ABSTRACT

At the heart of philosophy of perception, and often in philosophy in general, lies the question: how can we know that what we perceive is reality? There is a myriad of skeptical responses, which essentially conclude, in different variations, that we can never perceive the world as it actually is. Then, there are arrays of "naïve" responses to this question, which reply that we are in fact able to perceive the world as it actually is. Naïve, or direct, realism takes the latter view, and states that we are able to perceive objects in the world as they really are, and thus gain objective knowledge from the world.

Often, the existence of sense data is used to show that naïve realism is false. In contrast with this, I argue that the existence of sense data, which are a part, and not the whole, of objects, are what proves that naïve realism is true. I do this through a serious of steps, beginning with examining John Searle's *Argument from Illusion* in his book, *Seeing Things As They Are.*

Next, using H.H. Price's book, *Perception,* I show how the existence of sense data are the best explanation for how objects behave in a systematic way.

Last, I present my own view of naïve realism, which ultimately says that sense data are what we use to justify true and objective beliefs about objects and state of affairs in the world.

IN DEFENSE OF NAÏVE REALISM

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IN DEFENSE OF NAÏVE REALISM

INTRODUCTION

What should we call the phenomena of seeing a ghost that resembles a dead relative? Surely the ghost looks the same, walks the same, and speaks in the same way as the living version of itself that you once knew. Further, this isn't some movie-style ghost that is holographic, screams "oooh!" and floats down hallways. Instead, it is a very realistic, human-like ghost that sits next to you in a café and discusses politics with you over iced Americanos. In fact, after a lengthy discussion with this 'ghost,' you begin to wonder whether this ghost of your dead relative is any ghost at all, and consider that maybe, your relative his risen from the dead and has come back in its original, physical form. You can't just ask it if it is a ghost or an actual human—that would be rude. Ghosts don't tell the truth, anyway. You pinch yourself—you aren't dreaming. You pinch the ghost—it is made of real flesh and bone. What are you to do? How are you to know whether the dead relative before you is a ghost or your living, risen-from-the-dead relative?

In this thesis, I will defend my own version of naïve realism. I draw upon work by H.H. Price to present a new version of the sense data theory of naïve realism, and show how it avoids John Searle's objections.

I first investigate the motivations behind naïve realism, as presented by John Searle. I then present Searle's critical view of naïve realism, including what he calls the 'Bad Argument.' Next, I look at H.H. Price's defense of naïve realism—though my version of naïve realism will vary from his version. Then, I demonstrate that the perception of sense data is compatible with realism to show that Searle does not successfully dismantle the compatibility of sense data and naïve realism. I will ultimately present my own theory of naïve realism to show that we are able to perceive objects in the world directly via the sense data that are a part of the object. I show

that first, sense data are a part, but not the whole, of objects. And second, I show that sense data being a part of objects is what allows you and I to see the same objects in a similar-enough way, and it is this phenomena that allows us to gain objective knowledge of objects and justify beliefs about the world.

CHAPTER 1: JOHN SEARLE

1.1 What the Bad Argument Supports: Sense Data

Searle believes that the most influential, yet mistaken, assumption in the philosophy of perception is that "we never directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world, but directly perceive only our subjective experiences" (11). In other words, we never see objects as they are; we only see objects through our subjective perceptual experiences. Searle believes that the assumption that we can never directly perceive anything has stemmed from the Argument from Illusion, which he deems the 'Bad Argument.' The Bad Argument has led to what Searle considers a disastrous conclusion: "you never see material objects or other ontologically objective phenomena, at least not directly, but only see sense data" (21).

The conclusion of the Bad Argument—that we can never see the world directly—has persisted throughout philosophy. The contrary view—that we do perceive the world—is called direct realism. Searle posits how it is possible to both deny direct realism and gain knowledge of facts in the world, given that the biological purpose of perception is to gather information about the world.

The Bad Argument motivated other theories like 'representative realism,' which says that we "get knowledge of the world because in some respects the pictures resemble the things they are pictures of" (29). Historically influential philosophers like Berkeley fought back with the objection that "it makes no sense to say that two entities visually resemble each other if one is completely invisible" (30). Hume agreed with Berkeley, adding that perhaps objects only exist in the mind, as "impressions" (31). Kant, on the other hand, agreed with the Bad Argument's underlying assumption—that we could only perceive things subjectively—but "thought that

epistemically objective knowledge was possible because underlying our representations, and providing their ground, is a world of *things in themselves* which are unknowable" (31). Ultimately, the assumptions that the Bad Argument relies on, and the conclusion of the argument itself, supports the idea that we only gather sense data from experiences, from which we can infer the object, but we do not ever perceive that object itself. Sense data, then, according to Searle, serve as a kind of intermediary between the object and our perception of the object.

Further, the sense data we perceive in any given case may or may not represent what is really before us. For example, in a hallucination, we gather sense data of a brown dog, but in reality, there is no brown dog before us. In this case, there is some other thing, besides the brown dog, causing us to perceive a brown dog. Perhaps we are on an acid trip, in which case our brain is the sole creator of the brown-dog sense data.

In Searle's view of the sense data theory, in a case of veridical perception, the sense data that lead us to conclude that we perceive a brown dog come from an actual brown dog. In both cases, the sense data (that of a brown dog) are the same, so it may seem that we are having the same experience (of the brown dog) in both. Ultimately, for Searle, the Bad Argument suggests that we should appeal to the sense data from an experience to motivate saying that *something* is the same in these two cases of perception. I will go on to explore more about sense data later.

1.2 The Bad Argument

To explain the Bad Argument, Searle has us imagine seeing a book on a table. Suppose that seeing the book on the table was a result of a hallucination. It would seem that even in this case of hallucination, you are still aware of *something*, even if it is not an actual book on a table of which you are aware. You may be simply aware of sense data that lead you to believe you are seeing a book on a table. If you saw *something*, it follows that you were conscious of *something*,

and from that, it follows that you must have sensed *something*, whether or not what you sensed was actually there. This example serves to demonstrate that even if what we sense is not really before us, we are still aware of *something* in our visual consciousness.

Next, consider a different scenario in which you also see a book on a table. Let us assume this is a case of veridical perception—that is to say, you perceive a book on a table in a room with an actual book on an actual table. It seems that your subjective perceptual experience in this veridical case of perception is the same as your subjective perceptual experience in the previous hallucinatory case of perception—that there is a book on a table. Thus, the two experiences are indistinguishable from one another—they seem identical.

And alas, we have the Bad Argument. If we cannot distinguish between hallucinatory and veridical perceptions, and if we only subjectively perceive the sense data in both of the cases, then what we say about a hallucination, in which we know that we do not perceive what we see, we must say about a veridical case of perception, since you cannot differentiate between the two experiences. Since in a hallucination we do not directly perceive the world, and only perceive our subjective experiences, we must say this of veridical perception, too, according to Searle. Thus, we never directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world in any case of perception, but only directly perceive our subjective experiences.

Now that I have explained the assumption that motivated the Bad Argument, I will state the argument, and then go through the argument step-by-step. Below is the Bad Argument in Searle's own words (22, 23).

1) In both the veridical case and in the hallucination case, there is a common element—a qualitative subjective experience going on in the visual system.

2) Because the common element is qualitatively identical in the two cases, whatever analysis we give of one, we must give of the other.
3) In both the veridical case and the hallucination case we are aware of something (are conscious of something, see something).
4) But in the hallucination case it cannot be a material object; therefore, it must be a subjective mental entity. Just to have a name, call it a "sense datum."
5) But by step two we have to give the same analysis for both cases. So in the veridical case, as in the hallucination, we see only sense data.
6) Because in both hallucinations and in veridical perceptions themselves we see only sense data, then we have to conclude that we never see material objects of other ontologically objective phenomena. So direct realism is refuted.

Step 1 states that in both veridical and hallucinatory cases of perception, there is a visual, subjective, perceptual experience. This step relies on the assumption that all perceptual experiences (veridical or not) are subjective perceptual experiences. Again, in both veridical and non-veridical cases, we visually perceive some sort of subjective experience (like sense data) and not the object itself. For example, if I veridically perceive a chair, I am experiencing a chair-like sense datum. If I hallucinate the chair, I am also experiencing a chair-like sense datum. The implication of step 1 is that because you seem to be seeing a chair in both cases, the two experiences are indistinguishable from one another.

Step 2 states that because the two experiences are indistinguishable, whatever we say about the hallucinatory case of perception, we must say of the veridical case of perception. In other words, since the indistinguishable cases have the same common element (what is perceived could be a

sense data), if we acknowledge that in the hallucinatory case we are not directly perceiving anything, we also must say that we never directly perceive anything in the veridical case, either.

Step 3 simply states that in both the veridical and hallucinatory cases of perception, we are aware of something, are conscious of something, and see something. In both veridical and hallucinatory cases of perception, we are conscious of whatever it is we seem to see.

Step 4 states that because a hallucination is, by definition, a perceptual experience of an object that is not really before us, we only ever perceive a subjective mental entity. This subjective mental entity is henceforth called a "sense datum."

Step 5 states that because in cases of hallucination, we do not perceive any object that is actually before us, but only experience the sense data of the object we seem to see, we must only be experiencing sense data in cases of veridical perception, as well. Thus, we are forced to give the same analysis of both perceptual cases, because they are indistinguishable to us.

Step 6 states that, because in both hallucinations and veridical perception we only experience sense data, we do not ever see any objects as they are, directly, in any type of perceptual experience. Thus, we do not have objective experiences of the world—we only have subjective experiences of the objects' sense data. The conclusion of the Bad Argument refutes direct realism: the idea that we directly perceive objects and states of affairs.

1.3 Searle's Reply to the Bad Argument

Recall that Searle objects to the aforementioned Bad Argument. The first objection Searle has to the Bad Argument is that it forces us to accept that the only way you and I can gain knowledge of the world is through our own subjective experiences, and not from the ontologically objective real world. This implies that you and I can never see the world. Searle says that the "only reality that is accessible to us on this account is the subjective reality of our own private experiences.

This makes it impossible to solve the skeptical problem: How, on the basis of perception, can we ever know facts about the real world?" (23). We only ever have subjective experiences, and cannot possibly gather any true or justified knowledge from the world. However, this feels intuitively wrong.

The conclusion of the Bad Argument forces us to say that when we veridically perceive a book on a table we are not objectively experiencing the book on the table at all, but are only experiencing our subjective experience of the book on the table. It also implies that each of us would have a distinctly different experience of the same book on the same table.

Searle's biggest issue with the Bad Argument is step 3, which says that in both the veridical case and the hallucination case we are "aware of" sense data. Searle thinks this use of 'aware of' is too ambiguous, and can be interpreted in two ways. The first use of 'aware of' is what Searle calls the "'aware of' of intentionality," and the second use is the "'aware of' of constitution" (24). He sets up the following example to explain:

Suppose you press your hand hard on a table—so hard that it hurts your hand. Now compare the following two statements:

(a) I am aware of the table.

(b) I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

He says that while these statements are both true and similar, (a) "describes an intentional relation between me and the table. I had a sensation where the table was its intentional object. The presence and features of the table are the conditions of satisfaction of the sensation. In (a), the "'aware of' is the 'aware of' of intentionality. In a broad sense, 'intentionality' is the "feature of the mind by which it is directed *at,* or *about,* or *of* objects and states of affairs in the world" (33). I will go in depth about 'intentionality' in the coming pages.

In (b), "the only thing I am aware of is the painful sensation itself" (24). In other words, in statement (a), we are aware that there is a connection between the table and myself. In statement (b), we are only aware that something we are conscious of prompted some kind of sensation.

