Berlin Wall. However, Führer had something unexpected to say: he was slowly distancing himself from the movement. Apparently, people, with whom Führer did not necessarily agree were using his name and saying that he agreed with them, to further their own ideas and agendas about *Hartz IV*. Führer's remarks about the way people were using his name intrigued me; it was almost as if he and the *Montagsdemonstrationen* were brands, like Nike or Starbucks. Furthermore, as it turned out, a *Montagsdemonstration* was scheduled for the very next day. I was in the right place at the right time.

In response to the economic crisis and impending *Hartz IV* reforms, protests broke out in over 90 cities nationwide in August, most notably in the former *DDR*. The *Anti-Hartz IV* demonstrations in Leipzig<sup>5</sup> were the most

---

<sup>5</sup> Leipzig, is located in the state of *Sachsen* (Saxony), about 187 km southwest of Berlin, and was an important and predominate industrial city in the *DDR*. Through out German cultural history, Leipzig has been an important city. Composers such as Bach and Wagner once resided there; literature greats Goethe, Gottscheid, Schiller, Gellert, and Lessing also lived in the city and intellectuals, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche also are connected to the city.

extensively covered in the media, because they were among the larger demonstrations, and they claimed heir to the 1989 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* (Leipzig Monday demonstration) movement.

Despite the claimed ancestry of the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, its fractures characterize the movement. The most notable fracture is a splint in leadership. Winfried Helbig organized the *Leipziger* demonstrations in conjunction with the *Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität* (BüSo, Citizen's Rights Action Solidarity),<sup>6</sup> a leftist political organization. But because Helbig, the media and the *Leipziger* labeled the demonstrations "*Montagsdemonstrationen*," and the demonstrations followed the date, time, and route of earlier *Montagsdemonstrationen*, many looked to the *Nikolaikirche* and its pastor, Christian Führer, for leadership. Both organizations claimed to follow a "1989 model" of demonstrating, yet differed in their descriptions of what such a model entailed.

Nearly fifteen years after the euphoric reunification of the Germans, there is a certain coldness about the reunification, and Germany is deeply fractured along the former West/East lines. The fractures penetrate into nearly every aspect of the country, from economy and politics, to social and cultural matters. The rhetoric of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement is seeped with such fractures. Out of conflicting opinions about the role of the

---

Just outside the present-day city, is a monument commemorating the location where Napoleon was defeated in 1813.

<sup>6</sup> The *Nikolaikirche*, which was the head of the 1989 movement, supported the *Hartz IV* dissent, but did not support the 2004 summer demonstrations, believing that the demonstrations should not happen without the *Friedensgebete* (prayers-for-peace meetings).

*Montagsdemonstrationen* in a reunified Germany, arose discussion about unification's failures and existing prejudices divided along Cold War lines that Germans have against one another.

In this paper, I will explore the 2004 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* as a product of a Leipzig protest culture that originated in 1989. This culture is a specific way in which people protest and protests are regarded in Leipzig that is unique to the city. I will refer to this as the “*Montagsdemo* culture” after the *Montagsdemonstrationen* that characterize it. While there is prolific scholarship on the original 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, such as the scholarship by Lohmann (1994) and Pfaff (1996), the recent demonstration movement has not received the same amount of attention. I will also examine the economic, political, and cultural problems of reunification through the lens of the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen*. I draw from the theories of Smelser (1969), Tarrow (1991), Giddens (1984), Connerton (1989), Anderson (1991), Habermas (1994), Koopmans (1994), and Hefeker and Wunner (2003).

I derive my information from three types of sources. The first type is media, because it provides a broad perspective on *Hartz IV* and the demonstrations. No journalist or article is unbiased, but overall the bias of a newspaper is specific to the region it serves. I collected my information from five different newspapers: the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, a daily newspaper that circulates in Leipzig and the surrounding region, because it most extensively covered the *Montagsdemonstrationen*; two widely-circulated west German

papers, *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* provide a west German perspective on *Hartz IV*, the demonstrations, and east Germany. The *Wall Street Journal*, an American newspaper, highlights broader political, economic, and social trends that are connected to *Hartz IV* and the demonstrations. Lastly, I use the less-reputable daily newspaper, *Bild*, to supplement the photos of the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* that appeared in the other newspapers.

Secondly, personal impressions of Leipzig and the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* inform my work. My impressions emerged from August 8-18, 2004, during the height of eastern Germany's economic and unemployment crisis between. I observed two demonstrations, on August 10, 2004 and August 17, 2004. I am a 19 year-old female American college student with proficient German language skills and a practitioner of the Protestant Christian faith. New avenues of information and key impressions made about the *Nikolaikirche's* role and the existence of a unique Leipzig protest culture (which I will term "*Montagsdemo* culture" after the *Montagsdemonstrationen* that the protest culture is founded on), would not have otherwise been made without the immediate deep spiritual bond shared between Christians.

Conversations I had with Germans about the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, *Hartz IV* and other relevant topics enrich my other sources. Most conversations occurred in Leipzig between August 8-18, 2004, however, I conversed with west Germans in the week before and after my time in Leipzig. Engaged in these conversations were individuals ranging in age from 18 to 80. They were male and

female, Christian and non, and varied in profession, education, and came from different regions of Germany. Conversant individuals fit into four categories. I engaged in discussion *Nikolaikirche* members who were involved in the *Friedensgebete* and *Montagsdemonstrationen* in 1989 and 2004 (including the pastor, Christian Führer). *BüSo* volunteers who publicized and promoted the Leipzig protests and were mostly East Germans comprised my second category. Individuals I approached at random around the Leipzig city center compose the third category and the fourth is individuals I conversed with in west Germany.

Under no circumstance were individuals forced to converse, and the conversations lasted as long as individual had time for, or until discussion was exhausted. In all cases, engaged individuals were told at the beginning of the conversation the nature and purposes of the research and understood that notes from the conversations would be included in my field notes.

The aforementioned data sources expose different facets, complexities and tensions of *Hartz IV*, the *Montagsdemonstrationen* and unification issues. Within an information source, opinions contradicted each other, such as in conversations: some individuals were adamantly in support of the continuation of the demonstrations, while others were against it, or skeptical of their effectiveness. Each data source contained these tensions, such as the conflicting opinions of west and east German media on the effects of *Hartz IV*, or the underlying tension between the political left and right. These contradictions and tensions do not



weaken the data and validity of a “*Montagsdemo* culture”, but rather portray the complexities of German unification. This is further discussed in chapter IV.

## Chapter 2

### The 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* Movement

The 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* were a sustained series of weekly political protests that occurred spontaneously and organically in Leipzig throughout the autumn of 1989. Beginning in May 1989, every Monday evening at 5pm the *Nikolaikirche* held *Friedensgebete* (prayers for peace); these meetings were politically charged, blending scripture and prayer with political discussion. The motto “swords to ploughshares” (taken from Micah 4)<sup>7</sup> and emblem of a man beating his sword into the shape of a ploughshare created an identifying mark for the *Friedensgebete* and its focus on peace. These community prayers for peace meetings were not a new occurrence; beginning in the early 1980s, every year for 10 days in November the church would hold “peace decades,” which consisted of young people gathering for prayer. These “peace decades” arose out of the need to discuss environmental issues, specifically the arms race, which was protested in

---

<sup>7</sup> “*Schwerter zu Pflugscharen*” (*Micha 4*)

West Germany, but could not be openly discussed in the *DDR* (Führer, “Peace Prayer Services at St. Nicholas”).<sup>8</sup> However, what *was* new about the *Friedensgebete* is that they occurred on a weekly basis.

Throughout 1989, the popularity and support of the *Friedensgebete* grew, and they attracted a diverse group of participants who were largely non-churchgoers. From these *Friedensgebete*, the *Montagsdemonstrationen* spontaneously arose, and for thirteen consecutive Mondays between September 25 and December 18, 1989, *Leipziger* spilled out in the streets after the *Friedensgebete* (Lohmann 1994; 47). They took the spirit of the prayer meeting with them as they demanded a more open society characterized by free speech, a free press, and the freedom of travel outside of the communist block. It is important to stress that the demonstrations were neither planned nor organized, but arose spontaneously and were peaceful demonstrations.<sup>9,10</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> The *Stasi* (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* or MfS, Ministry for State Security—the state secret police) of the *DDR* was the more advanced and elaborate secret police systems in the communist countries. Impressive documents from the *Stasi* files show how very closely the citizens were controlled and surveyed (Führer, “St. Nicholas Church at Leipzig”). However, the *Stasi* left the institution of the church to be autonomous, although it monitored it closely, fearing that the church would abuse the freedom of expression it was given and become politicized. This meant that out of the all of the social institutions in the *DDR*, people were only allowed to talk about political matters and civic matter within the walls of the church. Although the MfS was headquartered in Berlin, the main regional office for Leipzig’s region was located a few blocks down the road from the *Nikolaikirche*.

<sup>9</sup> Führer writes in his reflections, that despite the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the movement, there was “not a single shattered shop window” (“The Events in Fall 1989”).

<sup>10</sup> A Universität Leipzig student, Sofia, who was nine at the time of the demonstrations, recalled in our conversation going to the October 9<sup>th</sup> demonstration with her mom. She also clearly remembered how she “didn’t really know what was going on, but [she] felt [the importance of] it” and carrying a candle as she demonstrated. Demonstrators on October 9<sup>th</sup> often held candles as a sign of peace, hope and non-violence.

With each passing week, participation in the *Montagsdemonstrationen* increased and amassed over 70,000 people on October 9, 1989.<sup>11</sup> On November 9<sup>th</sup>, the demonstration before the fall of the Berlin Wall, over 400,000 people from Leipzig and the surrounding area came to demonstrate against the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (abb. *SED*, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) (Bechert 1999). It is important to mention that although the protest attendance grew with each passing week, police repression occurred from May 8, 1989 through October 9, 1989. This repression took the form of barricades, arrests, and beatings. On October 9<sup>th</sup>, repression increased, and the government called in troops and military brigade groups for crowd-control (Führer, “The Events in Fall 1989”).<sup>12</sup> There were mass demonstrations in other cities throughout the *DDR* between October 9<sup>th</sup> and November 6<sup>th</sup>, but the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* were among the largest and were part of a sustained collective action movement. Eight days after the large-scale October 9<sup>th</sup> protests, Erich Honecker (1912-1994), the general secretary of the *SED*, resigned

---

<sup>11</sup> One elderly man that I conversed with in Leipzig told me that “almost all colleagues in [his] circle in the city construction in the DDR were united in a holy mindset in the demonstrations. Easily 50 colleagues participated in every demonstration.” Another Leipziger told me that I would be hard-pressed to find someone who hadn’t taken participated in the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, because the participation was so great.

<sup>12</sup> Sofia told me that her mom was involved in the demonstrations from the beginning and remembers that “in the beginning it was dangerous to take part [in the demonstrations] and my mom didn’t want to take us- me and my sister to go. And she left us at home while she went. Once she came home really scared and she knew the government had decided to interrupt the demonstration and they could use all force if they wanted. The tanks were already there and the police and army were already there. I think what they was talking was Gorbachev was the head of Russia, the Soviet Union at the time and he sorta appeased the Germans at the time so nothing would, but nothing was open and nobody knew what as going on, it was one of the Monday nights.”

(Lohmann 1994; 47). On November 9<sup>th</sup>—a month after this protest—the Berlin Wall fell. Less than a year later, on October 3, 1990, the *DDR* ceased to exist (Lohmann 1994; 47). The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the *DDR* are attributed in part to the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*.

The role of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* in the collapse of the *DDR* is still widely contested today. Although no one disputes that the movement contributed to German reunification, to what extent is often debated. Several scholars, including Wolfgang Engler (1999), believe that pop culture and the standard of living caused the collapse of the *DDR*, while others, such as Susanne Lohmann, believe that the collapse resulted from a mass exodus of workers, who left the *DDR* due to the economic crisis, coupled with the mass demonstrations (Lohmann 1994; 44).

One identifying characteristic of the 1989 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* is the broad support base it had; this was partially achieved by relying on social networks, such as the elderly man and his construction colleagues. These social networks helped the movement's growth by providing a basic structure for solidarity and mobilization.<sup>13</sup> Although the *Nikolaikirche* was instrumental in forging solidarity, the participants ultimately achieved it. Neal Smelser theorizes that solidarity is created when participants of a movement share a common ideology, background, and opponent (Smelser 1969;

---

<sup>13</sup> One effect that reliance on social networks had on the movement was that as more social networks participated in the demonstrations, larger numbers of participants were able to be mobilized quickly. Steven Pfaff believes these social networks were crucial to mobilization, particularly in the early phases of revolution in Leipzig (Pfaff 1996; 95).

15-7). Certainly the participants of the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* shared these elements.

According to Steven Pfaff, the population shared common ideological frames and value orientations in which grievances were understood (Pfaff 1996; 104); from this the 1989 movement's participants already had a mutual understanding that served as a foundation for solidarity within the movement. A common desire among the participants was for social and political reform within the *DDR*, which helped create solidarity. These reforms began with the demands for a more open society (including free speech and press) and the freedom to travel. It wasn't until after the opening of the Berlin Wall that the movement's participants pushed for a united Germany. Another value orientation originated in the *Friedensgebete*. Throughout the *Friedensgebete*, the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3-12) were often discussed; from these discussions an emphasis on non-violence arose.<sup>14</sup> The participants' actions and slogans best portrays this. They encouraged each other while marching by shouting "*Keine Gewalt!*" ("No Violence!"), exhorting their friends and fellow demonstrators to keep the Christian spirit and demonstrate in a non-violent manner (Führer, "The Events in Fall 1989"; Pfaff 1996; 108); these exhortations were not hollow, because participants did not

---

<sup>14</sup> In his written account, Führer stresses the importance of the Beatitudes (Matthew 5:3-12) in the *Friedensgebete* and in the larger movement: "They heard from Jesus who said: 'Blessed are the poor!' And not: Wealthy people are happy. Jesus said: 'Love your enemies!' And not: Down with your opponent. Jesus said: 'Many who now are first will be last!' And not: Everything stays the same. Jesus said: 'For whoever will save his life shall lose it and whoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it!' And not: Take great care. Jesus said: 'You are the salt!' And not: You are the cream. [. . .] The prayers for peace ended with the bishop's blessing and the urgent call for non-violence" (Führer, "The Events in Fall 1989").

respond aggressively with vandalism or violence to the state's aggression, and their peacefulness undermined the state's legitimacy.<sup>15</sup> This exemplifies the solidarity of the participants and how the movement was able to unite people from different backgrounds.

The participants of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* also shared a common background—the second element Smelser considers necessary for solidarity (Smelser 1969; 15-7). In the beginning of the movement, the participants lived in close proximity to each other and belonged to an involved interest group, such as an environmental group. However, as the movement grew, people from nearby towns and from different social networks began to participate. Participants from the same social network or interest group tended to have similar ideologies or values, i.e. people from environmental groups had similar concerns about the environment. Pfaff explains the significance that friends and associates—which are generally considered an aspect of social networks—had on the movement's growth:

Furthermore, when trusted friends and associates joined the demonstrations together, individual actors were more likely to have the self-confidence and expectation of support necessary to accept the risk of repression. When a circle of one's close friends and colleagues have decided on a course of action that requires group solidarity, an individual's nonparticipation would mean

---

<sup>15</sup> The result of the “*Keine Gewalt*” exhortations is that throughout the movement, even when hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated, *not a single store window was broken*. This was confirmed to me by several participants of the 1989 demonstrations that I spoke to and is recorded in Führer's account (Führer, “The Events in Fall 1989”). This aspect of the demonstrations supports Tilly's theory of resource mobilization, because the behavior of the participants did not reflect behavior of emotionally-driven participants, but rather participants who were in control of themselves and their voice. By acting peacefully--and thus rationally--amongst state brutality, the participants were able to further their aims while creating a legitimization crisis of the state.

suffering unacceptable damage to an identity in which much is invested (Pfaff 1996; 104).

This quotation lends insight into how the social networks effectively brought new people into the *Montagsdemonstrationen* and how participants from different sectors of the *DDR* joined the movement through social networks.<sup>16</sup>

This reliance on social networks and interest groups was important in creating a common background amongst the participants and helped create solidarity-conducive conditions. These interest groups encouraged structural conduciveness because they were often alienated from what the government found acceptable. Furthermore, they were easily mobilized and gave the participants a common background, since participants tended to know each other prior to the movement's beginning.

The *SED* was also responsible for the participant's common background. Because they were living in a communist system, part of the official ideology was that all people were alike and content with the political system; the participants had similar experiences, and experienced similar oppression by the limited

---

<sup>16</sup> However, one sector of society noticeably absent in the movement was the students and intelligentsia. Drawing from an interview with Führer, Torpey writes:

Even more significant, perhaps, is Reverend Führer's tendency to equate the category of "intellectuals" with those educated people who support the regime. The relative disinclination of East Germany's intelligentsia to challenge the state openly both distinguishes it from the traditionally obstreperous image of East European intelligentsia and puts that behavior in the context of a larger, less salutary tradition regarding the political passivity of German intellectuals (1995; 144).

One potential reason for this absence, is that the *SED* gave the intelligentsia privileges and goods, such as cars, wallpaper, travel abroad privileges, access to the foreign stores), that were not available to people of other professions.



freedom and the *Stasi* surveillance.<sup>17</sup> This is especially important in light of

Pfaff's findings:

There was a marked contrast between public acceptance and private doubts in an East German society. East Germans described themselves as “living on two tracks” (*Zweigeleisigkeit*); split between an authentic private sphere and a conformist public life (Pfaff 1996; 102) and though East Germans were characterized as conformist, dependent, unmotivated, conservative, and repressed, in fact they had a dramatic capacity for constructing flexible social networks, nurturing a feeling of community, creating alternative milieus and responding to opportunities to express dissent (Pfaff 1996; 101).

The main similar experience that united the East Germans was the double life they all lived. Because the public characterization of the East Germans differed from their private lives, (“dependent” and “unmotivated” yet they “had a dramatic capacity for constructing *flexible* social networks” [emphasis added]), this double-life enhanced the growth of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. By experiencing this common hypocrisy, the participants had similar backgrounds, and united through this common experience. Through this similarity, participants from different sections of society could experience solidarity during the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. These findings support Tarrow's rational actor and political opportunity models and Smelser's three elements of solidarity conduciveness, because even though the East Germans outwardly seemed

---

<sup>17</sup> In our conversation, Sofia described her experiences with the “sameness” of the DDR ideology: “But I can't remember, I think from what I remember everyone had a little something special. I think that there was not much clothes with the clothes, we all had these cord jeans, with cord—there were no real jeans, and if someone had jeans that was something special and we were all jealous. For example, I remember for *Fasching* (Mardi Gras)—people would have not exactly the same costume but a similar costume because there was not so much choice. But I still, like everyone would have the same shoes so old men would have this one kind of sandals, I remember some things but anyway, I don't see them as one person looking like the other because when you know people you see different things. And I would always know my picture.”

pacified with the regime, they dissented and were rational actors who sought the opportunity to publicly dissent.

The *Stasi*, police and communist government provided a common opponent for the *Friedensgebete* participants, the third aspect of Smelser's theory. Even before the movement began, the *SED* and *Stasi* were common opponents for many citizens of the DDR. However once the *Montagsdemonstrationen* began, the sense of a common opponent was heightened and it accelerated the solidarity among the participants.<sup>18</sup> Beginning on May 8, 1989, police and governmental agencies blocked off the roads leading to the *Nikolaikirche*, and in following weeks, the roads leading to Leipzig as a deterrent for would-be participants. Despite this, the movement steadily grew, even though the turnout at the *Friedensgebete* remained low until September 1989. The movement's spark came on October 7<sup>th</sup>—the fortieth anniversary of East Germany—when the police brutally attacked a defenseless, peaceful crowd. About 2,000 people were arrested in a ten hour period and kept overnight in a local horse stable (Führer, "The Events in Fall 1989"). Führer later wrote:

From our apartment we became witnesses of the most violent police action that we have ever personally experienced against a defenseless, nonviolent crowd of people who nonetheless, astonishingly, showed no fear. The attack on defenseless people who already were in custody frightened us all the more since we had never before experienced such conduct by an organ of the state. On Sunday [October 8] there was [. . .] an amazingly high attendance at worship (Führer, "Peace Prayer Services at St. Nicholas").

---

<sup>18</sup> Smelser's concept of psychological conduciveness capably explains the movement's gratification to its participants. Because of the potential danger the participants in movement faced, their repressed sense of anxiety that they experienced on a daily basis from living under the surveillance of the *Stasi* emerged and was gratified. For many, participating was a chance to publicly align their public life with their private.

The police brutality during this demonstration outraged people and two days later over 70,000 people participated in the *Montagsdemonstrationen* (Bechert 1999).<sup>19</sup> This incident coupled with participation statistics reveal how state oppression, such as police brutality, encouraged the movement's growth. After this, the demonstrations' participation skyrocketed; the following Monday<sup>20</sup> an estimated 120,000 people demonstrated in Leipzig's streets (Bechert 1999).

This dramatic increase in *Montagsdemonstrationen* participation due to a common opponent can be explained through Sidney Tarrow's calculated cost-benefit and political opportunity theories. Before the police brutality on the fortieth anniversary celebration of the *DDR* (October 7<sup>th</sup>), "the opposition in Leipzig had a few hundred members in September, with perhaps as many as 5,000 supporters (approximately 1% of the city's population), and were generally regarded as 'unrealistic dreamers' by the majority of East Germans" (Pfaff 1996; 96). A month later, the numbers soared into the tens and hundreds of thousands of supporters, who, like Sofia's family<sup>21</sup> and the elderly man, who hadn't participated in earlier demonstrations because of the risk involved, seized the opportunity and protested. This suggests the importance of cost-benefit in people's decisions to participate in the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Overall, these

---

<sup>19</sup> The participatory attendance for the *Montagsdemonstration* the week before is estimated at 20,000 people.

<sup>20</sup> October 16, 1989

<sup>21</sup> Sofia's participation in the demonstrations is an example of Tarrow's political opportunity theory: "At that time [October 9], I was secure because there was not the danger anymore. That the danger was abolished and that they would not use force. I went with my mommy and sometimes there were candles, and it was talked about even in schools. I asked some of my friends if they had been and I would look out for someone I know. So it was pretty open [October 9<sup>th</sup> and in the following demonstrations]."

findings of commonality—shared ideologies and desires, common personal and national backgrounds, and a common opponent of the closed society and *Stasi*—created solidarity in the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* movement. Through a reliance on social networks and interest groups, the movement grew through these channels. Because of the shared ideology and reform desires, people from all sections of *DDR* society joined in the movement.

The *Montagsdemonstrationen* were successful partly because the *Nikolaikirche* maintained a balance between the movement's decentralization and spontaneity while keeping its political focus. Through discussing Bible passages in the context of the political and social situation in the *DDR* and in the world, the movement acquired its focus and became politicized. The actual demonstrations were purely political in nature, but they were the result of the politically and socially charged discussions of the peace prayers. As John Torpey articulates, “The Monday demonstrations were the more or less spontaneous outgrowth of the ‘peace prayers’ in St. Nicholas Church” (Torpey 1995; 148). The *Montagsdemonstrationen* ultimately were a way for the participants of the *Friedensgebete* and supporters of these meetings to publicly express to the government and to the *Stasi* their desire for reform. Hence, even though the movement had religious tones and origins, the movement was a reaction to current social and political situations.

These successes were achieved in part through the consistency of the *Friedensgebete*, which helped to institutionalize the movement in people's minds.

As Pfaff remarks, “rather than being elaborately planned affairs, the demonstrations were held at the same time (Monday at 5 P.M.) in the city center throughout much of the 1989-90, making an elaborate organization of the event unnecessary” (Pfaff 1996; 104). Although they were heavily politicized, the *Montagsdemonstrationen* still fit underneath the religious umbrella. This was largely because the demonstrations were a spontaneous reaction to the *Friedensgebete*, which combined Christian principles with current social and political situations.

According to Pfaff, “by mid-1989 the church and the peace prayers were firmly established in the minds of the people as an “institution” of protest associated with the local oppositional subculture” (Lohmann 1994; 67). This institutionalization aided the movement because it gave a certain degree of stability and consistency, and people could join it whenever they were so inclined. “One demonstrator recalled that ‘There was no head of the revolution. The head was the *Nikolaikirche* and the body was the city center’” (Pfaff 1996; 104). It is important to mention that the *Friedensgebete* did not have a “leader” per se, but different interest groups lead the peace prayers each week. This decentralization aided the movement, in that “the decentralized character of the Leipzig demonstrations arguably contributed to their strength vis-à-vis the regime: ‘Since the demonstrations [were] unorganized, there [was] no possibility of appealing to someone to intervene and prevent something from happening’” (Lohmann 1994; 69).

The politicization of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* can be explained in part by Tarrow's political opportunity theory, because key turning points in the movement occurred as a result of political situations. For example, the *Friedensgebete* arose as a reaction to the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Likewise, the *Montagsdemonstrationen* became a mass movement after the government lost legitimacy through police violence on non-violent protesters during the fortieth anniversary celebration of the *DDR*. Tarrow argues in relation to the East European revolutions that "mass outbreaks of collective action are best understood as the collective responses of citizens, groups and elites to an expanding structure of political opportunities" (Pfaff 1996; 95). He goes on to note that "the rebellions in the East were set off by a radically new international opportunity structure" (Pfaff 1996; 95). Moreover, as Pfaff goes on to critique,

there are four crucial elements in a changing political opportunity structure: new areas of political participation have been opened up; political alignments are in disarray prior to a rearrangement of power; conflicts within elites have emerged; and challenger groups get new support from within or without the society (Pfaff 1996; 96).

