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Escaping the “King’s Dilemma”:

A Comparative Study of the Moroccan and
Jordanian Monarchies

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my family and friends who supported me while I was writing my thesis. I'd also like to thank my advisors Sohail Hashmi and Nadya Sbaiti for their assistance and insight.

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Introduction

Across the globe, the monarchical regime has fallen to coup d'états, revolts, and revolutions, and has been replaced by dictators and democracy. Within the Middle East and North Africa, eight countries have political systems that fall under the definition of a monarchy. Two of these countries are Jordan and Morocco. Both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have managed to survive and retain their power while other monarchies in the greater Middle East have failed. The Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies survived Nasserism and Ba'thism, Arab nationalism and Islamist movements. There is something about these states and their systems of monarchy that has allowed these particular political structures to survive. While these two governments do differ sometimes, the common structural and political elements of the Jordanian and Moroccan governments have created stable monarchies. The monarchs from these two countries have survived through trials and tribulations with a large majority of their power intact.

The monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have used similar tactics in order to maintain their power. The very existence of both modern states is intertwined with the existence of the monarchy. They use a combination of nationalism, fear, religion, and the very political systems they created in order to maintain a supportive base and keep themselves in power. The delicate balance game they play between giving their people the illusion of power while maintaining their own requires a great deal of political savvy by the monarchs and yet for the last 60 years, they have been successful.

Samuel Huntington presented the "king's dilemma" in *Political Order in Changing Societies* which describes the un-sustainability of absolute monarchies in the face of modernization. However, both the Jordanian and the Moroccan monarchies have maintained their power by making the monarchy essential to the state. The Jordanian and Moroccan

monarchies maintain the equilibrium in the political systems of both states. In addition, they have specific powers legally granted to them which are necessary in making the political system run smoothly. The monarchies are at the center of both Jordanian and Moroccan identities. The monarchy is presented as the very foundation of the state to their citizens. While the monarchy is presented as vital to the existence of the state, the kings manage the political system in order to subdue any and all dissidents. The kings of Jordan and Morocco utilize any means necessary in order to maintain their political and social power.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

From a plethora of monarchies that exist in the Middle East and North Africa, I chose the Sharifian Kingdom of Morocco and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as the focus of my paper for multiple reasons. First, they both claim part of their legitimacy through tracing their heritage to the Prophet Muhammad. While Saudi Arabia has a strong religious component to its monarchy, it does not claim to share blood with the Prophet. This religious component is critical to the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies and will be explored later. Furthermore, these two countries have survived many uprisings in the Middle East which has encouraged my belief in the states' ability to remain stable. These two countries are also similar in their lack of independent wealth. Both countries receive money from the United States, unlike Saudi Arabia which has oil reserves to finance its country. This aid forces the monarchs to maintain their delicate balance game between a façade of democracy and maintaining absolute power. There is also an abundance of literature on both of these states; their modern history is well documented. This was fundamental when selecting countries for this paper, due to the fact that a majority of my research is based on secondary resources. And finally, I chose only these two countries for a pragmatic reason. It would take a series of volumes to compare all of the monarchies in the

Middle East and North Africa yet it would not yield satisfying results. There are too many variables when one starts to compare eight governments. It would be impossible to cohesively and coherently delve into all of the Middle Eastern monarchies. The Moroccan and Jordanian governments share enough similarities that the data extracted from this comparison will yield valuable insight into their ability to maintain power. Realistically, gaining insight into this phenomenon required that I limit my scope to these two countries.

The “King’s Dilemma”

The modernization process in the Middle East is like a game tug-of-war. As some modernization policies are pushed on society, other parts of society push back. The implementation of this phenomenon, both internally and externally, is based on the belief that societies have evolutionary stages which lead to more powerful and civilized states. “According to this each society would evolve inexorably from barbarism to even greater levels of development and civilization. The more modern states would be wealthier and more powerful, and their citizens freer and having higher standards of living.”¹ As European states developed the three dimensions of modernization: technological, organizational, and attitudinal², they gained the ability to overpower the Middle East. The weakening of the Middle East and North Africa was seen as a result of not modernizing their state both internally and externally. Modernization was both implemented by the state and forced on the state by imperialist nations. It became an unstoppable force within society. Even as internal groups pushed back, they were integrated into the modern system; their reactions were part of modernization because they were a response to modernization. While the modernization process was started in the early 19th century, a fundamental shift occurred after World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. It was at

¹ “Modernization,” *Reference.com*, <http://www.reference.com/browse/modernization?s=t>.

² James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Quest for Theory* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1981), 63.

this point that imperial powers forced modernization changes in the Middle East versus previously where modernization was managed by the state (i.e. the Ottomans). The Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and the United Kingdom divided the Middle East into colonies; this imperialist agenda increased the speed of modernization while at the same time created a strong distaste for the Western imperialist powers. While many railed against imitating the West, once these concepts were introduced, there was no way to turn back: the local economies had become entangled with the global market, imperialist powers forced the implementation of European institutions, and the nation-states of the Middle East and North Africa were swept up in the possibilities of regaining their political power through modernization. Even today it continues to push forward.

To address the issue of modernization in traditional societies, Samuel Huntington developed a theory he called the “king’s dilemma” in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies*. This theory discusses whether or not a monarch can create modern and liberal reform while still maintaining his power. Huntington proposed that the monarch could either “attempt to maintain his authority by continuing to modernize but intensify the repression necessary to keep... control”³ or transform his monarchy into a constitutional monarchy where “the king reigns but does not rule.”⁴ This paper discusses the possibility that the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have found another way.

Modernization created a lot of demands on the state. In order to manage these demands it was necessary for the state to increase its capacity. This created both positive and negative political developments within the states. Some governments overbuilt their capacity and became dictatorships such as in Libya, while others could not keep up with demand and the government

³ Samuel. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 188.

⁴ Huntington, *Political Order*, 177.

gave way to anarchy such as in Afghanistan. It is necessary for governments to maintain a balance between demand and capacity in order to keep the state stable.⁵ There also came new ideas about the relationship between the government and the people. Before, the people served their government and expected little in return however, with the influx of Western philosophy and ideals, the general populace wanted their government to respond to their needs and be accountable to the public. With modernization, there comes “at the psychological level, ... a fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations.”⁶ People started to realize that they have power and are able to implement change. Due to this shift in society, leaders either had to concede some power to the people or use harsh force to scare the masses into submission. The second, more often than not, led to an overthrow of the dictatorship when the people of the state realize they have nothing left to lose and start a revolt, such as was just seen in both Tunisia and Egypt during the “Arab Spring”⁷. The heads of states needed to limit their own power and work with state institutions in order to maintain legitimacy. At the same time, they needed to expand their power so that institutions can acquire the scope needed to confront the modernization process. This paradox becomes the “king’s dilemma”.

The “king’s dilemma” as stated by Samuel Huntington makes the king a victim of his own politics in the battle of success vs. survival. Huntington saw little success for these monarchies never the less they still exist decades later. If modernization cannot be stopped, then the monarchy of a state has few options available. He can use repression, the first option given by Huntington. This will lead to an increase in enemies and a heavy dependency on the military.

The other option is for the monarchy to transform his monarchy into a constitutional monarchy

⁵ Bill and Hardgrave, *Comparative Politics*, 80, figure 3.

⁶ Huntington, *Political Order*, 32.