According to Searle, the first possible use of 'aware of' (a) would imply that I am aware of the table only. The second possible use of 'aware of' (b) would imply that I am aware of the sensation itself, which the table yielded. Searle believes in a case of veridical perception, we would be aware of the table *or* the sensation, but in the case of hallucination, we are aware of nothing. In the veridical case, we can be constitutionally aware of either the subjective experience or the table itself, or both. In the hallucinatory case, we cannot be aware of anything. So in the intentional sense of 'aware of,' step 3 is false. However, in a hallucination, as the Bad Argument concedes, we are at least aware, or conscious, of something—namely the sense data.

1.4 Setting the Stage for Searle's Theory of Perception

Recall that one of Searle's objections to the Bad Argument was that it forces us to accept that we can only gain knowledge of the world through our own subjective experience, and not from the ontologically objective real world. Searle fundamentally disagrees with this notion of *representative realism*, which says that the subjective experience we have of an object through sense data we perceive is enough to give us a sense of what the real world is actually like. Searle believes a better theory of perception is direct realism: the exact theory the Bad Argument attempts to refute. This view, sometimes called 'naïve realism,' maintains that we do have perceptual access to the real world, and that "we do not first have to perceive something else by way of which we perceive the real world" (15). We are able to see objects as they are.

Before I explain Searle's theory in detail, I will define some of his key phrases.

An *intentional object* is the object that your perception is *of* or *about*. For example, if you perceive a chair, the intentional object of the perception is the chair itself, and not your perception of the chair. Searle makes it clear that he thinks another mistake in philosophy is to suggest, "the internal visual experience is itself an object of perception" (19). Thus, on Searle's account, the intentional content of a veridical perceptual experience is always the object itself, and not the perception of the object or the sense data of the object. We are able to perceive objects in themselves, according to Searle.

Second, *conditions of satisfaction* are certain conditions something ought to meet to be a successful perceptual experience. For example, I know that to perceive a tree in a forest, I ought to see a tree in a forest. So, the conditions of satisfaction for perceiving a tree in a forest are seeing a tree in a forest. Setting the conditions of satisfaction for a successful perceptual experience require both 'network' and 'background.'

Third, Searle uses *network* to mean the background information you have of certain objects and states of affairs. For example, Searle says that you may see a Coastal Redwood tree. But in order to see the Coastal Redwood, I must have collateral information to set the conditions of satisfaction for what it is to see a Coastal Redwood, like what a Coastal Redwood is, what a Coastal Redwood looks like, and what a tree is, etc. (44).

As for *background*, Searle says there are a certain set of background abilities against which the intentionality functions. So, as Searle says, if I intend to go skiing, I must also have a set of 'background' abilities and capacities—the ability to ski and the capacity to make my way to the ski resort.

Fourth, Searle uses *experience* and *perceptual experience* in a way that can denote both veridical and the non-veridical experience, but uses 'perception' to strictly mean veridical

experience. Searle uses ‘experience’ to denote the in-mind-thing that happens after we perceive something from the world.

Fifth, we should note the distinction Searle makes between *ontological subjectivity* and *ontological objectivity*. When we refer to things that are ontologically subjective or ontologically objective, as we do in explaining perceptual experience, we are speaking strictly of the existence of certain objects. Thus, something ontologically subjective exists *from my perspective,* and only exists insofar as someone experiences it. Something ontologically objective exists *in the world, in reality,* independently of whether or not anyone actually experiences it. Alternatively, epistemically subjective claims are matters of subjective opinion, and epistemically objective claims can be settled as matters of fact (16). That is to say that we can easily settle whether or not chairs actually exist in our ontology, but may not be able to as easily agree on ontologically subjective claims about chairs—like if the torn-up chair in the philosophy department is attractive or not.

1.5 Intentionality

Searle’s theory of perception is built upon his idea that perception is an intentional, causal process. ‘Intentionality’ is the “feature of the mind by which it is directed *at,* or *about,* or *of* objects and states of affairs in the world” (33). Searle thinks that intentionality is a biological phenomenon and feature of the mind that occurs whether or not we are aware of it. For example, forms of intentionality can be feelings like hunger or thirst, emotions like anger and lust, or the belief that a higher power exists.

Further, intentionality is a mind-to-world phenomenon. For example, if I am angry with you, my anger (an intentional feeling) is directed from my mind toward the person with whom I am

angry (the content of the intentional feeling). Thus, intentionality is comprised of the *content* and the *intentional states* that are directed at that specific content.

Further, Searle says, "every intentional state consists of a *content* and a psychological *mode"* (33). To be clear, the 'content' of an intentional perception is whatever object or thing the perception is directed toward. Intentional perception is simply the notion that all perceptual experiences are intentional in that every perceptual experience we have is of or about something. For example, if I see a chair, the content of that perception is a chair and the psychological mode is seeing. If I intentionally perceive a child running through a field, the content of that perception is the specific child running through the field and the psychological mode is seeing.

Searle provides another example: "If I *see* that it is raining and I also *think* that it is raining, the two intentional phenomena, seeing and thinking, share a common content that it is raining. But the psychological modes, seeing and thinking, are clearly different in the two cases" (34). By that, Searle means that the part of the ontologically objective experience that both thinking and seeing capture, in this case, was the fact that it was raining. The common content was that it was raining. However, since I am only concerned with visual perceptual experiences, I will only focus on the psychological mode of seeing throughout my writing.

According to Searle, when you have a specific experience, it is because you "seem" to be having that specific experience. Of this, Searle writes: "The sheer phenomenology, the sheer experiential character of your perceptual experiences, gives you an impression that *this is how things are.* And that is a sure mark of intentionality" (56). In other words, Searle believes that having an experience reasonably leads us to believe we are experiencing something, and this is what allows us to gather ontologically objective knowledge from the world. Even in a hallucination, Searle says, we still "seem" to be seeing *something.* It seems as though not being

able to distinguish between veridically seeing something and *seeming* to see something was a mark of the Bad Argument. On Searle's account, however, it seems that not being able to distinguish between the two cases forces us to accept that perception is intentional because in both cases, our experience is *of* a certain thing. To be clear, a hallucination presents itself to us as if it is of something external, and that is what makes it intentional.

Thus, intentionality in Searle's account of veridical perception largely serves to show that there is a common content between the ontologically objective and ontologically subjective experiences we have. In a veridical experience, the content of the perception aligns with its real world content. In non-veridical experiences, it is a common content that links the ontological world and our subjective experience of it. Searle believes there is a causal connection between the ontologically objective and ontologically subjective experiences we have that allow us to obtain the common content from both.

Searle focuses on four features sufficient for intentionality: intentional content, direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction and causal self-reflexivity[1].

The **intentional content** is the content of the intentional experience. To say that something is 'intentional' is to say that it is directed *towards* something or *about* something. So a desire to fish is a desire directed toward, or about, fishing. A belief that cows eat grass is about some state of affairs—more specifically the belief that a certain species known as cows commonly consumes grass. In the case of experiences, the object we perceive is represented to the human in a certain way—perhaps veridically or as a hallucination—and this object is what Searle calls the 'content' of the experience.

[1] Some of these phrases have already been defined, but I will be discussing them here in the context of intentional perception.

Two relevant concepts that Searle uses to explain intentional perception are the 'success' or 'failure' of a perceptual experience, and direction of fit. A belief succeeds, or is true, if the content of the belief outside the human mind coincides with the content of the belief within the human mind. Similarly, a desire succeeds, or is true, if the content of the desire outside the human mind coincides with the content of the desire within the human mind. It seems that this matching of contents is what makes a perceptual experience veridical and the non-matching of contents is what makes a perceptual experience hallucinatory. In some cases of hallucination, though, it seems possible that, only by coincidence, the content of the belief or desire in the mind matches the thing-in-the-world that is the fact, or state of affairs, outside the mind.

Direction of fit is the direction in which the intentional content can succeed or fail in meeting the conditions of satisfaction. That is, the two kinds of direction of fit we can have in a perception are 'mind-to-world' or 'world-to-mind.' For example, a veridical perception intuitively has a 'world-to-mind' direction, since the world is causing our mind to perceive something in the world. A hallucination intuitively has a 'world-to-mind' direction of fit, but it does not fit the conditions of satisfaction. It must fail at least one of the conditions of satisfaction, by virtue of being a hallucination.

Of the *intention*[2] to do something, Searle says, "the direction of fit is world-to-mind and the direction of causation is mind-to-world" (36). In a veridical perceptual experience, the ontologically objective object (say, an actual chair in an actual room) causes you to perceive some ontologically subjective object (the chair that you can visualize in your mind), and that the direction of causation, or the conditions of satisfaction, for the chair in your mind is determined by the actual chair in the actual room. Whenever an intentional state has an entire propositional

[2] Note that 'intention,' in this case, has no relation to 'intentionality.'

content and a direction of fit, it will either match or fail to match the world, or will be satisfied or not satisfied.

In the case of perception, the direction of fit is 'mind-to-world' and the direction of causation is 'world-to-mind.' In an intuitive sense, it seems that if a case of perceptual experience is from 'world to mind,' it is veridical, since the world is causing us to perceive something in our mind. Again, if a perceptual experience is from 'mind-to-world,' it is likely a hallucination, since our mind is projecting an image on the world that may or may not really be before us.

Conditions of satisfaction are what make us able to say if a perceptual experience is successful or not. That is to say that if the object, which sets the conditions of satisfaction for your perceptual experience, matches the content of your subjective perceptual experience, the conditions of satisfaction are satisfied and you have had a veridical perception. Searle says: "the world will either be or not be the way it perceptually seems to me" (57). Here, Searle says our epistemological concerns should not worry us because we ought not worry about whether we can ever know for sure what we are seeing is "real" or in front of us—or even exists. Instead, all that should worry us is whether or not the content of our subjective experience is matching the content of the objective world, and if the conditions of satisfaction are met, or not. Thus, Searle's worries are strictly ontological and not at all epistemological. Searle is only asking *what it is* for a perception to be veridical, and is not asking *how we know* whether or not that perception is veridical.

Finally, the fourth feature sufficient for intentionality is **causal self-reflexivity**. This is the main feature that defines Searle's theory of perception. Causal self-reflexivity is the idea that perceptual intentionality "has as part of its conditions of satisfaction a causal relation between the intentional state and the external world" (58). In other words, part of the conditions of an

intentional state of seeing something is the notion that there is a causal relation between the content of our perception and the external world. Searle continues: "the intentional state is not satisfied—we are not perceiving the world in such a way that the intentional content would be satisfied—unless the world's being that way causes us to perceive it that way" (58). If there were no causal relation between the perception of an object and the external world, we could infer at least two consequences. First, we would have to say that there is no relationship between the things in the world and the things we perceive. Second, we would have to accept that it is possible that we never really gather any real information from the external world. Thus, Searle believes we should accept that there is some kind of causal relation between our subjective perceptions and the objective world in order to conclude that we are able to gain knowledge from the external world.

1.6 Searle's Argument

From Searle's discussion of the four sufficient features of intentionality, he arrives at what he deems the "the deepest argument for the intentionality of visual perceptual experiences," which he calls the *Argument from Transparency.* The Argument from Transparency is: "If you try to describe the subjective visual experience in your head, what you will find is that you are giving the same description that you would give of the state of affairs in the world" (59). Searle then provides the following example: If you give a description of a subjective experience, like "I seem to see San Francisco Bay," and then give a description of an objective state of affairs, like "I see San Francisco Bay," the two descriptions are identical. This is causal self-reflexivity. We should then ask Searle how it is possible that the two descriptions are the same. Searle would likely answer: "The conscious experience is itself a presentation of the state of affairs that constitutes its conditions of satisfaction. So the description of the content of the presentation has to match

the state of affairs that constitutes its conditions of satisfaction in the external world. The transparency of the relation between the subjective content in the head and the objective state of affairs in the world is an important phenomenon" (60).