However, if these four elements of the changing political opportunity structure are applied to the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*, it becomes clear that the politicization of the movement did not occur solely because of changing political opportunity.

Throughout the course of the movement, new areas of political participation opened up, as exemplified by the peaceful demonstrations and the political discussions within the church. Although the Leipzig people had marched

previously in the streets under the *SED*'s rule, the last mass demonstration before the *Montagsdemonstrationen* was quelled by Soviet tanks<sup>22</sup>. Demonstrating in a particular manner and fashion, and for a sustained period of time, as with the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, was a new way to politically participate by Leipzig residents.

The disarray of political alignments prior to a rearrangement of power, the second characteristic of the changing political opportunity structure, does not fit the Leipzig model. Due to the absence of a true civil society, there was a deficiency of definite political alignments. As Lohmann states, "an effective political opposition did not exist. The noncommunist parties and mass organizations that formed the National Front together with the *SED* were de facto subservient peons" (Lohmann 1994; 59). Furthermore, most people were not advocating for a unified Germany or even capitalism, but rather a *social* reform of socialism. In a poll done in Eastern Germany in November 1989, 86% of those polled wanted socialist reform, 9% responded that they wanted another path and only 5% wanted capitalism (Bechert 1999). Moreover, it wasn't until September 1989, months after the *Friedensgebete* began, that *Neues Forum* (New Forum) formed as an opposition group<sup>23</sup>. Lohmann describes the people's reactions to the *Neues Forum* as the following:

Beginning in early November, representatives of the opposition citizens' group New Forum and reform-minded members of the SED who delivered speeches at the Monday demonstrations in favor of a "democratic social alternative"

---

<sup>22</sup> This demonstration took place on June 17, 1953.

<sup>23</sup> *Neues Forum* after the collapse of the East German communist state merged with other political opposition groups in 1990 to form the political party, *Bündis/90*.

were greeted with boos and hisses. The unorganized masses participating in the demonstrations clearly had their own ideas about what direction the country should take—ones that differed from those held by many of the opposition groups and parties that claimed to represent them (Lohmann 1994; 75).

Moreover, *Neues Forum* was infiltrated by the *Stasi* and quickly declared illegal (Pfaff 1996; 96). Because of this, there was a very limited disarray of political alignments prior to the mass demonstrations and re-arrangement of power in October.

Similarly, conflicts within the elites, Tarrow's third characteristic, never did emerge, because, "in a party system dominated by one party, competition between various factions within the ruling party may serve as a partial substitute for party competition within a multiparty system. In East Germany, however, periodic intraparty purges effectively eliminated any active opposition to the hard-line core" (Lohmann 1994; 59, 62). Due to this purging there were very few opportunities for elites to form and gather power outside the hard-core line. Thus, the opportunity for conflict within the elites was minimal. The fraction that arose in October-November 1989 was not within the communist party, but rather between the *SED* and the people it governed.

Challenger groups—Tarrow's final characteristic—formed, first in the guise of the *Friedensgebete*, then the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, and later in the form of *Neues Forum* and reflected the movement's politicization and new political opportunities. Lohmann categorizes the challenger groups as *SED* party members who wanted to reform the socialist system; individuals who opposed the regime before 1989 and wanted democratic socialism; and individuals who were



not politically represented or loyal to socialism, but rather advocated capitalism and unification (1994; 75).

Tarrow's theory of changing political opportunity can also explain the politicization of the movement, not just its spontaneity, because the movement was sparked by current events, however it does not fit the Leipzig model entirely, because political alignments were not in disarray, nor were there conflicts between *SED* elites. The political nature of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, decentralization and spontaneity aided the movement's successes because it allowed the participants to vocalize their desires and shape the movement and the success of the movement.

The *Leipziger* movement did not intersect other reform movements in the *DDR*, but rather inspired other movements of civil disobedience. Until the *Montagsdemonstrationen* started, "there was no widespread protest within the GDR" (Pfaff 1996; 98). After the *Leipziger* protests began, protests spread to other parts of East Germany, most notably Berlin and Dresden. Lohmann adds, "[m]ass demonstrations in Leipzig on thirteen consecutive Mondays between September 25 and December 18, 1989, triggered a wave of political protest throughout the GDR," (Lohmann 1994; 47) and that "[m]ass demonstrations erupted in Leipzig before they spread to other cities, and turnout in Leipzig far exceeded the turnout elsewhere" (Lohmann 1994; 67). Furthermore, Lohmann goes on to suggest four possible reasons for Leipzig's predominant role in the *DDR* demonstrations:

First, compared with other cities of the GDR, Leipzig and its environs labored under a particularly moribund industrial structure and more severe environmental problems. Second, the Stasi apparatus was centered in Berlin so that the citizens of Leipzig had marginally more breathing space than did their compatriots in the capital. Third, the *Leipziger Messe* (Leipzig trade fair) regularly brought Western businesspeople and television crews to Leipzig, guaranteeing international media coverage for dramatic protest events. Fourth, the timing and geographical location of events in Leipzig provided a focal point for frustrated people who were willing to participate in mass protest but somehow had to coordinate their individual decisions without knowing or being able to identify one another (Lohmann 1994; 67).

While all of these factors are certainly important in Leipzig's crucial role in starting—and leading—the wave of protests in the *DDR* in the fall of 1989, they do not explain why the *Montagsdemonstrationen* were a role model of civil disobedience in the *DDR*.

The *Leipziger* demonstrations were a model of civil disobedience for other cities in the *DDR*, because the demonstrations were sustained, spontaneous and peaceful, and thus difficult for the government to stop legitimately. This model attracted participation because it was decentralized, so the participants controlled the demonstrations—and the larger movement—and shaped the demonstrations' success. The *Montagsdemonstrationen* participants were neither party elites nor came from the fringes of society; rather, they were common citizens who belonged to different sectors of society. Furthermore, these demonstrations happened every Monday for thirteen consecutive weeks, and were only a fraction of a larger, sustained movement. Perhaps the most important reason these demonstrations were a role model for and inspired other demonstrations is that “in an act of moral defiance, the Leipzig protesters in early October claimed to legitimately represent the people of the *DDR* in opposition to

the *SED*” (Pfaff 1996; 107). This legitimacy came as a result of not just peaceful protesting, but through “the chant ‘*Wir sind das Volk*’ (We are the people) combined with the image of the protesters from all sectors of *DDR* society” (Pfaff 1996; 108). The importance of calling themselves the legitimate people of the *DDR*, and extensively supporting that claim through the diversity of participants, was the main inspiration for other civil disobedience, because it showed that the movement supported *everyone’s* interests, not just the interests of a select few.

The *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* hold a unique place in history because it was effective in appealing and uniting a very diverse and large body of people with similar goals. Its spontaneity and reliance on social networks helped to channel the efforts and aims of the participants. Because many people did view the peace prayer meetings as an institution, the movement was able to be sustained until the desires of the participants were met. A common ideology and shared sense of experience helped forge solidarity among the participants and by legitimacy claiming to represent all of the people who lived in the *DDR* through the use of non-violence, “*Wir sind das Volk*” and participant diversity, the movement spread to other cities throughout the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* and caused mass demonstrations throughout the country. While no theorist has a model that fits the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* perfectly, the applied theories of Sidney Tarrow (1994), Steven Pfaff (1994), Susanne Lohmann (1996), Neal Smelser (1969), and John Torpey (1995) explain how a small prayer

movement sparked a larger movement that aided in overthrowing an oppressive political regime and reuniting a country.

## Chapter 3

### 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* Movement

#### 3.1 *Background of 2004 Montagsdemonstrationen Leaders*

##### 3.1.1 *Nikolaikirche*

The *Nikolaikirche* is the most predominate church in Leipzig, founded as a merchant church ca. 1165 (Czok 11). It is located on the main street, about equidistance from the northern and southern walls that once safe-guarded the city. Between 1539-40 the *Nikolaikirche* took part in the Reformation, transitioning from a Catholic church to a Protestant one. Martin Luther visited Leipzig seventeen times and preached from the *Nikolaikirche* pulpit on such a visit in 1539 (Czok 34).

The *Nikolaikirche* is also associated with Johann Sebastian Bach, who worked as the music director from 1723-1750 (Czok 56). As a member of the *Nikolaikirche* explained it to me, even as far back as the eighteenth century, the *Nikolaikirche* was more politically oriented then other *Leipziger* churches, especially the *Thomaskirche* (St. Thomas Church), which Bach is strongly associated with. As the city's musical director, Bach oversaw the worship in the

five main churches in Leipzig and he composed his more secular works for the *Nikolaikirche* and his more spiritual works for the *Thomaskirche*.

This association with the “secular” still remains today; the church and its pastor (Christian Führer) are famed for their concern and participation in social justice issues. In our conversation, Führer stressed the need for churches to be out on the street, amongst people and helping them, as Jesus did, and not confined to the pulpit and sanctuary. He was quick to emphasize that churches needed to remain impartial to political parties and alliances, but answerable to the needs of humanity. One way in which I saw the *Nikolaikirche* answerable to the needs of humanity was through hosting a weekly hot breakfast for Leipzig’s homeless. Given this background, it is understandable how a religious-political movement, such as the *Friedensgebete*, could arise from the *Nikolaikirche*, and why people looked to the church for leadership during the *Anti-Hartz IV* movement.

### 3.1.2 *BüSo*

The organizer and “true” leader of the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* was *Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität (BüSo)*, a liberal German political party, founded in November 1992 by Helga Zepp-LaRouche. The demonstration movement was not actually led by Zepp-LaRouche, but rather by Winfried Helbig, a member from Berlin. *BüSo* is not contained to Germany, works other branches of the international *Bürgerrechtsbewegung* (in countries such as France, Italy, Poland, Argentina, etc), and is closely linked to the

LaRouche Movement of the United States (*Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität*)<sup>24</sup>.

According to *Wikipedia*, *BüSo* “is the German affiliate of the international LaRouche Movement” (*Wikipedia* “Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität”)<sup>25</sup>. The reputations of the *LaRouche Movement* and *BüSo* are intricately connected with the reputations of their leaders. Lyndon LaRouche, a 8-time US Democratic presidential nomination candidate and leader of *BüSo*, is described as the following by *Wikipedia*:

Although [Lyndon] LaRouche has no formal qualifications, he has written extensively on economic, scientific, political, and cultural topics as part of his political views. Critics regard him as a conspiracy theorist, crackpot, attention-seeker and political extremist, while Chip Berlet, Dennis King, and others have described him as a fascist, a cult leader, and an anti-Semite. He has also been labeled an “unrepentant Marxist-Leninist” by Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, along with other high-ranking U.S. intelligence officers. He denies all of these characterizations. His followers regard him as a brilliant individual who has been unfairly persecuted for political reasons. [ . . . ] LaRouche was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1988 for conspiracy, mail fraud, and tax code violations, but continued his political activities from behind bars until his release in 1994 on parole (*Wikipedia*, “Lyndon LaRouche”).

*Wikipedia*’s characterization of LaRouche aptly fits my own experiences with his followers and critics. The *BüSo* volunteers I spoke with at the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* held LaRouche and Zepp-LaRouche in high esteem; one American, Sam, who was a member of the LaRouche Youth Movement,

<sup>24</sup> The LaRouche Movement was founded by Helga Zepp-LaRouche’s husband, Lyndon LaRouche.

<sup>25</sup> At the 2004 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* I spoke with individuals from both the German *BüSo* and the American LaRouche Youth Movement (a part of the larger LaRouche Movement), indicating how intricately linked the two organizations are. Most volunteers I saw representing the organizations tended to be college age (18-24), with a rare volunteer in her forties.

painted a prophetic portrait of LaRouche and his economic policies.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, I spoke with an individual who was intimately involved in United States public policy who thought LaRouche is “an extremist who does not entertain any information that runs contrary to his firmly held views.” *Wikipedia* characterizes Helga Zepp-LaRouche almost as colorfully as her husband:

The Schiller Institute [another organization started by Zepp-LaRouche as part of the LaRouche movement] website says that Zepp-LaRouche is "one of the world's leading authorities on Friedrich Schiller and on Nicolaus of Cusa ... Her scientific work extends from the German Classical period, to the humanist tradition of universal history, and Confucianism." Zepp-LaRouche's expertise in these areas has not been independently verified. The same website also says that, in 2000, she "exposed the murderous intent of the violent video culture, and particularly the Pokémon cult. [ . . . ] Regarded as a controversial figure in Germany, Zepp-LaRouche has been accused of being responsible for threatening telephone calls, and even death threats, received by one of her opponents" (*Wikipedia*, “Helga Zepp-LaRouche”).

<sup>26</sup> Sam: “Yes, [the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* have a place in 2004] because it wasn’t completed. It wasn’t just enough for the wall to be brought down, but what we’re actually taking about and what Zepp-LaRoche is talking about is how do you actually get economic development. It’s not just enough—the demonstrations and the wall came down—but we didn’t rebuild the east. I’m not just talking about East Germany, but it goes all the way into Poland and to Russia. We push forth all the way further, even into Shanghai; the idea of how do you actually go about re-building these things? You can’t do it because you just say, “Ok, go back together;” but we put forth a program in ‘87, ‘88, ‘89 called productive triangle, because in between Paris, Berlin and Vienna is the most productive area. Then the spiral arms go off to Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Istanbul and so on and so forth. So we’re talking about what was the policy that should have been in place, and we’re going through this at the time—Helga Zepp-LaRouche, because her husband Lyndon LaRouche was in jail in 1986. He was a politician, ran the democratic party for president couple times—three or four times—and in ‘88 he said before going to jail—they put him in jail—he was in Berlin and he came out and said directly that it was necessary, it was needed, first to recognize that the imminent collapse of the Soviet system is near and that the reunification of East and West Germany with Berlin as the capital is imminent. Same as the whole hotel speech thing he made. The whole point that he was saying is that we should use this as a period of time to develop the economy—the physical economy—not the speculative, Wall Street, “lets see how much they can put on pork bellies” nothing like that, but how can we treat the seductive labor that’s here in East Germany and rebuild Poland in particular, as an example, of what we’d be able to do for all of Russia after the fall of the wall. Now the wall fell, communism fell, and 10 years later you have—I mean 15 years later now—you have 10 years off the average lifespan of the Russian male. The economy is collapsing and a lot of these people will tell you that they think it’s better under communism then it is right now. So when you really think about it, the point is you actually complete the peaceful movement that actually started here. We started here 5 weeks ago.”



*BüSo*'s involvement in the 2004 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* is peculiar, because the organization does not have any strong ties to the city or the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Rather it appears that the organization could have used the economic recession and agitation about *Hartz IV* to further their political agenda. I found it peculiar that a few hours before the demonstrations began, *BüSo* volunteers skipped through the city center distributing leaflets written by Zepp-LaRouche, stating "In Saxony, the economy must grow"<sup>27</sup> and then went on to describe *BüSo*'s political and economic agenda and encouraged people to demonstrate.

According to the *BüSo* website, the organization has sixteen objectives (*Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität*).<sup>28</sup> Their first objective is to create 10 million jobs, which they propose to do through 200 billion Euros annually from the government for infrastructure investments, which would spur private investors. Due to the failure of the European Union's constitution, they support going back to the D-Mark. Similar to their first objective, *BüSo* proposes to maintain and

---

<sup>27</sup> "In Sachsen muß die Wirtschaft wachsen!"

<sup>28</sup> 10 Millionen Arbeitsplätze schaffen  
 Währungshoheit wiederherstellen  
 Infrastruktur erhalten und ausbauen  
 Produktive Kreditschöpfung  
 LaRouches Neues Bretton Woods  
 Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung statt "Globalisierung"  
 Eurasische Landbrücke als Friedensordnung  
 Physische Wirtschaft statt Spekulation  
 Kernkraft statt Windräder  
 Paritätspreise für die Landwirtschaft  
 Forschen für die Welt von morgen  
 Humboldts Bildungswesen zum Vorbild nehmen  
 Renaissance der klassischen Kultur  
 Gesundheitswesen vor der Demontage retten  
 Renten sichern durch Wirtschaftswachstum  
 Hände weg vom Grundgesetz!

expand infrastructure, on a 1000 billion Euro budget, that would develop both the communities and the federation. *BüSo* supports productive credit creation and would like to see the government banks lend money to investors for not necessarily profit maximizing purposes, but rather for projects that would increase the quality of life, such as hospitals and parks. The organization wants to create a new Bretton Woods system, in which the global monetary and financial system would be reorganized. Included in this, is the objective to limit speculation and to develop the physical economy. *BüSo* is against globalization that is driven by private profit and would like to create a new world economy that restrains such globalization.

Social objectives of the organization include integrating the double continent of Eurasia to create a peace organization. They support the development and use of nuclear energy instead of wind-generated. *BüSo* continues to support farmers through parity prices. Research for the world of tomorrow, particularly in the areas of space exploration, atomic fusion, nano-technique, AIDS and other diseases, is another objective of the organization. They would also like to reform the education system, by using Humboldt's educational system as a model and initiating a renaissance of the classical culture. That is, they would like to take the best of the liberal arts system in the United States that is based on traditional values and infuse a strong emphasis on research for the future in it. *BüSo* wants to salvage the health care system from falling apart and secure pensions for the

elderly through economic growth. Finally, *BüSo* does not want to alter the constitution in any way.

In evaluating *BüSo*'s program, many of their objectives seem utopian with conservative highlights and the organization provides neither their reasoning behind the objectives or a clear, realistic picture as to how they are to be implemented. Furthermore, although there is a clear social welfare aspect to *BüSo*'s policies and many of their ideas are embraced by other political groups, there is the potential for the implementation of cohesive mechanisms to achieve their policies.

### **3.2     *Sociological Analysis of 2004 Montagsdemonstration Movement***

The 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* differ from the 1989 movement, because unlike the spontaneity and organic quality that the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* had, the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* were carefully planned, calculated and promoted. Furthermore, solidarity was not achieved in the 2004 movement the way it was in the 1989 demonstrations.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Smelser theorizes that solidarity among demonstrators in a movement is achieved when they share a common opponent, ideology, and background. The participants in the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* did not share a complete ideology, but were united in their dislike of *Hartz IV*, which also served as a common opponent in the movement. Through conversations with people around the Leipzig city center, it seemed like *BüSo* and

*Nikolaikirche* supporters and volunteers shared a similar ideology, though the group ideologies were different. However, on the whole, a common ideology among the movement's participants was missing. The backgrounds of the participants that I spoke to all seemed to differ. A common interest group, i.e. *BüSo*, unified some participants, but even within the interest group, the participants' backgrounds were starkly different. Because of these differences amongst the participants, solidarity was not achieved in the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

The success of collective behavior can be described by six key value-added elements (Smelser 1969;13-7).<sup>29</sup> By applying this approach to the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, further differences between the two *Montagsdemonstrationen* movements can be identified and the failure of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* at repealing *Hartz IV* can be explained. Structural conduciveness, the first element, emerged from the protest tradition established in Leipzig in 1989 and from *BüSo*'s publicity and organization of the protests, which fostered participation and support of the movement, by encouraging would-be participants.

---

<sup>29</sup> Smelser's six key elements are (1) structural conduciveness, or a situation's structural characteristics that permit collective behavior; (2) structural strain, which is the ambiguity, deprivation, conflict and discrepancy within a movement; (3) the growth and spread of a generalized belief, which identifies the source of strain and attributes certain characteristics and responses to it; (4) precipitating factors, which are events that confirm or justify the generalized belief; (5) the mobilization of participants for action and (6) the operation of social control. This social control prevents and hinders the movement's action to minimize the conduciveness and strain and to curb the mobilization once the collective action has begun (Smelser 1969; 15-7). These elements must occur sequentially ["value-added"] in the movement for the movement to be successful.

The second element, structural strain, arose from the strain between the movement's leaders (*BüSo* and the *Nikolaikirche*) over the *Friedensgebete* (hence, the debate over the "1989 model"). This strain, though present, did not increase the participation, but rather hindered it. During my time in Leipzig, would-be participants who were loyal to the *Nikolaikirche* would not participate due to the absence of the *Friedensgebete* and journalists, such as Bernd Hilder (17. Aug. 2004) lamented that the splint in leadership could create an opportunity for the conservative extremists to become politically active. In comparison, this strain in 1989 stemmed from police measures of repression; it was through police brutality and threat of danger that the 1989 movement grew.

The growth and spread of a general belief, the third element, in the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* largely came from the media. The coverage of the events was important, because the media's presence added a sense of status and importance to the demonstrations, and was a way to perpetrate further thought and discussion about *Hartz IV* and the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, and encourage participation.

The *Hartz IV* reforms and devastation of the German national economy, particularly in the former *DDR*, comprised the fourth element of precipitating factors during the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. The demonstrations started occurring not long after the government publicized the reforms and east Germany hit a high of 20% unemployed; even in Leipzig, the unemployment rate hovered around 20%.

Unlike the spontaneity of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* participants and the reliance on social networks, mobilizing participants (the fifth element) in 2004, was slow and labored. *BüSo* mobilized participants through media articles (which created hype about the demonstrations), passing out handbills in the city shortly before the demonstrations, and by organizing an “info area” in the square across from the main train station, where their volunteers engaged potential participants in conversation and distributed further materials.

Social controls or other confining deterrents, the final element, in the 2004 movement were very minimal. The chief social control here was a negative response by the politicians and the deterring statements the politicians made. This is hardly anything in comparison to the police brutality the demonstrators of the early 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* experienced.

In place of Neil Smelser’s psychological conduciveness (1969) in collective behavior participants, I suggest that in place of psychological conduciveness, Paul Connerton’s habit memory was present. Connerton states that “there can be a habit of remembering a unique event” (1989; 23), which is expressed through the reproduction of a certain performance, such as a demonstration. The 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* can be considered a habitual way the Leipzig community remembers 1989, because its leaders and the media often linked the two movements, stating that the 2004 movement followed in the path of the 1989 movement. Furthermore, in

comparison to the bike race that occurred a few days prior, the city did not seem to be disrupted by the demonstrations, suggesting a “habit” of protesting.

Like the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, Sidney Tarrow’s (1991) political opportunity structure is relevant to the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Just as participation increased after the government lost legitimacy from the fortieth anniversary of the *DDR*, so the participation in the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* increased dramatically after *Wirtschaftsminister* (Finance Minister) Wolfgang Clement, who is partially in charge of implementing the *Hartz IV* reforms, said some insulting remarks about the *Montagsdemonstrationen*<sup>30</sup> (Apel; “*Hartz IV—Tausende gehen. . .*”). Regardless, the political landscape had vastly changed from 1989, and the German government remained strong and legitimately in power. The nature of the German government was not the target of the 2004 demonstrations, but rather the economy and welfare reforms. The timing of the 2004 demonstrations was strategic, because they started soon after the creation of *Hartz IV* and lasted until after they were voted on (September 19, 2004).

While Smelser (1969) is concerned with the minute details of collective behavior and its operation, Anthony Giddens (1984) considers the broad effects of collective behavior (Tucker 1). He distinguishes between collective behavior that engages in emancipatory politics from that of life politics. Giddens defines emancipatory politics as “eliminating the unnecessary constraints which limit the

---

<sup>30</sup> These remarks were made shortly before August 9, and according to Apel, on Monday, August 9, people demonstrated against *Hartz IV* in over 34 cities and it was the “number-one news item on all the media.” As coincidence would have it, this was the first demonstration that I witnessed; I was truly in the right place at the right time.

life-chances of particular groups” (Tucker 148). Collective behavior that relates to justice, autonomy, and the distribution of income, such as the civil rights movement, are examples of emancipatory politics. Life politics, on the other hand, “assumes a certain level of emancipation from traditional hierarchies and the fixities of tradition” and is concerned with personal things, like the quality of life and democracy (Tucker 148). The feminist and environmental movements are an example of life politics. Unlike with emancipatory politics, in which the outcome of the collective behavior can easily be determined successful or unsuccessful, it can be difficult to gage the success of life politics, because the results often happen in degrees and over a longer period of time. Both *Montagsdemonstrationen* movements can be described in terms of emancipatory politics.

The 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* portray emancipatory politics, because they dramatically changed the political and economic situation in the former *DDR*. In contrast, the 2004 movement is not as overtly emancipatory, because although the demonstrations failed to repeal *Hartz IV*, the *Leipziger* protested the reforms and despairing economy in the name of justice. Unlike the 1989 movement, the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* was also a “New Social Movement” (NSM). Characteristic of NSMs is a demand for a cultural identity because identities are no longer stable. Like Giddens’ life politics, the success of a NSM is difficult to gage. Certainly this fits the *Leipziger* model, as 15 years after the German reunification, cultural differences keep *Leipziger* from fully



integrating with the western Germans, yet their identity is no longer defined by their country [East Germany].<sup>31</sup>

The 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* did not achieve solidarity, as Smelser suggests, because the participants did not share a common ideology or background. The failure of the movement to revoke *Hartz IV* is due to the inability to achieve Smelser's six value-added elements. Although the participation did drastically increase after Clement's insulting remarks, and the demonstrations were aligned to the political timetable for *Hartz IV*, the German government remained strong and legitimately in power—a stark contrast to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Giddens's emancipatory politics describe both demonstration movements, although the 2004 demonstrations also fit the New Social Movement description. Through evaluating the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* by these theories, it appears that the improbability of the movement's success could have been predicted by these theorists. Some other factor must have been present that would sway the Leipzig community to demonstrate. I hypothesize that this factor is due to the presence of a “*Montagsdemo* culture” in Leipzig.

---

<sup>31</sup> This instability of *Leipziger* identity informed the way in which people talked about the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. In several conversations I had, my informant expressed uncertainty about the place *Montagsdemonstrationen* have in contemporary Germany. Frau Husenbeth responded to my question with “That is a very difficult question. The demonstrations then I admired very much, but the situation today is completely different; the problems are different.”