⁷ This will refer to a time period in the Middle East and North Africa in which the citizens in these countries are protesting against their governments. It covers from January 2011 until present time. The term should not discount the fact that the Middle East is a rich area teeming with political philosophies and these revolts did not appear out of nowhere.

where the king's power is severely limited. While Huntington in 1968 felt "the future of existing monarchies [was] bleak,"⁸ the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan have successfully retained their power. Huntington stated that "some existing societies with traditional monarchies, however, may be too backward for even revolution. Whichever course they take, what does seem certain is that existing monarchies will lose some or all of whatever capability they have developed,"⁹ yet these two case studies have opened alternatives to this theory. Neither the monarchy of Morocco nor Jordan has succumbed to Huntington's predictions. These two governments utilize the façade of constitutionalism in order to legitimize their governments while preserving their authority. These states have maintained a delicate balance of sustaining the power of the monarchy while still creating liberal reform to appease the people. A monarch must carefully walk this line in order to maintain his position, for if he slips he will either become a figure head, such as Queen Elizabeth II of England, or end up deposed or banished from his country, such as King Farouk I of Egypt.

The modernization of the West has taken centuries and now countries in the Middle East who wish to follow in their footsteps, are doing so at a much faster rate. The Middle East tried to take the fast track in modernizing which has placed an enormous amount of demand on the state, the only institution with enough power create reform and alleviate difficulties. How does a monarch continue to modernize while maintaining most if not all of his power? Both the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies have so far succeeded in this endeavor. The manner in which they have escaped this paradox will be the focal point of the remaining chapters.

Defining Terms

⁸ Huntington, *Political Order*, 191.

⁹ Huntington, *Political Order*, 191.

A monarchy in the context of this paper is a government rule by one authority. This king or monarch has absolute authority and the decision making power. Though the monarch's moves may need to be slightly tempered so that he doesn't exile his base and while it may be wise to keep his general population happy, he is not hindered from making any decision he desires; he has absolute power and authority. This use of monarchy will also refer to hereditary monarchies in which the power is passed through the bloodline to the heir chosen by the king. While both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies are classified as constitutional monarchies,¹⁰ which are defined as a monarchy whose powers are limited by a written constitution, they will be referred to as monarchies.

The word nation will refer to a people and their shared cultural and historical perspective. As Benedict Anderson said "it is an imagined political community... because the members of even the smallest nation will never know their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."¹¹ A nation has no physical boundary but is generally limited to an area because a nation is created with a cultural and historical record that allows for homogeneity within its self defined boundaries. If there is a need to distinguish between the groups within a state with regards to a historical perspective, then that will be indicated.

A regime is defined as the form of the government, i.e. the Moroccan regime is currently a monarchy. Government is used to refer to the top ranks that run the country such as the Mohammed VI or Abdullah II government. This term will refer to those with decision making power and will include cabinet ministers. Government will also be used to refer to the machine

¹⁰ *CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

¹¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006), 6.

of the monarchy, i.e. structures of the government or branches of government such are the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of the United States' government.

The state is defined using the traditional Weberian definition: “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory... the state is considered the sole source of the ‘right’ use of violence.”¹²

Hopefully by laying out these definitions, the following arguments and information will be understood as clearly as possible.

Sources

The main source of my theoretical framework was based on the theory of the “king’s dilemma” discussed in Samuel Huntington’s *Political Order in Changing Societies*. While the text in and of itself is intriguing, his vision for the future of monarchies is limited. The longevity of the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies has shown that monarchies do not necessarily end in failure. The lack of alternatives presented by Huntington has inspired this paper and assisted in structuring my research.

A majority of my primary sources are newspaper articles or documents written by the Jordanian and Moroccan governments. These were English sources. The information that I gathered from the government is heavily biased towards the monarchy and was written for a Western audience. It highlighted the progression towards democracy and the public loyalty to the king. This image is promoted to assure the West that this nice, friendly monarchy cares about the moral code the West enforces, and it gives both Jordan and Morocco more leeway in the international sphere. Some of the information presented is skewed for the Western public so that they will not object to aiding these monarchies. The information is none the less vital when

¹² Max Weber, “The State—Weber’s definition, the role of legitimacy & Iraq,” Weblog, entry posted December 23, 2007, <http://jdasovic.com/2007/12/23/the-state-webers-definition-the-role-of-legitimacy-iraq/>.

looking at the monarchy. Information being presented to a Western audience would highlight the morals that the West believes in and promotes while an article presented to an Islamic audience would highlight Islamic morals and ideals. The Western desire for a pro-democracy nation explains why there are attempts to appear democratic without actually reducing the power of the monarchy. The flowery rhetoric of the monarchy gives insight into what the monarchy believes it is and why it acts in certain ways.

While I tend to give newspaper articles more credit for their information, I also recognize that newspapers, depending on their location, must temper their articles. For example, Al-Jazeera is a great source for immediate information about the Middle East. It is generally accurate however, Al-Jazeera is based in Qatar and is not allowed to publish articles that might badly reflect Qatar or its government. Newspapers are also restricted by monetary funds. It is expensive to have reporters across the world and information is often shared between news corporations. However, I'm was unable to visit these countries and newspaper articles were the most accurate way to get reliable and up-to-date information about what was occurring in Jordan and Morocco.

In addition to political texts, I also utilized general history texts which offer a chance to examine the events of the country in the political context in which this paper is constructed. While some periods of history are more ambiguous than others, I made sure to cross reference texts. I also recognize the limitations on older texts. For example, two general books I used for background information were *Morocco: a Country Study* and *Jordan: a Country Study* which were printed by the Library of Congress in the 1980s. While the older information was still valuable and useful, it was not effective for analyzing the current context of the monarchy in society. With regards to analytical texts, I first assess the trustworthiness of the text. This comes

from understanding the histories of the nations in order to assess if the events they base their theories on are accurate. I also look at the author's background. For example, I use a source from Gregory White who is a Smith professor. He specializes in the Maghreb. I deemed him trustworthy by his academic credentials and the logic of his arguments based on clear and strong evidence. It is necessary that I utilize the authors experience in the field and in academia and their ability to do more in-depth research to supplement my findings and theory. With such a multifaceted topic, all sources need to be taken with a grain of salt.

Chapter Outline

Chapter I is a brief history of the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies. This chapter is meant to give context to the paper and allow the focus to be the modern monarchies of these two states. Chapter II focuses on the political systems of Jordan and Morocco. The monarchies have structured, created, and limited their political system in order to maintain their power. The manner in which they do so, through the constitution and political divisions in their governments, is presented in chapter II. The focus of chapter III is civil society and it's place in creating stability for the monarchy. This includes the freedoms and restrictions placed on the press, NGOs, opposition movements. The monarchy must balance the needs of its people with its own stability and survival. Chapter IV discusses the pivotal role the monarchy plays in the state. The king is not just a political figure but also a religious one. There is a strong nationalistic pride in the monarch as a symbol of the state. Chapter V describes the influence of the Arab revolts that occurred throughout 2011 and how these monarchies maintained their positions. The final section is the conclusion to this thesis. It will show that the monarchies have maintained their stability and power through a multitude of approaches. It also discusses some future difficulties

the monarchies will have to face. The balancing game these two monarchies play allows them to react quickly to threats against their authority.

Chapter I: Histories of the Moroccan and Jordanian Monarchies

History of the Moroccan Monarchy

The Moroccan monarchy claims a history that is far longer than the history of the Jordanian monarchy. The state is considered one of the world's oldest countries due to its "continuous 1,200-year history as a political entity."¹³ This has created a sense of stability and permanency for the monarchy. The monarchy is essential in the identity of the Moroccan state. This is a political maneuver which makes the general population think of the state and the monarchy as one and the same; one cannot exist without the other. Due to this maneuvering, the monarchy gains stability, support, and legitimacy. If the monarchy is removed, the state will cease to exist.

Early History

The Imazighen were among the first people in the region that is currently known as Morocco. They formed a socio-political system based on kinship. Tribes could be broken into clans that shared a common ancestor; clans in turn consisted of extended families. These tribes eventually established territories in which they enforced their will upon defeated enemies and other weaker tribes under their protection; this created small, turbulent kingdoms.