Aside from intentionality as a concept, Searle focuses on 'intentional objects,' especially in cases of non-veridical perceptual experiences. Searle believes it is a mistake to think that every intentional state must have an object as its content. In non-veridical cases of visual experience, there need not be any actual object. For example, if you have a hallucinatory experience of a chair, the content of your intentional experience is a chair, but there may be no physical object 'chair' before you. So, to Searle's point, the content of the intentional state need not be a material chair.

Here, Searle says that one may think that: "in the case of beliefs about nonexistent objects, there is nonetheless an object that has that kind of existence…"intentional inexistence"…and these intentional objects, objects of intentional states, are not to be thought of as actual objects in the world, but rather as objects in our mind when we have a belief. And those objects exist in the mind whether or not there is a corresponding object in the real world" (38). From intentional inexistence, we conclude that we are able to have an intentional perception of something that does not exist, as we do in hallucinations. However, a hallucination of a chair is still a hallucinatory experience *of* or *about* a chair.

Searle does not believe there is any such thing as an object of a non-veridical experience, and he does not think there are any 'intentional inexistences.' Searle's issue with this "intentional inexistence" is that, "it prevents us from seeing that actual beliefs do indeed have intentional objects, when there actually is such an object in the world" (38). Thus, Searle thinks that if we accept intentional inexistence as a concept, we are then unable to see that there is a common

content between ontologically objective and ontologically subjective objects. If we are unable to see that there exists a common content between ontologically objective objects and ontologically subjective objects, we again run into the skeptical problem of how we attain any real knowledge from the world. Even in the case of a hallucination, then, there still may exist in the world the content of our intentional perception, even if our perception of the object in question is not veridically perceived.

Searle is still not concerned about our epistemological concerns here. Asking: "How do we know that the content of my internal world and real, external world is the same?" is not a productive question. Rather, Searle makes it clear to the reader that he is strictly concerned with whether or not the contents of our perceptions match one another. To appease our epistemological worry, Searle reminds us that the very biological function of perception is to teach us something about the world external. Thus, when we perceive things veridically, we are able to gain information and knowledge about the real world. He says: "The sheer phenomenology, the sheer experiential character of your perceptual experiences, gives you an impression that *this is how things are*" (56). Further, Searle would say that aside from epistemic questions being out of place here, they simply do not matter to the topic of intentional perception—at least according to the way he defines 'intentionality.' If the content of the mind and the content of the world match, that is a veridical perception. If the content of the mind and the content of the world do not match, that is a hallucinatory or illusory perception. But, to be clear, Searle is not at all worried about how we *know* whether or not the content of the mind and content of the world match. The contents either do match, or they do not.

Imagine again the case in which someone says: "I seem to see San Francisco Bay" and "I see San Francisco Bay." Searle believes that the content (San Francisco Bay) of the two statements

are the same because there is an inherent relation (namely, the causal self-reflexivity discussion previously) that connects the two statements (59). When you ask what thing-in-the-world you are seeing, you reply: "San Francisco Bay." When you ask what, from your point of view, your experience is like, you also reply: "San Francisco Bay." And because San Francisco Bay-the-thing causes San Francisco Bay-the-content-of-the-perception, it follows that the latter just is what it is for the former to be presented to me. It is not presented via some third thing, what is traditionally called 'sense data,' according to Searle. This identity of language between "San Francisco Bay" in describing what you see and "San Francisco Bay" in describing what you experience is what Searle calls 'transparency.'

Searle does not believe that the external world resembles the content of the inner experience. Rather, the content of our subjective experience is the same as the object of the intentionality in the external world *only when* the external world causes the internal experience. To Searle's point, we use the same words to describe both what we are seeing and our experience of what we are seeing to denote that both experiences have the same content. Of these matching descriptions of contents, Searle says: "The description of the content of the presentation has to match the state of affairs that constitutes its conditions of satisfaction in the external world" (59). My experiential content *is* my experience of the external object, and having that experience is what it is for me to experience that object. It is not a coincidence that the external world resembles my internal experience. It is because of causal self-reflexivity that my experience of the external world causes my internal subjective experience, and thus, the two experiences are 'the same.' As Searle puts it: "The conscious experience is itself a presentation of the state of affairs that constitutes its conditions of satisfaction" (59). In other words, the conditions of satisfaction set by the external

object allow for us to call our internal experience of the objective world, and the objective world itself, 'the same' if the conditions of satisfaction are met. These are veridical experiences.

1.7 Searle's Argument for Direct Realism

Searle's account of veridical visual perception contains two distinct phenomena: "[1] An ontologically objective state of affairs in the world outside your head and [2] an ontologically subjective visual experience of that state of affairs entirely inside your head. The former causes the latter, and the intentional content of the latter determines the former as its condition of satisfaction" (17). Thus, Searle believes that the correct explanation of visual perception is to say that there are actual ontologically objective things in the world, and there are the ontologically subjective things that exist only inside of your head, and that the causal property of intentionality between the two is what allows you to perceive things from the real world.

For example, there may be an actual chair before you, which actually exists in the room you are in, and there also exists the chair that you experience—the ontologically subjective chair—which only exists inside of your mind. But, it is the things in the world that cause you to experience the things that you perceive. Whatever experience you have in your mind uses your network and background information of the real world objects to set the conditions of satisfaction for successful or unsuccessful perceptual experiences. So, an actual chair in an actual room causes you to visually experience a chair, but the chair you experience only exists inside of your mind. However, there is a causal connection between the actual chair and your mind's experience of the chair. Again, this chair is the common content of the your perceptual experience and the conditions of satisfaction for it. The ontologically objective chair sets the conditions of satisfaction that our perception of the chair must meet in order to be successful. So, I subjectively perceive the chair that ontologically objectively exists, and use the ontologically

objective qualities of the chair I perceive to set the conditions of satisfaction for the chair that I subjectively perceive inside of my head. If they match, I have had a veridical perception. If they don't match, I have hallucinated.

Ultimately, Searle thinks we ought to focus on the causal connection between the ontologically objective object of our perception and the ontologically subjective object of our perception, as well as the intentional content that is common to both of the cases of veridical perceptual experiences.

To help clarify Searle's reasoning, imagine the case of a young woman named Jill taking LSD. LSD makes you hallucinate unusual objects and colors. Maybe you will see a pink elephant, or flowers performing a well-choreographed dance. Jill has never taken any drugs before—let alone LSD—and she does not have any expectations for this trip. She is taking the drug simply to experience something new and exciting. Let us say that during her trip, Jill sees many strange things. First, Jill has the perceptual experience of the United States of America electing a president fit for office. Second, Jill has the perceptual experience of rainbow elephants floating above her head. Third, Jill has the perceptual experience of a dog on her lap. It seems as though in the first and second instance of perceptual experience, Jill was hallucinating—these things could never exist in our real, ontologically objective world. In the third perceptual experience, though, there happened to be an actual dog on the lap of Jill while she hallucinated a dog.

Thus, we should be able to conclude that even in abnormal subjective experiences like these, it is still possible to have a chance perception that happens to align with objective reality, even if the perception is a hallucination—like Jill did when she hallucinated the dog on her lap, when there happened to be a dog on her lap. Since Jill was on drugs, she could have had this experience of a dog on her lap without an actual dog being on her lap. It also seems that the drug

caused Jill to experience a dog on her lap, and that the dog on her lap did not cause her to experience a dog on her lap. This example demonstrates that there seems to be multiple ways to interpret Searle when he says 'causal connection.'

It also seems that, based on the example of Jill on LSD, we should be able to say that it is the causal relation between the ontologically objective intentional experience and the ontologically subjectively intentional experience that allows for the subjective experience to succeed. However, Searle might say here that even though Jill's perceptual experience of the dog is veridical, it is not identical to a normal, veridical subjective experience that Jill may have of the dog on her lap if she were not on LSD. The veridical experience Jill had on LSD was an accident that happened by chance. But in other normal, non-drug-related cases of visual perception, the visual experience is caused by the outside world. According to Searle, in a veridical perception, the object causes the content of the subjective experience.

This means that when Jill ingests acid in order to have experiences, and neither believes nor cares whether her experiences are of anything in particular, the content of the experiences must be different from normal, in virtue of Jill being on a hallucinogenic drug. Jill's experiences on acid no longer have causal self-reflexivity, which normal experiences do have.

Searle thinks that the identity of the descriptions when we are asked: "what thing do you see?" and "how do things appear to you subjectively?" supports the view that we do not observe sense data. Suppose Jill does not give the same answer to both of these two questions. Suppose she answers the first question with: "I have no idea, I am tripping." And answers the second question with: "There is a brown dog on my lap." If she were just observing sense data, it would seem that she ought to say the same thing on acid as she does when she is not on acid and perceiving the world veridically, as the sense data are the same.

Her experiences are not causally self-reflexive because there is nothing in the external world causing Jill to have these various sort of internal experiences—only the drug itself, which are all brain-made. Jill's experiences on acid do not succeed in meeting Searle's proposed conditions of satisfaction for an intentional, veridical perception because her experiences on acid do not match any objects in the world. It is only the acid causing the experiences. These are hallucinations.

CHAPTER 2: H.H. PRICE

2.1 Naïve Realism

Perceiving sense data are necessary, but not sufficient, for holding beliefs about material objects, according to Price. Further, a material object itself is not a sense datum, but a complicated group of sense data. To simply receive sense data from an object to our brain is not enough to perceive the object. Price says "in order to bring the group of sense data before the mind, we should have to 'collect' the sense-data…so that memory will be required. And…we have still to recognize that they stand in such and such relations to each other…otherwise, though aware of the members, we are not aware of the group" (21-22). For sense data to prompt some sort of perceptual recognition, there requires an element of both memory and recognition. That is, to have a perceptual experience, according to Price, we need to be able to recall all of the sense data we are sensing. We then need to recognize the sense data we are sensing. Finally, we need to see how the sense data fit in relation to one another.

According to Price, sense data are, broadly, things we sense. He says that "when I am in the situation which is described as seeing something, touching something, hearing something, etc., it is certain in each case that a color-patch, or a pressure, or a noise exists at that moment and that I am acquainted with this color-patch, pressure or noise. Such entities are called sense-data, and the acquaintance with them is conveniently called sensing" (18). In other words, sense data are the qualities of things we can sense and describe. Price maintains that the same sense data from one object cannot necessarily be sensed in the same way by different minds. Price does not commit to sense data being necessarily physical or mental.

Price continues, “It is quite certain that sense-data at any rate do not occur in the void. For they are intimately united with the psycho-cerebral events upon which they are wholly dependent for their origin, for their persistence and for all their qualities” (137). In other words, Price believes that sense data do not exist in space without the aid of the human mind. In fact, according to Price, sense data are wholly dependent on the human mind for their existence.

However, according to Price, we should only be concerned with the relations that sense data have to the objects to which they belong, and their relation to the perceptual act by which they help to make us conscious.

Price believes that even if material objects were composed completely of sense data, sensing would be neither a sufficient nor necessary condition of holding beliefs about objects. We would need something more—namely the mental process that allows the sense data to get from the object to our brains. This mental process has often been called ‘perceiving,’ but Price believes that one sense of the word ‘perceiving’ has some degree of ambiguity. Price has us consider any illusion of sense and then imagine being deceived by it. Let us imagine we see two candles when there is only one candle before us. We perceive two sense data, while there is only one material object in reality. Price believes that if we are to accept that we see two sense data in this case, “it is possible to perceive what does not exist (though of course what we *sense* always exists when we sense it) and it would be necessary to distinguish between true and false perceiving” (23).