### 3.3 Anthropological Analysis of 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* Movement

The fluid manner in which participants in the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* gathered, demonstrated and dispersed is noteworthy, because it suggests the demonstrations are culturally significant in Leipzig. Indeed, watching the protests, it was as if the *Montagsdemonstrationen* were commonplace. Individuals went about their daily lives until it was time for the demonstration to begin. Around 5pm, the traditional starting time of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, the *Nikolaihof*—the historical starting place of the demonstrations—became coagulated with people. Led by the *BüSo* volunteers, participants paraded around the ring, carrying signs and yelling. Onlookers lined the streets to watch the demonstration. Once the demonstrators reached the main train station—the ending point of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*—people dispersed and daily life continued. Minutes after the last demonstrators reached the train station, it was as if the protest had never happened. The *Montagsdemonstrationen*'s presence, regardless of whether an individual demonstrated or abstained, seemed accepted and integrated into the whole of Leipzig society.

This unique phenomenon of the integration of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* into Leipzig society can be described as a form of Paul Connerton's (1989) habit memory. Habit memory "consists simply in our having the capacity to reproduce a certain performance" (Connerton 1989; 22) and often corresponds to an individual learning something through the acquisition of a habit

or bodily practice (Connerton 1989; 23). Most importantly, “there can be a habit of remembering a unique event” (Connerton 1989; 23). The *Montagsdemonstrationen* became a habit of Leipzig culture through the repeated demonstrations in 1989. The thirteen consecutive demonstrations occurred on the same day, same time, and along the same route. Through this repetition and the growth of participation, the demonstrations became something that *Leipziger* were accustomed to, a habitual part of the weekly routine.

Even after the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement ended, the participants retained the capacity to demonstrate as they did during the 1989 movement. This capacity was preserved through two other forms of memory Connerton (1989) examines: personal and cognitive memory. Personal memory refers to the remembering of an individual’s life history and are “located in and refer to a personal past” (Connerton 1989; 22). The habit of demonstrating that formed through the 1989 demonstrations is maintained through individuals recollecting their personal experiences as participants in the movement. Cognitive memory is qualified as requiring “not that the object of memory be something that is past, but that the person who remembers that thing must have met, experienced or learned it in the past” (Connerton 1989; 22). It sustains the habit of remembering the unique Autumn 1989 because individuals, who were too young to form concrete personal memories of the monumental movement or were born later, ‘remember’ the 1989 demonstrations by recalling things they learned about it, i.e. the demonstration route, time and place, its demands and the results of the

demonstrations. Older demonstrators, on the other hand, had formed personal memories of the experience and could recollect these personal experiences.

The *Leipziger*'s capacity to reproduce a certain performance is demonstrated through the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen*. In these protests (as well as other protests that occurred in Leipzig since 1989), the participants "re-enact" the success of 1989. One example of this habitual demonstrating is the presence or absence of crowd control for a demonstration. According to one *Leipziger*, after the peaceful 1989 demonstrations, the Leipzig police do not feel that crowd control is necessary for a *Montagsdemonstrationen*, so long as it follows a *Friedensgebet*. However, because the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* were not supported by the *Nikolaikirche*, the police were present at the demonstrations to provide crowd control, should the occasion arise.

These protests can be thought of in terms of incorporated habits, which are bodily actions that intentionally or unintentionally convey information (Connerton 1989; 73). The bodily action of demonstrating conveys the memory—personal or cogitative—of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. The fluidity I watched in the demonstrations' occurrence was a habitual expression of these personal and cogitative memories from prior demonstrations. Habitual, because only after a certain amount of 'practice' does something, such as a protest, occur in a society without causing a chaotic disruption.

Through the repetition of the protests in 1989, sporadic protests during the 1990s, and the personal and cogitative memories of 1989, a protest culture emerged that is specific to Leipzig and the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Different *Leipziger* pointed out ways in which the events of 1989 were still present in Leipzig society. Two predominate examples were the continuation of the *Friedensgebete* and the *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

### 3.3.1 *Friedensgebete*

Despite the events of 1989 and 1990 that led to a dramatic change in political, social and economical landscape in Leipzig, the *Friedensgebete* persist as a part of the *Nikolaikirche*'s activities. As in the *DDR*, they occur continually at the church from September to May, beginning at 5pm every Monday. The overseer of the 2004-05 *Friedensgebete* informed me that as in the *DDR*, a different organization leads the *Friedensgebet* each week. The organizations for the 2004-05 *Friedensgebete* included Unicef, and among the topics covered are the Roma in Romania, Chernobyl, Aids, Latin America, and the 10 year anniversary of the Rwanda genocide. The overseer, who took part in the 1989 *Friedensgebete*, described the structure of a contemporary *Friedensgebet* as unchanged from the 1989 *Friedensgebete*. A passage of scripture is read, followed by a short speech and discussion by that week's organizing group. The

emblem and motto of the *Friedensgebete*<sup>32</sup> from the 1980s also remains the same. Moreover, the *Nikolaikirche* continues to hold *Friedensdekade* every November in conjunction with the *Friedensgebete*.<sup>33</sup>

### 3.3.2 *Montagsdemonstrationen*

The connection between the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* movement to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* is well established in the media and in the minds of *Leipziger*. In one article, Führer and Helbig claim to both follow the “1989 model” of protesting in the 2004 movement (Welters, “*Heute Montagsdemo. . .*”). Elsewhere, a protest is debriefed within the historical confines of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* (“*Hartz IV—Tausende gehen. . .*”). An interview with the Sachsen-Anhalts Ministerpräsident, Wolfgang Bömer, solidifies the connection between the 1989 and 2004 movements, as he insists that comparison between the two movements is unfounded (Wonka). Ultimately these comparisons foster a connection between the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* and the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* in the mind of the public and bolster the legitimacy of the demonstrations.

The 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* also seemed easily connected to the 1989 movement in the minds of the *Leipziger* I spoke with. In most responses, the informant naturally contextualized the 2004 demonstrations in the 1989

<sup>32</sup> “*Schwerter zu Pflugscharen*” (*Micha 4*). In English: “Swords to Plowshares,” which is taken from Micah 4.

<sup>33</sup> These “*Friedensdekade*” (Peace decades) are 10 consecutive days in November dedicated to praying for peace and began in the early 1980s. For further information, please refer to Chapter 2.

*Montagsdemonstrationen*, even if they wavered about the 2004 protests, like Frau Husenbeth.<sup>34</sup> Some would-be informants reacted strongly when I asked about a connection between the two demonstrations and said they did not want to talk to me about such things. Their reaction also indicates, though, that there is a connection established between the two *Montagsdemonstrationen* in their minds, even if it is a negative one.

The *Friedensgebete* overseer mentioned in a conversation that throughout the 1990s Leipzig had several other *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement—the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* were the first of the type, but not the last. She cited the demonstrations protesting the Iraq War (2003) and demonstrations in response to the 9/11 US terrorist attacks as *Montagsdemonstrationen*. I saw evidence of this in my trip to the *Nikolaikirche* archives in newspaper articles the church had saved. However, not finding it relevant to my topic at the time, I have no written record of these demonstrations. Nevertheless, the sporadic *Montagsdemonstrationen* help to establish its acceptance in society.

### 3.4 *The Media*

The media and public sphere play a significant role in exposing the presence of this “*Montagsdemo* culture.” To the *Friedensgebete*, the media added an air of importance. One Universität Leipzig student, who volunteers at the

---

<sup>34</sup> Frau Husenbeth: If one demonstrates, they won’t be put in jail; that’s already established, but what one can achieve what one could then achieve, that disturbs me, because we really allow completely different things. Today it’s this really small thing or a different story.

*Nikolaikirche*, remarked that the attendance of the *Friedensgebete* is consistently enhanced by the presence of the media. She pointed out a certain woman sitting towards the front of the *Nikolaikirche* during one of Führer's Monday evening remarks on the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*,<sup>35</sup> saying that she *only* attended the *Friedensgebete* when the media was present [emphasis hers]. Her remarks indicate that media helped institutionalize the *Friedensgebete* as a cultural element of Leipzig society. This institutionalization represents a way in which the culture of Leipzig 1989 interacts with the Leipzig 2004 culture and symbolizes the active memory of autumn 1989 in Leipzig.

In Leipzig, the media facilitates the exchange of knowledge, ideas and events pertaining to the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Benedict Anderson (1991) and Jürgen Habermas (1989) propose different roles that the media plays in a community. Anderson theorizes that the media *creates* and *sustains* a community that is larger (or more geographically spread out) than face-to-face interactions are capable of sustaining. Habermas believes the media chiefly *influences* and *informs* the public sphere (Habermas 1989; 231). To Habermas, then, the media is a mean and not the direct cause of a community's origins. During my time in Leipzig, I noticed that *BüSo* relied extensively on the media to promote their demonstrations. Habermas best describes their use of the media, because it elicited support by widely publicizing their position, notified people about the

---

<sup>35</sup> These Monday-evening remarks were in lieu of a *Friedensgebete*, which hadn't resumed yet due to the summer break. According to this student, Führer and a few women who were a part of the *Nikolaikirche*, these remarks were a "mini- *Friedensgebete*."



demonstrations, and debriefed each demonstration. However, by influencing and informing the public, *BüSo* sustained the “*Montagsdemo* culture” and the protest community just as Anderson elucidates.

*BüSo* did rely on the media, but also promoted their demonstrations through face-to-face interactions. I observed them talking to interested individuals and skipping through the city center passing out handbills before the demonstrations. Yet the media proved more efficient and effective in reaching large numbers of people in this imagined community. According to Benedict Anderson (1991), an imagined community is a community that extends beyond the capabilities of face-to-face interaction, but the individuals are connected through the circulation of ideas in print capitalism. Through the facilitation of information throughout the imagined community, the media binds the involved players<sup>36</sup> and actors<sup>37</sup> in the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* and “*Montagsdemo* culture”.

### 3.4.1 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* (Diagram 1)

In 1989, the media, specifically the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, connected the *Nikolaikirche* with the German communist party (the *SED* or *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*), and the people living in Leipzig and the surrounding community. The SED controlled the media, and it was *Stasi*-

---

<sup>36</sup> I consider *player* to describe an involved, unaware entity that may or may not be influential.

<sup>37</sup> The term *actor* is used to denote a consciously involved entity that may or may not wield influence.

infiltrated, but nevertheless, reported on the actions of the *Nikolaikirche* and the people living in Leipzig and the surrounding community. It is worthwhile to mention that one of the three main demands of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* was for press freedom. The October 12, 1989 *Leipzig Volkszeitung* extensively covered the October 9 demonstrations, and included a personal account of the events written by Führer. This suggests that the state relinquished control over the media not long after the wide-scale protests began. As Habermas suggests, the media informed the players during the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

Because of the political and ideological system that the movement occurred in, the media did not connect all the players in the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. At the beginning of the movement, the police and *Stasi* were active players in the demonstrations because they were the *SED*'s repression mechanism. Rather than acting on their own accord or from information conveyed by the media, they acted as the state authorized them to. This state control manifested from intra-party tensions, laws, policies and self-surveillance.

Other connections between players existed in the 1989 movement that did not rely on the media, but rather face-to-face interactions. The *Nikolaikirche* implemented the *Friedensgebete*, because the *SED* granted churches autonomy, including free speech. Although the *Stasi* had no control over the church, they did monitor its activities by means of infiltration to assure that the autonomy was not abused. The *Nikolaikirche* harnessed and wielded this autonomic power through the open political discussions of the *Friedensgebete* and implementation of its

motto “*offen für alle*” (open to all). These conversations attracted hundreds and thousands of individuals from all sectors of society from Leipzig<sup>38</sup> and the surrounding areas.

Furthermore, the police and Stasi forcefully constrained the *Leipziger* and other involved Germans in order to prevent them from toppling the regime: the police resorted to physical violence and force, such as during the fortieth anniversary celebration of the *DDR*,<sup>39</sup> while the *Stasi* employed extensive surveillance, arrests, and means of torture. Another connection between the civilians and the *Stasi* remains: the *Stasi* made extensive use of costumes and disguised themselves as civilians, as to avoid detection.

### 3.4.2 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* (Diagram 2)

Similar to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstration* movement, the media facilitated the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV* demonstrations and connected its players. These players included the *Nikolaikirche* (Führer), *BüSo* (Helbig), the German government, western Germans, eastern Germans, and the economy. Even more than the “*Montagsdemo* culture”, the media was the primary means of transmitting and conveying information was, as Habermas proposes. Journalists reported on the attitudes and actions of actors, such as Helbig, Führer and

---

<sup>38</sup> While all cultural sub-groups, such as industrial workers, environmental activists, etc, were present for the *Friedensgebete*, university students and other members of academia were not a part of the movement, as they tended to be sympathetic towards the regime.

<sup>39</sup> Please refer to Appendix \_\_\_ for photographs of this police brutality from the 1989 movement.

Lafontaine,<sup>40</sup> on economic problems, government policies (*Hartz IV*), and the demonstrations. The articles also overviewed each demonstration (such as where the demonstrations took place, the number of participants and the reasons that the individuals participated). These articles were important for Germans living on either side of the former border, because they were able to keep track of the “other”, the economy, and the political situation. In this sense, the media created and sustained an imagined community. The leaders of the Leipzig *Hartz IV* opposition movement contributed to the media, especially Helbig, who organized the demonstrations, and the media provided the *Nikolaikirche* information about the “results” of the larger opposition movement and the protests that they did not endorse.

Despite the majority of communication occurring through the media, players were connected through means other than the media. The two main actors in the 2004 dissent, *BüSo* and *Nikolaikirche* exchanged information with each other through personal interaction. *BüSo* also relied on face-to-face interactions to educate and impart their opinions to eastern Germans, as I discussed in the sections about *BüSo* and the media earlier in this chapter. The German government and the economy were intricately linked since the government regulates the economy through laws and policies.

---

<sup>40</sup> Oskar Lafontaine, is a high ranking politician in Germany’s SPD and was once the Wirtschaftsminister (Minister of Finance) between 1998-1999, when he resigned (Wikipedia, “*Oskar Lafontaine*”). Lafontaine participated in and supported the *Anti-Hartz IV* demonstrations, for which was severely criticized by fellow politicians. However for participants and the organizers of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, he was seen as a hero.

### 3.4.3 “Montagsdemo Culture” Diagram 3)

In the Leipzig-specific protest culture, the media conveys information as Habermas suggests, and maintains the specific way in which the *Leipziger* members demonstrate and consider protests. Unlike 1989, in which five other churches aided the *Nikolaikirche* on October 9<sup>th</sup> onwards (Führer, “The Events of Fall 1989”), it is solely the *Nikolaikirche* that interacts with and helps sustain the “*Montagsdemo* culture”. The media sustains the “*Montagsdemo* culture” by conveying the *Nikolaikirche*’s reactions and attitudes to events to the *Leipziger*. Similarly, the media relays the responses and needs of the *Leipziger* to the *Nikolaikirche*. The media influences and shaped by the *Nikolaikirche* and *Leipziger*, because these other agencies rely on the media for information about the government and international community. This enlightens the opinions and actions of the *Nikolaikirche* and *Leipziger*.

### 3.4.4 “Wessi-Ossi” Relations (Diagrams 4, 5 and 6)

The role of the media is intertwined in the “othering” and the fractures between the “*Ossis*” and “*Wessis*”,<sup>41</sup> which I will discuss in detail in chapter IV.

## 3.5 *Photographic Analysis of the Movements*

Despite claims made by Helbig that his leadership of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* follows the “1989 model” (Welters, “*Heute*

---

<sup>41</sup> Eastern and western Germans use these terms when referring to the other negatively.

*Montagsdemo. . .*”), the stark contrast in how the two movements were photographed is remarkable. In this section I examine photographs from both events to test Helbig’s claim. The most predominant distinction I noticed is a shift from a *Massenproteste* (protest by a mass of people) in 1989 to the demands of the protesters in 2004. Other important diversions include a change in the style of the slogans, and who participates.

### 3.5.1 1989 Montagsdemonstrationen

One of the most widely recognized photographs from the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, taken on October 9, 1989 (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 98-9) (image 1), depicts the event as a mass demonstration. The photograph’s focus is on the mass of participants and their unity, and the photo’s frame is mostly filled with demonstrators. This photo was taken from a distance to capture the extent and feeling of the demonstration. It was taken in the dark; the street lights illuminate a sea of demonstrators as they walked down the *Ringstraße*.<sup>42</sup> There are only two signs present and they are too far away from the camera to read. The focal point of this photograph—and also in a broader perspective, of the movement—is the people, and hence their opposition to the regime, rather than their demands.

---

<sup>42</sup> The *Ringstraße* is a circular street that encircles Leipzig’s inner city. From the *Nikolaikirche*, in the inner city, the demonstrators would walk to the *Ringstraße*, and around it, passing the *Stasi* headquarters and ending at the *Hauptbahnhof* (main train station).

The “*Visafrei bis Hawai*”<sup>43</sup> photo (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 146-7) (image 2), like the previously discussed photo, depicts the demonstration as a mass movement. Unlike the October 9<sup>th</sup> photo, there are no geographical markers (buildings, roads, trees, etc.) present that indicate the setting. Taken at close range, looking back at the participants, this photo depicts the facial expressions for many participants. Most are smiling; some are talking or laughing with others and all seem to be having a good time.

The *Massenprotest* theme carries over to photos of earlier demonstrations. In three photos taken on October 2<sup>nd</sup> (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 56-7, 97) (images 3, 4 and 5), the camera captures some of the police brutality that occurred at the beginning of the movement. Swarms of police officers are captured dissuading masses through human blockades and physical violence. Although the angle and location of the photographs are different, the amount of people in each image lends itself to fit the category of *Massenprotest*.

The photo of two youth sitting on top of friends’ shoulders making the peace signs with their fingers (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 128)<sup>44</sup> (image 6) portrays the participants as youthful, and ecstatic about the demonstrations, similar to what was shown in the “*Visafrei bis Hawai*” photo. Nearby, adults look equally as happy, though they are not as expressive. Congruent to other 1989

---

<sup>43</sup> “*Visafrei bis Hawai*” in English means: “Visa-free to Hawaii.” Taken at the October 23, 1989 demonstration.

<sup>44</sup> This photograph was taken on October 16, 1989.

*Montagsdemonstrationen* photographs, the demonstrators surrounding the youth allude to the *Massenproteste*.

The role of the *Nikolaikirche* is also depicted in the photographs. Images from the October 30<sup>th</sup> *Friedensgebet* (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 174) (image 7) and the gathering of participants outside the church (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 175) (image 8) show that throughout the movement, people of all ages, from youth to silver-haired ladies, participated. Crowded isles and pews of the *Friedensgebet* reveal that it too had widespread appeal and was well attended. The crowd shot of the gathering outside the *Nikolaikirche* also characterizes the movement as a popular movement: the photograph's focus is not on an individual person, but rather the mass of people assembled at the church.

In another photo (*Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 178-9) (image 9) participants with signs of various sizes line the *Rathaus* (city hall). This use of signs and slogans is noteworthy, because photographs of prior demonstrations show very few participants carrying signs. The slogans are skillfully written, creating either a pun or a rhyme, poking fun at the situation and sometimes subtly stating their demands; a few signs bluntly state a demonstrator's demand (such as "*Freie Wahlen*"<sup>45</sup>). Similar to other photographs, the subject of this image is an engaged crowd of different ages.

Despite the sheer number of participants each week, it is plausible the movement acquired the face of a mass movement in the images of it because of

---

<sup>45</sup> *Freie Wahlen* translated into English means *Free Elections*.



the threat of danger. At the beginning of the movement, the state and *Stasi* were still firmly in control, and demonstrators were punished through police brutality, arrested or “temporarily detained” for their participation (Führer, “The Events in the Fall 1989”). Crowd shots, in addition to capturing the awe of the movement’s magnitude, left participants’ identities a secret. Before the fortieth anniversary celebration demonstrations on October 7<sup>th</sup>, individuals can only be identified in a few photographs. From October 9<sup>th</sup> on, individuals can be identified, even in crowd shots. The threat of persecution was also dramatically reduced on this date, largely because of increased amount participation.

### 3.5.2 *Comparative Analysis of the 1989 and 2004 Montagsdemonstrationen*

In contrast to the images from 1989, the 2004 *Anti-Hartz IV Montagsdemonstrationen* photographs contain several themes and elements that are absent in the 1989 photos. Instead of the depiction of a *Massenprotest*, the signs the participants carry and their slogans dominate the photos. Accordingly, the only aerial crowd shots I found of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* appeared in *Bild* (image 10 and 11), a less reputable daily newspaper that is comparable to the United States’ *New York Post*. This change of presentation resonates with the absence of the *Volk* (people) in the conversations about the movement. In 1989 this was an important part of the slogans and the movement’s

mentality (i.e. “*Wir sind das Volk!*”<sup>46</sup>) which emphasizes the collective. This use of *Volk* was noticeably absent from all sources I obtained data from, including observation<sup>47</sup>. This focus on the individual, the message and the desired result of the demonstration parallels the rhetoric of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

With the exception of the aforementioned aerial pictures, the images were taken on the same level as the demonstrators. Unlike what is shown in the 1989 photographs, the 2004 demonstrators in the front of the protest carry most of the signs in that particular demonstration and are themselves obscured by the signs. Symbolically, this signifies that protesters’ demands are more important than their presence. Demonstration photos from the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (21. Aug. 2004) (image 13) and *German World* (*DW-World.de*) (image 12) aptly fit this description.

The images reveal differences in 1989 and 2004 participants. Overall, the participation was widespread in 1989, in that participants came from different walks of life and not just from Leipzig, but also the surrounding areas and were of different ages. Participants in the 1989 photos range from teenagers to elderly, however, several *Leipziger*, informed me that they had participated in the larger

---

<sup>46</sup> *Wir sind das Volk!* translated into English means *We are the people!*—an echo of the United States’ Declaration of Independence, and the most predominate slogan of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. The slogan indicted that the demonstrator were the citizens of the *DDR* and thereby, were legitimately voicing their demands and protesting the regime.

<sup>47</sup> My informants often referred to the *Volk* of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* as “people” (*Menschen* or *Leute*), i.e. “The people [*Die Menschen*] thought that their lives would improve,” and used the vague “they” in replace of “we” or “I”. This shift in semantics signifies an unwillingness to call themselves the *Volk* of the *DDR* and to say we/I were/am disappointed in reunification and the broken promises made to them by West Germany. It also paints the informant as “smarter” than the others who did believe in the promises of the West Germans.

demonstrations as young children (3-10 years old), but could not clearly recollect details of the experience. In comparison, images, statistics, and personal experiences of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* confirm that substantially fewer people participated. The ages of the participants seemed to be confined to mid-twenties to early sixties; moreover, demonstrators appeared to belong to the mainstream, employed sectors of society, rather than different cultural sub-groups, i.e. Goths, neo-Nazis, etc.

This difference in participation between the two *Montagsdemonstrationen* movements mirrors the difference in the participant expressions in the photos. Despite the gravity of the 1989 situation, in which demonstrators faced police brutality and a fragile, uncertain future, the photographs capture enthusiasm and excitement over the demonstrations. This eagerness was absent in 2004; in only one photo did participants appear lighthearted. The soberness encompassing the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* reflects the situation from which the protests arose: economic hardship, a divided leadership, and a society that neither fully supported the demonstrations nor completely dissented.

### 3.5.3 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*

There is a photograph of the demonstration where participants are carrying three large white signs and a white banner that reads “2004 *Leipziger Montag Proteste*”<sup>48</sup> (*DW-World.de*) (image 12). Gone are the handmade signs of 1989,

---

<sup>48</sup> The English translation of this sign is: “2004 Leipzig Monday Protests”

replaced by professionally made, mass-produced signs. The banner is more than twice the size of a sign, emphasizing its importance and the significance of the term “*Leipziger Montag Proteste*.” The wit of the 1989 slogans is replaced with overtly stated demands, such as “*Weg mit Hartz4 und Agenda 2010*.”<sup>49</sup> The camera faces the crowd, which is obscured by the disproportionate number of signs; thus diluting the demonstration’s portrayal as a *Massenprotest*. Unlike other photographs, the participants do not appear to be serious about protesting: many are walking around the square and conversing with others.

In an August 21, 2004 photograph from the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (image 13), the demonstrators are almost completely covered by the signs that they carry, except for a small row of demonstrators carrying the white “2004 *Leipziger Montag Proteste*” banner that is in the aforementioned photo. As with the preceding photo, signs in this photograph are primarily professionally made. Even more than the prior photograph, this photo encapsulates the participant’s seriousness. Although a participant or two converses, the rest of the participants holding the banner are solemn.

I consider next the photo of demonstrators holding a large blue banner with the words “*Hartz IV (crossed out)/Hungerlohn und Zwangsarbeit!/Uns reicht’s!/Das geht zu weit!!!*”<sup>50</sup> (*European News*) (image 14). Like the photographs with participants holding the *Montag Proteste* banner, the camera

---

<sup>49</sup> The English translation for this sign is: “Away with Hartz4 and Agenda 2010.”

<sup>50</sup> The English translation for this banner is: “Starvation wages and forced labor! Enough is enough! That goes too far!!!”

angle in this photo is tilted up in a way that increases the size of the banner in proportion to the participants. This resonates with the absence of the *Massenprotest* theme amongst the 2004 movement and photographs. This photograph is unique among the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* photos, because participants seem to enjoy themselves and many are smiling or laughing. Furthermore, the demonstrators in this image are mostly women.