Islam was introduced into Morocco shortly after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Islam expanded across North Africa under the second Rashidun Caliph 'Umar. By 710, the first Arab invasion of present day Morocco commenced under the Umayyad Islamic caliphate.¹⁴ The Arab warriors were "fired by their new and militant faith."¹⁵ *Rabats*, or garrisons filled with pious warriors who had renounced the material world, were established across North Africa. Their beliefs led these Muslim warriors across North Africa in order to conquer lands for Islam.

¹³ Harold Nelson, ed., *Morocco: a Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1985), 3.

¹⁴ Nelson, *Morocco*, 9.

¹⁵ Mervyn Hiskett, *The Course of Islam in Africa* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 1.

It was their duty to expand the *dar al-Islam*. They became missionaries of god, spreading popular Islam through the Moroccan desert.¹⁶ This process was neither simple nor easy. According to the accounts of Ibn Khaldun, it was difficult for the Arabs to get a foothold in Morocco due to the strong *assabiyya*, group feeling, found within the tribes.¹⁷ This was the glue that held them together. And though the Arabs did eventually defeat the Imazighen tribes and force their conversion to Islam, the tribes would rebel against Islam numerous times; “therefore, it has taken the Arabs a long time to establish their dynasty.”¹⁸

For centuries before the European invasion, Imazighen tribes ruled the land. These dynasties had limited scope in territorial power and control. Their power extended from the central tribe in rings; as one moved away from the center, the power of the ruling tribe faded.¹⁹ At the center resided the *makhzen* which is the ruling tribe. They then exerted power onto the *guish* who acted as the enforcers for the *makhzen*; they gathered the taxes due to the ruling clan. The next ring in this power structure was composed of tribes that paid taxes to the *makhzen* and acknowledged the central tribe’s rule over their group. The most interesting layer to this system is the last layer which consisted of groups outside of the control of the *makhzen*. This area was known as the *siba*.²⁰ It was the “wild west” of the Maghreb. Within the Moroccan state, “until 1933 [with colonial imperialism], no effective or outside government exercised authority over the region”²¹ yet this region continued to remain relatively peaceful and self-governing. In this area, quarrels between tribes were solved by outsiders. When a dispute occurred, a mediator with

¹⁶ J. Spencer Trimingham, “Expansion of Islam,” *Islam in Africa* (New York: Van Nostrand- Reinhold Company, 1969), 14.

¹⁷ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History*, vol 1, trans. Fraz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 335.

¹⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, 333.

¹⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (London: Weiden & Nicolson, 1969), 3.

²⁰ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 3.

²¹ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 1.

no connection to either group was called upon to devise a solution for the group.²² These men, who were highly trusted by the tribes they assisted, were called *marabout* and were considered descendants from Sufi saints.

The popular Islamic movement of Sufism had strong roots in the Maghreb and with Imazighen tribes in the area. This Islamic group has a strong history with saints, and though it is forbidden to pray to saints, people prayed through saints to Allah and hoped that saints would intercept these prayers and bring them quickly to Allah's ear.²³ *Marabouts*, as decedents of Sufi saints, were then believed to have a stronger connection to Allah through the original saint. The *marabout* could provide *baraka*, or blessings, for the tribes because of their close connection to Allah.²⁴ This informal system of mediators, which was well followed, was derived from a religious belief in the powers of the *marabout*.²⁵ This allowed the segmentary system of tribes outside of the rule of the *makhzen* to maintain order.²⁶

The rise and fall of these small kingdoms developed into a pattern which was observed by Ibn Khaldun in the *Muqaddimah*. It begins with the previous dynasty being conquered by a strong tribe from the desert. The harsh desert living conditions hardened the warriors and created a powerful group. This group stopped their continual migration and chose to settle in one area instead of continuing their nomadic life. By the third generation, this dynasty has weakened due to its sedentary life style. It became vulnerable to attack by stronger desert tribes who invaded the city and established their rule of law. This occurred over and over again, "whenever one tribe

²² Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 8.

²³ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 8-9.

²⁴ Peter J. Awn, "Sufism," in vol. 13 *Encyclopedia of Religion*, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005), 8821.

²⁵ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 68.

²⁶ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 35 – 52.

[was] destroyed, another [took] its place.”²⁷ This repetitive system has created a history of strength and purity that is associated to life in the *siba*.

Several important dynasties ruled this territory. This includes the Idrissids, the founders of Fez in the 780s, and a multitude of others who established far reaching empires and cities that still exist today.²⁸ The Alawite dynasty originated in 1666 when Muulay Rashid claimed the title Sultan of Fez after seizing control from the previous dynasty, the Saadis.²⁹ The current monarchy claims descendance from the Alawite dynasty in order to show its historical ties to the land. The defeat of the Saadi dynasty by the Alawis is a prime example of the tribal system mentioned previously. Muulay Isma’il (r.1672-1727),³⁰ heir to Muulay Rashid, consolidated his brother’s conquests into a kingdom. He also created a bureaucracy and a tax system on trade. Muulay Isma’il amassed a janissary army that was loyal solely to the monarchy.³¹ He focused on creating a structural framework for the state. The reign of Muulay Isma’il was followed by a 30 year period of anarchy.³² Muhammad III (r. 1757- 1790)³³ was the next Alawite successor able to regain control; he focused on national identity and tried to rouse support for the monarchy by claiming legitimacy through religious means.³⁴ However, increasingly weak successors allowed the colonial powers to establish a foothold in the Maghreb.

Colonization of Morocco and the Imperialist Presence

In the late nineteenth century, European control over Africa expanded. Due to the weakness of its monarchy, Morocco became a place for European powers to display their

²⁷ Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, 333.

²⁸ White, Gregory W, “Kingdom of Morocco,” in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. David E. Long (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 456.

²⁹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 31.

³⁰ Nevill Barbour, *Morocco* (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons Ltd, 1965), 118

³¹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 31-32.

³² Barbour, *Morocco*, 122.

³³ Barbour, *Morocco*, 122.

³⁴ Bowen, Lee Donna, “Alawite Dynasty,” in vol.1 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar., 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 105-107.

strength and test the strength of other nations. Morocco thus became a highly desirable area for many European powers.

The main contenders for Morocco were Britain, France, Germany, and Spain.³⁵ Each country had different reasons for their desired control over the region. The British had a strong influence in Morocco in the nineteenth century. They sent advisors to the Moroccan monarchy and constructed railroads which were financed through British investment. The Germans not only had considerable concessions for mining in Morocco but also represented “the largest group of foreign property holders in the country.”³⁶ Spain directly controlled a piece of coastal territory in Morocco and after a short war in 1860 laid claim to Ifni.³⁷ However, the country that gained the most control over Morocco was France.

France’s influence over Morocco and North Africa grew after the French invasion of Algeria in 1830.³⁸ At first French relations were based on a need to control the border between Algeria and Morocco due to tribal raids. As a response to these raids, France used 200,000 French troops to temporarily occupy parts of the Moroccan territory.³⁹ Though this started as a side effect of their occupation of Algeria, their desire to integrate Morocco into their occupied territory was part of a larger plan to extend French political and economic control across North Africa.⁴⁰ A series of bilateral treaties with Italy, Britain, and Spain in the early twentieth century, granted France primary control over Morocco, while Spain was able to hold on to the city of Tangiers.⁴¹

³⁵ David S. Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political Economy, Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 395.

³⁶ Nelson, *Morocco*, 39.

³⁷ Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East*, 395.

³⁸ John Ruedy, “Algeria: Overview,” in vol. 1 *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 122.

³⁹ Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East*, 395.

⁴⁰ Sorenson, *An Introduction to the Modern Middle East*, 395.

⁴¹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 40.