In another sense, we can interpret ‘perceive’ in a way Price finds much more favorable. Price continues: “But in another sense of ‘perceive’, and one that comes closer to ordinary speech, it is not possible to perceive what does not exist, and the distinction between true and false does not apply to perceiving at all” (23). This is similar to Searle’s concept of ‘intentional inexistence,’

which is to have an intentional perception of something that does not exist. Like when we hallucinate a pink elephant, for example.

So, to go off of Price's example, to perceive a candle means: "(I) I sense a sense-datum; (2) this sense-datum is related to a candle in a peculiar and intimate manner; (3) there is no other thing to which this sense-datum is related in that manner" (23). But more generally, when we perceive an object, according to Price, we first perceive a sense datum or sense data of the object. Second, the sense data we sense are related to the object in a 'peculiar and intimate manner,' meaning the sense data we perceive in this instance could have only come from that particular object in that particular moment. Third, the sense data, which corresponds to the object we perceive, can belong to no other object but that object which we perceive.

Price continues: "Thus, perceiving is not a specific form of consciousness, like acquaintance or believing or wondering; it does indeed involve a specific form of consciousness, namely sensing (acquaintance with sense-data), but that which it involved in addition is not a form of consciousness at all—it is merely *de facto* relation…It follows that if a material thing is in this sense perceived, then that thing necessarily exists. But this by no means implies that all perceiving is true" (23). In other words, Price believes that perceiving is a unique phenomenon in that when we perceive an object, the object exists—or, at least a percept exists in our minds. But we acknowledge that with one sense of the word 'perceive,' there is always the caveat that not all perceptual experiences are true, in that not all things we perceive actually exist before us.

Price prefers the second sense of the word 'perceive.' But he believes we are best to avoid both senses of the word 'perceive.' To find a better definition, first, we must find a name for the "non-sensuous mode of consciousness of which we have spoken" (25). Recall, this is the phenomenon

of perceiving something that is not really before us, which Price hereon out calls ‘perceptual consciousness.’

Second, Price thinks that when need a phrase for the situation in which a sense datum only belongs to a very specific object. Price calls this “having a material thing present to one’s senses” (25).

Third, Price thinks “we need a name for the relation subsisting between the sense-datum and the material thing when the material things is present to the senses of the being who is sensing that sense-datum” (25-26). Price calls this relation the relation of ‘belonging to.’

Price believes that based on our need for new terms at the ambiguity of ‘perception,’ there are two main questions that ought to concern us:

1) “What is perceptual consciousness and how is it related to sensing?
2) What is the relation between a sense-datum and a material thing when the thing is present to the senses of the being who senses the sense-datum? i.e. what is the relation of belonging to? (26)”

Ultimately, Price thinks that naïve realism holds the answer to both of these questions. For Price, naïve realism consists of three theses, of decreasing importance:

1. Naïve realism holds that I can directly perceive objects in the world.
2. Naïve realism holds that my consciousness knows that there is an object to which the sense data sensed by me belong.
3. Naïve realism holds that in the case of a visual sense data, ‘belonging to’ means the same as ‘being a part of the surface of in a literal sense,’ as one side of a page in this book is a part of the whole surface of this page.

According to Price, sense data are a part, and not the whole, of an object.

2.2 The Argument from Illusion

Price continues with the *Argument from Illusion* as a nearly sufficient refutation to naïve realism, but notes that the Argument from Illusion is unclear as it consists of two distinct arguments, which Price deems the Phenomenological Argument and the Causal Argument.

The Phenomenological Argument "seeks to show directly that there are visual and tactual sense-data which cannot be identical with parts of the surfaces of material objects" (27). In other words, the Phenomenological Argument says that certain sense data are not identical with the object to which they belong. This is the case in an illusion, for example, in which the sense data we perceive do not exist as part of any object that is before us, but only exists as sense data that were brain made.

The Causal Argument "seeks to show that visual and tactual sense-data only exist while certain processes, other than sensing but contemporary with it, are going on in the nervous system and perhaps in the mind of the being who senses them. And it is inferred from this that they cannot be identical with parts of the surfaces of objects; for such an object (and therefore the surfaces of it) *ex hypothesi* continues to exist at times when we are not sensing, and it is now contended that at those times the sense-data do not exist" (27). In other words, the Causal Argument says that certain sense data are not identical with the object to which they belong because of the existence of sense data depend upon the mind or nervous system of the perceiver. Further, the Causal Argument says that certain sense data do not exist at times when the perceiver is not sensing them.

Price acknowledges that these two components of the Argument from Illusion are hard to state clearly, but suggests that by defining 'illusory sense-datum,' he can avoid certain obvious criticisms. Price defines an 'illusory sense-datum' as: "a sense datum which is such that we tend

to take it to be part of the surface of a material object, but if we take it so we are wrong. It is not necessary that we should *actually* so take it. Thus if I were to see a mirage knowing it to be a mirage, I should not be deceived, but the sense datum would be nonetheless illusory: since I do *tend* to take it for part of the surface of a pool of water, and if I actually did I should be wrong. Nor have we begged the question against naïve realism in saying this" (27). Here, Price is saying that the sense data we perceive in both veridical perceptions and hallucinations are equally as illusory and that we have no good way of concluding in the moment of perceptual experience if what we perceive is veridical or not. Thus, hallucinatory sense data are no more 'illusory' than veridical sense data based on perceptual experience alone—the two types of sense data only differ epistemically. Similar in approach to Searle, Price is not at all concerned with whether or not we can know if what we perceive is veridical or not; Price is only concerned with the matter of the fact.

It may be thought that by distinguishing between the sense data we perceive in veridical perceptions with the sense data we perceive in hallucinations and illusions, we could understand how to differentiate between the two during perceptual experiences. Thus, Price defines normal sense data as "parts of the surfaces of material things and are *not* dependent on processes in the observer's brain: while abnormal ones are dependent on processes in the brain and are not part of surfaces on material things, but are related to the things in some more complicated way. The material thing would still be the remote though not the immediate cause of them, and they might still resemble parts of its surface though they would not *be* such parts…when I sense an abnormal sense-datum, we must say, I merely *believe* that there exists a material thing part of whose surface it is: only when I sense a normal one do I *know* that there exists such a material thing" (31).

Price is defining normal sense data (the kind you would perceive in a veridical perception) as sense data that are dependent on the material world and not dependent on the brain. Price then defines abnormal sense data (the kind you would perceive in a hallucination) as sense data that are dependent on the brain and not dependent on the material world.

While Price acknowledges the ontological difference between normal and abnormal sense data, he writes, "The difficulty is that there is no qualitative difference between normal sense data as such and abnormal sense-data as such. Indeed the whole trouble about abnormal sense data is precisely that they simulate normal ones. Otherwise it would not even be possible for us to be deceived by them; they would be strange, but they would not be illusory" (31). In other words, while there is an obvious epistemic difference between the sense data of veridical perceptions and the sense data of hallucinations, in reality, when it comes to our perception of such sense data, there is no qualitative difference detectable by us. If these qualitative differences were detectable, we would not have trouble differentiating between veridical perceptions and hallucinations in the first place.

Price continues: "there is no discernible difference in our consciousness when we pass from sensing a normal sense-datum to sensing an abnormal one, or vice versa. In both cases there is acquaintance with something, and in both cases there is also 'perceptual consciousness'. What the nature of this 'perceptual consciousness' may be we are to consider later, but certainly it is the same in both cases. It is impossible to hold that it is knowledge in the one and mere belief in the other" (32). Price is saying that because we cannot differentiate between normal and abnormal sense data during our perceptual experiences, we cannot claim to necessarily gain either knowledge or belief in either experience. The fact that normal and abnormal sense data are indistinguishable obliterates any distinction we may like to draw between their epistemological

imports. If one justifies belief in something, so must the other, and the same goes for failure to justify belief. In sensing both normal and abnormal sense data, we are acquainted with some object that we believe to be before us—we are "perceptually conscious" of the object, as Price puts it.

Price says that perhaps we could avoid this particular difficulty by "making the knowledge less determinate" (32). By this, I take Price to mean we can decide that knowledge means something different depending on if it is the knowledge we have of objects we perceive via normal or abnormal sense data. Price continues: "Might there not be different sort of 'belonging to?' Normal sense data might then belong to the thing in one-way and abnormal in some other way. And this would enable us to admit that the consciousness is of the same nature in both cases. In each case, it might then be maintained, it is knowledge; and what we know is that there exists some material thing or other to which this sense-datum belongs in some way or other: in which way, and therefore also what particular sort of material thing, would remain to be determined later" (33). By making the definition of knowledge less determinate, we would be able to have knowledge from the sense data that belong to objects in veridical perceptions, and a different kind of knowledge from the sense data that come from the sense data in hallucinations.

Price thinks that we could just say that we get knowledge from veridical perception and only gain beliefs from non-veridical perceptions. But then, we would need a non-circular way of say why only one of these cases yields 'knowledge,' and the other only yields mere 'belief.' Otherwise, the declaration looks like a restatement of the problem that we cannot, from our own perspective, tell the difference between the cases.

Though Price is a proponent of naïve realism, he acknowledges that the mere existence of hallucination has been seen as an objection to the theory. He writes: "In hallucination, for

instance in the visions of delirium, the sense-datum is completely wild; it does not belong to any material thing in any way at all. The pink sense-datum, to take the usual case, not only does not belong to a pink rat, as the sentient himself assumes: it does not belong to anything, and indeed owns no allegiance of any sort except to the disordered nervous system which generates it" (33). In other words, the hallucinations seem to imply that if we see things as they are, then hallucinations would be reflections of the world. The sense data that come from objects we hallucinate give us knowledge of literally nothing, as the sense data we perceive during a hallucination come from no such object that is before us—they are completely brain made.

Price concludes that "if the Phenomenological Argument and Causal Arguments are correct, then naïve realism is certainly false, since it cannot be held that all visual and tactual sense data are parts of the surfaces of material objects, and considerations of continuity suggest strongly that none are. Nor can it be held that all instances of perceptual consciousness are instances of knowing: and it is strongly suggested that none are. The positive conclusion is that all sense-data are produced by processes in the brains of the beings who sense them" (33). Price is saying that if in hallucinations, the sense data we perceive are brain made, and we are not gathering sense data from any real object that are before us in that moment, it must be the same case for veridical perceptions as well. Recall that Searle makes an identical argument. And thus, even in veridical cases of perception, according to this line of reasoning, our brain is creating the sense data we are gathering. So, just as our brain creates a red sense datum and a tomato sense datum when we hallucinate a red tomato, our brain creates a red sense datum and a tomato sense datum when we veridically perceive a red tomato.

However, Price offers the following reply to the two aforementioned objections to naïve realism: "That both of [the Causal Argument and Phenomenological Argument] tacitly assume in

their premises the truth of the very theory which they profess to disprove" (33). According to Price, the Phenomenological Argument relies entirely upon the citation of negative instances, meaning that we must have knowledge of the objects that the Phenomenological Argument seeks to describe. For example, the Phenomenological Argument would argue that, according to naïve realism, there is a sense datum *s* that belongs to a material object M. However, upon "inspection that *s* is not part of the surface of M because M is in another place of because it has another shape or size" (34). Price notes, however, that we are not able to have such knowledge of sense datum *s* not being a part of the surface of M unless we already have knowledge of object M. It is through observation that we gain knowledge about object M in this case, or any other case. Price then says "must we not then assume that *these* sense-data at least are, and are known to be, parts of the surfaces of objects, in order to show that others are not? Thus with regard to these sense-data, and with regard to these acts of perceptual consciousness, Naïve Realism would have to be true" (34).