One such photo that does show the protester's signs and depict the demonstration as a *Massenprotest*, is the photograph in which the participants are gathered on one of the Leipzig streets and are standing around (N24) (image 15). Many participants are in conversation with one another. As with other photographs from the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, the participants appear in this image to be primarily male, the youngest participant appearing to be in the early-to mid-twenties. This photo suggests that although the *Montagsdemonstrationen* in 2004 have moved away from the *Massenprotest* portrayal and emphasis on the *Volk*, it hasn't completely moved away from its origins.

The photo of the 2004 demonstrators walking down the street in a protest (*Leipziger Internet Zeitung*) (image 16) is unlike other 2004 photographs because it shows the participants in the act of demonstrating instead of merely gathering. Participants in this photo are primarily men, ranging in age from a young boy on his father's shoulders to gray-haired men. This photo indicates how the protesters *demonstrated*: in one long line, four abreast. This is a noticeable change from the

1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, where so many individuals demonstrated, that they moved though out the streets in one undefined mass, with only physical barricades defining the physical shape of the collective demonstrators. This change highlights the decreased participation and suggests that an unspoken demonstration protocol formed from the 1989 experiences.

The photographs of Oskar Lafontaine participating in the 2004 *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen* are noteworthy (*Dradio.de*) (image 17 and 18). These images focus on Lafontaine and his participation in the *Montagsdemonstrationen* all the while trying to depict him as just “another demonstrator.” This is accomplished by photographing him carrying the “2004 *Leipziger Montag Proteste*” banner and always in a crowd setting. However, the photos are unconvincing because of Lafontaine’s appearance. Amidst a sea of civilians wearing jeans and t-shirts, Lafontaine is surprisingly well groomed and dressed in a suit. His facial expressions also give him away; in the photos, he is looking around and taking in the experience of being on the streets with the people. Lafontaine seems to enjoy it, while those around him, who are use to demonstrating, are expressionless.

#### 3.5.3.1 Absent From the 2004 Photographs

It is impossible for photographs to capture how the *Montagsdemonstrationen* are affected by media, because the images cannot be separated from the media: they are part and parcel of it. As I discussed in the

section about media in this chapter, participation in the dissent increases when the media is present; an example of this is the woman in the *Nikolaikirche* who only comes to the *Friedensgebete* when the media is present. Noticeably missing from the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* photographs, is the presence of the *Nikolaikirche*; this is attributed to the split in the movement's leadership. The absence of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*'s pillar indicates a diversion from the prior movement and a secularization of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* and society. This absence weakens Helbig's claim that his 2004 protest movement follows the 1989 model (Welters, "*Heute Montagsdemo. . .*").

The images also do not depict the Leipzig society's response to the demonstrations, such as spectator participation and wavering opinions of the movement. Further missing are images of each demonstration emergence and dissipation. These absences are not the product of deficient photography, but rather things that cannot be caught on film. I rely on my observations and conversations with *Leipziger* to compensate for this.

As I observed, the participants of the 2004 demonstrations came in waves. A dense group of participants would be followed by fewer participants and that by another dense cluster. The participants at the front of the demonstration were typically the ones carrying signs and banners, and yelled sporadically. The majority of the participants, who followed this front group, walked silently. Their walk is also of interest; they did not march, walk forcefully or even briskly, but rather strolled and almost looked as if they were oblivious to the demonstration's

significance. After the last demonstrators finished at the main train station, Leipzig seemed unchanged and unaffected by the demonstration. I noticed that everyone immediately went back to their everyday life, and no one lingered around, talking or demonstrating further.

I saw the commitment of the city in the *Montagsdemonstrationen*; despite the movement's division, they were well attended and attracted a noticeable amount of spectators. Even dissenters that I spoke to accepted their presence and spoke positively about prior demonstrations.

### 3.5.3.2 Significance

This image comparison indicates that even though several 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* participants described the 2004 protests as “the same” as the ones in 1989, and despite both leaders claiming to follow the example of 1989 (while at the same time disputing what it actually meant), the two *Montagsdemonstration* movements were very different. 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* images stand out because of their noticeable contrast to 1989; through this contrast, an image emerges of the precise, Leipzig-specific way of demonstrating. The protesters' signs and banners often obscured them from view, denoting that the size of the demonstration is less important than its message. Moreover, only a few of the signs in the photos were handwritten: most were professionally generated. This indicates that the demonstrations was



prepared for, and hence, had lost the spontaneous, organic nature of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

The image contrast of the two *Montagsdemonstrationen* movements also depicts how demonstrations are regarded within Leipzig. The large white “2004 *Leipziger Montag Proteste*” banner carried in several of indicates that the *Montagsdemonstrationen* have a brand-like quality to it. In these images, the participants are promoting the “brand” of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*—and the memory of 1989—along with their demands. Furthermore, because this banner is twice as large as the signs, its size indicates the importance of the “*Leipziger Montag Proteste*.” The participants’ expressions and behavior in the 2004 photographs suggests the presence of a “*Montagsdemo* culture”, because they treated the demonstration seriously, almost as if it were a task, yet seemed to enjoy the *Montagsdemonstrationen* atmosphere and experience more than the actual demonstration. Furthermore, the participants in this photo do not appear to belong to a fringe group, such as the Neo-Nazis, but rather different sectors of mainstream society; an important observation in contrast to west German protests.<sup>51</sup>

### 3.5.3.3 Media Representation of the “*Montagsdemo* Culture”

Dieter Wonka’s interview with the Sachsen-Anhalt Minister-President, Wolfgang Böhmer (Wonka), discusses the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* from

---

<sup>51</sup> I examine this difference in Chapter 4.

the perspective of the local government. From this discussion come two important insights: the first, regards the government's fear of what might happen if too many people take to the streets, the second relates to the comparison of the 2004 demonstrations to 1989. Böhmer expresses the government's fear of the demonstrations, articulating that,

If as a result, of these mass protests on the street, this law was repealed, then with it would our entire democratic, through the constitution in a stipulated system of decision making in a democracy be called into question. That would have wide-reaching consequences that I don't want to think about at all (Wonka).<sup>52</sup>

Although the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* are not explicitly referred to in this statement, Böhmer subtly addresses the legacy and success of the 1989 movement, because it was an instance in Sachsen-Anhalt during most citizens' lifetime in which mass protests did call a government into question. However, Böhmer is quick to insist that such a comparison between the 1989 and 2004 *Montagsdemonstration* movements is unfounded, saying, "But it is true that the comparison of the Anti-Hartz demonstrations with the Monday demonstrations from 1989-90 is inappropriate" (Wonka).<sup>53</sup> He also clarifies the danger of this comparison, saying, "With this comparison, just as it is the same as the time when

---

<sup>52</sup> Wenn als Ergebnis der massenhaften Proteste auf der Straße dieses Gesetz aufgehoben würde, dann würde damit unser gesamtes demokratisches, durch das Grundgesetz festgeschriebene System der Entscheidungsfindung in einer Demokratie in Frage gestellt. Das hätte weit reichende Konsequenzen, die ich gar nicht zu Ende denken möchte.

<sup>53</sup> Aber es bleibt dabei: Der Vergleich der Anti-Hartz-Demonstrationen mit den Montags-Demonstrationen von 1989/90 ist unangebracht.

the *DDR* demised: the loss of the political power begins with the loss of the perceptual abilities” (Wonka).<sup>54</sup>

In the article “*Heute Montagsdemo gegen Hartz IV—Pfarrer Führer geht nicht mit,*” Welters overviews the split leadership of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement. Although the *Nikolaikirche*, represented by its pastor, Christian Führer,<sup>55</sup> and demonstration organizer Wilfried Helbig (from *BüSo*), both supported the opposition to the *Hartz IV* reforms, they dissented about *how* to express dissent. Führer, who led the 1989 movement, refused to support the 2004 demonstrations without first having a *Friedensgebete*. Helbig did not deem the *Friedensgebete* a necessary component of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Both men claimed to follow a “1989 model” of the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*.

Most striking about this article is the debate that Welters highlights the presence of: what is the “1989 [protest] model”? According to Welters, there is a discrepancy between Helbig and Führer regarding the significance of the *Friedensgebete* in the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. This discrepancy is further supported by my conversations with the *Nikolaikirche* and *BüSo* volunteers. As the title of the article suggests, Führer opted out of participating in the 2004 demonstrations because of this discrepancy over the 1989 model. Welter captures Führer’s perspectives on the 1989 model in the following: “His motto: no Monday

---

<sup>54</sup> Es ist mit diesem Vergleich wie seinerzeit beim Untergang der DDR: Der Verlust der politischen Macht beginnt mit dem Verlust der Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit.

<sup>55</sup> As I have discussed in previous discussions, Führer initiated the *Friedensgebete* and played a large role in the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

demonstration without prior meditation in the church. And how important it is, to order their minds and with God's help, acquire courage, the turn-around autumn showed. "I call this the Leipzig Model of 1989" (Welters 9. Aug. 2004).<sup>56</sup> At the heart of this debate lies the *Friedensgebete*, and with it, the roll of the church in contemporary Germany.

Particularly fascinating about this discrepancy is the concept of a 1989 model. Given that the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement was a historical event that arose spontaneously, the conditions from which it arose cannot be duplicated nor synthesized. It is impossible then to have a true model of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, because it can never be truly duplicated. Furthermore, the concept of a "1989 model" gives the *Montagsdemonstrationen* a brand-like quality, because it implies that there is an essence to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement that can be duplicated or re-created. This is enhanced by *BüSo*'s role in the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, because an outside organization started a protest cycle in Leipzig that claimed heritage to an organic, original Leipzig movement.

The brand-like quality of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* was particularly evident to me during the *Nikolaikirche* coffee. Beyond Führer's remarks about pulling back from the movement, the *Montagsdemonstrationen* "brand" appeared in the *Frankfurt '68er*'s visit. Just as the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* had a

---

<sup>56</sup> Sein Credo: keine Montagsdemo ohne vorherige Meditation in der Kirche. [. . .] Und wie wichtig es sei, seine Sinne zu ordnen und mit Gottes Hilfe Mut zu schöpfen, habe der Wende-Herbst gezeigt. „Ich nenne dies das Leipziger Modell '89.“

profound effect on *DDR* society and created a protest tradition in the east, so the Frankfurt student protests in 1968 had a similar effect in West Germany.<sup>57</sup> The *Frankfurt '68er's* visit to the *Nikolaikirche* to investigate the possibility of uniting the two traditions is paramount, because it also signifies that the western Germans acknowledge and perceive the *Montagsdemonstrationen* as an effective and persuasive mean to for political change.

### 3.6 Conclusion

Due to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstration* movement's role in the *Wende*,<sup>58</sup> the *Leipziger* memorialized the demonstrations. Accordingly, museums preserving the memory of the *DDR* and Leipzig during communism were founded and October 9<sup>th</sup> is a designated commemoration day. But beyond museums and holidays, the memory of 1989 is woven through out the daily lives of the *Leipziger*. Connerton (1989) describes how societies express the memory of a historical fragment from their past through habits. These incorporated and instilled habits convey the memory of the historical fragment in individuals that the society is comprised of. The *Friedensgebete* continues as it always had during communist rule. Protests and demonstration movements that have a similar shape and form to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* are also forms of recollecting the past. Although Connerton does not address how a society incorporates a historical

---

<sup>57</sup> I discuss the West German protest detail in depth in Chapter 4.

<sup>58</sup> die *Wende* means "turning point" and is the name ascribed to the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the period from the time the wall fell (November 9, 1989) to the day East Germany had free elections (March 18, 1990).

fragment into the collective memory, Anderson and Habermas suggest how the media provides the societal cohesion necessary for the aforementioned habit to be formed. I also examined the agencies involved in the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, the “*Montagsdemo* culture” and 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*; in each scenario, the media connected the other players to each other.

## Chapter 4

### Reunification Fractures Exposed through the 2004 Montagsdemonstrationen

#### 4.1 *Introduction*

The 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* contain further cultural implications beyond the formation of a Leipzig-specific protest culture. Because the *Montagsdemonstrationen* are unique to east Germany, they are a means to study persisting West-East differences in Germany. In conversations that I had with Germans about the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, my informants often mentioned economic and cultural differences between the two halves. Journalists also seized the chance to discuss political, economic and cultural reunification issues within the context of *Hartz IV* and the *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

#### 4.2 *West German Protest Tradition*

The *Montagsdemonstrationen* are specific to east Germany, because the demonstrations themselves suggest that the two Germanys, during the forty years that they were divided, developed separate protest traditions. The most noticeable distinction between protest traditions is their legacies. The *Montagsdemonstrationen*'s legacy of radically changing the recent history of the

region sustains and informs recent demonstrations in the east. In contrast, the protests in the west have no history of drastic success or change that occurred as a result.

In “*The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany 1965-1989*,” Rudd Koopmans (1993) develops a model of protest waves, using the West German protest cycles of the 1960s and 1980s as a case study. Koopmans uses the American civil rights movement, the Italian protest wave of the 1960s and 1970s, and the new social movements in Western Europe to support his claims (Koopmans 1993; 637). His model combines internal and external factors in an “interplay between facilitation, repression, and the chance of success that defines external factors combined with activists’ choices among three strategic options—innovation, increased participation or increased militancy” (Koopmans 1993; 637b). Koopmans data is drawn from coded data taken from the *Frankfurter Rundschau*’s Monday issues between 1965 and 1989 (Koopmans 1993; 638); he identifies two concentrations of protests in Western Germany: the first during the late 1960s and the second in the 1980s. His study “focuses on protest events produced by ‘new social movements’ (NSM) in Western Germany” (Koopmans 1993; 638); these, he elaborates, “include the peace, ecology, Third World solidarity, squatters’, womens’ gay, and student movements (including the radical Communist and terrorist groups that sprang from the student movement)”



(Koopmans 1993; 638).<sup>59</sup> Throughout his work, Koopmans supports Tarrow's (1989) political opportunity structure, noting that "both waves of NSM protest originated in changes in the political opportunity structures confronting these movements, particularly in the position of the West German Social Democrats: (Koopmans 1993; 638).

Koopmans examines four types of *demonstrative actions* that serve to mobilize participants: *legal actions* mobilize large numbers of people (demonstrations, rallies, petitions), *confrontational actions* that are disruptive (blockades, occupations, illegal, non-violent demonstrations), actions of *light violence* (such as breaking windows), and *heavy violence* (arson, kidnappings, murder) (Koopmans 1993; 639-40). He also analyzes *organizational support*, an internal factor characterized by the support or sponsorship of a protest by an organization, such as terrorist groups, communist vanguard groups or established organizations, i.e. churches or political parties (Koopmans 1993; 640). Furthermore, external factors of *repression* and *facilitation*, authoritative constraint (i.e. police intervention) and support from established political actors mold the protest cycles (Koopmans 1993; 640).

Koopmans highlights several distinctive elements in the West German protests that differ from the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*. These elements include heavily concentrated confrontational actions, presence of violence, limited participation and the character of the demonstrations.

---

<sup>59</sup> These movements are concerned with Giddens' life politics (Tucker 1998), a contrast to the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*'s emancipatory politics.

The West German protests relied heavily on concentrated confrontational actions in both cycles and on “new tactical innovations that were developed first during the American Civil Rights movement” (Koopmans 1993; 642b). Violence is another key characteristic of the West German protests that is absent in the *Leipziger* protests. Koopmans notes that “1969 was the peak year for occurrences of light violence in the first wave, i.e., one year after the peak year for confrontational tactics. In the second wave, both peaked in 1981” (1993; 644b).

Heavy violence is present in the two West German protest waves, although it did not appear until late in the cycles. Koopmans notes that heavy violence in the first wave is obscured in its radicalization; in the second wave “increase in heavy violence was also particularly pronounced for violence against people” (1993; 664). Out of these protests, only 4% between 1980 and 1984 involved violence against people; from 1985 onward 25% included violence against people (Koopmans 1993; 644). This is still markedly lower than the violence that occurred in between the two protest cycles: between 1969 and 1972 8% of the protests involved heavy violence, but rose to 50% during 1974-1977 (Koopmans 1993; 644). Koopmans explains that this increase is due in part to the *Rote Armee Fraktion* (Red Army Fraction, *RAF*), a radical terrorist group that arose out of the first protest cycle, and between 1975 and 1977 several dozen high-ranking politicians, judges and businessmen were killed (1993; 644). Even so, the presence of heavy violence against people in protests in itself is a sharp contrast from the pacifist *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

Participation in the West German protests, in comparison to the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, was limited because the movements drew from specific participation pools, such as university students in the student movement, instead of from the whole of society. Hence, these movements were not widely supported by the general populist, but rather by sub-sections of society. In the movements that Koopmans (1993) discussed, the participants in each movement are only those to whom the movement applies: the environmentalists, women, students, gays, communists, terrorists, and those concerned with squatting and the developing nations. West German demonstrations are made famous by the Neo-Nazis and other fringe groups, which is contrasted to individuals from every sector of society that participated in the *Leipziger 1989 Montagsdemonstrationen*.

#### **4.3    *Economic Fractures***

*The Economist* (18 Sept. 2004) examines the failed unification of Germany. The article's claim that German unification has failed, draws from quotes from politicians, economic statistics and sociological polls. While this article supports the findings of Walker et al., it focuses primarily on the relationship between economic dysfunction of the east German economy and social problems and attitudes, using Dresden and its surrounding towns as a case study.

Problems between the regional economies do not seem to be easily corrected, according to *The Economist*, as "the divide was highlighted again this

week by Horst Köhler, Germany's president, when he said that Germans must accept inequality between regions, because the country can no longer guarantee comparable living conditions in all of them" (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004).

*The Economist* cites several flaws in the German political economy as the cause for the problems in the east, notably that,

many of east Germany's problems flowed from the political decision to go for a quick unification in 1990. East German firms, whose productivity was lower than expected, had too little time to adapt. Two other much-criticized decisions are almost secondary: the one-to-one exchange rate adopted for eastern and western marks, which meant high costs, and the rapid sale of eastern state firms by the Treuhand privatization agency, which allowed western firms to buy and close competitors (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004).

Furthermore the west German economic system is also partly to blame; according to Georg Milbradt, Saxony's premier, "We got a system that favors the status quo when we needed one that supports development—just like western Germany in the 1950s" (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004).

Similar to *The Economist's* (18 Sept. 2004) critics of economic unification failure, Hefeker and Wunner (2003) argue that the failure of quick economic unification in Germany and the problems of the east German economy since 1990 are "based on the desire of the then government to maintain electoral support" (Hefeker and Wunner 2003; 109). They propose that there was an "underrepresentation of uniquely East German interests in the formulation of the economic parameters of unification policy" (Hefeker and Wunner 2003; 112); this under representation Hefeker and Wunner rationalize "as the outcome of political support maximizing behavior on the side of politicians" (2003; 112). As a result of this, unification was far more popular among East Germans than among West

Germans. However, the unification policy was “political sensible to complement a policy platform that was principally in favor of unification (thus targeting the East German electorate) with a unification policy that was targeted at the concerns of the West German electorate” (Hefeker and Wunner 2003; 112). In other words, the political platform favored the East Germans by favoring unification, however, the unification policy was written to favor the West Germans, and thus ended up as a disservice to both Germanys. The result according to Hefeker and Wunner is that, “arguably, one could make the case that the policies of German unification has left almost everybody worse off” (2003; 111).

But that is not the only problem persisting today; “the eastern economy has failed to become self-sustaining, says Rüdiger Pohl, former director of the Institute for Economic Research in Halle” (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004). This inability to sustain itself has wide-reaching consequences, and “although it is growing faster than the west’s [economy], it would shrivel without government transfers, which are still flowing at an annual rate of Euro 83 billion (about 4% of total German GDP and a whopping 22% of east German consumption)” (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004).

Although all of Germany experienced economic hardship, it was most noticeable in the eastern region. German newspapers and Germans that I spoke with during my trip consistently reported that the national unemployment rate was at a record high, with 8-10% unemployed in western Germany and 18-20% in eastern Germany (Walker et al. 25 Aug. 2004). According to the German

government's June 2003 GDP per capita break-down, eastern Germany had a €18,600 GDP; western Germany's GDP was €27,700 and the national GDP was €25,800 (Walker et. al. 25 Aug. 2004). The east earned approximately 67% of the west and 72% of the national average. These figures are also from approximately 14 months before the demonstrations began and before the unemployment rates rose dramatically. These figures from before the deep economic recession show the extent of the financial dissonance between the regions and suggest why *Hartz IV* caused more anguish in the east than the west.

#### **4.4     *Role of Hartz IV***

The cause of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement, *Hartz IV*, exposes reunification fractures because of its symbolism and economic implications. It has been suggested that the *Hartz IV* reforms “have become a symbol that western Germany, itself in dire need of reform, cannot keep up its end of the bargain” made when Germany unified in 1990 (*The Economist* 09/18/04). The bargain included promises of “flourishing landscapes” and economic prosperity in the East. Hence the Western promises were sweet-nothings whispered in to Eastern ears.

The reform targets *Arbeitslosengeld II* (Unemployed Money II), which is the welfare paid to unemployed individuals after they have been unemployed for a year. *Arbeitslosengeld I* and *II* used to be more extensive in Germany and are considered part of an unemployed individual's insurance; it was never seen as

welfare, and hence did not carry the social stigma that welfare has. For unemployed individuals whose unemployment extended beyond 48 months or who did not have *Arbeitslosengeld II*, they received *Arbeitslosenhilfe*, which is state welfare. *Hartz IV* combines *Arbeitslosengeld II* with *Arbeitslosenhilfe*, and eliminates *Arbeitslosenhilfe*. Part of the opposition that the demonstrators had to *Hartz IV* is the degrading nature of the welfare stigma. By merging *Arbeitslosengeld II* with *Arbeitslosenhilfe*, the degrading nature of welfare is transferred in part to the recipients of *Arbeitslosengeld II*.

The reform and the expected changes are outlined by the German government in a half-page article printed in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (17. Aug. 2004). “The goal of all *Hartz* reforms is to bring the unemployed as quick as possible back to work” (Die Bundesregierung).<sup>60</sup> The government intends to achieve this by giving jobseekers

a personal contact person, a so-called case manager. This colleague of the work agencies will fundamentally attend the jobless more intensively than before. And: every needing young person under 25 years old quickly receives through *Hartz IV* an offer for vocational training or a job, career preparation measures or qualifications (Die Bundesregierung 17 Aug. 2004).<sup>61</sup>

In addition, the amount of welfare that an unemployed person receives on *Arbeitslosengeld II* (beginning after 12 months of unemployment and lasting until the end of the fourth year of unemployment) is regulated, in a way that the longer

---

<sup>60</sup> Ziel aller Hartz-Gesetze ist es, Arbeitslose so schnell wie möglich wieder in Arbeit zu bringen.

<sup>61</sup> So bekommen Arbeitsuchende künftig persönliche Ansprechpartner, so genannte Fallmanager. Diese Mitarbeiter der Arbeitsagenturen werden Arbeitslose wesentlich intensiver betreuen als bisher. Und: Jeder hilfsbedürftige junge Mensch unter 25 Jahren erhält durch Hartz IV umgehend ein Angebot für eine Ausbildung oder Arbeitsstelle, berufsvorbereitende Maßnahme oder Qualifizierung.

an individual is unemployed, the less money that person receives. Furthermore, the German government promises to look at each family situation before assigning an allotted amount of money. Factors that the government consider in each family situation include: car/transportation situation, the size of the house or apartment, spending money, private retirement fund, utilities, the number of dependent children on the unemployed individual, and employment and salary of the unemployed's partner (Die Bundesregierung 17 Aug. 2004).

The main weakness of the German government's reform is the motivation behind the reform. It tries to address the problem of welfare free-loafers, but does not focus on a more pressing issue: the shortage of jobs, particularly in the east. The government does try to take into account the different financial situations of the two former halves, in that it assumes a lower cost of living in the east; however it doesn't necessarily address the salary differences or cost of living differences between the two regions or provide means to help level these differences. Although job re-training is provided for unemployed persons under 25 (who are newer to the work force and more recently educated), it fails to offer job training services for those over 25 years old, who have been in the work force for much longer than those under 25 years. Also, while the German government champions that *Hartz IV* is better for unemployed persons over 58 years old, the article does not indicated *how* it is better. Lastly, the article provides answers to limited hypothetical problems and situations, but not to situations beyond that.



#### 4.5 *Political Fractures*

Although the upper house of Germany's Parliament (equivalent to the US Senate) has equal representation of the 16 German states, the balance of power remains skewed: only 6 states composed the former East Germany, with 10 states forming West Germany. Thus, the upper house remains an unequal mix representing different and sometimes opposing needs and traditions of the former *BRD* and *DDR*. This disproportional representation of the former Germanys contributed to the political divide in passing *Hartz IV*: the six states from the former *DDR* and one state from the former West Germany voted against it, but were outnumbered by the nine other West German states, who voted in favor of the reform.

These economic woes are not without political consequences: "in June, a high-level commission argued that continuing to transfer billions eastwards would endanger Germany's future" (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004). This commission is significant because it "*broke a taboo by blaming many of Germany's economic ills squarely on the cost of unification*. Politicians had always avoided this argument, for fear of creating conflict between west and east" (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004, added emphasis). Although this commission bluntly blames the German economy's failure on unification, it also indicates how fragile the relationship is between west and east politicians, particularly on economic matters.

Marcus Walker et al. remarks that “the deeping economic divide between the country’s west and east is endangering a political schism” (25 Aug. 2004). This schism, he elaborates, is most noticeable in *Hartz IV*, because it “passed through the upper house of Germany’s parliament, the equivalent of the U.S. Senate, because of the support from most of the 10 western states, while none of the six eastern states voted for the measure” (Walker et al. 25 Aug. 2005). This indicates the existence of a political divide along the former Cold War boundaries exposed through the political economy.