Morocco officially became a French protectorate with the signing of the French-Moroccan Treaty of Fez in March of 1912.⁴² The treaty declared that in conjunction with the Moroccan monarchy, the French could and would enact any reform policies they saw fit for the welfare of the nation. France was allowed total control over Moroccan foreign policy and was allowed to station troops in Morocco as well as to police the state.⁴³ The true purpose of this document was to keep the Moroccan state from collapsing and allow France to maintain their dominant position in trading situations with Morocco. Technically, Morocco was still a sovereign country though the French had absolute political, economical, and military power in the country.⁴⁴ Though the country was now under French control, it did not come without bloodshed. For over a quarter of a century, the French waged a campaign against rebel Imazighen forces that hid among the Rif and Atlas ridges.⁴⁵ The French effort to subdue the rebels in these mountainous regions was termed pacification; it ended in 1936.⁴⁶

Unlike the French occupation of Algeria, Morocco saw less violence and more state institutions remained intact. While Algeria was beaten into submission, Morocco was dealt a different hand. The French believed that a strong and stable Morocco was vital to France's security.⁴⁷ Due to its geographical position at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, a stable Morocco lent stability to the interior of the sea which includes southern France. This meant that the native institutions were left in place and the center of government was reorganized. The sultan Mulay Hamid signed every reform into law in order to maintain the appearance of power for the state. France was firm about stabilizing the state and then allowing Morocco some

⁴² Nelson, *Morocco*, 43.

⁴³ Nelson, *Morocco*, 50-52.

⁴⁴ Nelson, *Morocco*, 40.

⁴⁵ Nelson *Morocco*, 49.

⁴⁶ Larry A Barrie, "Morocco: Overview," in vol. 3 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, Ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004.), 1570.

⁴⁷ C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: a History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 158.

semblance of independence. These reforms were all run by Marechal Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey who was the French Resident General from the creation of the protectorate state in 1912 until 1925.⁴⁸ He tried to limit the French role in Morocco because he believed that his job was to modernize the institutions of the state and tried to push respect for the traditions of Morocco. For him, his mission was to modernize and civilize the unruly nation.

Lyautey was replaced in 1925 by Jules Joseph Theodore Steeg. While Lyautey tried to maintain a semblance of Moroccan independence, his successors did no such thing.⁴⁹ Morocco essentially became a French colony with direct French administration. “Beneath the façade of indigenous government, more foreign officials were introduced, and they gradually acquired a wide control.”⁵⁰ The sultan became a figure head and the Moroccan people were second class citizens in their own state, while the French civil servants and residents in Morocco stalled the independence process of the country. The French administration claimed the right to administer justice to all foreigners.⁵¹ These capitulatory rights were common throughout the Middle East and North Africa as imperialist countries fought to give their citizens addition rights in foreign lands. Any attempt by native government to regain control, political and economically, was limited by European interests. “The Capitulations were turning into a system by which foreign residents were virtually outside the law.”⁵² Public outrage was a common response and could be felt across the Middle East and North Africa. Ayatollah Khomeini stated, with regards to the Iranian capitulations his own country faced:

If some American’s servant, some American cook, assassinates your marja

[leading religious scholar, viewed as the ‘object of emulation’ by lay

⁴⁸ Pennell, *Morocco*, 392.

⁴⁹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 50-51.

⁵⁰ Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 285.

⁵¹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 52.

⁵² Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 274.

Shi'a] in the middle of the bazaar, or runs him over, the Iranian police do not have the right to apprehend him... [The members of the Iranian parliament] have reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog. If someone runs over a dog belonging to an American, he will be prosecuted... But if an American cook runs over the Shah, the head of state, no one will have the right to interfere with him.⁵³

While the capitulations in Morocco were created by the French, the feeling of being a second class citizen is clear in this quote.

With the influx of a large number of French citizens into Morocco, the influence of French culture soared. By 1936, 150,000 French citizens were living in Morocco.⁵⁴ Many Moroccans tried to keep their culture intact and saw the French as sinful and harmful to the nature of the Moroccan culture. However, there was no way to hinder the influx of French culture into the country. Fatima Mernissi's memoir, *Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girlhood*, exemplifies the clash of these two cultures. While it is not the focus of her book, it was impossible for her to write about her childhood in Morocco in the late 1940s without mentioning the French. The snippets that are seen paint a vivid image of the French occupation of Morocco, "We knew the French were greedy and had come a long way to conquer our land... They had power and could hurt us."⁵⁵ This illustrates the sentiment of the Moroccan people towards the French in the middle of the twentieth century.

⁵³Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 157.

⁵⁴ Nelson, *Morocco*, 54.

⁵⁵ Fatima Mernissi, *Dreams of Trespass: Tales of a Harem Girl* (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994), 22-23.

Rise of Nationalism

Nationalism and discontent were brewing in Morocco. By 1934, the Moroccan Action Committee was formed by a small group of nationalists, and they devised a plan to return to the indirect rule presented in the Treaty of Fez.⁵⁶ This plan called for strict application of the Treaty of Fez, which had made Morocco a French protectorate. When their tactics of appeals and petitions failed to achieve any results, they rebranded themselves as a nationalist party with a wider array of demands in order to achieve popular support.⁵⁷ After several violent attacks which were linked to the organization, the group was forcibly suppressed by the French. The start of World War II caused the fractured nationalist movement to become more united.⁵⁸ The promises of independence for Syria and Lebanon led the Moroccans to believe that if they assisted the French then they would also be considered for independence. Over 300,000 Moroccans served in the French army and the training they received would allow them to create a viable armed resistant movement.⁵⁹

The end of World War II caused immense change to the imperialist system. Due to the political, economical, and emotional chaos of Europe, Western powers could no longer devote their resources to their colonies. When the Allies won World War II in 1945, the Atlantic Charter which stated that “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them”⁶⁰ became part of the international agenda. Colonized people across the Middle East and North Africa expected to have the ability of self-determination.

However, the French did not consider Morocco for independence after the end of World War II

⁵⁶ Nelson, *Morocco*, 55.

⁵⁷ Nelson, *Morocco*, 57.

⁵⁸ Pennell, *Morocco*, 254-255.

⁵⁹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 57.

⁶⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, *The Atlantic Charter*, 14 Aug 1941, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>.

and the nationalists were upset that French rule would not abate. A new political group was formed with the name, Istiqlal, which means independence.⁶¹ They created a manifesto, calling for independence and a democratic constitution. Their manifesto was approved by Mohammed V. He then sent it to the Resident General. This moment is memorialized in Mernissi's book:

One day in January 1944, Mother said, King Mohammed V, backed by nationalists all over Morocco, went to the top-ranking French colonial administrator, the Resident General, to make a formal demand for independence. The Resident General got very upset. How dare you Moroccans ask for independence! he must have screamed, and to punish us, he launched his soldiers into the Medina.⁶²

The Resident General actually responded by accepting some reforms but he refused to reconsider the protectorate status of the state. Istiqlal rejected this response. The Resident General then had 18 Istiqlal members arrested for allegedly collaborating with the Germans.⁶³ This incited violence against the French administration. A second nationalist movement was formed by the name of the Democratic Party of Independence which solidified the schism in the nationalist movement that existed before World War II.

Sultan Mohammed V supported the nationalists and refused to sign any reform proposal that offered less than full independence for the Moroccan state. In 1947, Mohammed V went to Tangiers and called for national unification and "omitt[ed] his planned mention of French-Moroccan friendship and the benefits of French rule."⁶⁴ This angered the French and a new Resident General, Alphonse Juin, was put in place. He reorganized the government to further

⁶¹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 396.

⁶² Mernissi, *Dreams of Trespass*, 23-24.

⁶³ Nelson, *Morocco*, 58.