More simply put, the objection to the Phenomenological Argument of naïve realism may be to say that sense data are in my head, and the surface that the sense data belong to exist outside my head, so the sense data are not in the surface—but that begs the question. According to naïve realism, the sense data really are in the surface of the object, and not in my head, so the argument that denies the Phenomenological Argument of naïve realism just goes to prove naïve realism when it concedes that sense data are in the surface of an object.

One may wonder how I become aware of sense data if they are not in our mind, to which Price would reply that in veridical perceptions, we are simply able to see the sense data of an object, as it is part of the object itself.

Price does not think that his reply to the objection to the Phenomenological Argument completely saves naïve realism, but he believes that by stating naïve realism more carefully in the first place, we can avoid the two objections all together.

To state naïve realism more carefully, first, "we might admit that we do have knowledge of the existence and nature of the cricket-ball, the glove, the chair-leg [for example]; and that we do get it from sensing sense data. But, we might say, there is no reason to assume that we get it in the way naïve realism alleges. It might be necessary not just to sense one sense datum, but also to compare a large number of sense data and find that they stand in certain relations to each other. There might really be a relation of 'belonging to'—as indeed there obviously is—and we might be capable of knowing that particular sense-data belong to particular material things: and yet this relation might be different from what naïve realism thinks it is, e.g. it might be much more complex or less direct, or it might be many-one instead of one-one" (34-35).

To avoid the objection to naïve realism that says we have *a priori* knowledge from sensing, Price believes we can admit that we have knowledge of the existence and nature of certain material objects and that we have this knowledge from sensing sense data. But, we get this knowledge not from sensing just one sense datum, but from understanding the relationships between sense data and how they stand in relation to each other. Price is also hypothesizing that the sense datum we perceive does not just belong to an object, or just belong to the person's mind, but it may belong to both at once. Price does not think we need to commit to the way naïve realism has historically seen these relations, but, regardless, there no consensus on how sense data stand in relation to one another.

Second, Price does not believe that we are forced to have knowledge about particular material things. In his view, naïve realism only forces us to "possess the conception of *material thinghood*

or know what the term ‘material thinghood’ *means*” (35). We do not require knowledge about particular material things. We can have conceptions of ‘things,’ whether or not those things have had any instances.

The Causal Argument says “sense-data vary with variations in the medium between the observer and the object, with variations in the observer’s sense-organs, and with variations in his nervous system. And we never find a sense-datum in the absence of a sense-organ and a nervous system” (30). The Causal Argument implies that sense data are not only affected by processes in the brain, but are entirely brain made. If this were the case, then once we stop sensing, the sense data themselves would cease to exist. If sense data cease to exist when we stop sensing, then it cannot be true that sense data are a part of the surface of objects.

Price thinks that the Causal Version of the Argument from Illusion presupposes *a priori* what we can only know about certain objects *a posteriori*. Price says it “is constantly talking to physical media, of mirrors, lenses and prisms, of drugs and physical diseases, and especially of sense organs, nerves and brains. Thus it presupposes a vast amount of detailed knowledge concerning a variety of material objects. And this knowledge is certainly not *a priori.* It is got from observation: it presupposes both sensing and what we have called perceptual consciousness” (36). In other words, the Causal Argument does not prove that there are not material objects to which sense data belong, or that if there are, they are not accessible to our minds. Otherwise, it would contradict its own premises, and this, in turn, begs the question.

Price continues: “Or, if it is not knowledge but only a body of beliefs, then the argument is proportionally weakened; and even so the beliefs are still based on sensing and on perceptual consciousness. Thus whatever the argument proves, it certainly cannot have the slightest tendency to prove that there are not material objects to which sense-data belong, or that if there

are, they are not accessible to our minds; otherwise it would be contradicting its own premises" (36). In other words, we only get presentations of sense data if certain causal processes are going on, and we can tell that certain processes are going on because altering the causal processes of our brains—for example, by dropping acid—can alter the resulting sense data. Because you are manipulating your brain, and not the things outside of your brain, sense data cannot be a part of the things outside of you—they must be in your brain, according to some interpretations of the Causal Argument of the Argument from Illusion.

Price replies that we are only able to know about these manipulations of causal processes in the brain by seeing things, because any causal process can only be discovered *a posteriori*. So the anti-naïve realist has to say that I can get knowledge *a posteriori*, but the naïve realist would say that it is the obvious view of *a posteriori* knowledge that we get *a posteriori* knowledge only because objects have sense data in them, or on their surface. So unless one assumes that naïve realism is false, the Causal Argument cannot show that sense data are not in external objects at all.

Price continues: "Despite these gross confusions in the statement of it, the Argument from Illusion obviously does prove something, even in its Causal form…An inquiry about 'belonging to' and about perceptual consciousness is concerned (among other things) with the foundations of Physiology itself: for all the empirical sciences are based on observation" (37). In other words, the Argument from Illusion us reasonably suspected of presuming that all empirical science was, at some point, based on observation gotten through sense data. Consider that even the very first scientific experiments were based on visual observations before any sophisticated scientific instruments were even invented. Consider your daily observations and ways in which you describe objects—you describe them by their qualitative properties—their sense data.

2.3 Modifications of Naïve Realism

Price offers two ways in which philosophers have attempted to modify naïve realism. Both attempts have failed, though, according to Price (55).

1. The Theory of Multiple Location:

We see things from a point of view, and thus, "we must distinguish between the characteristics which characterize something only *from a place,* and those which characterize it *simpliciter"* (55). As Price puts it: "It is part of [an object's] essence to *face* in a certain direction. Likewise tactual data have their qualities from a 'point of contact'" (57). The case that complicates that Theory of Multiple Location, according to Price, is the perceptual phenomena of 'doubleness.' "Is it even sense to say that from a certain place something is *doubled?* I think it is not. For 'doubleness' is not a quality at all. *A is doubled* really means that *there are two A's* and even if you add 'from a place,' it still means this. Thus when you say that something is doubled you do not mean that it has a new attribute. You mean that there is a new subject of attributes. No doubt each of the two sense data in double vision has its qualities from a place. But there are *two* qualified entities, not one: whereas (by hypothesis) there is only one piece of matter" (57). In other words, when we see something as doubled, Price thinks that it is not from a 'certain place' that you see double, because doubleness is not a quality of something. Rather, when you perceive an object as doubled, you are not seeing 'doubleness' as a property of the object, rather the 'doubleness' is a quantifier.

2. The Theory of Compound Things:

Sense data form parts of a compound object. For example, imagine the familiar optical illusion of a stick in a glass of water. You perceive the stick to become bent at the point where it enters the water. However, "The stick is not bent, but the compound stick-plus-water really is bent, and

the crooked sense datum is part of its surface. These compound objects really do exist in external Nature and do have their qualities…just as 'simple' objects like sticks have theirs" (59). In other words, the object stick-in-water is not bent, but the sense datum stick-in-water is bent, which is why you perceive it as such.

Compound Things theorists want sense organs and the brain of the observer to be able to be a part of the compound, but Price thinks that is impossible. He says: "for even if we interpret it selectively, no one can seriously contend that the crooked color-expanse which I sense is *part of the surface of* the compound object stick-plus-water, in that literal sense in which, if there were a bent stick, it could be part of the surface of *that.* The surface of the compound—if it can be said to have one at all—must be the surface of the upper half of the stick plus the top surface of the water" (59). In other words, if we were to start including the upper half of the stick and the top surface of the water in our concept of sense data, for example, there would seem to be no limit to where our compounding of what should and should not be included in sense data should begin and end.

2.4 Price's Causal Theory

Price is a naïve realist, and "the Naïve Realist, we may recall, maintained two theses: (I) that in the case of visual and tactual sense-data 'belonging to' means 'being part of the surface of'; (2) that perceptual consciousness is knowing that a sense-datum is part of the surface of a material thing" (66).

Price, under the assumption that the previous two theses failed, has us consider the following theory: (I) that in the case of all sense-data (not merely visual and tactual) 'belonging to' simply means *being caused by,* so that 'M is present to my senses' will be equivalent to 'M causes a sense-datum with which I am acquainted'; (2) that perceptual consciousness is fundamentally an

inference from effect to cause (66).

Price volunteers a preliminary difficulty of his new theory. The first difficulty with his theory is that "We are not ordinarily conscious of making any inference at all when we see a table or a chair or a tree." That is to say, when we perceive objects in our ordinary life, we are not consciously making inferences.

That being said, Price says that we are simply conditioned to make these kinds of inferences, as we have been doing since childhood. He says that inferring material objects from sense data so often "has enabled me to establish the inductive generalization that wherever such and such a kind of such-datum exists, such and such a kind of object exists too. Once having established it, I proceed henceforth to apply it in a mechanical way to all my sense-data as they come along, without thinking any more about the ground upon which it is based" (68). Thus, according to Price, we are able to subconsciously recognize the causal relation between sense data and material objects that the sense data correspond to. The sense data now become easily recognizable to us as signs or markers of the object.

Price continues: "Still, my present power of reading the signs depends upon a long course of causal inferences in the past. And even now, it would be said, I do occasionally infer an object from my sense-data by a causal inference, e.g. when I correct an illusion, or when I consider whether such and such a sense-datum is illusory or not" (68). Essentially, we do not need to take time to process the fact that we perceive sense data once we become familiar enough with an object and the sense data that mark the object. If we perceive an object enough, the many components of sense data that it consists of become much like the ability to read, in which the letters that make up a word become automatically understandable to us.

Further, Price thinks that one is able to conclude what a chair is right away after many experiences seeing chairs is because one recognizes certain qualities of a chair, and when you see the sense data that marks those qualities, you can immediately realize that what is before you is a chair. Price calls this sort of immediate recognition 'rational belief' and not 'knowledge.'

Price continues: "Something very like it occurs even in arithmetical and geometrical thinking. For instance, if we find a right-angled triangle we straightaway take it that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, without going through Pythagoras's Theorem again every time" (68-69). Like the instantaneous recognition of a mathematical equation we know by memory, certain sense data that marks objects often become immediately recognizable to us.

Though Price believes that sense data are parts of the surface of objects, he does not believe that material objects cause sense data. Of this, Price says: "No *simple* causal argument, which could be gone though again every time without trouble, will take us from a sense-datum to a material thing" (69). That is to say that there is no causal argument that is sufficient to explain to process of how we perceive a sense datum from a material object. Any object that we perceive only gives us very complex sense data that are not always produced only by the object we perceive in that case.

Price explains that, "For instance, it cannot be said that the table is *the* cause of the sense-data which 'belong to' it. On the one hand, why should we go so far back? Why not say that the light rays are the cause of the sense-datum—or the retina, or the brain, or even (perhaps) the mind?" (69). In other words, according to Price, objects are not the cause of sense data. According to Price, the table itself does not cause a table-y sense datum, for if we are to say that the object is

the cause of the sense datum, we can not be so sure that our eyes or mind did not cause the sense datum, if the table was just a hallucination, after all.

Price continues that if we were to say that objects cause sense data, "Are we to say, then, that the sense datum belongs to the brain, the eyes, the dynamo, the sun, no less than the table? For we have used the phrase 'belonging to' in a special meaning: a visual sense-datum *s* belongs to a material thing M when M is present to the senses of the mind which is acquainted with *s;* that is, when the plain man on sensing *s* would say 'I am seeing M.' It is to the table then, and to nothing else, that the sense datum belongs. But it is causally dependent upon an indefinitely large multitude of things. How then can 'belonging to' be defined in terms of causal dependence?" (69).

As Price puts it, our perceiving of sense data is causally dependent upon an indefinitely large multitude of things. The object itself has not caused the sense data. It is, instead, the object, along with many other variables, external and internal to ourselves, that has caused the sense data we perceive.