The chancellor elections in September 2005 also played into the political climate, giving the east Germans more leverage than they otherwise have, because a predominate amount of east Germans are swing voters (Walker et al. 25 Aug. 2004). This gives them an advantage over the western German voters, because most western Germans vote according to their party alliance. These voting trends, according to Walker et al., have caused the politicians from implementing other welfare reforms, and have put political leaders, specifically Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel, “to talk less about free market economies and more about social justice” (25 Aug. 2004). Walker et al.’s observation about the shift in contemporary political rhetoric is indicative of persisting value differences between the former West and East Germanys. West Germany, with its inherent capitalist traditions, places high value on free market economies, while the former *DDR* with its communist memories cares more about social justice. In the east, the *Montagsdemonstrationen* and demands of repealing *Hartz IV* gave them

leverage in the political system, because, as Walker et al. points out, it forced the chancellor candidates to address their grievances in hopes of gaining more votes.

Because the East integrated with the West and the pre-existing Western political structure, all national politics are primarily perceived as *western* German politics. “Western politicians have failed to consider the east’s circumstances, argues Gottfried Fonfara, a pensioner taking part in a demonstration that drew 30,000 people in the eastern city of Leipzig on Monday. ‘They don’t understand, and they’re not even interested,’ he says” (Walker et al. 25 Aug. 2004). These political fractures, driven by the economic differences, feed into social problems and reinforce the “*Mauer im Kopf*.”<sup>62</sup>

#### **4.6 Social Fractures**

The persistent “*Mauer im Kopf*” manifests itself in different ways, including sociological surveys, voting trends and in the daily lives of Germans. Similar political and economic fractures to the ones discussed in the prior sections emerged in my observations and conversations with Germans. However, in my conversations, a large social/cultural component of the differences between western and eastern Germany was apparent, such as being a “*Wessi*” who moves to eastern Germany, hence having more difficulty to make ends meet, or living in a tension of value differences as the east slowly incorporates the western value

---

<sup>62</sup> *Mauer im Kopf* refers to the festering of East-West differences in an individual’s head, even though the Berlin Wall, itself was torn down.

scheme, and this social and cultural tension both hides and fosters fractures between the two former Germanys.

“According to a survey by Forsa, another pollster, 24% of western Germans believe that it would be better if the Berlin Wall were still up (against only 12% in the east)” (*The Economist* 09/18/04). This statistic highlights the difference between the “Wessis” and “Ossis,” in that twice as many “Wessis” than “Ossis” believe that they would have been better off if Germany had not reunited, and it also indicates a notable amount of people in the German society who regret reunification.

Beyond the divide of believing that the Germanys would have been better off if the Berlin Wall was still up, the Berlin Wall endures in individual values. Walker et al. describes the significance in the difference of values (the western value of free market economy in contrast to the eastern value of social justice) in politics during the demonstrations, as discussed in the previous section. However, *The Economist* elaborates on this theme, remarking that,

a recent survey by the Allensbach Institute shows how different mentalities in the two parts of the country remain. To most western Germans, freedom (49%) matters more than equality (35%). To eastern Germans, it is the other way around (36% and 51% respectively). In the west, 41% are happy with Germany’s political system; in the east only 27%. Other polls suggest that eastern Germans still feel like “second-class citizens”, in the words of Matthias Platzeck, Brandenburg’s premier (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004).

These stark contrasts in values demonstrate that despite, or even because of, the persistent economic problems, socially the west and east Germans remain distinctly different. “It would be a shame if the prediction of Wolfgang Nowak, a former junior minister in Saxony who now heads the Alfred Herrhausen Society,

a think-tank, came true: ‘We might be the first country which has, by unifying, created two peoples’” (*The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004).

Despite the physical absence of a barrier separating western and eastern Germany, such a division persists in contemporary Germany in the minds and interactions of eastern and western Germans. The process of “othering” that each engages in is almost cyclic. The incomplete cycle that the “*Ossis*” undertake (diagram 4) begins with the regional economy, as it is a part of the national economy. That is, how the regional economy compares to the national and western economies. Through “facts” about the economy, i.e. unemployment statistics and, in the instance of *Hartz IV*, the estimated number of welfare free-loafers, laws are created by the German government. These laws affect both former Germanys. The media publicizes these laws; the “*Ossis*” then make value judgments about the west and the federal republic that are substantiated in their perceptions of their situation and understanding of the law. These value judgments expose the value differences and fractures between the “*Wessis*” and “*Ossis*.” Differences are circulated amongst the “*Ossis*” through face-to-face interactions and eastern German media. Discontent and hurt feelings are fostered through this and spread throughout the community through face-to-face interaction and regional media, is incorporated into the perception of the “other” and manifests as sentiments or beliefs that the “*Ossis*” hold about the “*Wessis*.” In conversations I had with East Germans, individuals expressed sentiments of feeling that the “*Wessis*” have something they didn’t (i.e. higher salaries, more job

opportunities) or that they are not valued or considered in western decision making that affects the entire federal republic.

The process the “*Wessis*” undertake in “othering” the “*Ossis*” (diagram 5) is similar, but not identical. Like the “*Ossis*”, the “*Wessi*’s” incomplete cycle originates with the national economy. The economic condition of Germany is revealed through the media (and to a lesser extent, face-to-face interactions amongst “*Wessis*”); since the economy is often discussed in terms of West/East and whole, a floundering eastern economy and poor national economy creates and reinforces “facts” about the “*Ossis*” as it correlates to the economy (i.e. lazy, don’t want to work). “Facts” are conveyed through interpersonal interaction and the media, exposing and reinforcing differences. Differences and “facts” cause discontent and hurt feelings, such as feeling robbed or used financially, manifest into the “*Wessis*” sentiments about the “*Ossis*”, such as the belief that the “*Ossis*” are taking the “*Wessis*” money. One “*Wessi*” expressed to me that under the communist system, the “*Ossis*” never had to work to ensure their survival and so they never learned to work hard; because of this mentality, the East Germans don’t want to work, thus the eastern German economy is failing. The bias this “*Wessi*” holds illuminates some of the depth and breadth of the “othering” that exists in German society.

Despite fifteen years of unification, the “*Ossis*” and “*Wessis*” still remain fairly separate; in conversations with Germans from different regions, I’ve repeatedly been told by both western and eastern Germans, that it is more

common for “*Ossis*” to travel west than it is for the “*Wessis*” to travel east (diagram 6). As co-habitats of the same country, they are nevertheless connected. The media is the main connector, however, personal interactions with the “other” or with people who claim to know more about the “other” also diffuses perceptions of the “other.”

In conversations I had with Germans, *Hartz IV* exposed another fracture in the seemingly “unified” Germany: the relationships and perceptions that “*Ossis*” and “*Wessis*” had about each other. Although this is a topic that is often discussed in American German language and culture classes, and something that I had seen a bit in a previous trip to Germany, I was taken aback by how pronounced it was during the economic recession and *Hartz IV* protests. One western German in particular lamented that the communist system made the “*Ossis*” lazy, because they were assured a living and worked in a dysfunctional work system, so they didn’t want to work for money and therefore the “*Wessis*” paid for the welfare that the “*Ossis*” lived off of. As my informant shared this, she spoke bitterly. Another westerner, from a different region, merely pointed out to me, that the welfare money comes from the taxes of both western and eastern Germans, and that all Germans contributed to it equally.

While perceptions of the “other” certainly exist, a west German I spoke to who had lived in Leipzig for eight years, while reflecting on her experiences in

Leipzig, affirmed the popular saying, “*Ossis wird Ossis sein und Wessis wird Wessis sein*,”<sup>63</sup> but went on to explain to me that,

“I think that, easily, Westerners are for Westerners and Easterners are for Easterners, and Westerners don’t come into contact with Easterners. Likewise, Easterners would live in the East and have no contact with West Germans or go to West Germany. West Germans, who live in West Germany, have no contact to the East Germans or East Germany. I think that between both groups their own impression of the other remains in their head and their impression because of the way of life over freedom of life and concept of life.”<sup>64</sup>

Hence it seems, as I discussed in the section on agencies, that the “othering” persists due to media representations of the West and East Germans and through face-to-face interactions with someone who had contact or knew of someone who had contact with the “other” that this fracture persists in the culture. Another western German who had come to Leipzig for the demonstrations observed that in people’s minds there continues to be an East/West division and went on to say that he expected this difference to persist for ten or more years. A Universität Leipzig student remarked, that growing up Germany was divided along East/West lines and continues to be so. She suggested that as long as the division between East/West remains in people’s minds, nothing will change and Germany will remain divided.

One medical student told me that working in eastern Germany, she earns only 58% of what her west German friends earn in the same profession. She also

---

<sup>63</sup> Easterners will be Easterners, and Westerners will be Westerners.

<sup>64</sup> „Ich denke dort wo einfach Wessis für die West-Deutschen und Ossis für die Ost-Deutschen und Wessis nicht mit Ossis in Kontakt kommen. Also Ossis würden im Osten leben und kein Kontakt mit West-Deutschen oder nach West Deutschland haben. West Deutsche, die in West-Deutschland leben und keinen Kontakt zu Ost-Deutschen oder Ost Deutschland haben. Ich denke, dass zwischen den beiden Gruppen ihre eigene Vorstellung wegen den anderen beiden in Köpfen bestehen und eine Vorstellung wegen Lebensform über Lebensfrieden, Lebenskonzept.“



explained that while rent is a bit cheaper in Leipzig than in other west German cities, the price of clothing, food and meal tickets cost the same. Her experience sheds a light on why eastern Germans were afraid of the results of *Hartz IV*. A similar cost of living, but markedly decreased wages in a region leads to individual financial struggles and regional problems with the economy. Coupled with high unemployment, a reduction in welfare benefits without creating new jobs in a struggling region, it is understandable why as many as 30,000 people would feel the need to demonstrate. Throughout my time in Leipzig, I often heard these frustrations vented in conjunction to *Hartz IV*, most vocally by individuals who were not associated with *BüSo* or the *Nikolaikirche*.

## Chapter 5

### Loss of the “*Montagsdemo* Culture” Through Western Integration

#### 5.1 *Introduction*

The “*Montagsdemo* culture” is fading in Leipzig due to Leipzig’s ever growing connection to West Germany. This perceived loss of the “*Montagsdemo* culture” stems from legitimacy issues regarding the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* and splintered opinions by *Leipziger* over the future and roll of the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*.

#### 5.2 *Expectations*

The tension between the two protest traditions stems from the different protest traditions and that the East integrated with the West, and hence, the east Germany is suppose to adapt to west Germany and the western ways instead of retaining their own culture or the western Germans adopting cultural aspects of the eastern Germans.

During the forty years that they were divided, East and West Germany developed separate protest traditions. The most noticeable distinction between protest traditions is that in the East, the legacy of the 1989 demonstrations, and

how those demonstrations changed their recent past history and the course of the state, sustains and informs demonstrations. The West protest practices have no history of radical success or change that came as a result of the demonstrations. Because of the protest traditions, it is expected in east Germany, that the government will alter their policies in accord to the demonstrations. In west Germany, there is no such expectation, and the government expects that the populace will work through unions to change legislation.

Different demonstration traditions led to different expectations by the populace and the government about the appropriate response of the government and attitudes of the populace towards the demonstrations. In west Germany, demonstrations do not generate the same response as in east Germany, because the two typically protest over different subject matters, as I discussed earlier in this section. Hence, the opponent of many western German demonstrations are international actors involved in particular global events, such as the United States in the instances of the Iraq war (2002) and the arms race (1960s). In contrast, demonstrations are perceived by eastern Germans as a legitimate means of expressing discontent with the government and changing legislation, largely due to the success of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*. Bernd Hilder openly supports the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, writing that, “The Monday demonstrations should continue to happen, until *Hartz IV* ‘in its present form is

gone' ” (17. Aug. 2004).<sup>65</sup> This stance on the protests indicates that because of the success of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, they are considered a legitimate form of political opposition, and a way for communities to constructively and forcefully voice their dissent without violence and pressure the government for change. A few *Leipziger* I spoke with expressed fear that without the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, the government would not hear their opinions or listen to their concerns.

The east and west governments also respond to the 2004 demonstrations differently. The east German government (specifically the Sachsen-Anhalt government) was afraid of the protests, and the Sachsen-Anhalt Minister-President, Wolfgang Böhmer, states that,

If as a result, of these mass protests on the street, this law was repealed, then with it would our entire democratic, through the constitution in a stipulated system of decision making in a democracy be called into question. That would have wide-reaching consequences that I don't want to think about at all (Wonka).<sup>66</sup>

These fears are justified through the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* outcomes, and participation in eastern Germany was remarkably greater than in western Germany. Bernd Hilder concurs, remarking that “[t]he overall feeling of agitation in the west of the republic remains noticeably cooler than in the east” (Hilder, 17.

---

<sup>65</sup> *Die Montagsdemonstrationen sollen fortgesetzt werden, bis Hartz IV „in seiner jetzigen Form weg ist.“*

<sup>66</sup> Wenn als Ergebnis der massenhaften Proteste auf der Straße dieses Gesetz aufgehoben würde, dann würde damit unser gesamtes demokratisches, durch das Grundgesetz festgeschriebene System der Entscheidungsfindung in einer Demokratie in Frage gestellt. Das hätte weit reichende Konsequenzen, die ich gar nicht zu Ende denken möchte.

Aug. 2004).<sup>67</sup> The demonstrations in the west German cities had around a hundred participants each, while the *Leipziger* protests saw on the same day as many as 20,000 participants (“*Hartz IV—Tausende gehen. . .*” 17. Aug.” 2004).<sup>68</sup>

### 5.3 *Splintered Opinions*

“*Hartz IV-- Tausende gehen in 90 Städten auf die Straße*” (*Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004) overviews the response to the *Montagsdemonstrationen* by participants and politicians. These responses are not homogenous, but rather fractured, exposing the divide between the people and the politicians, particularly in the east. This division alludes that the protest traditions in the west and east are different, because of the participation and involvement differences in the two regions. “Alone at the Anti-Hartz-Demo in Leipzig marched, according to police estimations, between 15,000 and 20,000 people from the St. Nicholas Church square through the city to the Supreme Administrative Court,”<sup>69</sup> yet “in the west German cities, participation remains at around a hundred participants”<sup>70</sup> (*Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004). These figures suggest differing concepts of collective behavior legitimacy, because the eastern protests, especially the *Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen*, have over 1,000 times the participation that the western German protests had.

---

<sup>67</sup> Zudem bleibt die insgesamt aufgeheizte Stimmung im Westen der Republik spürbar kühler als im Osten.

<sup>68</sup> In den westdeutschen Städten blieb die Beteiligung bei jeweils einigen hundert Teilnehmern.

<sup>69</sup> Allein bei der Anti-Hartz-Demo in Leipzig zogen nach Polizei-Angaben 15 000 bis 20 000 Menschen vom Nikolaikirchhof durch die City zum Bundesverwaltungsgericht.

<sup>70</sup> In den westdeutschen Städten blieb die Beteiligung bei jeweils einigen hundert Teilnehmern.

Moreover, about half of the Leipziger and East Germans that I asked the question “Should the Montagsdemonstrationen continue to happen?”<sup>71</sup> to, responded immediately with “Good question” or “That is difficult to say.”<sup>72</sup> This hesitation and questioning of the use of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* is indicative of western influence. These remarks support my observations of the demonstrations and the uncertain future of the *Montagsdemonstrationen*, because although the presence of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* was accepted by all, most people did not seem know if demonstrations were an appropriate way to express their grievances about *Hartz IV* and if they should continue. Both the article and my conversations expressed divided loyalty towards the demonstrations: support because of 1989, but uncertainty because of the changes in situation, such as the divided leadership. The future of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* is uncertain, because it is no longer perceived as the most effective or legitimate way to change a situation.

---

<sup>71</sup> *Sollen die Montagsdemonstrationen wieder passieren?*

<sup>72</sup> *Das ist schwer zu sagen.*

## Chapter 6

### Conclusion

Fifteen years after the reunification of Germany, the country remains divided and people call for reform once more in the streets of Leipzig. Where there was once euphoria and hopefulness, coldness and jadedness exists. There is one political structure, but two peoples.

This barrier is not physical, but rather an economic, political, and social one. As I've examined, economic differences between the prosperous west and struggling east reinforce and further the divide. Indicators of this divide include unemployment statistics (8% unemployed in west; 18-20% in the east), salary differences (jobs in the west earn a noticeably more) and the annual Euro 83 billion transfer needed to maintain east Germany's economy (Hefeker and Wunner 2003).

Stemming from these economic differences are political and social differences. Because economic recession was most severe in east Germany, eastern Germans reacted most strongly to the government's *Hartz IV* reform. Data analysis indicates that western and eastern Germans tend to vote differently, so

politicians had to refocus their political platforms to cater to the needs of the eastern Germans. This refocusing is significant, because some eastern Germans say that they don't feel like the government cares about the people in the east.

The “*Mauer im Kopf*” remains the largest dividing factor between the Germans. The perceptions of the “other” and the separation between eastern and western Germans is largely a state of thinking that originated with economic differences that became value differences. The role of the media is paramount this “othering”, because it informs the public (Habermas 1994) and creates an ‘imagined’ community of people who have the same knowledge and ideas, but have never met each other (Anderson 1991). The media can both unify people, as with the “imagined” community, as well as divide people the discussion on the “*Mauer im Kopf*” illustrates.

One commonality shared between the western and eastern Germans is the presence of a protest tradition. However, these traditions remain different. In west Germany, Koopmans argues that a tradition of New Social Movement protests emerged that oftentimes involved violence. In contrast, the East German protest tradition originated in the success of the 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen*; non-violence and the day and time the participants meet characterizes this protest tradition. Incorporated into this protest tradition is Connerton's habit memory (1989), suggesting that the historic 1989 *Montagsdemonstrationen* movement is embedded in present demonstrations. Through this form of memory, a Leipzig protest culture evolved. This “*Montagsdemo*” culture is a specific way in which



people protest and protests are regarded in Leipzig that is unique to the city. Despite claimed ancestry of the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* to the 1989 movement, images from the 2004 movement reveal a physical evolution of demonstrations, such as a shift from a *Massenproteste* to a focus on the demands.

The collective behavior theories of Smelser (1969), Tarrow (1991) and Giddens (1984) explain how the two movements are fundamentally different despite the rhetoric of the 2004 demonstrations. The 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen* were unsuccessful largely because they were calculated, organized demonstrations, and so solidarity and the elements needed for success were not present in the movement.

However, like Führer slowing distancing himself from the 2004 *Montagsdemonstrationen*, the *Leipziger* are slowly separating themselves from their communist past and embracing the west. Giddens' work on emancipatory and life politics-orientated demonstrations (1984) reveal that although both *Montagsdemonstrationen* movements are emancipatory-politics centered, the 2004 protests were not as strongly rooted in the emancipatory politics as the 1989 movement was, reflecting an influence of the West German protest tradition.

As the East continues to integrate with the West, I theorize that the East culture and attitudes will change to fit the West model. Indeed, traces of this process are already evident in contemporary Leipzig. As I have already outlined, in the eastern culture, demonstrations are a legitimate form of public dissent; but the fractured opinions about the *Montagsdemonstrationen* I encountered

symbolizes western influence on the *Leipziger* “*Montagsdemo* culture”, because it shows that “*Ossis*” are adapting to western values. It follows then, that as the two former Germanys become more united and as the east adapts to its incorporation with west Germany, that the “*Montagsdemo* culture” will fade away because west Germany does not legitimize what it symbolizes and the need for the demonstrations will decline. Regardless of the future of the *Montagsdemonstrationen* and the “*Montagsdemo* culture”, eastern Germans will remain proud of 1989 and what they achieved though the *Montagsdemonstrationen*.

## Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1991.

Apel, Rainer. "Helga Zepp-LaRouche Sparks Anti-Austerity Demonstrations in Germany." *Executive Intelligence Review*. 20 Aug. 2004. 2 Feb. 2006.  
<[http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2004/3133saxony\\_demos.html](http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2004/3133saxony_demos.html)>.

*Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität*. 20. April 2006. <<http://www.bueso.org>>.

"Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität." *Wikipedia*. 24 Feb. 2006. 20 April 2006.  
<[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%BCrgerrechtsbewegung\\_Solidarit%C3%A4t](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B%C3%BCrgerrechtsbewegung_Solidarit%C3%A4t)>.

Connerton, Paul. *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Czok, Karl. *Die Nikolaikirche Leipzig*. Leipzig: Ed. Leipzig, 1992 (Museen, Sammlungen, Denkmale).

Die Bundesregierung. "Betriff: Hartz IV." *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004.

Bechert, Robert. "Fall of the Berlin Wall," *The Socialist*. 1999. 12 Nov. 2004.  
<<http://www.socialparty.org.uk>>.

Führer, Christian. "Nikolaikirche: The Events in Fall 1989." Leaflet from *Nikolaikirche*. Aug. 2004.

---. "Peace Prayer Services at St. Nicholas." Leaflet from *Nikolaikirche*. Aug. 2004.

"Getting Back Together is so Hard." *The Economist* 18 Sept. 2004: 58.

Giddens, Anthony. *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.

“Hartz IV-- Tausende gehen in 90 Städten auf die Straße.” *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004.

Hefeker, Carsten and Norbert Wunner. “Promises Made, Promises Broken: A Political Economic Perspective on German Unification.” *German Politics*. 12.1 (2003): 109-34.

“Helga Zepp-LaRouche.” *Wikipedia*. 27 Feb. 2006. 17 April 2006.  
<[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helga\\_Zepp-LaRouche](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helga_Zepp-LaRouche)>.

Hilder, Bernd. “Hartz IV: Protest ohne Ende.” *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004.

Image. *Badische Zeitung*. 5. Nov. 2005.  
<<http://www.badische-zeitung.de/aktionen/2004/dossiers/hartz/178,1164322.html>>.

Image. *Bild Leipzig*. 10. Aug. 2004.

Image. *Dradio.de*. 30. Aug. 2004. 3 Dec. 2006.  
<<http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/politischeliteratur/386102/>>.

Image. *DW-World.de*. 6. Sept. 2004. 10. April 2006.  
<<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1319122,00.html>>.

Image. *European News*. 5. Nov. 2005.  
<<http://eur.news1.yimg.com/eur.yimg.com/xp/dpa/20050712/10/2657489369.jpg>>.

Image. “Fischer wirft Lafontaine rechte Polemik vor.” *Financial Times Deutschland*. 24. Juni 2005. 5. Nov. 2005.  
<<http://ftd.de/pw/de/11915.html?imgpopup=1&nv=Image0>>.

Image. *Leipziger Internet Zeitung*. 5. Nov. 2005.  
<[http://www.lizzy-online.de/bilder/artikel/demo3\\_0804.jpg](http://www.lizzy-online.de/bilder/artikel/demo3_0804.jpg)>.

Image. *N24*. 5. Nov. 2005. <<http://www.n24.de>>.

“Lyndon LaRouche.” *Wikipedia*. 15 April 2006. 17 April 2006.  
<[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon\\_LaRoche#2004](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_LaRoche#2004)>.

Lohmann, Susanne. “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91.” *World Politics* 47.1 (1994): 42-101.

Magirius, Friedrich. "Peace prayer services at St. Nicholas." St. Nicholas Church. 8 Jan. 2005. <[www.nikolaikirche-leipzig.de](http://www.nikolaikirche-leipzig.de)>.

"Monday demonstrations." *Word IQ*. 10. Dec. 2004.  
<[http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Monday\\_demonstrations](http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Monday_demonstrations)>.

Neues Forum Leipzig. *Jetzt oder nie—Demokratie! Leipziger Herbst '89*. Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 1989.

"Oskar Lafontaine." *Wikipedia*. 15 March 2006. 17 April 2006.  
<[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oskar\\_Lafontaine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oskar_Lafontaine)>.

Pfaff, Steven. "Collective Identity and Informational Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East Germany in 1989." *Social Forces* 75.1 (1996): 91-117.

Smelser, Neil. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Tarrow, Sidney. *Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest*. Ithaca: Cornell Studies in International Affairs, Western Societies Papers, No. 21, 1991.

Torpey, John C. *Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 148.

Tucker, Kenneth H. Jr. *Anthony Giddens and Modern Social Theory*. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1998.

Walker, Marcus, Andrew Wallmeyer and Andrea Thomas. "Revolt in Germany's East Skews Political Agenda." *The Wall Street Journal* 25 Aug. 2004: A9.


"Was die BüSo tun will - in Stichworten." From *Neuen Solidarität* Nr. 34/2005. *Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität*. 4 April 2006.  
<<http://www.solidaritaet.com/neuesol/2005/34/programm.htm>>.


Welters, Dominic. "Das Leben wird hart(z)." *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004.

-----, "Heute Montagsdemo gegen Hartz IV—Pfarrer Führer geht nicht mit." *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 9. Aug. 2004.


-----, "Partnerschaft am Leben halten." *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 9. Aug. 2004.


Wonka, Dieter. "Kein Vergleich mit 1989." *Leipziger Volkszeitung* 17. Aug. 2004.


**Diagram 1****1989 Montagsdemonstrationen**


**Diagram 2****2004 Montagsdemonstrationen**



**Diagram 3****“Montagsogmo Culture”**



**Diagram 5****“Mauer Im Kopf:” “Wessi”**

**Diagram 6****“Ossi/Wessi” Interaction**

**IMAGE 1**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 98-9.

**IMAGE 2**

Sign reads: Visa-free to Hawaii

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 146-7.


**IMAGE 3**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 97.

**IMAGE 4**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 97.



**IMAGE 5**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 56-7.

**IMAGE 6**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 128.

**IMAGE 7**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 174.

**IMAGE 8**

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 175.