⁶⁴ Nelson, *Morocco*, 58-59.

weaken the state and tried to limit the sultan's power. Juin told the Mohammed V "to dissociate himself from the Istiqlal"⁶⁵ or he would depose the sultan. The sultan however, had the power of veto and used it often to try to maintain his position. Mohammed V travelled to Paris in 1950 to discuss greater autonomy for Morocco directly with the French, but his proposal fell on deaf ears.⁶⁶ He was again threatened with being deposed, like some of his predecessors, if he continued to veto laws. The French then manipulated Imazighen tribes into moving in on both Fez and Rabat and told the sultan if he did not sign the laws into action, then he would be pushed out.⁶⁷ The threat worked and Mohammed signed the decrees. This public humiliation of the sultan by foreign forces enraged the masses. This ended with a violent clash in the streets and made nationalism more prominent; it also led to the exile of the sultan and his family to Madagascar in 1953.⁶⁸ The ulema were then summoned by the French and told to approve of the new sultan as was customary. The few that refused were jailed. This exile further fueled the nationalist movement which turned to violent tactics and acts of terrorism. The French started talks to find a solution to this violence and were convinced that the only way to end it was the return of Mohammed V.⁶⁹ Mohammed V only agreed to return with the provision of gradual Moroccan independence and he agreed to institute a constitutional monarchy.⁷⁰

Independence

Mohammed V was restored to power in 1955 and independence from the French was granted in 1956.⁷¹ By 1957 the Kingdom of Morocco was formally created when Mohammed V

⁶⁵ Pennell, *Morocco*, 278.

⁶⁶ Nelson, *Morocco*, 59.

⁶⁷ Pennell, *Morocco*, 278.

⁶⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 396.

⁶⁹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 61.

⁷⁰ Pennell, *Morocco*, 288.

⁷¹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 61-62.

assumed the title king.⁷² With the Istiqlal party, Mohammed V formed a government out of urban elites with himself at the helm. This is the start of the modern Moroccan constitutional monarchy.

At this time, Mohammed V was very popular for restoring the independence of the country.⁷³ He was considered to have the blessing of Allah. While dissidents existed, a majority of them were absorbed into the police force and the army. At first this government was a picture of political unity however, it fell apart within the first five years of the kingdom's existence. Mohammed V refused to become a figurehead while the Istiqlal party desired a less powerful role for the monarchy.⁷⁴ This schism caused Mohammed V to dismiss his prime minister in 1959. He chose to fill the position himself and named his son Hassan the deputy prime minister. King Mohammed V died unexpectedly on March 3, 1961 leaving his son Hassan as his successor.⁷⁵

Hassan II

King Hassan II faced the same problems as his father but lacked the popular support that legitimized his father's role in the government and in the state. He quickly consolidated his power and reduced the place of political parties.⁷⁶ However, this led to political strife within the country. The people and the political parties grew more disillusioned with their new government. To try to appease the people, Hassan II introduced a constitution in 1962.⁷⁷ While it guaranteed political freedoms, it also gave vast powers to the monarchy and solidified Hassan II's power. The king assumed the title "Commander of the Faithful". The monarch was now able to dissolve

⁷² "Morocco," *CIA World Factbook*.

⁷³ Marvyn Howe, *Morocco: the Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 89.

⁷⁴ Nelson, *Morocco*, 66-67.

⁷⁵ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 397.

⁷⁶ Nelson, *Morocco*, 68-69.

⁷⁷ Nelson, *Morocco*, 69.

parliament and could declare emergency rule through Article 35 of the constitution.⁷⁸ After riots in 1965, Hassan II utilized Article 35 and declared a state of emergency which lasted until 1970.⁷⁹

The 1960s were a time of political arrests and media censorship; the government had to sanction all political activity, which was minimal at this point in time. Hassan II then passed a second constitution in 1970 in order to solidify his legitimacy.⁸⁰ It allowed the king the sole ability to revise the constitution, issue royal decrees at will, postpone elections indefinitely, and it replaced the bicameral parliament with a unicameral parliament. This increased both the monarchy's power and the dissatisfaction of the people.

Due to his harsh political repression, Hassan II faced two coup d'états by the military in the early 1970s.⁸¹ The king was never injured in these attempts. These events, however, made him more determined to stamp out any who opposed his rule. In 1972, a third constitution was introduced.⁸² It was boycotted by political parties and the elections for parliament continued to be postponed. The political system was fractured into pieces with the king sitting at center of the government. While Hassan II was suppressing political parties and the Moroccan people, he was liberalizing the economy. The end of the 1970s saw a slow revival of political life in Morocco due to the fact that the king felt secure in his position. The 1977 elections were a strong victory for the monarchy when 81 out of 176 seats were won by loyalists of the king.⁸³

⁷⁸ Henri Lauzière, "Morocco: Constitution," in vol. 3 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, Ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 1572.

⁷⁹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 71.

⁸⁰ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 397.

⁸¹ Nelson, *Morocco*, 73-78.

⁸² Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 398.

⁸³ White, "Morocco," 464.

In the mid 1970s, he also “reassert[ed] his country’s historic claim to the [Western] Sahara”⁸⁴ which gained him popular support. In 1976 a war broke out over the validity of the Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.⁸⁵ The costs of war, as well as several droughts, caused a large strain on the economy. Due to the economic problems, public unrest grew more prominent in society. Unemployment skyrocketed and was estimated around 24 percent in 1983.⁸⁶ The 1980s were a time of riots and renewed repression.⁸⁷ Thousands were arrested in this time period and several newspapers were shutdown. These troubles continued into the 1990s. There was a constitutional referendum in 1992 and in 1993 Hassan held parliamentary elections in order to quell the unrest and the foreign criticism of his government; it was the first election in nine years.⁸⁸ The rest of this decade was a period of paralysis for politics in Morocco as Hassan II grew ill. He died on July 23, 1999.⁸⁹

Mohammed VI

Mohammed VI is the current King of Morocco and so far has ruled for eleven and a half years. He succeeded Hassan II in 1999. He created a very different tone for his government. While he still maintained his authority, he opened up the Moroccan political sphere. This included creating a space for a freer civil society, allowing opposition groups more access to the political system in elections, and encouraging democratic reforms. This strategic move cemented his legitimacy internationally and separated his government from the harsh government of his father. He married a “common” woman and is considered a friend of the poor. The elections of

⁸⁴ White, “Morocco,” 463.

⁸⁵ Nelson, *Morocco*, 83-87.

⁸⁶ James N. Sater, *Morocco: Challenges to Tradition and Modernity* (New York : Routledge, 2010), 98.

⁸⁷ Nelson, *Morocco*, 87-93.

⁸⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 399.

⁸⁹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 399.

2002 were considered the country's first free and fair elections in the history of the kingdom.⁹⁰

He also reformed the family code, an incendiary topic in the political realm. He created a plan to fight poverty and illiteracy in his country.

History of Jordanian Monarchy

Pre-Ottoman

In the year 633 CE, Arab armies spread Islam into the Jordanian region from the Arabian Peninsula.⁹¹ After the end of the rule of the Rightly Guided caliphs, the Umayyad caliphate (691-750 CE) had control of the Jordan Valley.⁹² When the Umayyad dynasty went into decline, they were overthrown by the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258 CE).⁹³ This caliphate moved the empire's capital from Damascus to Baghdad. This move along with an increase in sea trade versus land trade, transformed the Jordan Valley into a backwater. The main source of wealth was from trade with pilgrimage caravans going through the area. In the 10th century, the Fatimid's conquered this region. They were quickly replaced by the Seljuk Turks.⁹⁴

The Seljuk Turks were deemed a threat to the Byzantine Empire. That, in combination with a desire to regain control of Christian religious sites, started the First Crusade which led to the creation of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.⁹⁵ Jerusalem was reacquired by the Arabs after Saladin, the Egyptian sultan, pushed the crusaders out of the holy land in a decisive battle in 1187 CE known as the Battle of Hattin.⁹⁶ After the death of Saladin, his sultanate was unable to hold the conquered lands together and they fell apart into small principalities that often fought

⁹⁰ "Freedom in the World: Morocco," *Freedom House*, (2011), <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/morocco>.