Price believes a way to escape this difficulty of his theory of naïve realism is to differentiate between *standing* and *differential* conditions (70). Standing conditions are things that are necessary to all sense data and do not wholly determine any of them. For example, a standing condition would be that all sense data occupy space or have a color. Differential conditions are the varying conditions, which account for the difference (or the differences) between a red sense datum and a blue sense datum, for example. Each material object is a collection of same appearing sense data, where the same sense data can be observed at different times. "Obviously it is absurd to identify M with any or all of the standing condition of *s*; but it is quite plausible to identify it with the *differential* condition of *s*" (70). This is what the Causal Theory intends to do.

For example, when I see a yellow carnation, there are certain things that must be true. There must be light and space, I must have a functioning brain, and I must be able to see the flower—but none of these things are specific to *that* yellow carnation. Instead, the light and space and my ability to see simply play a causal role in the perception of the yellow carnation, and in other things too. That particular carnation is set apart from these general, standing conditions by it's having particular sense data that belong to it—its yellow, carnation sense data, for example. Apprehension of sense data are what make it that unique thing that I see—that is what it means to say there are differential conditions of the existence of the carnation.

And thus, we have Price's Causal Theory, which is as follows:

"*Given s, it is possible to infer the existence of M as s's differential condition.* On this we may note:

(I) M must be the differential condition of *s, not just any sort of condition.*

(II) Nor must it merely be so as a matter of fact. The relation of differential conditioning must be so apprehensible by us that we can pass by means of it from the apprehension of *s* to the apprehension of M.

(III) Yet this need not actually occur, and in an adult mind at least is not necessary to the *belief* in M's existence, though it is to the *knowledge* of M" (70).

The first premise of the Causal Theory is that it is possible to infer the existence of a material object M as the differential condition of a visual sense data.

What can be inferred from *s* as its differential condition? "One well-known account represents the argument as follows: Every event has a cause, and every sense-datum is an event. It must, then, have a cause. Its cause must either be myself or something else. But it cannot be myself, for sense data are independent of my will. As Berkeley stated: 'When I open my eyes in broad

daylight it is not in my power to chose what I shall see.' Sense-data must therefore be caused by events in something other than myself" (70). Since every event has a cause, and sense data are events, all sense data have causes that must be independent of myself since I cannot cause perception of things that are outside of myself, according to Price. Price believes that this is the only plausible basis for the Causal Theory. He writes: "if every event has a cause and if our sense-data, or again if their comings-into-beings, are events, then something else must exist besides our sense-data" (73).

Price ultimately concludes that the Causal Theory holds that "we are not entitled to consider that visual and tactual sense-data are constituents of the surfaces of material objects until we have proved that they are" (100). But Price believes we do the opposite, and "we consider them to be so until it is proved that they are not" (100). Price still believes that we are much more sure about the existence of the material world than we are about the truth of the proposition above.

I will now draw on Price's ideas to present my own view, and say what is wrong with Searle's view.

CHAPTER 3: WHY SEARLE'S THEORY DOES NOT REFUTE NAÏVE REALISM

3.1 More on Sense Data

According to own my theory of perception, we are able to perceive objects in the world directly, and we do so via perceiving sense data that belong to objects. The perception of sense data is incompatible with Searle's theory of direct, intentional perception, though he does provide a definition for sense data, which is: "the things that make us aware that we perceive something in visual perception," in order to demonstrate that sense data serve as a kind of intermediary between the mind and the object we perceive.

According to Price, sense data are, broadly, the things we sense when we perceive an object. Price says that "when I am in the situation which is described as seeing something, touching something, hearing something, etc., it is certain in each case that a colour-patch, or a pressure, or a noise exists at that moment and that I am acquainted with this colour-patch, pressure or noise. Such entities are called sense-data, and the acquaintance with them is conveniently called sensing" (18). In other words, sense data are the qualities of objects we can sense and describe. Price maintains that the same sense data of the same objects cannot necessarily be sensed by different minds in the same way. For example, you and I need not perceive the green-ness of a green book in the same exact way, though we are both able to conclude that the book should be called 'green.'

Another important point to note from Price's definition of sense data is that sense data are the differential properties of objects, in that they are what make perceived objects look different from each other. There is a classic 'reverse spectrum' thought experiment, where the experience I have and call 'green' and associate with grass is the experience you have, which you call 'blue'

and associate with the sky. Neither Price nor I need to say that we have different sense data in this thought experiment. For both Price and myself, sense data are what make one perceived object different from another perceived object. The subjective quality of the two sense data could differ, so long as they are what allow both of us to differentiate a green ball from a red ball, and attach the same color-expressions to each, respectively.

Searle and Price both define sense data as the sense-able qualitative properties between humans and things, and use these definitions to motivate naïve realism. Searle defines sense data as mental things that exist within us, while Price is not committed to sense data being physical or mental. I will present my own definition of sense data shortly.

Another important difference between the two definitions is that Searle's version of naïve realism (and sense data) forces us to conclude that we can never perceive the world directly, while Price does not conclude that sense data necessarily lead to the indirect perception of objects. Recall that Searle believes that the perception of sense data lead to indirect perception, and thus, perceiving objects through sense data cannot be the way in which we perceive the world since Searle believes we are able to perceive objects as they are—directly. Searle believes it is the causal connection between ontologically objective objects and state of affairs in the world and our subjective perception of those objects and states of affairs that allows us to perceive objects directly.

On the other hand, Price's version of naïve realism, which does not conclude that we have indirect perception of objects and states of affairs in the world, says that sense data are simply the intermediary between our minds and the objects in the world we perceive. I agree with Price.

Since I will ultimately convey that there are both veridical and illusory sense data, which are distinct from one another, I will define sense data in a way that first, does not exclude us from

perceiving the world directly, and second, demonstrates that there is a factual, yet imperceivable, difference between hallucinatory and veridical sense data.

Thus, I shall define sense data as the real, sense-able, qualitative properties of objects that exist in relation to us. In veridical perception, sense data are not brain made, and in hallucinations, sense data are brain made.

First, sense data are real, sense-able things. We know this to be true because when we perceive objects we do not know the names of, or are unfamiliar with, we first perceive their individual qualitative properties, and verbally describe them by those properties.

For example, imagine you see a mysterious object on the street corner one day. You are on the phone with your sister and say: "Natalie, I do not know what this object before me is. Let me describe it to you. The object is about six feet tall, has a red octagon posted at the top, has four white letters printed on it: S…T…O…P." Your sister tells you it is called a 'STOP sign.' The six-foot-tall-ness and red-octagon-ness you described to Natalie were the sense data of the stop-sign-object. In my view, these sense data are present both in your brain and are part of the object outside of your brain. What allows us to perceive the stop sign is the three-way relationship between our brain, the sense data that are a part of the 'STOP' sign, and the real, objective 'STOP' sign.

When we only consider objects we are familiar with, or objects we encounter in our everyday life, it is easy to ignore the multiple qualitative properties the objects are comprised of. However, if you are to consider objects you are unfamiliar with, it may become easier to understand what sense data are.

This example should also demonstrate that when we visually perceive objects that we are particularly familiar with, our brain perceives the sense data so quickly, that we do not require

time to process the sense data to know what we are looking at. Much like immediately knowing that the answer to 2+2 is 4, if we see an object often enough, we recognize what it is and call it by that name without a second thought. We know that sense data are real and sense-able things that are part of objects themselves simply because when we see objects we are unfamiliar with, we describe them verbally by their qualitative properties—their sense data.

Another important aspect of my definition of sense data are that they are a brain made phenomenon in hallucination, but not brain made in veridical perception. In veridical perceptions, the sense data we perceive exist as a part of the object we perceive. In a hallucination, we perceive an object that is not before us—our brain is firing neurons in such a way that sense data are being created to make us believe we are seeing something we are not actually seeing with our eyes, though we are "seeing" the object with our brain.

There are also important cases to note that are not hallucinations, but illusions. That is to say that we perceive something before us that is just slightly different than what is actually before us. For example, we may perceive a pink elephant, while before us there stands a grey elephant. In a case like this, where opponents of sense data may reply that clearly there is no such 'pink sense datum' that is part of the elephant, we could reply that we are simply making an error of judgment when we perceive the elephant as pink instead of grey.

Another interesting illusory case to consider is the Muller-Lyer Illusion, in which we perceive two lines of the same length as two different lengths. This case, again, could simply be written off as a case of bad judgment on our part about the length of the lines.

The illusory case of the bent stick in water, which was mentioned previously by Price in his section on the Theory of Compound Things, also presents an interesting problem, since we perceive a sense data of a bent stick in a cup of water, which we know for certain is not a bent

stick in a cup of water. The sense data we perceive tells us otherwise. This case is helpful for opponents of sense data theories, until we acknowledge that the sense data fulfill their role in distinguishing between the stick and the environment of water around it, and further, as soon as we remove the stick from the water, our intuition is confirmed. The sense data are still a part of the stick, and account for the fact that we are able to perceive the stick directly. However, similar to the previous two cases, the normal way these sense data behave is interrupted, and this causes us to make an error in judgment about the stick.

However, veridical perceptions are not made up of brain made sense data. In a veridical perception, we are seeing an accurate picture of the world before us—for that is the very definition of a veridical perception. The difference between the sense data in a hallucination and the sense data in a veridical perception is that in a hallucination, we are receiving some old, leftover sense data (perhaps from a past perceptual experience), and in a veridical experience, we perceive sense data directly from the object itself, as it is before us. For clarification, the object the sense data belong to causes those sense data in a veridical perception. Without the existence of the object, there would be no such sense data in the first place. This is because the sense datum *is* part of the object itself. Objects, then, cause the sense data that is a part of them.

Based on my aforementioned point, it seems that sense data can stem from objects that exist in the present, or from things that have existed in the past. Consider a hallucination of a loved one who recently passed away. We can acknowledge that the dead person we are hallucinating no longer exists in the world as a physical being. You are hallucinating someone that you once perceived veridically.

This is an important point because it speaks to the second part of my definition, which is that the sense data of hallucinations are brain made. We know that hallucinations are comprised of

completely brain made sense data simply by asking our neighbor if they see the same thing we do, to which they would reply: “no.”

This example demonstrates that the phenomenon of brain made hallucinations is not only possible, but also completely realistic, given that we can have hallucinations of past veridical perceptual experience and the sense data we perceive in hallucinations came from those veridical experiences.

Finally, when it comes to defining sense data, it seems that in most cases, unless we are told, we are not able to know in the moment of perceptual experience if we are having a veridical experience or if we are having a hallucinatory experience. Thus, veridical and hallucinatory sense data are experientially indistinguishable.

3.2 Why Searle is Wrong

First, Searle believes that naïve realism forces us to accept that we can never perceive the world directly. Recall the ‘Bad Argument’ in Searle’s words:

1) In both the veridical case and in the hallucination case, there is a common element—a qualitative subjective experience going on in the visual system.
2) Because the common element is qualitatively identical in the two cases, whatever analysis we give of one, we must give of the other.
3) In both the veridical case and the hallucination case we are aware of something (are conscious of something, see something).
4) But in the hallucination case it cannot be a material object; therefore, it must be a subjective mental entity. Just to have a name, call it a “sense datum.”
5) But by step two we have to give the same analysis for both cases. So in the veridical case, as in the hallucination, we see only sense data.

6) Because in both hallucinations and in veridical perceptions themselves we see only sense data, then we have to conclude that we never see material objects of other ontologically objective phenomena. So direct realism is refuted.

Though Searle is correct about there being a common element that is qualitatively identical in both veridical perceptions and hallucinations in which we perceive the same sense data, he is wrong to say that naïve realism concludes we must then give the same 'analysis' of both cases. Further, Searle's inferred conclusion of naïve realism is overly strong. My reasoning for these objections is as follows.