IMAGE 9



Signs read: “For the continued all-sided refreshing of the GDR”, “For a social ecological alternative civilian service”, “Woman chooses woman, with us can one (man) do nothing”, “15 days after the turning point, give the dictator an end”, “Free choice”, “Dictators divide the power”

Source: *Neues Forum Leipzig* 1989; 178-9.

**IMAGE 10**

Source: *Bild Leipzig* 10. Aug. 2004.



**IMAGE 11**

Source: *Bild Leipzig* 10. Aug. 2004.

IMAGE 12



Signs read (L to R): “Do Away with Hartz4 and Agenda 2010!”, “A request for the CDU: Thank Schröder with an honorary membership”, “People would work”, “Leipzig 2004 Monday Protests”

Source: *DE-World.de*.



IMAGE 13



Sign w/ Schröder reads: “So there, twit! Put an end to Schröder’s CDU politics!”

Source: *Die Leipziger Volkszeitung* 21. Aug 2004.

IMAGE 14



Sign reads: Starvation wages and forced labor! We are fed up! That goes too far!!!

Source: *European News*.

IMAGE 15



White sign says: Poverty/Fear/Homelessness?

Source: N24.

**IMAGE 16**



Sign reads: “Work for People”

Source: *Leipzig Internet Zeitung*.

IMAGE 17



Source: *Leipziger Internet Zeitung*.

IMAGE 18



Source: *Leipziger Internet Zeitung*.

### Transcript 1

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben.

U: mmmhm

M: Meine erste frage ist, wie ist die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands nicht erfolgreich? Was sind die Probleme mit der Wiedervereinigung?

U: Ich denke dort wo, einfach, Wessis für die West Deutschen und Ossis für die Ost Deutschen und Wessies nicht mit Ossies in Kontakt kommen. Also Ossies wurden in Osten leben und kein Kontakt mit West Deutschen oder nach West Deutschland haben, und West Deutschen, die in West Deutschland leben, kein Kontakt zu Ost Deutschen oder Ost Deutschland haben. Ich denke, dass zwischen den beiden Guppen ihre eine einartige Vorstellung wegen den anderen bein in Kopfzen bestehen und einartige Vorstellung wegen Lebensforum über Lebensfrieden, Lebenskonzept...ja.

M: Und denn...

U: Also! Auch eine ganz lebensliche, dass ich denke ist geschellschaftliche Eben ist, und auch ein anderer lebenslicher Punkt ist dass das Halt. Ich finde, dass es ist schon heraus. Das ist zu ein Punkt, ich finde es kann eigentlich einnehmen in Ost Deutschland, sie gehalte immer nach 58% maximal Leben von dem Leben in West Deutschland verdienen. Oder was man im Westen verdient, die Ost Deutschen, die in West Deutschland arbeiten verdienen 100%. Aber alle die in Ost Deutschland arbeiten, egal ob sie Ost Deutschen oder West Deutschen, verdient 58%. Außer denen die von West Deutschen direkt nach Ost Deutschen verschickt werden um hier zu arbeiten, sie kreigen um 100%, und dass finde ich geht nicht an.

M: Na ja. Ist dass die Probleme denn mit der Wirtschaft?

U: Ja. Hier hat einfach nur wo Arbeitslosigkeit ist und auch so der aufbau des viele unternehmen so schon strugglen und was auch nicht schaffen grad hat und nicht schaffen 100% des Gehalte zu seit. Aber irgendwie es ist komisch. Ich arbeite, zum Beispiel, in einem Krankenhaus, das ist in Deutschland weiterkontan Kliniken in Ost Deutschland und in West Deutschland. Ich kreige hier was die Ost

vergütet und meine Kollegen in Ruttergard die eigenen Arbeiten haben was in der West vergütet. Also, das passt woll nicht. Es ist nicht so das die Lebenshaltung kostet in Ost Deutschland gunstiger. OK, in Leipzig haben die Meiten weigende gunstiger als in der vergleicht Vergrößenstadt in West Deutschland. Aber in sonsten Kleidung, Supptikets, Essen kostet alles die gleiche wie in Westen. Von daher kann man nicht begrunzen.

M: Sollen die Demonstrationen wieder passieren? Und darüber was hat Clement gesagt?

U: Ja. Ich denke das Lebens insgesamt von unsere Gesellschaft ist, dass es unpolitisch ist, und wir leben in Osten wie in Westen. Und dass in Westen es ist einfach Gleichgültigkeit ist, oder so eine Haltung—kennst du den Ausfolg, „ich bring mein Scheppen ins Tropfen dabringen“? Also, selber so gut Einrichten oder selbe so gut Organizieren. Das ist mein Leben und alles andere körre mich nicht. Im Osten, denke ich Kopf nach inzu, dass viele Menschen sehr viel Unrecht hat über die die manchmal Marx-Wirtschaftliche-Geschellschaftliche Form über Kapitalismus. Und, dass die viele Entwicklung in der Gesellschaft und in der Politik nicht nach Vorsehen können, nicht verstehen, und deswegen auf der Unsicherheit herauslich in der kammende Jahre zurück ziehen, und also das ich arbeite in eine Krankenhaus außer hat von Leipzig aus am Land. Ich bemerke ganz viele von den Schwestern dort eben ihre Familie zurück ziehen, weil da irgendwie versuchen zu überleben so zu sagen, aber eben überhaupt nicht politisch werden, weil sie sozial auch angieren jetzt außerhalb von ihren Beruf, weil sie eben die Gesellschaftlichen Form nicht mehr nach vorsehen können. Das irgendwie so wie so...das früher war, wo alles kaput gehen, und wo man auf genau wo man aufgewachsen jetzt das gibt's nicht mehr und aber diesem Ding das war zum Besten kommt, verstehen sie das auch nicht. Sie nehmen es personliche zurück.

Und jetzt auf die Frage zurück zu kommen, ich denke zu einer Wende des '89 Grad brauchen wir nicht. Wir müssen sich nicht zu befreien jetzt hier, aber es ist ganz klar was wir verändern muss. Ich denke, dass so viele Harz dalinie in den Köpfen der Menschen was anderen, weil die Sozialstaat, den wir im Westen 60 Jahren lang aufgebaut haben, das funktioniert nicht mehr, und wir müssen einfach akptiziert, dass es eins warum unsere ganze Sozialleistung gibt immer Angst vor Sozialsicherheit, dass wir als Burger selber viel mehr verantwortlich sind für unsere Gesundheit um zu grenzen und so weit. Dass ist das Verscheiden sie nicht verstanden hatte; sie hat denken, dass das Staat muss und Firm alles machen, und jetzt eben dagegen demonstrieren, dass das Staat bestimmte Reform einleidet und bestimmte dritt ziehen, einfach gegen den Reform sozial-und-wirtschaftlichen Situation sich furen muss. Ich denke, wir als Bürger müssen zu Entschide um strehen und in andere Weg eben der Reform entwickeln wie man jetzt eben auf Grund beendet wirtschaftlichen und soziallichen Gesetzung wieder bestimmte Leistungen auf bewergt kann. Also, Sozialleistungen, Konzentrationen



und so weiter. Ich denke nicht, ich denke wir werden auf unsere Einstand müssen dass die Arbeitslosigkeit 15 bis 20% haben werden. Ich denke es wird nicht mehr weniger werden. Es müssen bestimmt ein Reform eingeleidet.

M: Was ist die Bedeutung des 1989 für heute?

U: Also die Bedeutung für uns Deutsche, die in Deutschland leben. Einfach dass wir wieder ein Volk sind als Volk in einem Staat leben. Ich komme auf... meine Familie—ich bin im Westen aufgewachsen aber wir haben sehr viele verwandeten in Osten, in Ost Deutschland. Wir sind einmal im Jahr Ost Deutschland gefahren um zu besuchen der DDR. Und einfach das wir jetzt, jetzt diese Grenzen nicht mehr zwischen uns aber und das wir verwantlen eine große Familie sind. Ich denke, dass auch politisch eben ist. Dass wir ein Volk sind und ein Staat haben und sonst die Bedeutung, dass die Ost Deutchen hat jetzt, dazu kann ich nicht sagen, weil ich West Deutsche bin, die in Ost Deutschland leben. Aber eben für mich als West Deutsche hat es auch komplet eine Bedeutung weil ich in Ost Deutschland leben und arbeiten kann. Ich finde Leipzig eine wunderbare Stadt und ich bin total freut; ich finde es ein Lokal, wo ich selbst arbeiten wollen zu Leipzig gesett man kann andere alternativ in dem große, in dem Angebot u.s.w. so daher zu mich persönlich eben diese besuchst du auch.

## Transcript 2

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Wie waren Sie mit den Demonstrationen in 1989 verwickelt?

G: Ich war in einem Betrieb, wo fast alle Kollegen in meinen Kreis in den Stadtbau in der DDR und Stadt großes Partei darüber in einer heiligen Mindsau an den Demonstrationen vereinigt. Leicht 50 Kollegen an jeder Demonstration teilet.

M: Jeder Montag?

G: Jeder Montag, ja.

M: Was macht der Erfolg der 1989 Demonstrationen?

G: Ich habe nicht verstehen.

M: Warum waren die Demonstrationen solch ein größer Erfolg?

G: Also. Die Unterscheide für mich war ein größer Erfolg. Es ist uns glumu an der DDR-Prinzipal. Wir vereinigen Deutschland sehr zu schnell und das war eine sehr größer Erfolg.

M: Wie ist Ihrer Lebensqualität anders?

G: Auch auf der Vereinigung war ich zwei Jahre oder drei Jahre voranrent also für das auch mit Kollegen betreiben und ich wußte den Vorurstand geben. Das war Anfangs Hitlers Schule; es gab sehr wenig Geld als ich also mein Rent erreicht hatte, habe ich wieder besucht zu beobacht. Nach drei Jahren als einfach habe ich selbständig arbeitet. Das kannst du verstehen?

M: Ja.

G: In zwischen war denn die Rente zu hoch zuwacht, zu staggart wordern, das ich quitter Kollegen konnte. Ich bin Feieraudit, eine Farbika auch eine ausgeschnite Rente und wir leben beides ganz gut von der Rente. Ich finde es toll dass du gekommen bist.

M: Können Sie bitte beschreiben eine Demonstration? Was passiert jeder Montag?

G: In der Demonstration, als einfach am Anfang war es kein Demonstration, am Anfang war ein Treff in der Kirche, in der Nikolaikirche, war das Freidensgebete, und wir beteten für den Freiden und man betete für Ausweisen aus der DDR, die Demokratische Republik Deutschland. Es sprach aber warum in Leipzig immer mehr Leute, die an quisend gebetete in dem Wochen. Sie passten nicht in der Kirche hinein, so sie sich versammeln in der Bruder Kirche. Immer mehr, immer mehr und in der Gottesdienst in der Kirche vorbei war die Macht der Demonstration. Sie fingen es sehr klein an, von der Kirche zum Hauptbahnhof, das war die Ausnahme und die außer Demonstration. Die Polizei es weit wieder über die Übergen, die auf der Demonstation verteilen. Sie wurden dazu gewaltet es ist in die Staat warum war auf der Straße, aus dem Ring in der Stadt darüber schritten. Und sie als Tausend, zehn Tausend dazu rund hundred Tausend Menschen verabschließen. Und sah eine Volksbewegung.

M: Meine letzte Frage ist, was ist die Bedeutung des 1989 für heute und was sind die Probleme mit der Vereinigt Deutschland heute?

G: Als die Richtigung Kohl. etwas super versprochen und die Leute verprochen es hat verteuscht, ich will so zu sagen die etwas primitiver. Sie haben geglaubt sich an so viel Geld verziehen. Wir hätten Hausen wie in den Westen. Alles wie Paradies aber natürlich nicht so. Das gab viele Probleme, die das Geld schluck, zum Beispiel war die Betriebe der DDR. Glaube ich den Lage der Konkorenz des Westes, der Konkorenzstand zu halten. Die Ei laubt was Ei was bewusst zerstört durch westliche Betrieb. Sie kauft die Betriebe freilich auf, durch kostliche Leitung und weckt aber das keinsee andere dieser Betrieb aufzubauen, so lange es ist ihre eigne Betrieb nicht zu sterken, die auf zu bauten wie ein Haus zu bauen. Dadurch kommt die Arbeitsversicherung in Osten und die Hausen jeden teuschete, das ist die Arbeitslosen verkehrtlich. Also! Erstmal wurde dann die Regierung Kohl abbewegung. Kohl war der erste Deutsche Bundeskanzler, das das Volk abbewegt wollte. Desty war das Parteilicher abgelegenhait, schlussend sich die Partei zusammen; er stutzte den Demonstrationen. Kohl war das erste Bundeskanzler, deswegen das Volk abgeben wurde. Gerhard Schröder ist ein Demokrat, den beentauscht durch die was auch passiert ist. Es dauert aber zu lange. Ich selbst bin aber da zeugen über der Politik der Sozialdemokrat und konzenquenz durchsetz da folgende das Bundes auch jetzt geht, aber akzeptiert sagutiert. Es geht zu langsam, dass sagen die meisten die Leute auf heute wie eintauschet.

### Transcript 3

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben.

FH: Ja.

M: Meine erste Frage ist wie ist die Vereinigen Deutschland nicht erfolgreich gewesen? Wo sind die Probleme?

FH: Probleme damals oder heute?

M: Heute.

FH: Heute die Probleme. Ja. Die hohe Arbeitslosigkeit und dadurch natürlich soziale Probleme. Also die Menschen, die kein Arbeit mehr haben, ins Sozialabreist gebauten, ihre Wohnung zum Teilen verlassen zu müssen und andere Bildene geschene, weil sie zu teuer sie kann nicht mehr besorgen können, damit zusammen hängt. Das sind echte großen Probleme.

M: Was ist die Rolle der Kirche in diesen Probleme? Was sollte die Rolle der Kirche sein?

FH: Die Rolle der Kirche? Ja, bedürftlichen Menschen, als eine Ältere oder Kranke zu unterstützen ihnen Hilfe zu geben. Wir haben eine Zivildienstleistugen, aber im Moment ist in Kananda, aber es fängt wieder an in September eine, der ist eben eine Speziale für altere Leute, da gibt ihnen einkaufen und tringt ihnen zum Arzt und hilft ihnen im Haus hat und solche Dinge.

M: Sollen die Demonstrationen wieder passieren?

FH: Das ist eine sehr schwierge Frage. Damals haben die Demonstrationen mir sehr viel bewurbt aber der Situation heute ist ganz anders, die Probleme liegt anders und damals es ist nicht ob man damit nicht wieder erreichen können. Denn damals hatte es eine Pragmater betroken; heute nicht so. Die Verordnungen sind ganz anders. Wenn man demonstriert das Gefange geht nicht, das es schon in Ordnung, aber was man errichen kann, was damals errichen kann, das stirbt mich, weil hin doch wir erlauben eben ganz anders sind auf das von der anderen

Machen vertragen das ist von einer Hundred sehr sehr großen Machen vertragen von heute ist diese doch kleine Dinge oder andere Geschichte.

M: Was ist die Bedeutung des 1989 für heute?

FH: Ja, das ganze Leben hat geändert. Das die ganze Gesellschaft ist ungeöffnet worden und geändert worden und das habe ich jeden einzige Bürger früher der DDR bezogen. Aber den gearbeitet word oder die Schule oder Studium—alles hat sich geändert. Das wurde für viele natürlich schwer. Man viele betriebe Dinge wurde damals kaputt und man muss sich um orientieren und neue Arbeit und zum Zeile man ist in Bett gezogen aus dem 1990. So heute ihr nach vierte man lieber Wand ist um Geld und Arbeit bekommt ist hier nicht, weil eben hier ist so viel kaput gegangen von Industrie vor Endnung.

M: Wie hat Ihren Lebensqualität verändert?

FH: Ja. Wer Arbeit hat, das ist die Qualität des Lebens natürlich wird es gesteiben und da gibt's andere Möglichkeiten. Sein Leben heute hat sehr hoch gesteigen aber es gibt viele, sie haben nur wenig Arbeit und nur ein Kopfmogel und ein Ehepaar nicht oder pakein. Diese finden es schlechest am.

### Transcript 4

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben.

G: Ja.

M: Warum hat Deutschland die Arbeitslosenprobleme?

G: Es ist nicht nur in Deutschland, aber es ist überall. Aber es ist ein 8 Million Invention. Da nicht aber damit 50 Million den Doys, dass sie kennen auch wird. Nein, es ist irrlogisch. Was-- 80 Million dabringen dies denn? Das wäre Industrie kaputt.

M: Wer soll das Problem korrigieren?

G: Der Staat wird das machen. Aber nicht now jetzt das SPD-- NICHT das SPD. NICHT machen. Lass die CDU werden in Deutschland.

M: Sollen die Demonstrationen wieder passieren? Oder sollen--

G: Ach na ja, das ist... die müssen den Fussen unter dem Geist der Bruderdienst dafür. Aber wie ist es machen, das ist... das ist schwer. ja. Das muss man sehen und soll nicht so weit es ist..sehen.

M: Was macht der Erfolg der 1989 Demonstrationen?

G: Was Friede gemacht haben?

M: Was haben sie gemacht und warum?

G: So was und warum?

M: Warum gibt's die Ergfolge?

G: Natürlich die DDR geht völlig weg. Naja. So schön.

M: Naja, aber warum?

G: Der Russe Staat... Staat der Russen, naja?

M: Was ist die Bedeutung der 1989 Demonstrationen für heute?

G: Verstehe nicht, was?

M: Kann man heute etwas von diesen Demonstrationen lernen?

G: Heute, ney, kann man nicht. Es ist vorbei. Obwohl die Demonstrationen für das neue Raus hat, da ist nicht gut... da ist misdrinen. das ist uhh... das geht nicht mit damals zu vergleichen. Damals kam man zur Kirche kallas und Gott und sie sich verstecken und das geht nicht mehr.

M: Mit die Montagdemonstrationen, die Kirche hat die Montagsdemonstrationen

G: geholft

M: geholfen? Was soll die Rolle der Kirche sein--heute?

G: In der politische Kirche?

M: Was soll die Kirche machen oder soll es etwas machen?

G: Kann sei es muss nicht machen. Sie muss ruhig sein und weiss ich nicht und dort kann ich nicht sagen. Ich bin selber kannlich vor Kirch aber das ist eine interessante....

<tape cuts>

M: Sind sie auf von dieser Meinung?

A: Nicht nahre, sowieso, naja das kann man nicht. ich denke nicht. Es ist nicht dumm aber es halfte nicht. Wer gearbeitet und gearbeitet und sagte nicht und so will nicht. Es ist zentrum.

M: Ich war kurz in West Deutschland und Wessies hat zu mir gesagt, dass die Probleme ist dass die Ossies wollte Geld zu kreigen—bekommen, aber sie möchten nicht zu arbeiten.

A: O mein es ist so quatch! und sie bluten Hunde! Es geht um nicht. Das muss dir die West Deutschen, die bemerkt Arbeitslosengeld kreigen, das werden wir noch besser daran wer werden. Das ist unsinn. Sie kreigen 10, 12 Mark mehr. So wie so. Denn sind eben noch andere. Ich verstehe es nicht. Das ist dumme Verquatchen von denen, pfiefener. Aber da setzlich so 40 Jahre der Geteilet zu

sein und vermittelt zusammen es ist schwer, das zu horen. Kamm ebenlich aus. Es ist schwimmig.

M: Können Sie bitte ein bißchen über Ihre Lebensqualität sprechen?

A: Ich bin 70 Jahre alt. 70. Was wurden wir über Lebensqualität wissen? Es geht noch nicht mehr hier ja. Laut mal bitte und ein Bier trinken und denn es ist gut, nicht? Das ist Ruhe.

M: Aber es ist besser...

A: Nay

M:... ohne die

A: Aber ohne die Kommunist ist es sein. Meine Herpik nur den nachsten 303 mal Grunde, aber das wird die Bezeugung die Abemeter. Aber sie sind versicht. Das ist schon zum Gott tun aber es kreigen nicht alle. Das kreigen viele gar nicht. Das nur kommt zu, dass die mit Kinder nur zu finden, 2, 6, 700 Mark im Jahr. Das kommt damit, dass das Leben nicht reis versicht den langen Weg. Das ist eine Abenturfahre. So es wird schwer. Schwer.

M: Ist die Wirtschaft nur das eigeine Problem, oder gibt es andere?

A: Uhh...

M: Mit der Vereinigung?

A: Die haben total gewusst, West Deutschland hat der DDR kaputt gemacht.

M: West Deutschland?

A: Natürlich. Einmal Frei. Mehr wie 3 Jahre haben die nicht gehalten die Buden. Now dieazig 60 Jahre zu schluss im Misverstandvoll zu bleiben.

M: Soll etwas von hier in Leipzig gemacht, oder es ist nur von Berlin?

A: Auf von Berlin. Auch sind die Partein müssen sich selber zawut.

M: Wo kann Deutschland Arbeitslosen Programs, wie in Hannover mit der Arbeitslos hat Hitler der Marschsee gebaut, braucht Ost Deutschland etwas wie das?



A: Das kann sie nicht mit dem Verfreiden gebaut und sie leben in Russland dadrin. [...] Kaputt, alles kaputt. Kann nicht sagen.

### Transcript 5

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Meine erste Frage ist warum ist die Vereinigung Deutschland nicht erfolgreich?

KH: Ich glaube für viele Leute...sind skeptisch. Doch. Sie haben vielleicht mehr getraut, es ist die Realität nicht gesehen. so wie so. So viele sind schwierig mit den Vereinigung des Nation dazu gekommen. Sie fühlen sich unverstanden, arbeitslose auch. Das ist das Problem, dass viele Leute eigentlich nicht zu froh bereit waren. Sie haben gesehen, eine Farbe, ein Land, wo waren wir hinreisen aber generativ der Erfolgreich, das glaube ich, dass ist falsch. Das wäre falsch. Es gab kein anderen Weg. Es ist eine Nation, zwei Länder aber eine Nation. Das kann nicht gut gehen. Ein Land.

M: Wer soll die Probleme korrigieren?

K: Wer?

M: Wie und wo?

K: Die Politiker sind da zu fort, und das geht eigentlich zugemindert. Also man kann, wie ich selbst, es kann nicht sagen grün wird das Richten oder Rot wird das richtigen oder Kansch und gar nicht Hilfe. Das kann nicht passiert. Aber wissen verscheinlich wir müssen als ein Gemeinsam sprechen, nicht einfach nur die Politik. Aber das die Leute vergessen.

M: War es ein unter-oben aber so die Probleme von oben-unten korrigieren? Oder immer nach unten von oben?

K: Das wird nicht funktioniert. Von unten nach oben zu korrigiert, das wird nicht funktioniert. Also man hat eine Freigewerte Regierung und man muss natürlich zutreten zu der Regierung haben so das funktioniert überhaupt gar nicht. Das funktioniert demagog gar nicht. Aber wenn das Volk wird, seine Vertrete wird, müssen natürlich das auch versorgen dass die Inquestende Volk es waren. Sie kann ab gewiegt haben. Aber für vielen ist das unklar, was soll passiert, warum das alles passiert, warum auch einmal politiker anderen interessenten haben oder eigen Interesse vertreten und nicht des Volkes. Das kann sie nicht hinaus haben und so geht nach Hause, das gibt's kein Geld mehr.

M: Sollen die Leute mehr demonstrationen?

K: Mehr Demonstrationen, taja, man kannt war vor dem Wende sein gedenken Ausdruck geben, aber das wird auch von viele Unverständnis stossen. Ich glaube das die Demonstrationen in rudigen Zeit allein oder wieder großen besurden kann. Das wird nicht funktioniern. Da gab viele zu viele Leute, da sitzt eigne Leute im Park—und ich auch—und viele wissen gar nicht was der Erfolg des Demonstation ist. Sie wollen gar nicht hindort. Fühlen sie sich unverstanden wollen sie denn sagen, wo denn gehen lieber irgendwo wohin und bleiben hier sitzen sitzen das Grenze aus und bleibende da verstehen. Das ist eigentlich das Schlimme davon.

M: Die Demonstrationen in '89 hat die Leute hier in Leipzig seit bekommen und was ist die Bedeutung der Demonstrationen heute?

K: Heute? Also heute wollen sich die Leute eigentlich gehor verschaffen. Sie wollen sich Lust machen. Sie wollen sagen „ja, wir möcheten das Sozialband gehört, dass zu gehört werden, dass denke ich. Es wird nicht darum gehen um irgendwie kobal zu machen oder irgendwie zu sagen wir sind gegen alles, dass ist das Unverständnis was dass, das kommt wieder zum Ausdruck, ja klar.

M: Ich habe einmal West Deutschland gewesen und ich habe zu mir gesagt, dass die Ossis möchten Geld haben aber sie wollen nicht arbeiten. Ist das das Wahrheit?

K: Ja, das ist auch zu sindu...es ist zu einfach. Vielen Leute wollen ja arbeiten, sie wissen ganz genau das ohne Arbeit gibt's kein Geld also der Traum viele Volk der Lotto zugewinnen oder so wie der sind 1 Million zu 1 also das kann nicht sein. Aber es wird viele ja manupliert. Dass wird viele schön gelaudet, das wird viele in der Zeitung, was die Leute auch denkt. Alte Leute voreinding sagt ja, mein welt geht immer weniger denn es mein Traum.

M: Meine letzte Frage ist was soll die Rolle der Kirche sein?

K: Die Kirche?

M: oder soll die Kirche eine Rolle haben?