⁹¹ Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Jordan: a Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1989), 10

⁹² Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 12.

⁹³ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 12.

⁹⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 12.

⁹⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 13.

⁹⁶ Metz, *Jordan*, 13.

among each other. This left a large region open and weak to invaders; they were all eventually conquered by the Ottoman Empire.

Under the Ottoman Empire

Under the rule of Selim I, the Jordan River Valley was thoroughly integrated into the Ottoman Empire in 1517.⁹⁷ The Jordan region became a stagnate backwater that was removed from the center of the Ottoman society. The region now known as Jordan was divided into vilayets, or provinces, that were ruled with absolute authority by their governors at the behest of the sultan who ruled from Constantinople.⁹⁸ Within towns and in the countryside, shari'a law was enforced by the Ottoman government while in the desert, tribal law was accepted. The area was not only the bread basket of the Middle East but also needed to protect the route to Mecca due to the sultan's position as "the guardian of its holy places."⁹⁹ This allowed the people to acknowledge the legitimacy of the sultan as a political and religious ruler.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw three movements that radically impacted the Jordan valley and the Middle East in general: Arab nationalism, pan-Islamism and Zionism. As the Young Turks, an organization that promoted Turkish heritage over Ottoman heritage, became more prominent, some Arabs started to question where they fit in this new society.¹⁰⁰ The Arab nationalist movement started as an attempt to revive the Arab culture which was floundering in the Ottoman Empire. Tribal opposition to this plan of cultural domination grew and Sharif Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashmi was the spokesman.¹⁰¹ Due to his opposition to the Ottoman government, Sharif Hussein and his sons were detained in Constantinople. As pan-Turkism grew, so did Arab opposition to the empire. World War I was a time of hope for the

⁹⁷ Metz, *Jordan*, 13.

⁹⁸ Metz, *Jordan*, 13.

⁹⁹ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 222.

¹⁰⁰ Hasan Kayali, "Young Turks," in the vol. 4 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 2408.

¹⁰¹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 332.

Arab nationalist movement. The Ottoman Empire was weak and the Arab nationalists hoped that this weakness could be exploited in order to gain Arab independence. By August of 1914, the Ottoman Empire had sided with Germany and the British were looking for a way to weaken the relationship between the two.¹⁰² Through negotiations, the British agreed to assist the Arabs in their quest for independence with a document known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. These letters promised British support for Arab independence in certain areas in return for Arab assistance in fighting the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰³ This document is very vague which will lead to future issues; Jordan was included as an area that was going to become independent. In June of 1916, Sharif Hussein led the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire with arms, supplies, and funds provided by the British.¹⁰⁴

As McMahon and Sharif Hussein negotiated over the future of the Middle East, the British were also in secret negotiations with the French and the Russians to divide up the same land. This document is known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and it was signed in 1916.¹⁰⁵ This document divided the Middle East into specific zones that were controlled by the European powers listed above. Russia was removed from this agreement after the Bolshevik revolution which also had the country removing itself from the war. While this was occurring, Jewish settlers were trying to reclaim *eretz yisrael*. One Zionist leader, Chaim Weizman, was able to utilize his friendship with Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign minister at the time, to get the British to agree to use all of their resources in assisting the Jews in creating a home land; “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this

¹⁰² Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 332.

¹⁰³ Don Peretz, “Arab Revolt (1916),” in vol. 1 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 264.

¹⁰⁴ Peretz, “Arab Revolt”, 264.

¹⁰⁵ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 318.

object.”¹⁰⁶ The British were carving up the Middle East with the help of the French and though they made many promises to different sects about who would have which part of the region, they were truly looking out for their best interests.

Hashemite Kingdom

Sharif Hussein and his sons, Faisal, Ali, and Abdullah, played a pivotal role in World War I which allowed the Triple Entente to emerge victorious. Due to this victory, the British tried to place Sharif Hussein’s three sons into states they created from their mandate.¹⁰⁷ This area was desired by the Arabs and included countries known today as Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan. Unfortunately, the British assumed that they would be able to place a Hashemite son in present day Syria, a land which fell under the control of the French. The French exiled Hussein’s son Faisal from Syria.¹⁰⁸ To soothe any discontent arising from this situation, the British rearranged the sons. They removed Abdullah from his position in Iraq and replaced him with Faisal. Then to give a kingdom to Abdullah, they created a new state known as Transjordan.¹⁰⁹

Abdullah became the head of the Transjordanian government in 1921 at the behest the British.¹¹⁰ This new country had no cohesion; the people of this region had no common bond nor were they united in a specific way that would lend towards the creation of a nation. It was completely fabricated by the British.¹¹¹ This country was financed with British subsidies and the country operated under the guide of British advisors who handled the economy, foreign policy, and any defense needs.¹¹² Abdullah ruled his kingdom through a small executive council with

¹⁰⁶ Arthur James Balfour, *Balfour Declaration*,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/The+Balfour+Declaration.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 332.

¹⁰⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 332.

¹⁰⁹ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 318.

¹¹⁰ Metz, *Jordan*, 25.

¹¹¹ W. Andrew Terrill, *Global Security Watch: Jordan* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010) 1-2.

¹¹² Metz, *Jordan*, 26.

which he handled any domestic issue that arose. In 1923, the United Kingdom recognized the progress of Transjordan in modernization and in independence.¹¹³

The country remained under British supervision until post-World War II. However, during this time, Abdullah was creating and strengthening his base in anticipation of independence.¹¹⁴ Abdullah chose his capital carefully, picking the village of Amman over the much larger city Salt. Amman had hospitable Christians who were generally “favorably disposed towards the Hashemites. Abdullah appealed to them in a ‘special way as a *sharif* and a Muslim of undoubted credentials who was, at the same time, tolerant and fair-minded’.”¹¹⁵ The Christians felt safe with Abdullah and believed that he would follow the tradition of protecting *dhimmis*, or groups of non-Muslims in a Muslim community. He, with a small army and the British air force, was able to quell any local and tribal opposition to his claim as the head of the state.¹¹⁶ Abdullah I also encouraged the migration of professionals from Syria and Palestine because Transjordan was lacking in such personnel. However, by the 1930s, “two-thirds of the bureaucracy (excluding the British officials) were already staffed by original Transjordanians”¹¹⁷ and they were replacing the foreign workers. This process encouraged Transjordanians to create a new professional class who then became top leaders in the government when the state was created. Another major step towards independence was reached with the Treaty of London between Transjordan and the United Kingdom in 1946.¹¹⁸ This document proclaimed Transjordan a kingdom and a new constitution was written and approved by the Legislative Council of Jordan. The United Nations however declined to accept Transjordan’s membership

¹¹³ Metz, *Jordan*, 26.

¹¹⁴ Terrill, *Jordan*, 4-5.

¹¹⁵ Asher Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy: the Hashemite Success Story,” in *Middle East Monarchies*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 90.

¹¹⁶ Metz, *Jordan*, 26-27.

¹¹⁷ Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy,” 91.

¹¹⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 334.

request due to a veto vote by the Soviet Union which felt that Transjordan lacked true independence from the British. 1948 saw another treaty which removed all restrictions placed on the Transjordanian government by the British, allowing Abdullah to claim the title King of Jordan.¹¹⁹ Then in 1949 he changed the name of the state from Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.¹²⁰

Abdullah I, King of Jordan

Abdullah I annexed the West Bank to Jordan in 1950.¹²¹ While this move was not well met, it became a key moment in shaping the political sphere of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. He focused on searching for a long term peaceful solution with Israel which caused many other states to denounce Abdullah I as a puppet of British imperialism. King Abdullah was assassinated on July 20, 1951 at Al-Aqsa mosque before Friday prayer by a Palestinian.¹²² “The gunman’s principle motivation for the attack was anger over the king’s supposedly secret but very well-known meeting with Israeli leaders with the goal of negotiating an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.”¹²³ Abdullah’s Palestinian-Israeli politics, a problem caused by the creation of Israel and the subsequent wars that followed, cost him his life.