First, in premise two, there is no reason why we should accept Searle's statement that we must give the same analysis of both the veridical and hallucinatory cases of perception just because there a qualitative subjective experience going on in the visual system in both cases. We may ask Searle what he means by 'analysis.' If he means that we must say that in both hallucinations and veridical perceptions that the exact same brain processes are occurring, then he is making a factually incorrect statement, and later contradicts himself when he acknowledges that the two experiences are in fact different. We know that in hallucinations, we are seeing something that is not before us and in veridical perceptions, we are seeing something that is actually before us. Even though we may be able to perceive a common content in both veridical cases of perception and hallucinatory cases of perception, we cannot give the same kind of analysis in both cases because they are different kinds of perceptual experiences. We know that both the veridical case and hallucinatory case contain different kinds of sense data, as a matter of fact. Even though the two experiences look the same, we know the two experiences are caused in different ways. The object itself causes the veridical experience, while the brain alone causes the hallucinatory

experience. We know this because the sense data of veridical perceptions exist as a part of the object perceived, whereas the sense data of hallucinations are completely brain made.

Second, if we look to what Searle infers as the conclusion of the Bad Argument, we see that he is making it far stronger than it needs to be. Searle ultimately concludes that because we only see sense data in hallucinations, we must only see sense data in veridical perceptions, and thus, we never see objects directly. The first issue with this conclusion is that Searle believes that naïve realism implies that because the sense data of veridical perceptions and hallucinatory perceptions are indistinguishable, we must give the same 'analysis' of both. However, I already dismantled this point, given that we know the cases are different as a matter of fact.

The third issue with the conclusion that Searle infers of the Bad Argument is that veridical perception and hallucinatory perception contain the same kinds of sense data. If we think back to the definition I offered of sense data above, it becomes obvious that the kinds of sense data we see in hallucinations must be different than the kinds of sense data we see in veridical perceptions, since the two kinds of perceptual experiences are factually different.

The types of sense data we sense in hallucinations are sense data that do not come from any kind of object that is before us in the moment in which we perceive the object; they are brain made. On the other hand, the kinds of sense data we see in a veridical perception are sense data that are coming directly from the object that is before us that we perceive in that very moment; they are not brain made. Based on this observation, it is clear that we are able to see material objects directly and objectively, even if we see the objects via sense data. Price also offers a reply to Searle's point when he says that there are normal sense data in veridical perceptions and abnormal sense data in hallucinations.

Searle asserts the Bad Argument has two main consequences, but I am only concerned to address one consequence of his argument. It is that Searle believes the Bad Argument forces us to accept that the only way we can gain knowledge of the world is through our own subjective experiences, and not from the ontologically objective real world. Searle seems to conclude this based on his belief that sense data is an intermediary between the brain and objects in the world, and that because of this, anything we perceive by way of sense data (which is everything, according to naïve realism) is indirect, and thus subjective. However, this is not at all what naïve realism, or the 'Bad Argument,' as Searle calls it, implies. Price's version of naïve realism, for example, only forces us to accept that sense data exist, and that sense data are the existents by which we visually perceive objects. Based on the sense data we perceive of an object, we can justify beliefs about the whole of an object. Consider, for example, seeing an uncut, whole tomato. You cannot see the interior of the tomato—the fleshy inside full of seeds—but based on the exterior, you justify beliefs about the interior. You can infer the existence of a fleshy interior full of seeds.

Further, sense data being a kind of 'intermediary' between the brain and objects in the world need not render our experience of the world either indirect or subjective. We are still able to perceive the world directly, despite perceiving the world through sense data.

Some may object to my claim that despite sense data being a kind of 'intermediary,' we are still able to perceive objects directly. This objection may come as a result of the idea that I am saying something like: "First, there is an object. Second, we perceive the sense data of that object. Third, I become aware of that object." This would, in fact, be a chain of three elements that lead us to become aware of an object. However, just because I perceive the world through

sense data, which is exactly what I am claiming, does not mean that we cannot still perceive the world and its objects directly. Consider the following example.

When we veridically perceive a red tomato, we may say aloud: "I see a red tomato." In that utterance, we are describing what we see based on the sense data of the tomato, or its qualitative properties—namely its redness and its tomato-ness. It seems uncontroversial to say that we are still seeing the red tomato directly in this case, versus if we had imagined another case in which we had also uttered aloud: "I see a red tomato," and did not see the redness or the tomato-ness. If we did *not* see the redness or the tomato-ness, then saying, "I see a red tomato" would have been wildly misleading, and we would probably not have said it in the first place. In that case, it must have been a quotation, a line in a play, or an outright lie. Cases like these are what make sense data intuitively crucial.

Regarding the subjectivity that Searle thinks naïve realism entails, we ought to consider a case in which we veridically perceive something from one angle, and veridically again from another angle a few minutes later. Suppose I see the statue of Michelangelo's David from 10 feet away, and then again from 15 feet away. What has changed? Only the distance I stood in the first and second cases. The object itself (Michelangelo's David) is objectively the same in both cases, yet my subjective experiences of Michelangelo's David are unarguably different.

Similar to sense data, we are able to have subjective experiences of real objects, and have a human awareness of what is objectively the same and what has changed. We are probably able to tell standing 10 feet away and 15 feet away that the statue we are looking at is Michelangelo's David. We would say in both cases: "That is Michelangelo's David." We would know this objectively. We would also probably be able to say something like: "I can tell standing 10 feet away that he is totally ripped, but when I stand 15 feet away, my experience changes slightly

because I cannot tell that he is totally ripped. He looks a bit pudgy." This pudginess is part of our subjective experience that results from our subjective point of view. Searle is wrong because he does not consider the fact that we can still distinguish which objective properties objects possess and lack, even if all we perceive are sense data. The human mind is capable of filtering out our subjective[3] experiences of objects.

It seems that there are often conflicts about what we perceive in cases like these, but these types of conflicts are often ruled out if we suppose that there really is an objective object before us—namely David, in this case. From one angle, David looks unhappy, and from another angle, he may look thrilled. From another angle, David may look quite tall, and from another angle, he may look quite short. However, these notions of tall or short and happy or unhappy are perhaps conflicting judgments about the statue of David, but there is one objective David and one set of sense data that belongs to the statue of David.

Searle ultimately believes the correct explanation of visual perception is to say that there are actual ontologically objective things in the world, and there are ontologically subjective things that exist only inside of your head, and that the causal property of intentionality between the two is what allows you to perceive things from the real world.

The issue with Searle's concept of causal connection is that there seem to be cases where there is in fact some causal connection between the objective state of affairs in the world and the content of a perception, but where there is some kind of intermediary effect from the primary cause that actually causes a specific experience of perception. So, the causal relation between the object and the mental states of the perceiver is not sufficient for perception of the object.

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[3] The reason I call these qualities of the statue of David 'subjective,' is that there is much disagreement over these kinds of judgments. This is not the focus of my thesis, though.

For example, imagine a cat lying in a bush. Now imagine that the way the cat is laying there causes a pile of twigs to form in the shape of a cat. The pile of twigs looks like a cat lying in the bush. So, what we have is a cat in a bush, and a cat causing twigs in the shape of a cat to form. However, what I happen to perceive are the twigs that only look like a cat. Did the cat cause us to perceive the cat? Well, yes—we see a cat in the bush. But we are not seeing the actual cat; rather we are only seeing the twigs that look like a cat that the actual cat itself caused to form. Further, it seems like the cat lying in the bush caused us to see a cat lying in the bush, but in fact what we perceive are the twigs in the bush, which were caused by the cat in the bush. It may only be by coincidence that an actual cat caused our perception of the cat, in this example.

One objection to the aforementioned example would be to say that I am only seeing the twigs, and not the cat itself, so the analogy with veridical perception fails. However, consider that in the real case of veridical perception, in which I perceive an actual cat in the bushes, I am only seeing the light reflected off the cat, and not the cat itself—so the analogy still holds. The sense data of the actual cat are not the sense data of the cat-like object we perceive, which is really a bunch of twigs.

Because the cat is causing the perception, Searle has to say we see the cat. But this is not the case. The sense data theory gets the case correct, however. We do not see the sense data belonging to the cat—we see the sense data belonging to the twigs. We infer the existence of the cat, and it is only by chance that we are correct.

Another example to demonstrate this point would be seeing the moon and stars in the sky. Perhaps when you typically peer upward, you see the moon and count about 15 stars. However, when you look up and see the stars, the stars you see are not really there. The stars have long ago exploded into space matter and no longer exist. What you are seeing are the stars that existed

many years ago. We are, in some sense, seeing the past. So, similar to the cat in the bush example above, it seems fair to say that the stars caused us to see the stars, but we are not actually experiencing the stars—because there are no stars to experience, but only something they emitted when they did exist.

Thus, while Searle's account of intentional perception may succeed in explaining how basic veridical perceptions work, his theory does not succeed when it comes to hallucinations and cases of perception that have an intermediary effect which actually yields the content of a perception.

3.3 Why Price is Somewhat Wrong

In the same way that I distinguish between the sense data we perceive in veridical perceptions and the sense data we perceive in hallucinations, Price distinguishes between normal and abnormal sense data. Price says that normal sense data "*are* parts of the surfaces of material things and are *not* dependent on processes in the observer's brain: while abnormal ones are dependent on processes in the brain and are not part of surfaces on material things, but are related to the things in some more complicated way" (31). In other words, according to Price, normal sense data are physical existents and brain independent, while abnormal sense data are non-physical existents and brain dependent. I agree with this stance.

Assume going forward that normal sense data correspond to veridical perception, and abnormal sense data correspond to non-veridical perception. First, recall what leads Price to distinguish between normal and abnormal sense data: Price has us imagine that we see an object veridically. When we perceive the object, via its sense data, even when we close our eyes and cease to perceive sense data, the object continues to exist. On the other hand, in a hallucination, the sense data are brain made, as there is no actual object in front of us, regardless of whether our eyes are

opened or closed. Thus, Price concludes that normal sense data are physical and brain independent, and that abnormal sense data are non-physical and brain dependent, as a matter of fact, even if we cannot tell the difference in the moment of our perceptual experience.

Given Price's understanding of sense data, he believes in a causal theory of perception that relies on the differential condition of a sense datum to infer the existence of an object. Price believes that the way we should think about sense data within the context of a causal theory of perception is to first distinguish between standing and differential conditions. Standing conditions are things that are necessary to all sense data and do not wholly determine any of them. Differential conditions are the varying conditions that account for the difference, or differences, between this red sense datum and that blue one, for example. And so, Price's causal theory maintains that: "*given s [a sense datum], it is possible to infer the existence of M [a material object] as s's differential condition.* On this we may note:

(I) M must be the differential condition of *s,* not just any sort of condition.

(II) Nor must it merely be so as a matter of fact. The relation of differential conditioning must be so apprehensible by us that we can pass by means of it from the apprehension of *s* to the apprehension of M.

(III) Yet this need not actually occur, and in an adult mind at least is not necessary to the *belief* in M's existence, though it is to the *knowledge* of M" (70).

In other words, Price's theory of causal perception is something like: we can infer the existence of an object as the differential condition of a sense datum. For example, object M and object N are both trees, and thus have all of the same standing conditions, like leaves, tree bark, and other tree qualities. But it is the differential conditions of the sense data that make the sense data belong to object M, rather than belonging to object N. The oak-ness sense datum of object N and

the apple-ness sense datum of object M are their differential conditions—they are the sense data that make the trees different from one another. There are also more general standing conditions that objects can have, like the fact that they occupy space, or that they are perceivable by humans.