K: Das die Kirche Einfluss auf das Grenze, ja, damals wurde es anders. Damals gab es, war es eine alterntive dazu. Aber die Kirche hat gar nicht der Macht zum Stoßen. Also dass denke ich auch dass die verkerhte Weg ist darauf zu offen zu sagen, ja gut, die Kirche oder das Schipfolder haben die Richtung, weil sie das selber tun. Das kann nicht funktioniern, da gibt's für mich, gibt es nicht von oben

irgendwie jemand kommt und alles klappt macht und fluster darauf macht und dass wurde alles gut und hat alle Arbeit, und dass ist, denke ich falsch. Es wird das nicht so sein auf der Kirche machen kann oder stoppen kann, also hat von der Parthis oder Ephtis die evangelische Kirche ist oder reformede Kirche ist auch über dass die denn sagen was gemacht daso. Das denke ich nicht.

### Transcript 6

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Meine erste Frage ist haben die '89 Demonstrationen einen Platz heute? Sollen die Demonstrationen wieder passieren?

S: Wieder passieren? In der DDR aber nicht... bleissendes Erfingnis.

M: Wie ist der Vereinigung des Deutschland nicht erfolgreich?

S: Naja, für solange im Kopfen es ist, lassisch bei dem Meisten, absolute gar nicht, passieren nicht. Seit nur fest 6 Jahre bin ich mit den Eltern und dazu gehört ich, Lise wieso weit es denken einfach bei dem. Als ich ein Mädchen war es immer noch Ossi/Wessi getrennt wurde. immer noch so.

M: Wer soll es anders machen?

S: Anders machen wurde es einsammen gehen. Weil es einsammen wir haben müssen es langsam und einsichen und dann es so. Aber wie es ist anders, es steckt da nicht drin so es ist kein Politiker, dass wußte es. Ich habe den ganzen und kann nicht Kann nicht sagen so was wichtig ist oder nicht. [?]

M: Müssen die Politiker dass machen oder ?

S: Alle Leute, eigentlich. Sei gewollt sehr sehr schnell ans.

### Transcript 7

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Ich möchte zu erfinden, haben die Montagsdemonstrationen ein Platz oder ein Teil in der deutschen Politik heute?

I: Ja, das ist sehr schwer zu sagen ob die Montagsdemonstrationen einden haben oder die Montagsdemonstrationen waren damals so zu sagen der Umschluss, der Ablosung der Regierung und die gesagte ebende Freiheit und die Vereinigung der Deutschland. Aber heute Tag geht es unpraktish oder die Montagsdemonstrationen, die sollen ja gegen den Sozialabbau eben im Staat, bei uns drüber der Arbeitslosigkeit so war und so fort. Früher hat da keine Arbeitslosigkeit gehabt und jetzt natürlich war es kein so wichtig als Demos sich so bemude, so keine Arbeitsplatz und keine Arbeitsblutter zu davon mit will man eben war so und den Staat zwing die Gesetze, die eigentlich schon ein Abscheide sind, eben zu eine voreinandere und macht hinein aber das wurd zu möglich eben karum möglich verein. Der Staat geben kein Geld mehr und hat die Arbeitslosigkeit in Dänemark man zugenannt werden.

M: In ihren Meinung, sollen die Demonstrationen wieder passieren?

I: Wieder? Ja ich meine zuversuchen ist es schon. Vielleicht zu erricht man einiges wenn sammel mal genug Leute dagegen protestieren und gehen auf die Strasse gehen danahrer. Und was soll die Regierung angefahren wollt aber schwer zu sagen.

M: Wie waren Sie mit den Demonstrationen verwicklet?

I: Ich hier war rein Ich bin drückstren mitgenommen aber nicht in Dänemark. Wie jetzt hier mit den jungen Menschen, die noch keine Genzen bekommen und die eben einaufgewesen sind.

M: Was macht der Erfolg der 1989 Demonstrationen?

I: Tja

M: Warum waren sie solch ein großer Erfolg?

I: Sie konnten anders sich augenlich vielen waren es klar. Sie gedacht wollen was sie errichten, was macht andern zu genommen werden. Was die finzinallibertieren nicht so gesup werden in Dänemark, es war ein kertsverfallust aber.

M: Haben die Demonstrationen Ihr Leben gewicklet?

I: Ja, ich meine vor 14 Jahren die Demonstrationen dagegen eine ganz andere politische Sachen zu der Zeit. Die Regierung schwustert so oder so und erlaubt wurden die Freiheit hang zwollen es ist schon anders als wie ET oder jetzt Montagsdemonstration gegen verfolgen.

M: Wie ist die Vereinigung des Deutschland nicht erfolgreich?

I: Tja. Aber warum? Das ist sehr sehr schwer sachenmal zu sagen warum sie nicht erfolgreich war. Man hat ziemlich viel gesucht aber es hat eben sich dastimmt zusammenbruch viele Sachen mal damit bereichtet: die Betreib, die Industrie ist es kaputt gemacht wurden, ja, da haben viele Geld eingesteckt in grossen Marbe und haben die Teilreise Aussenlandes oder indian vereigine Betreibe ausverweirt und sachen macht ein Jahr oder macht zwei Jahren oder so haben so denn wurden eben die Firma inswand besetet. Denn liquitiert wurden gemacht. Man hat sie die Vogelgeld genommen wurden, die gesagt, und wie gesagt eben aufzubauen und abzeugnis oder aus bild macht zu bringen und dort wie da Fuß passen und sehr sehr schwer. Wir haben uns damals genommen, so zu sagen, haben die Paupno von uns genommen haben sie mit ihrem Wand believiert es war und die große Unzufreidenheit, die eben was man zeugen ist.

M: Mit den 10 zu 20% arbeitslos, was soll man machen oder was soll die Richtag machen?

I: Sehr viele sind ja eben schon sag man mal, ihr macht den Wend oder 10 Jahren mindestens arbeitslos und alles zwar ueber 40 ist eben ganz ganz schwer wieder Arbeit zu finden. Zu wenig Betreibe war und selbst die Betreibe die Stasi haben sie solch richtig gekempfen, die bekomme keine Aspekte und so war und so vertrei die Leute ganz einfach kein Geld haben was machen zulassen. was war die ganze Hand...tja.

M: Ist es ein Mauer im Kopf Problem mit die Osis und Wessis?

I: Ja, es ist ungefar vereinlich, aber ich meine von uns sehr viel Osis gehen ja eben rüber nach West Deutschland weil subseben Teilleise der Arbeitplatze da sind und versuchen eben in Stuttchen Geld zu verdienen und in andere Lander zu gehen dort wusst eben Arbeit gibts zu andere Dinge zu macht und zu bald in ein Betreib zu macht von philosophantopf.

M: Soll die Kirche eine Rolle haben?

I: Ach, die Kirche. Da muss ich sagen. Ich bin Heide. Nicht getauft, nicht konfirmiert, war zuisch die Kirche war hier in Ost Deutschland so zu sagen den Neues Bundeslandern nicht so. Drüben ja.

M: Aber es hat ein grosses Teil in den Montagsdemonstrations...

I: Ja, das stimmt. Nikolaikirche, so ja, ich meine ja.

M: Soll die Kirche etwas zu machen?

I: Doch, ich wurde sagen, die Kirche für nicht ist schon eben junger Menschen ansicht zu beiten veranstranug zu machen und so war und so fort. Das ist schon. Aber in Bilder schwatz es ist eben sehr sehr schwer, weil die Menschen doch eben nach gustaben in der Kleidung oder so, kann/soll die Kirche die Menschen an sich binden in der Kurs der zu viel Abweglos. Man hat zu viel Möglichkeiten. Ich ander weitig nicht zu früher nach aber natürlich in dem gesindigen Gemiden. Tja.



### Transcript 8

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben.

D: Ich bin nach die Demonstrationen nach der Mauer gefallen ist, nach dem Wende gewesen ist, und finde aus West Deutschland ruhiger als in Ost Deutschland ist wegen den Arbeiter.

M: Werden Sie in Ost Deutschland geboren?

D: Nein, West Deutschland geboren.

M: Da gibt's die Aussage, „Wessis wird für Wessis sein und Ossis wird für Ossis sein“—stimmen Sie zu?

D: Ich glaube in Kopfen da gibt's immer noch eine Unterscheide zwischen Ossi und Wessi und wird dannach für zehn oder so Jahren geben.

M: Können Sie ein bißchen über die Wirtschaft sprechen?

D: Ich glaube, dass wenn die Wirtschaft ganz nicht so schlecht weit wird es daran dass der Neuteil der Bundesrepubik oder der Ostteil komplet moraufgebaut worden muss und kompletter Wetter der Tiergarten aufgewordern muss. Es wurden ganz schlecht heute.

M: Wer soll es verbessern?

D: Wer? Das kann die Politik verbessern.

M: Direkt auf dem Richttag oder in lesser Politik wie hier?

D: Die andere Politik ist schon OK, aber der Bundesländer müssen angekocht um gutes Lande Politik und den Bundesländer geht es auf wird, aber ich wundere mich deutsche Politik verändert und nicht der Bundespolitik. Die soll sich nicht verändert werden.

M: Soll die Kirche eine Rolle in diesem Prozess haben?

D: Die Kirche? Ich glaube die Kirche hat Autonomie und braucht nicht eine Rolle gespielt.

M: Die Religion und die Politik sollen nicht gemischt sein?

D: Das ist zwei unterschiedliche Dinge. Die Religion macht ihr Ding und die Politik machen Politik und die Leute sollen die zwei nicht vermischen.

M: Danke.

### Transcript 9

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben.

K: Für mich war schon das soziale Ding in der DDR, der Sozialsystem, da hat eine Arbeit, da hat Schuldbewegung. Kennen dazu war OK also und jetzt ist alles nicht mehr. Es ist Urteil. Jetzt gibt da kaum Arbeit.

M: Ja. Mit 20% arbeitslos das kann nicht passieren, aber hat die Demonstrationen.

K: Ich bin daher jeden Montag mit gelaufen. Jeden Montag.

M: Wie hat die Demonstrationen Ihr Leben verwicklet?

K: Eigentlich kaum. Da ich auch öffentlich so vergeld hat kann nicht rein. Ich meine ich hab zwei jetzt zu dem Thema hier. Könnten sie sich wie die ändern. Ich hat blöden kleinen zwischen anderskeit und den Grenzen nicht mehr. Wo die Stadt möchten daran.

M: Warum waren die Demos in ,89 einen großen Erfolg?

K: Ja probable vor der Abvolk das der eben eine Kreisen kann und andere Meinung sagen könnten. Ich sage alles, egal jetzt wo ich stehe. Also, meine Meinung—wo ich stehen. Es ist natürlich schwer, weil ich geändert wurde und dann habe ich oft meine Suchen und meine Kopie und diesen auch schwer zu Glück zu bringen die Leuten war. Sie denken gesunden und arguren und so wie so. Gibt's es bei mir Tuschest unverfleishnis verstehen; da gibt's keine Finisha. Ich habe offnis und zu mir kann es OK macht und sag wie es ist und muss es alleine machen, so dass ist ein punkt in der DDR vor mehr zusammenheit ins zwischen den Leuten. Jetzt ist eben wie so allein gestorben.

M: Wie ist ihre Lebens anders seit in ,89?

K: Letztes Jahr hält ich nach Arbeit, aber da ich nach Arbeit hat. Kann ich mich seine heute da geschmitten aber im Moment geht's mir nicht ganz gut, wir weit Umstand entsprechen, also ich meine durch meine Ding im BüSo.

M: Ist Ihre Lebensqualität heute besser?

K: Nay. Schlimmer.

### Transcript 10

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. In Ihrer Meinung haben die Demonstrationen von 1989 ein Platz heute in deutscher Politik?

O: In der Politik oder in der Gesellschaft?

M: Beiden.

O: Naja. Also ich bin eigentlich zu jung—ich bin sechs, aber ich habe das Gefühl, dass die Leute sehr selten kann aber es ist schade finde ich dass ich so jung bin und es ist schon da her gewesen wäre. Also das Ältere als 5 Jahre alt gewesen habe ich persönlich hier mitgekommen hätte ziemlich schon schade. Meine Generation also ist so gewöhnlich als die ältere Leute ist.

M: In Ihrer Meinung warum waren die Demonstrationen einen großen Erfolg?

O: Ein Erfolg war was alles geht die Zeit war, weil alles so wie so kaputt war und auf zu schwächen hätten war und dass die Leute mitgekriegt haben. Es war irgendwie eine Abbindung wenn in der Sozialsystem alles kaputt geht dann versucht man auf zurecht und dem mehr Freiheit zu letzten und dann sich ist die Grundlage da. Dass man, weiß man, was passieren kann und wo es wunder nicht erlaubt, als ich gesagt habe. Es hat schwer eigentlich setzlich, eigentlich zuversetzlich und weiß das auch nicht. Ich wurde man sagen, dass heute eine schlechte Rolle spielt in der Leute im Osten der übernachtlich fühle und Probleme sehen irgendwie ob die Religion versorgen sind. Das ist schon zusammenheit gibt's unwohl. Lange dabei zusammen und haben zusammen alles gemacht und so und es muss im Kopf den wieder den viele Ausbilden und kriegen alle Probleme ab. Aber ich wollte schon das gemacht irgendwie kann schon sein.

M: In Ihren Augen, was sind die Probleme heute?

O: Ja, das Problem ist, dass die Leute damals arme waren und heute immer noch sind. Also es ist ein Problem von vielen, aber dass hören sich die Leute beklagen sie sind schon Augen übersagte beklagen über Unrecht, über Diktator, über solchen Sachen. Das stimmt gestürzt und heute sind die ganze Sachen weit weg, weil da gibt keine Diktator mehr, aber die Leute gehen nicht besser so unbedingt. Man kann alle möglichen Sachen kaufen dies voll nicht da, aber man hat trotzdem viele

mehr Probleme irgendwie und sein Lebensstandard nicht klarheiten. Vorher war nicht ein Problem weil immer gleich war und natürlich viele Leute gehörte zur Meinung, dass es doch besser war, wenn man ganz war. Ich sage, dass konnte heute aber dafür muss man einsteigen irgendwie eine Wohnung zu verlieren und solch. Kann es richtig aber viele Leute denkt mehr so.

M: Was macht der Erfolg der '89 Demonstrationen?

O: Alles geht besser, das ist der Erfolg. Der Erfolg ist die Freiheit zu Reden, zu Reisen, überhaupt...das ist der Erfolg demon, die man noch hat von.

M: In '89 die Kirche hat eine große Rolle...soll die Kirche heute eine große Rolle haben?

O: Also damals die Kirche eine große Rolle gespielt hat, das war auch eine bedingte zu verfeuert Glück, weil die Kirche man könnte nicht einkreisen zu sehr, und die Kirche haben früher in der DDR schon gefunden ausstatt Kirche sein könnten für das im Osten tanz und die Kirche und hatte nicht direkt mit der Kirche selbst zu tun, die Kirche war die einsige Freiraum. Das ist schon toll und ich finde auch es ist eindeut. Ich selbst bin nicht religiös und ich finde nicht alles das die Kirche oder die evangelische Kirche sagt oder denkt oder Meinung hat gut aber ich kann nicht sagen ob die Kirche mir wichtiger sein sollte als es schon ist. Aber ich habe viele die Kirche es ist einfach so, es ist schon OK und dafür kann ich mit. Ich glaube das die Kirche heute noch wichtig Rolle spielt in der Gesellschaft aber nicht mehr notwendig ist und irgendwas auf zubauen. Man hat zu viele Schultz. Man muss... heute andere Möglichkeiten gibt oder bei jeder andere Möglichekeiten hat, wir haben viele oder zu viele und die Kirche ist eine von vielen.

M: Soll die Kirche die Religion mit der Politik mischen?

O: Na ich bin eigentlich verswindisch mit der Einschwich zwischen der Politik und der Religion. In einem Beispiel dagegen, dass in der Urfach der Europasische Verfassung und der Zug auf der Kirche dadrin ist weil oft in Europa irgendwie christlich ist aber trotzdem gibt auch Menchen nicht christlich ist in Europa, gibt auch menchen von einen anderen Religion und deshalb finde ich schwierig bei der Politik für alle da ist so man das auch trennen nicht aus der christlichen einshaft da einfach so. Es ist so wichtig ist um sich halten.

M: Aber von Geschichte—kennen Sie Martin Luther King?—er hat Politik mit Religion gemischt und auch in '89 waren die beiden gemischt.

O: Ja. Richtig.

M: Soll es wieder passieren?

O: Ja. Für mir aus Gana, ich sehe es einfach, also wenn die Kirche wieder bestimmt es unterstützt oder wenn sie findet es wichtig aber ich höhe die eignes Program und das natürlich nicht 100% wichtig fuer die leuten Ausdrucken. 1989 die Kirche Revolution unterstützte die Leute Freiheit brauchen das war auch eine christlichen Grunde irgendwo ist wenigstens jedoch die Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit und wenn das macht als ich ein Kind das gleiche war, das ist auch die gleiche Gerechtige allen Menschen die Gleichen sind und so was Dinge das ist auch eine Begriffen ist und können wir zusammen kampfem oder durch die Kirchen kampfem. Aber wenn zum Beispiel, Sachen gehen durch die Kirche unbedingt direkt was zu tun haben, muss wenn die Kirche unterstützt habe ich nicht dagegen, aber man kocht unbedingt immer.

M: Was soll die Leute von hier (Leipzig) machen? Mit dem Arbeitslosen, mit dem Richtag, mit dem Mauer im Kopf?

O: Ja. Gut. Die Mauer im Kopf zwischen Ost und West Deutschen. Ja, die muss schonmal weg. Einfach deswegen weil das es Egal ist. Gibt's auch keine Mauer dieser Art zwischen Deutschen und Französichen oder Italianen und Deutschen und so was, wenn man nicht artisch außen einander; ich meine die Leute, die nicht austrotzen in Europa leben alle zusammen und macht es auch gemindsam und was soll es eine Grunde geben so von der Ansicht, von der Denken, von der Meinung hier zwischen Ost und West Deutschen unmöglich getrennt. Egal dass das Verbind so viele Grenze aufgewurtz werden. Also in der gar keine Kempfen also in der tan wichtig dass die Ost Deutschen aber sauer sind auf West Deutschland und so. Das kann nicht noch kriegen, weil sie sich bekrent von der normalen Leuten dass die Wirtschaft hier in der Region so schlecht ist und nicht belogen. Was man sagt, nach der Wende vielen Leute aus West Deutschland unternimmt viele Deuten in Ost Deutschland auf genommen. Ganz die Europa tan und die Leute hier abwussten ganz ablaufft alles neu und dann kann sich wirklich wieren, weil sie keine Ahnungen hatten. Das kann sie sich auch wieder nach vorsehen. Ich finde sie aber wurtzig. Wurtzig Dinge und ausgleich hatten.

M: Muss die Wechsel von Unten nach Oben passiern oder oben nach unten?

O: Die Verteilung soll schon von Oben nach Unten, so gleich wie der Verteilung finde ich. Ja. Das ist meine Meinung.

M: Warum?

O: Warum? Weil man nur geht ander braucht, man macht die Leute anderefehlt und manche Leute so viele Geld haben, dass sie man niemals die sinnvoll was manche denen anfangen sich, denn haben sie sich nur weil sie damit richtig sind

und weiss macht sich Reisen kann in einem Sinn. Für dies ist ganz sozialistisch Unterteil gehört, was ist ehrlich, weil wann manche Leute, die schon einbewegung ein und wenn ihre Arbeit nicht funktionieren, sie kriegen davon ein Unterdrückt und das war für alle Leute, die kriegen der Greicht. Das kann liecht passieren. Das ist zum Beispiel wo ich auch nicht weiss, also wenn man da ist oder in eine Bewegung dagegen oder machen wurde, ob richtig die Kirchen wäre, die könnte ein unterstützen oder ich erinnere mich an nach wenn die Kirche nicht eränderen konnten, weil sehr in der Geschichte nicht unbedingt irgendwann unten wird woll hat so etwas abzubauen so abhaus gemist. Das von die evangelischen Kirchen bleiben schon aber die katholischen Kirchen, zum Beispiel es nicht groß ist und weil nahre doch sozialistischen Handbewegung. Das ist seit so.



### Transcript 11

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben.

W: Wenn sie so fern schon, wenn die Zimmer versionen von '89 nicht gehen hätte, wären sie möglich garen nicht hier. Also wäre Deutschland nicht ein, wäre nicht die Grenze, wäre nicht die Mauer und glaubt in Deutschland. Ja, dass die Leute mehr reisen könnte hin und her und die Studenten von anderen Länder hierher könnte um studieren, auch die ehremalieren jungen Leute auf der DDR von anders können und studieren können. Tja. Wirtschaft verweiren sich, da hat natürlich eine große Veränderung in die Gaben, und da kamen jetzt, dass alles nicht verbesser geworden ist. Da hat es daran das für viele ist es besser geworden, aber für viele ist es schlechter geworden aber das hangt vielleicht mit dem Gesamtweltlage zusammen—nicht nur jetzt mit Deutschland. Sontag Chris Kapitalismus Russisch mitgekriegt kommt er hier her aus Frankfurt. Er hat gesagt ein Schritt schon einiges Glauben als erlauben sollen. Wird sein anderen Weg gehen und kreigt nicht mehr und er hat von dem Deutschen Bank genannten schon der ander Weg als der Verwicklung einmals der DDR so gedacht.

M: Sollen die Demonstrationen genau wie in '89 wieder passieren?

W: Nein. Soll, kann nicht wiederholt; verbinde es mit der Zeit. Es kocht, alles bequem ist wird und leicht, wie der sollt, aber schwach.

M: Kann nicht die Wirtschaft anders machen?

W: Ging alles kaputt in der Gerechtigkeit. So zu einfach nicht kein, aber kann ein Grund stehen. Vielliecht anregen darueber druckt zu machen—das ist was nicht bleiben kann wie die Wirtschaft und find der so.

M: Wo ist die Vereinigung des Deutschland nicht erfolgreich?

W: Ja das ist jemals der DDR der Wirtschaft einfach quach gemacht die konquerenz also schreiben gibt's hier zu wenig Arbeiteplatze zu stedy hier. Das ist schon wo es nicht erfolgreich sehen wo es anders beschreiben. Betreibe zu lenden Arbeit zu finden.

M: Waren Sie mit den Demonstationen verwicklet?

W: Ja. von beide. Hier in Leipzig niemand nicht mehr der Beide. Es ist zu stutzt alle beiden zu Ende viele ging.

M: Soll da ein Freiheitsgebet geben?

W: Ja, ich kann nicht sagen, weil in der DDR jeder hat ein Bequem da zu geben, keine Konflikt bekommnis, weil den Dennach so oder da hat politische Stellung Freiheit.

M: Was ist die Rolle der Kirche und was soll die Rolle der Kirche sein?

W: Gerechtigkeit.

## Transcript 12

S: If you want to do something with this, I've read it myself...but the main thing you'll have to look at... what's your question anyway?

M: My question is why 1989 and why 2004 and do the Monday demonstrations of '89 have a place in 2004?

S: Yes, because it wasn't completed. It wasn't just enough for the wall to be brought down, but what we're actually taking about and what Zepp-LaRouche is talking about is how do you actually get economic development. It's not just enough—the demonstrations and the wall came down-- but we didn't rebuild the east. I'm not just talking about East Germany, but it goes all the way into Poland and to Russia. We push forth all the way further, even into Shanghai, the idea of how do you actually go about re-building these things? and you can't do it because you just say, "Ok, go back together," but we put forth a program in '87, '88, '89 called productive triangle, because in between Paris, Berlin and Vienna is the most productive area of \_\_\_\_ and about the size of \_\_\_\_ . Then the spiral arms go off to Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Istanbul and so on and so forth. So we're talking about what was the policy that should have been in place and we're going through this at the time, Holga Zepp-LaRouche, because her husband Lenin LaRouche was in jail in 1986; he was a politician, ran the democratic party for president couple times—3 or 4 times, and in '88 he said before going to jail—they put him in jail—he was in Berlin and he came out and said directly that it was necessary, it was needed, first to recognize that the imminent collapse of the Soviet system is near and that the reunification of East and West Germany with Berlin as the capital is imminent. Same as the whole content hotel speech thing he made. The whole point that he was saying is that we should use this as a period of time to develop the economy—the physical economy—not the speculative, Wall Street, "let's see how much they can put on pork bellies" nothing like that, but how can we treat the seductive labor that's here in East Germany and rebuild Poland in particular, as an example, of what we'd be able to do for all of Russia after the fall of the wall. Now the wall fell, communism fell, and 10 years later you have—I mean 15 years later now—you have 10 years off the average lifespan of the Russian male. The economy is collapsing and a lot of these people will tell you that they think it's better under communism than it is right now. So when you really think about it, the point is you actually complete the peaceful movement that actually started here. We started here 5 weeks ago.

M: Is this a purely an economic movement or are we talking also a socio-political movement?

S: It's socio-political. It's a civil rights movement. The title, I'm telling you~

M: In '89 the church was the leader of the movement; what is the roll of the church today?

S: What ever it wants to make itself, but there's a problem, I'm not going to say what the church should/shouldn't do, if they wanna do what they wanna do, they do what they wanna do. My main idea of what we're doing is not to tell people what they should/shouldn't do, whether they're in the church or Muslim, I don't care, it doesn't mean anything to me; they're all human beings. I don't care if they're Jewish, I don't care if they're Muslim, I don't care if they're Christian, they should be here because the importance of this is that they are taking away the dignity of the German people.

M: Could you please speak about the Civil Rights movement and how it might apply?

S: You're looking at history from the standpoint of events, but it wasn't the events that created the movement, but what created history of that time and what creates history now is the movement. It's not just that Martin Luther King Jr. was a minister, but he had a mission, and he had to move the people that he was with. In an idea of what it meant to be a human being, yes, he did use religion.