Abdullah had two sons and the line of succession was unclear. At the time of the assassination, Abdullah’s oldest son Talal was out of the country receiving treatment for a mental illness.¹²⁴ His younger brother Naif, temporarily, became the regent of Jordan. While there was some support for the ascension of Naif to the throne, many believed that Talal would

¹¹⁹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 334.

¹²⁰ Terrill, *Jordan*, 7.

¹²¹ Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 194.

¹²² Terrill, *Jordan*, 8.

¹²³ Terrill, *Jordan*, 8.

¹²⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 30.

have been Abdullah's choice so that Talal's son, Hussein, could eventually be crowned king.¹²⁵

Talal did assume the duties of the monarch of Jordan upon his return. He was well liked by the population of the East Bank and tried to improve relations between Jordan and other Arab nations. He also propagated a new constitution in 1952.¹²⁶ However, Talal's condition continued to worsen and he was quietly asked to abdicate the throne in favor of Hussein. He acquiesced to that request and retired to a villa where he lived out the rest of his life.¹²⁷

Hussein

With the abdication of his father, Hussein returned from his studies in England to Jordan. He was seventeen years old.¹²⁸ However, due to his age, Hussein could not constitutionally accept his role as monarch of the nation and a regency council was formed to rule on his behalf until Hussein's eighteenth birthday. During that period, Hussein returned to England and trained at the British Royal Military Academy. When he turned eighteen, he returned to Jordan and formally took the oath to be the king in 1953.¹²⁹

One of the major issues facing Hussein was the incorporation of the Palestinians into Jordanian society. These Palestinians were generally more radical than the elite Jordanians running society; the Palestinians wanted to embrace the Arab nationalism which was spreading across the rest of the Middle East whether it's for the creation of the state of Palestine or the creation of a larger Arab state. In 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officer's Revolt successfully overthrew the Egyptian monarchy.¹³⁰ He became a hero to Palestinians everywhere

¹²⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 30.

¹²⁶ Terrill, *Jordan*, 8.

¹²⁷ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 334.

¹²⁸ Terrill, *Jordan*, 8.

¹²⁹ Peter Gubser, "Hussein ibn Talal," in vol. 2 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 1062.

¹³⁰ "Nasser, Gamal Abdel (Jamal Abd Al-Nasir; 1918–1970)," in vol. 2 of *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005), 328.

“as a champion of Arab nationalism.”¹³¹ The Palestinians were resentful towards the European powers that pushed for the creation of the state of Israel and towards the Arab monarchies that accepted defeat and became stooges of imperialism.¹³² Nasser was a beacon of hope for the Palestinians. In addition to unrest growing among the Palestinians in Jordan, the number of conflicts along the border between Israel and Jordan grew. Palestinians in Jordan committed terrorist attacks against Israel and the reprisal to these attacks was brutal for the Jordan.¹³³ Hussein’ army tried to hold the border but their numbers were inadequate. The issue grew along with clamors for war and anti-Western sentiments.

In 1956, Israel, with assistance from Britain and France, attacked Egypt. After both the British and the French entered Port Said, Hussein proposed that Jordan attack Israel. Nasser told Hussein not to waste his strength for a lost cause.¹³⁴ However, it did lead to a severing of the relationship between England and Jordan. In 1957, an agreement was made to free Jordan from its dependency on England. The Arab Solidarity Agreement had Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria paying Jordan approximately 70 million dollars every year for ten years in order to replace British aid. Unfortunately, these payments never came and the British withdrew all of its troops and ended all British subsidies in Jordan.¹³⁵

Internally, the country was not fairing much better. The elections of 1956 led to Sulayman Nabulsi and the Nationalist Socialist Party coming into power.¹³⁶ Nabulsi was selected by Hussein to be the prime minister of Jordan. Nabulsi was a strong support of Nasserism and his government and policies reflected that political stance. In 1957, there was a power struggle between Nabulsi’s government and the monarchy. Hussein feared that Nabulsi was trying to

¹³¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 30.

¹³² Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy,” 90.

¹³³ Metz, *Jordan*, 31.

¹³⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 32.

¹³⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 32-33.

¹³⁶ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 335.

abolish the monarchy and he decided to demand that Nablusi leave his position.¹³⁷ The political tension continued to rise. It came to a head with the Az Zarqa affair.¹³⁸ A misunderstanding occurred between the head of the Jordanian Army, Ali Abu Nuwar, and Said al Mufti who was trying to form a new cabinet; Al Mufti thought that Abu Nawar was demanding military approval for the new cabinet. Then false rumors of Hussein's death started to spread at the army base in Az Zarqa.¹³⁹ Hussein, now needing to prove he was alive and in control, forced Abu Nawar to go with him to Az Zarqa. Abu Nuwar's life was threatened by troops who were thrilled to see their monarch alive. Abu Nuwar was forced to flee the country.¹⁴⁰ There were several cabinet crises following this event until Ibrahim Hashim, a loyalist to the crown, was able to create a new government.¹⁴¹ He then outlawed political parties.

In order to shore up the state's defenses against the wave of pan-Arabism and coup d'états that were rushing across the Middle East, the king allied Jordan with the United States, which became the primary source of foreign aid for the kingdom. Another union was created in 1958 by Iraq and Jordan.¹⁴² These two countries created the short-lived federation known as the Arab Union with Faisal II as the head of state and Hussein as the deputy head of state. However, five months later the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a bloody coup d'état. Faisal II and his family were killed.¹⁴³ Hussein wanted to avenge his death and restore the union by sending the Jordanian army into Iraq but his advisors convinced him to change his mind. At this point in time, Jordan was an isolated state with very few allies in the region.¹⁴⁴ Because of this, Jordan

¹³⁷ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 335.

¹³⁸ Terrill, *Jordan*, 9.

¹³⁹ Metz, *Jordan*, 33-34.

¹⁴⁰ Metz, *Jordan*, 34.

¹⁴¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 34.

¹⁴² "A Guide to The United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Iraq," *U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian*, <http://history.state.gov/countries/iraq>.

¹⁴³ "Iraq" in vol. 1 of *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005), 189.

¹⁴⁴ Terrill, *Jordan*, 11.

strengthened its ties to the West. The United States and Britain both sent aid and troops in order to stabilize the monarchy.¹⁴⁵ While political tensions were at an all time high, Hussein was able to maintain control through the loyalty of the army and the use of emergency martial law. This peace lasted for approximately two years. In 1960 Hazza al Majali, the prime minister, was killed by a bomb placed under his desk.¹⁴⁶ Bedouin troops moved into the city and Hussein appointed a new prime minister, Bahjat at Talhuni. Suspects were apprehended and hanged.¹⁴⁷ In 1961, Talhuni was replaced by Wasif at Tal.¹⁴⁸

In the early 1960s, problems with Israel grew. Israel started an irrigation process in order to divert water from the Jordan River and pipe it to the Negev desert. It is not a mighty river and the potential deviations could be devastating for the Arab states. "Israel's insistence on proceeding with land development in the DMZ (demilitarized zone) and its unilateral diversion of the Jordan River headwaters followed the failure by the Arabs to ratify the Eric Johnson Jordan Valley Development project."¹⁴⁹ An Arab League meeting to address this issue was called by Nasser. In this meeting, they decide to divert the water into Syria before it could reach Israel. It would then be shared by Jordan and Syria. This agreement also called for the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the voice of Palestine.¹⁵⁰ However, while the Jordanian government had originally chosen to support the Palestinian Liberation Organization, they were forced to publicly withdraw that support due to an increase in border incidences between Jordan and Israel. The PLO launched numerous attacks from the West Bank which

¹⁴⁵ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 335.