In premise two of his argument, Price says that these differential conditions must be fully apparent and perceivable to us, and for the differential conditions to exist as a matter of fact is not enough. This means that, according to Price, we must be able to perceive the differential conditions of object M and object N quite clearly.

However, in premise three, Price backtracks, and says that the differential conditions must only be perceivable if we seek to have knowledge of an object M, but the differential conditions need not be perceivable if we only seek to have a belief of object M's existence.

Based on Price's analysis that we can infer the existence of an object M as *s*'s differential condition, it might seem that Price believes that the object M *is* the differential condition of *s* itself. Price reduces the oak tree to its oak tree-ish-ness, but this cannot be so. When we perceive sense data, we are not seeing the whole of the object, but only parts of the object. Consider again perceiving a red tomato. You may perceive the red-ness, the round-ness, and the tomato-ness, but there ought to be some part of the object you cannot perceive—namely the inner part of the object that gives rise to the exterior sense data that is perceivable to us. We know this inner part of an object exists, even though we only see the sense data of the object, simply because there must be something that gives rise to the sense data—in this case it is the tomato itself. This is the best explanation of how objects give rise to sense data.

First, it seems that there is no set order in whether belief or knowledge ought to precede one another. For example, if someone tells me unicorns exist, I may choose to believe them, and if I

perceive a unicorn veridically, I may be validated in my belief that unicorns exist, and subsequently have some knowledge about unicorns. On the other hand, I may have knowledge of unicorns existing because I have been told that unicorns exist by an all-knowing, all-powerful being, but this sort of knowledge requires no sort of perceptual experience to achieve should I choose to accept what the all-knowing being has told me. Some may choose to counter that this is not knowledge at all, but just a belief, but consider mathematical equations, in which we *know* the right answers, even though we have never perceived a physical number. The simple phenomenon of math demonstrates that we do not require experiencing objects and things tangibly to have knowledge of them.

Another flaw in Price's argument is his persistence that sense data are not caused by the object to which the sense data belongs. This is certainly fundamentally wrong in the case of veridical perception because if a given object did not exist, the specific sense data that are a part of that object would not exist either. Some may remain unconvinced that this indicates a causal feature, but consider the following example. Imagine Carole is standing in an empty room that consists of only a single red ball. Carole veridically perceives a red ball. Could Carole have perceived a red ball without there being an actual red ball before her? No. One may object that Carole could be dreaming or hallucinating, but if we also take into account that the red-y, ball-y sense data that Carole perceives is part of the red ball itself, we are forced into accepting that the red ball is the sole reason for her veridically perceiving the red ball in the empty room. The red ball caused the red-y, ball-y sense data, by virtue of its existence, that Carole perceives, which allows her to veridically perceive the red ball in the room.

Of course, in the case of a hallucination, this sort of example never troubles us, since we are never bothered to consider a case in which anything other than our brain created the sense data, which we perceive.

3.4 My Modification of Price's Theory

My theory of naïve realism is as follows:

1. We see sense data, which are part of objects.
2. Objects are different from sense data, but
3. Sense data are nonetheless parts of objects.
4. Sense data are the parts of objects that we can see.
5. We can use the sense data to justify true beliefs about objects.
6. These true beliefs are often independent of the particular sense data we saw to justify them, and so, are objective.

In general, any theory of naïve realism must only hold that objects appear the way they actually are. My version of naïve realism maintains this, but also holds that sense data are part of the object itself. Further, the object we perceive is composed of two parts. First, it is composed of multiple sense data. Second, objects we perceive are composed of the interior part of the thing that gives rise to the sense data. We cannot perceive this part of the object, but this part of the object can often be inferred from the sense data.

An objection to my position is for someone to say that in many cases, we never see the part of the object that gives rise to the sense data. Consider that there is a green rock that we perceive as having a green sense datum and a rock sense datum, for example. In this case, it seems there is no part of the rock to cut open to uncover. However, while we never see the interior part of the green rock that gives rise to the sense data, it is the best explanation of the fact that the sense data

in veridical perception are systematic and organized. We infer the existence of the second part of objects because in veridical cases of perception, sense data follow predictable patterns—namely, sense data mimic the object that they are a part of. So, we infer that this 'other' part of the object must exist.

When I perceive a chair veridically, I am really only perceiving its sense data, and not the whole of the chair itself, though I perceive the chair directly. The object 'chair' is different from the sense datum 'chair,' but the sense datum 'chair' is still part of the object 'chair.' We use the several different sense data of the 'chair' we perceive to justify true beliefs about the 'chair' we perceive, like that the chair is three feet tall, brown and made of leather. The true beliefs we hold about this 'chair' are independent of these particular sense data we saw to justify our beliefs, and so, are objective. The beliefs are objective in the sense that many people can perceive the sense data of the same chair to justify the same belief—namely that there is a chair in front of them. There can be one object—the chair—accessed by different sense data, by different people.

When I use the word 'objectivity,' it should not be taken that I mean our experiences of an object will be exactly the same. When I use the word 'objectively' to describe the experiences that we are able to have of the world, I mean the experience we have of the chair, via our experience of perceiving its sense data, gives us an objective *enough* experience of the chair. Basically, we all see the same chair, see it as about three feet tall, realize it is made of leather, give or take the slightly different angle we perceive it at, or the slightly different shade of brown we perceive it to be.

Consider that when I perceive this chair, I am able to see all of properties that can be perceived by me at a given moment in time. Consider that if I cut the chair in half, there would be other properties of the chair that would become perceivable to me as well, like the chair's cotton

filling. There is something about sense data, and our perception of them, that gives way to us gaining beliefs about an object. However, when we perceive the sense data of an object, we are usually always unable to perceive every part of the object, or are unable to gain the whole image, or idea, of an object. For example, if I perceive a tomato, I cannot see the slimy, seedy interior, but I infer it is there because of my past experiences with tomatoes. However, if I slice the tomato in half, I will likely perceive the slimy, seedy interior I inferred existed because of the sense data I was able to perceive.

Thus, using the sense data we perceive from an object, we are able to infer other properties of an object, like the properties that are not immediately apparent or perceivable to us.

Further, we ought not infer that perceiving sense data implies that we perceive objects either indirectly or subjectively. When it comes to cases of veridical perception that largely depend on our point of view or context, etc., we are able to filter out the subjectively perceived properties of objects, as I demonstrated in the aforementioned example of Michelangelo's David, and thus we are still able to perceive objects objectively through sense data. Also, because sense data are part of the object itself, perceiving sense data does not necessarily mean that we cannot still perceive an object directly. In summation, all naïve realism ought to imply is that the sense data we perceive in a veridical perception, which is independent, yet part of the object we perceive, allows us to have objective and justified beliefs about objects.

Consider that when we hallucinate an object, we perceive the sense data of something that is not really before us. Disjunctivists, who believe that there is no similar mental process between the way we hallucinate and perceive objects veridically, may object that we may perceive sense data only in veridical perceptions, or only in hallucinations, but not both. To quell the worry of disjunctivists, briefly consider that there is an obvious mental connection between perceiving a

chair that is before you and taking a drug and believing you see a chair in front of you, when the chair is really there, but you are uncertain whether or not it is a hallucination. In both cases, you see the chair. The sense data we perceive are coming from no object that is before us, so what object, if any, is that sense data a part of? The sense data are completely brain made, though I am not concerned about where the sense data you perceive came from, though they reasonably came from a past experience, or a composite of past experiences.

Often, the existence of hallucination tends to be the downfall of naïve realism. However, because my version of naïve realism only forces us to accept that sense data exist and that sense data are the existents by which we visually perceive objects, the existence of hallucination alone ought not be a strong enough objection to naïve realism. Even while acknowledging the existence of hallucinations as a concept, we can still accept that sense data exist and we can still accept that sense data are the existents by which we visually perceive objects. In a hallucination, though there is no object to perceive the sense data of before us, we still visually perceive objects via brain made hallucination.

The advantage of my view—saying that objects cause the sense data that belong to them—is that it allows me to say that it is likely that you and I are seeing the same thing, or close to the same thing, when we look at the same object. For example, if it is the case that a blue sense data belongs to, and is a part of, a blue bag, anytime you or I look at that blue bag, we will both see the blue sense datum. Alternatively, it is also the case that we will see the bag-shape sense datum that is also a part of the bag. We may, perhaps, see slightly different shades of blue based on the way the light hits the bag. Perhaps we may see the bag from a different angle, and while I say the bag is boxy, you may see it as crushed—though we would both conclude it is a blue bag. This is because the blue sense datum and the bag sense datum are part of a single blue bag object itself.

A second advantage of my view is when it comes to skeptics of naïve realism asking how I can be aware of a sense datum that is part of an object that is spatially distant from my brain. My view maintains that when I perceive sense data, it is possible for those sense data to exist in both the object and my brain at the same time. This should not seem far-fetched. In fact, consider any other veridical perceptual experience you already have and consider that you both see the object before you, assuming it exists in the world, and also can close your eyes and imagine it using only your brain.

A third advantage of my view is that it allows for me to concede that you and I can see radically different sense data when looking at the same thing, while maintaining that one of us is surely hallucinating in this case. The reason for this is that when it comes to perceiving an object veridically, you and I must see the same thing—or close enough. This is because the sense data we perceive are a part of the objects themselves, and if we perceive the object veridically we ought to see roughly the same thing. We must be able to verbally describe the object before both of us in a way that is at least agreeable to us both. For example, if we both see a black rock, even if we see different shades of black and a different angle of the rock, we must both explain the object as a 'black rock,' or something close to that if we both perceive the object veridically. If you were to describe the object as a 'red cup,' we would be in a disagreement, and it would seem as though you were hallucinating.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter 1 of my thesis, I explained Searle's 'Bad Argument,' also known as the *Argument from Illusion,* which is what he believes led to the support of sense data, and the subsequent view that we can never directly perceive objects in the world, or perceive the world objectively. Next, I discussed Searle's reply to the 'Bad Argument,' which essentially objects to the ambiguity of the argument. Next, I went over Searle's theory of intentional perception, which he calls the *Argument from Transparency*. While Searle is a direct realist, he does not support the existence of sense data. Searle's theory of perception maintains that there is a connection between objects in the world and the images of those objects in our brain, and that connection is what allows us to get knowledge about the actual object.

In Chapter 2, I turn to Price's theory of naïve realism, which is compatible with the existence of sense data. I examine the Argument from Illusion, which Price offers as a nearly sufficient response to naïve realism. Next, I look at three historical modifications of naïve realism that bring more new questions than solutions. Price ultimately offers his own causal theory of perception that concludes the differential conditions of objects is how we perceive them.

In Chapter 3, I dismantle Searle and Price's arguments and offer my own version of naïve realism. I first make it clear that I am a naïve realist. I define sense data as the real, sense-able, qualitative properties of objects that exist in relation to us. In veridical perception, sense data are not brain made, and in hallucinations, sense data are brain made. Then I show how my definition of sense data varies slightly from both Searle and Price's definitions. Next, I make it clear that while veridical and hallucinatory perceptions are indistinct from one another, they are different causes. Then I demonstrate that we intuitively describe objects by their sense data. I then

describe that I hold sense data to be a part of the objects they belong to. Then, I show that Searle's theory must be wrong because it is possible for sense data to coexist with realism, as my whole theory maintains. Then I show why Price is somewhat wrong, by showing how object must cause the sense data that they belong to. Finally, I present my own theory of naïve realism, which offers several advantages, including the ability to gain objective knowledge of the world, and justify beliefs about the world and objects in it. Overall, I show that John Searle's argument does not refute the sense data theory of perception as shown by H.H. Price. I prove that the perception of sense datum is compatible with perceiving objects directly, by demonstrating that sense data are a part of objects themselves.

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