M: But his foundations on what it meant to be a human being were Judeo-Christian... so how is this Judeo-Christian?

S: Human beings need to live. Judeo-Christian, Islamic, all the things, basic understanding of man is created in the image of God. So in an economic system, you want to treat people like human beings, not like animals. You don't want to give away 150 Euros after you have given away everything else plus your children's future and have to give them that money too. Then maybe, if we feel like it, we'll give you something—350 Euros/month or something like that so you can live. All that creates is more poor people, because they don't have the money to buy what is being produced, that means other people are going to be laid off, and that creates unemployment and what you should do is create jobs and high technology and between high technology.

### Transcript 13

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Meine erste Frage ist wie hat die '89 Demonstrationen Ihr Leben verwicklet?

I: Ahh. Die Problem ist dass ich sehr jung bin. Ich habe es als junge am Fernsehen gesehen, der die bilder—die Fernsehen Bilder—von der Mauer. Es ist sehr schwierig für mich, weil ich so jung. Ich weiss es nicht vorher war natürlich dass keine Mauer auch in West Deutschland ist. Aber da gibt's viele Manner, die erinnerte; Ich denke die Situation dafür. Also ich, vor der Öffnung der Mauer, war mit meinen Eltern—ich bin in Berlin; ich habe in Berlin gelebt, in West Berlin und ich bin früher in Ost Berlin mit meinen Eltern zusammen. Aber das war sehr lange hier und für mich nicht wirklich erkennbar was in meine Leben getan hat. Weiss nicht. Bin zu jung.

M: In Ihrer Meinung, was ist die Platz der '89 Demonstrationen in der deutschen Politik und Gesellschaft heute?

I: Leute in Ost Deutschland sind hierreise sehr stolz darum was sie geschafft haben '89—was die Gemeine geschafft haben; die andere Seite ist sehr verbittert über was geschen ist. Ich habe mit ein paar Leute gesprochen, dass jede Seite ist verändert. Aber die Leute sind in Ost Deutschland verwirrt auf die geschafft haben: sie sagen „ahh ich hab' mich genug.“

M: Was ist die Bedeutung des '89 für heute?

I: Gute Fragen. Gute Fragen. In dieser schweren Zeit in Deutschland, in Augenblick, verbinderen sich die Menschen, Ost und West auf die Resisen, wunderschön Tages damals, vor '89, in Ost Deutschland sie sagen, „Damals haben wir wegen arbeit, vor der Wende.“ Die Wessis sagen sie „Damals hatten wir wenigstens Ost Deutschland eben von unserem Geld.“ Also im Augenblick, ist es so dass wie wir getrennt, nicht zusammen gefühlt, sondern sodach wir sind getrennt gibt. Mehr als vorher.

M: Warum sollen [oder sollen nicht] die Demonstrationen wieder passieren?

I: Ich bin der Meinung soll passieren, weil die Menschen in Ost Deutschland nach der Wende betrogen worden. Sie wurde abtterraten Freiheit haben sie haben konsum Freiheit gehabt. Aber Ost Deutschland wurde nie wirtschaftlich.

M: In die '89 Demonstrationen hatten die Kirchen eine wichtige Rolle. Soll die Kirche eine Rolle haben heute?

I: Gute Frage. In deutsche Politik, meinst du? Menschen durch die Kirche Mut bekommen, natürlich. Wenn die Menschen nicht benutzten, so sagen Montagsdemonstrationen schlecht und die Menschen mütigen denn hat nicht die Kirche besinnt auf Tradition.

M: Was soll die Rolle der Kirche sein?

I: Meine Meinung nach denn einsige Menschen betrogen, nicht nur zu sagen, es gibt doch Sicher in diesem Land, die nicht Mögen, zu sagen, und sie sagen, doch sie sind auch Menschen. Sie glauben etwas anders.

M: Sind die '89 Demonstrations Christlich?

I: Kann nicht einschutzen; bin zu jung und ich habe an Fernsehen gesehen. Habe nicht sehr gut bescheftig. Weiss ich nicht.

M: Wo sind die Vereinigen des Deutschland nicht erfolgreich?

I: In der wirtschaft. Die Wirtschaft war nie vereinigiert.

M: Ist es nur mit der Wirtschaft?

I: Ich wurde sagen alles ander gibt sich auf die Wirtschaftlichen. Dass die Wirtschaft vereinigeren gefailt hat, ich habe das versorgt dass sich Ost und West, wir prüferfeld, wir sind different Tieren. Sehr different Tieren. Die West Deutschland sagen, sie haben zu viele Geld und die Ost Deutschen sagen .....

M: Was macht die Erfolge der '89 Demonstrationen?

I: Ich bin nicht sicher, aber es waren die Menschen.

### Transcript 15

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Meine Frage ist, was ist die Bedeutung des '89 für heute?

A: Es hatte es damals berechtigung ich wurde es trotzdem sagen genau wie heute. Ich bin alt und nicht mehr jung, aber ich habe nicht gedacht für so vielen Jahren dass heute nachmals die Leute in der schwierige, dass die Menschen, also sich dagegen wären und zu verraten. Es ist nicht die letzte Stufe da unter schon, man erkennt das nicht, aber es ist denn mit Ländern zu viele mit man verbunden dass verheiten mit Papierkrieg zu beantrauch und anzutragen und hören zu bieten und alles, das ist von Frankreich, schlimm. Schlimm. Es geht es das dann machen will und existieren. Es gibt ja in der nachbaren Staat viele in die Überall, die in den Dingen stehen, denn es macht sehr gut geht. Ich kann die anderen Leuten nicht verstehen. Anderen Leuten ja arrgentlich nicht den Stand. Sie haben was sehr hoch in der legende Leute und waren nicht mehr auf die Straße gehen und hoffen die Langgelassen sind-- das waren wir-- als berufliche Menschen und die Ruma sind, sie dacht wir wurden von Kongessen vorhanden. Wir sind ja nicht dumm. Wenn es eben traut eine neue Information kamme durch die Median, dass ist das wieder abgeknippt wird, wie was gelernt wird und das wie geteurer wird die Menschen ab und wird als Manner Erfahrung. Immer Kontakt läufe. Warum? Ich würde dort sie haben kein Geld mehr für die Straßenbahn richtig versuchen, und solche kleine Beispiele zu gesehen waren. Wir haben so viele geschrieben früher, das es alle in denen Frase hat alles geklappt. Könnte es denn die Freiden so teuer als ist den Ruhen die ganzen Beziehung Politiken alles. Schwierig, damals war alles war Kollektiana; wir haben ja alle Arbeit gehabt. Ich habe für 55 Jahre als Angestellt und heute ob hier her gehen. Der Rente geht unter. Die Absichlich pflegt Stufen haben wir hier und solche Sachen. Also und weiss nicht was kommt Morgen. Muss ich Morgen als man erlaubt alles klappt dass das irroflexen-- kommt sie mit alles mit?

M: Waren Sie mit den Demonstrationen verwicklet?

A: Die Menschen müssen eine Möglichkeit haben, die demokratisch zu argumentieren eine freidliche Art. Müssen denn umlaufen zu schreien zu schlaffen was die Sachen eben, also hier, „Schluss, stop, nicht mehr,“ nicht noch mal drunden in der Sozialabsegen. Das ist der Rechtstand, denke ich mal.

<conversation about where I am from and NYC, the division of Germany>

M: Sollen die Demonstrationen wieder passieren?

A: Ja, wird sie in eine rücke Stadt wie jetzt hier natürlich hab sie nicht gelesen ob die Stufe wieder Weg mehr trinkt sich ich habe zu tun fertig mit meiner Gesundheit fertig werden, verstehen sie. Ich kann nicht mehr leisen mehr großen. Hier steht der Bilderweise. Das wird immer statt finden warum nicht die Menschen kann das machen. Weiss nicht.

M: In Ihrer Meinung ist das nützlich?

A: Niedich? Ja, wenn man kann jetzt die ganzen Dinge, die jetzt hier laufen, ist Rittgangers machen kann, aber man muss mal eine Grenze binden jetztlich ab, jeden Tag ist immer wieder Reisen, wenn das dann durch ist hier mit damein ab Januar—der Abbau—dann ist im Februar kommt wieder Ost die Westliche. Das denn muss Schluss sein woran da breiar. Das nicht so gut reisen ja.

M: Soll die Kirche eine Rolle haben?

A: Die Kirche? [Lange Pause] Naja, ich meine die hilft jetzt die Menschen und sagt unsoschirmbasheft macht das Mal. Es tut nicht schaftbar das mal. Aber am Ende ich sehe ist das realistisch? Und sage das jeder Mensch kann nicht die Kirche helfen. Er muss sich selber helfen und jeder muss selber durch; es kann nicht hin gehen zur Kirchen, weil er muss ja hier, er hat zu wenig Geld und er müsst Bürger helfen oder das Beten man nicht hier, das nimmst mir nicht. Verstehen sie, das nimmt den Menschen nicht. Kann nicht an der Glauben was möchte. Ich habe nicht dagegen aber ich bin nicht kirchlich gebunden, so zu sagen. Aczeptierte das, die Kirche. Natürlich. Aber, so richtig helfen ist, ist der letzte Zug noch dass jemand einbildet in zustand ist der Freidenische Kopfs den Freiden. Immer was neu ist, immer was dumm ist.

M: Was macht der Erfolg des '89?

A: Denke schon das das genau wie jetzt: einfach, das Volk war nicht dazugen. Nay. Es gibt's nicht was ist politisch beeinflusst weil. Macht das nicht. Man wießen die Menschen, es spricht sich Ruhm da wir gehen. Ob dann Steuer waren von deuer oder dacha, weil da gibt keine. Alles war unerlauben und heute durch die Median und Klaptda alles.... weiss nicht.

M: Können Sie ein bißchen über wie Ihr Leben anders seit '89 ist?

A: Also, wieso ist das Kapital in Spiel gegangen. Jetzt in Dinge in der Geschäftig, die war nicht so begnzen. Die ist heute auch nicht kaufen und so hier was heute



gibt's das braucht man gar nicht alles. Es ist eine überflussliche Stadt und da ist lang schon leicht zu essen. Wir hatten zu essen. Aber nicht so mit Afrikanischem oder was weiss nicht was die Leute, die so richtig gefällt hat, weiss nicht.

M: Ist die Lebensqualität verbessert?

A: Naja, Lebensqualität es ist schwer zu verstehen. Mehr Auswahl und Qualität...ich kann nicht so gut antworten. Oder was falsch tun. Wir waren nicht so viele Geld hatten, wie alles hat man es nicht so wunderschön heute ob es ist mehr Qualität oder.

M: Aber heute mit mehr Sicherheit haben Sie mehr Obst zu essen.

A: Die ja und solche Sachen aber es ist quach. Da gibt's mehr Auswahl, natürlich, aber wenn heute nicht sagt es gab gar kein Phanomen. Irones Theme. Im Krankenhaus und Kindergarten gab es immer Bannanen. Und zu Weinachten man hatten ja viele Pearisn. Aber man muss immer an Obst nach werken gedacht. Da haben so teuer quativen Maschinen, wissen wir, und wir haben teure Lebensmittel eingekauft und die Leuten Sachen, ja dabei Weinachten mehr Apfelsienen aber es ist im Werkvoller Maschinen da fuer uns gegangen und das war zu ein Gold haben, das braucht gegessen.

M: Haben die '89 Demonstrationen ein Platz heute in der Politik oder der Gesellschaft?

A: Ich denke nicht in sozialen Dinge trenntabeidish und nicht mehr in dem alter Binder. Wir haben schon viele begreift müssen. Ich weiss nicht ob das ein Kreis war oder mit Organization gehabt... Erleben gang weiss ich nicht.

### Transcript 16

M: Was Sie jetzt sagen, wird in meiner Aufsatz schreiben. Meine erste Frage ist was macht der Erfolg des '89 Jahre?

Y: Was die Freidliche Revolution erfolgreich gemacht haben? Ich denke es war eine Mischung ob verscheiden Sachen. Es waren die Leute, die auf die Straße gegangen sind, war natürlich auch die Situation, die zu den Freiden geherrs hat, und denn auch natürlich die aussen-politische Situation. Ach, dort 1985 mit den Reformen in der Sowjetunion mit den Auseinander zu gehen, der Sowjetunion und der USA und das hat natürlich auch verwurt die Reich dafür. Der Protest der Leute im Land und auch die große Ausreise Bewegung. Das war eine ganz wichtige Sache die dazu gehört hatte. Das immer mehr Unruhe im Aufland kommt. Natürlicht die starke Haltung der Regierung der DDR; also die Politiker in der DDR überhaupt nicht dazu frei getragen, dass das Freidliche Revoution statt gefundert in gegenteuer sozusagen die Kampf alles auf zu halten.

M: Waren Sie mit den Demonstrationen verwicklet?

Y: Ich habe eintir genommen von einigen. Ich habe damals Studentin hier im ersten Semester und in der Ding gegangen. Aber ich habe jetzt nicht mit dem vorbreite überhaupt nicht zu tun. Also ich kann damals nicht ob niemanden in der DDR die Situation gearbeitet hat.

M: Wie haben die Demonstrationen Ihr Leben verwickelt?

Y: Ja, ich denke dass muss jeder für sich selbst individual beantworten. Also ich finde mir nicht so spezial können als bevor der Freidlichen Revolution ja mit der Demonstrationen in Leipzig angefangen hat und mein Leben hat sich dadurch total verändert. Ich möchte mich gar nicht vorstellen was wo ist jetzt wäre und würde nicht passiert werden. Ich hatte dann die Möglichkeit zu Ausland gefahren und die Welt angeschaut und hat mein Studium gewechslet und wirklich studiert wo ich dachte ich könnte nie rein dazu haben und Spaß machen wird. Tja.

M: Haben die '89 Demonstrationen heute einen Platz in deutscher Politik oder in der Gesellschaft?

Y: Ja. Es man wieder sehr kognassiv in der Zeitung gelesen haben man sucht natürlich an der Kultur der Montagsdemonstrationen anzukunft. Durch jetzt ist es ganz andern Thematik ob es gut oder schlecht ist, dass nicht gut ist, da ist natürlich die Kultur der Montagsdemonstration im Kopf ist immer grad hier in Leipzig am 9. Oktober, also über den Jahrestag der großen Leipziger Montagdemonstration und der verscheidenigen veranstaatungen Staat. In der altere Kreigen der Menschen haben die eine weiniger Rolle, ich denke sie nicht an jeden Tag sich an den Demonstrationen errinert, aber natürlich die Demonstrationen so weit gepracht wie jetzt sind so gehalten und daher ganz wichtig dass man errinert grad an diese Kultur, diese Protest Kultur.

M: Können Sie bitte ein bißchen über die Protest Kultur beschreiben?

Y: Ja. Freidlich, also vor einem Ding, erstmal natürlich in dem Demos aus freidlich und es war, was machen den Demonstration an den 9. Oktober im Leipzig daran 70.000 Menschen, die gegen der Regierung protestiert haben. Das war so eine Demonstration vorher in Leipzig an dem 17. Juli 1953 der ja blutisch geendet hat. Hat es so was wieder dagegen von den Demonstrationen in Leipzig Tausande Leute von die kleine Staaten auf die Straße und so in dagegen steht die Regeme auf gestanden aber freidlich und das hat es mit dem Freidliche Revolution sozusagen nicht getragen.

### Transcript 17

M: I was hoping to hear more about your experiences growing up in the DDR and with being part Czech.

S: I'm half Czech, half German. I can't remember a lot, I was only 9 years old when the wall came down. Do you want to know what I remember or how it was?

M: I'd like to know what you remember and how it was.

S: now when I look back, I was 9 years old, not everything that I say now may be accurate. I was nine years and now that I look back, I have a different perspective. I was 9 years. I had no idea how life was going to be. I just remember I was a happy happy child. Just a couple of things, for example, when I tell people, no one believes me when I tell them we only had half a banana a year. It was crazy. In kindergarten, it was around Christmas. We would never get a whole banana, just a half. It was something that was really very special. Oranges for example, when I'm hear and eating oranges, just like things I remember. And when I'm hear now eating oranges was like Christmas, because we had oranges just for Christmas. And to give you an idea, like watermelon, in the summer, we would go to a shop. It wasn't like here because all the prices were the same, my father and me would go to the shop- all the shops were the same, and all the prices were the same- and you needed to have connections. If you had someone you knew who was working in the shop, it was like a supermarket only smaller, they would sometimes hide like a cucumber for you. And when you come, they would give it to you. Like with watermelon, we would stand in a que for one hour with our little cart and carry and buy 3 or 4 at once because it was so special. And I just remember in the DDR we had nutella- it was a big thing, we didn't have it; it was a capitalistic product so wasn't allowed in the DDR, but in the Czech Republic they had something similar. It was not nutella, but it was a chocolate cream. I just remember they had more things and it was more liberal. I remember, I think in the Czech Republic you could get oranges more often or fruit, not like Germany, and you had more choice when you went shopping, just from what I remember.

M: Do you remember everyone being about the same? Or do you remember some families being really wealthy?

S: I know one girl, in my school, when I was small I didn't know what she was talking about because I didn't know what Statiz- the secret police of east Germany. And she was always telling me, "my father, he works for the army and he's going into the basement and there they can buy the good stuff." And I didn't know. But she told me things like this. Later, I asked my mom, and they said, yea, they work for the secret police, and they who work for the secret police had sort of a better life. They had access to products that the normal person would not get. And they would sort of watch over other people, they would spy on them, would have an easier life. And at the time I was nine years old, and I didn't know about traveling and I think my perception of the world was not completely developed yet. I had not concept of being locked in to a country. I never had this feeling. Now I wouldn't be here- if the DDR did still exist I wouldn't sit here right now- but I would be allowed to go to Cuba, Russia, Czech Republic or all the other communistic countries.

M: Did everything seem fairly equal?

S: You mean the people and how did they dress?

M: Yes. Like were they "cookie-cutterish" was your individuality taken away?

S: I think the thing is most of my friends were in Young pioneers or FDR, they were two youth organizations and after you finish school you would, put on a uniform and have a blue scarf wrapped around your head, and sing songs altogether and when everyone put on these dresses everyone looked the same because they were like little uniforms. But I can't remember, I think from what I remember everyone had a little something special. I think that there was not much clothes with the clothes, we all had these cord jeans, with cord there were no real jeans, and if someone had jeans that was something special and we were all jealous. For example, I remember for Halloween- in German, Fasching- people would have not exactly the same costume but a similar costume because there was not so much choice. But I still, like everyone would have the same shoes so old men would have this one kind of sandals, I remember some things but anyway, I don't see them as one person looking like the other because when you know people you see different things so you see. And I would always know my picture. When I was little I always imagine behind the boarder everything colorful, and everything's perfect and its colorful, and I know after the wall came down, we traveled to West Germany and I was so disappointed because it wasn't so colorful. I was always having this dream that there's this train and we cross the boarder and everything is colorful and so nice. And when we went everything was normal and it wasn't that special. The houses were like; you can see from the buildings- you know the communistic typical building looked everywhere the same- and of course everyone had the same car. I just saw their clothes, but

everywhere everyone had the same car, the same fridges, everywhere the furniture was like this type furniture. It true.

M: What were your roads liked?

S: They were paved. In the big cities and even in the old ones you had cobblestone, but they were all paved. Normally they were paved. Normally.

M: Do you feel that east is still poorer than the west, economically?

S: What I hear from my friends- I'm not in the job market right now yet- but from what I know, for a part time job, I would get paid, it was at the time 15 DM, which is around seven dollars-fifty, and for the same job in western Germany I would get more, it was maybe 5 DM more. But living in western Germany is more expensive, if you go out for a drink that's more or if you rent a flat that's still different, but what I think is that in the end if you compare how much you make to how much you live, that's about the same. In Mecklen-Pommelburg, which is one of the states, there is a lot of unemployment at the moment; I think it was at one moment 14%, which was, we've never had any of the Bundeslaender of the states and therefore some of the people are unhappy and saying things like "we want communism back because in communism everyone had a job, there was no unemployment, everyone was the same."

M: Do you feel that one system is better than the other?

S: I know.. the sad part is that I really love the idea of communism, and that everyone is an individual and the reason its not working is that is different and in the end everyone wants the best for him or herself and therefore the idea that everyone is the same- I like it- but the conclusion will never going to work. And how it was organized- you were never allowed to travel to a capitalistic country because the communists were afraid that you might like the ideas of the other world better or I don't know.. how it was organized it wasn't well, but the basic idea I really like.

M: The main questions I had related to the Nikolikirche protests. I mean, what did they do to the city? What was happening in the city and how did it affect both your life and your family's life?

S: I can just tell what I remember, but also what I read afterwards. I know the church in the DDR always was an area where people could or allowed to express their thoughts, and be protected, but still it was dangerous. Kinda protected. It started on Mondays and was called the famous Montagsdemonstration. Which means demonstrations on Mondays. So people would meet, I think always at 6pm in the church. And then they would have pray and then talk about what was going

on politically, and would also pray for like world peace and address and not only this problem but other problems. And I don't know, I think at the time political topic got in it too. And people would start to talk about it and it would attract more and more people. And at one point after they came out of the church all together, they would walk all through the city together with candles and umm umm Schild...how do you call it?

M: Signs?

S: And I know my mom in the beginning it was dangerous to take parts and my mom didn't want to take us- me and my sister to go. And she left us at home while she went. Once she came home really scared and she knew the government had decided to interrupt the demonstration and they could use all force if they wanted. The tanks were already there and the police and army was already there. I think what they was talking was Gorbachev was the head of Russia, the soviet union at the time and he sorta appeased the German at the time so nothing would, but nothing was open and nobody knew what was going on, it was one of the Monday nights.

M: Had this been going on a couple of years? Months?

S: I think a couple of months at the time.

M: How did protests go one before the Berlin wall fell?

S: I don't remember. I think my mom. It was late summer so maybe two or three months, maybe longer. I don't know, I think the people in the church maybe a year before every Monday, but I don't know. I could ask my mom and find out the details because I don't know myself, that's just what I remember.

M: Were these protests discussed a lot in your family or on street corners?

S: Yeah. I was eight or nine, nine years old, so I didn't really know what was going on, but I felt it. At that time I was secure because there was not the danger anymore. That the danger was abolished and that they would not use force. I went with my mommy and sometimes there were candles and it was talked about even in schools and I ask some of my friends if they had been and I would look out for someone I know. So it was pretty open.

M: Sorta going along with that, were there sorta any rhythms or patterns in your family?

S: You mean, at this time?

M: Both at this time and up until the wall fell? What was your family life like?

S: My family anyway was not the normal family at the time, because I was baptized and it was not common to be baptized at that time in the DDR. So I wouldn't consider my family the best example for the typical DDR life. But I know for example with my friends, they were organized in the young pioneers with the scarves...like the people here who go..

M: Like the girl scouts?

S: Yeah. Exactly.

M: Was there any reason or can you think of any reason of why you were such a happy child?

S: I don't know, I think the way my parents raised me, I don't know, and I was always allowed to have friends come to my place. And I knew like there was things that were something special, like watermelon was something special and I was looking forward to it and like for example, at Christmas the oranges, and things were special and at the time I was not annoyed, I was just appreciating things, I did not know, and I was not thinking consciously about it. And I also know that people would be more connected, I just have it here by chance, how it looked, and everyone here would be driving this car, and this is how we lived, I think my father lives in one of those, I can show you later. One time all the people of all the houses would all work together cleaning the inside of the yards and you would know your neighbors afterwards we had a big bar-b-q and so you would. I think this made life somehow nice. And now days, I don't even know all the people who live in the houses anymore. And some people don't say hello; they don't greet.

M: Were you happier as a child than now or were your parents happier?

S: No, I would never say, because we were never allowed to travel or go abroad, and so I'm happy that there is no communism anymore. But I like the basic idea. And everyone can feel it when I talk, that I grew up there and that I like the basic idea that everyone has the same, but I mean I didn't feel the oppression, but my parents, I think felt it. I always say that I grew up in the perfect time, I had a good childhood and learned so much to appreciate things and not to take anything for granted and I think that it will be really difficult to have children, because when I think now about having children, I would have preferred to have them grow up in a country because now when you go to a supermarket you say mom I want this, I want that, and we had nothing with Marx, I never said I want this I want that, because we had nothing.



M: Anything else?

S: I don't know, there's just one more. But just as a little example of how life changed, two years ago before Christmas, I spent with my boyfriend at the time, he came to visit me; he's not from Germany, but from Israel, and we stayed at a flat- one of those houses- and I wanted to make for him Christmas dinner, and I ran out of flour and I thought, I'm not going to run out, but do the thing we did with the DDR. In the DDR when you ran out of something you just go to your neighbor and ring and ask, could you give me something like 2 cups of flour or milk or an egg, and you would buy it the next week and bring it back. And I was just like we need flour now, there was no shop open on the 24<sup>th</sup> and I was like, ok, I'm going ask the neighbors and it was Christmas, and on Christmas you never disrupt neighbors because it's really a family thing, a family celebration. And I had my cup and I rang the door and this woman answered and was like, oh! It like the in the old good times and she gave me a hug and invited me into her flat and introduced me to her family and gave me a piece of cake, and it was just so nice. But of course I think of it from the Russian point of view and it was like because we were repressed by another power above us, so of course we were like little people and work together and everyone would help each other out. But now there's no power that oppresses us, so everyone goes their own way and no one helps each other out, and therefore things have changed. Also of course my friend from Israel was amazed when I came back with my flour and I was so happy and that was how it worked and you didn't need to know your neighbor. I have good memories, but I know that if the system would ever stay, I would be unhappy because I know I wouldn't be able to follow my dreams.