¹⁴⁶ Terrill, *Jordan*, 10.

¹⁴⁷ Metz, *Jordan*, 36.

¹⁴⁸ Metz, *Jordan*, 36.

¹⁴⁹ Don Peretz, "Arab-Israeli War (1967)," in vol. 1 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 248.

¹⁵⁰ Terrill, *Jordan*, 11.

caused a series of reprisals by Israel.¹⁵¹ From May 1965 and on, the reprisal attacks grew more vicious and frequent and in 1966, Hussein stopped granting approval of both the PLO and Syria.¹⁵² The reprisal attacks caused a wave of riots throughout the West Bank. Skirmishes were also had on the border between Jordan and Syria.

The tension between Syria and Jordan was set aside due to the Six Day War. On May 30, 1967 a mutual defense pact between Syria, Jordan, and Egypt was formed, though they had neither a plan of defense nor attack.¹⁵³ On June 1, Israel created an emergency cabinet with a war hawk, Mousidian, as its leader which produced a plan of attack in reaction to the mutual defense pact. June 5th was the day of Israel's preemptive strike.¹⁵⁴ They neutralized Egypt's air force, taking out over 400 planes, and they did the same to the Syrian air force.¹⁵⁵ Israel told Hussein to not get involved but due to the mutual defense pact, he felt he had no choice and he launched an attack. Israel then entered the West Bank and had the Jordanian army fleeing within hours.¹⁵⁶ Israeli troops circled Old Jerusalem and occupied the city. By June 7th, Israel occupied and controlled all of the West Bank. The United Nations Security Council created a ceasefire resolution which Israel signed on June 11th after conquering the Golan Heights. This crushed the idea of pushing Israeli's into the sea and the ideals of pan-Arabism with it. Resolution 242 was adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967 to put an end to this matter.¹⁵⁷ It called for Israel to return to pre-1967 borders, the acceptance of the right to exist for all states in the region, and the search for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue. Jordan sent signals of acceptance but did not openly embrace the resolution. The resolution then fell to the wayside.

¹⁵¹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 336.

¹⁵² Metz, *Jordan*, 37.

¹⁵³ Metz, *Jordan*, 38.

¹⁵⁴ Peretz, "Arab-Israeli War (1967)," 248.

¹⁵⁵ Peretz, "Arab-Israeli War (1967)," 249.

¹⁵⁶ Metz, *Jordan*, 38.

¹⁵⁷ "Arab-Israel War (1967) (5 June–10 June 1967)," in vol. 1 of *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 35.

Out of all of the countries that fought Israel, Jordan was left the most devastated after the 1967 war. There was now a large refugee population in Jordan, a weak economy, and the need to reassess their international relations policy along with rebuilding their defensive capabilities.¹⁵⁸ There were also several Palestinian groups inside of Jordan that had confrontations with the Jordanian government. This led to civil war in 1970 when Palestinian guerilla groups (the *feyadeen*) hijacked multiple planes.¹⁵⁹ Hussein saw this group as a threat to his authority and reinstated military rule.¹⁶⁰ He demanded that the *feyadeen* lay down their arms and evacuate the cities and other key areas of which they had gained control. This led to a ten day civil war which was fought between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).¹⁶¹ Syria sent aid to the *feyadeen* while Israel and the United States gathered forces in order to aid Jordan. Syria, under pressure from other nations, removed their forces while the *feyadeen* fought until September 25, when they agreed to a ceasefire.¹⁶² Hussein and Arafat, the head of the Palestinian Liberation Army signed an agreement on September 27th which called for the withdrawal of the PLA and an exchange of prisoners.¹⁶³ A further agreement was signed between the two groups on October 13th in which the *feyadeen* had to accept the sovereignty of the king and cease carrying arms outside of their camps while the monarchy would grant amnesty to the *feyadeen* for all crimes committed during the civil war.¹⁶⁴

Hussein now needed to reestablish his authority within Jordan and his place within the Arab world in general; he did this by implementing new economic and foreign policies. He formed a group that would represent both the West Bank and the East Bank called the Jordanian

¹⁵⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 335-336.

¹⁵⁹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 336.

¹⁶⁰ Metz, *Jordan*, 42.

¹⁶¹ Terrill, *Jordan*, 16.

¹⁶² Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 336.

¹⁶³ Terrill, *Jordan*, 17.

¹⁶⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 43.

National Union in September of 1971.¹⁶⁵ It was the only legal political organization however it was not a political party but a space for all Jordanians to discuss the direction they would like the country to take. All Jordanians were eligible for membership with the exception of those advocating foreign ideologies such as Marxism. He also started the United Arab Kingdom, a federation which would allow the separate banks to be autonomous provinces within Jordan and still under Hussein's power at the same time.¹⁶⁶ The National Assembly would still divide its seats equally between the two regions. These two plans were never enacted. Hussein also paid a visit to the United States of America in 1973 which solidified his connection to the West.

On October 6, 1973, a surprise attack was launched on Israel by Egypt and Syria.¹⁶⁷ On this day, Egypt crossed the Suez Canal and broke down the Israeli barrier on the other side.¹⁶⁸ Egyptian troops then stormed across the Bar Lev line and forced the Israelis to flee the Suez Canal zone. At the same time, the Syrians were attacking the Golan Heights and managed to remove the Israeli troops there.¹⁶⁹ Israel was taken by surprise and lost mass amounts of supplies. The United States came to Israel's aid with an airlift of supplies but was unable to get more involved due to a threat by the Soviet Union. These two superpowers were playing chicken with each other over actions taken in the Middle East. By October 11, 1973, Israel held both fronts; it then rearmed and switched to an offensive strategy.¹⁷⁰ Once again due to proximity and the greater ideals of pan-Arabism and pan-Islam, Jordan entered the fight. Hussein started to amass troops which caused Israel to send troops into the West Bank. While he did not open a third front

¹⁶⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 44.

¹⁶⁶ Metz, *Jordan*, 45.

¹⁶⁷ Don Peretz, "Arab-Israeli War (1973)," in vol. 1 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 250.

¹⁶⁸ Metz, *Jordan*, 45.

¹⁶⁹ Don Peretz, "Arab-Israeli War (1973)," 250.

¹⁷⁰ Don Peretz, "Arab-Israeli War (1973)," 250.

with Israel, King Hussein did send troops to Syria.¹⁷¹ The USSR called for a ceasefire on October 21 which was accepted by both Israel and Egypt. However it took three days to go into effect.¹⁷² During that time Israel reoccupied both the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal. On October 22, the UN Security Council reaffirmed their desire for Israel to act within Resolution 242 from 1967 in regards to Israeli occupied lands.¹⁷³

Jordan called for Israel to vacate the lands it occupied at a conference held in Algeria in November of 1973.¹⁷⁴ Hussein also stated that he did not represent nor speak for the Palestinians and supported their right to self-determination but only after their territory was unoccupied. Hussein was still at odds with the PLO, though the summit did vote to recognize the PLO as the voice of the Palestinians. Hussein was forced to accept that he would have to work with the PLO in order to deal with the Palestinian issue, while other countries warned the PLO that they must work with Hussein or risk another civil war.¹⁷⁵ The Palestinians refusal to reassess their claim of total sovereignty over the entire West Bank led to Hussein asking to reschedule an Arab summit that was to be held in Rabat in October of 1974.¹⁷⁶ The proposed topic of this summit was to formally recognize the PLO and their role in the future of Palestine. In response to his request, Egypt revoked its previous statement on restoring the West Bank to Jordan and put all of its weight behind the PLO.

The Rabat Summit occurred as originally planned in October of 1974.¹⁷⁷ The PLO representatives demanded that the summit produce a declaration that “any Palestinian territory liberated by Arab forces would be turned over to the ‘Palestinian people’ as represented by their

¹⁷¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 45.

¹⁷² Peretz, “Arab-Israeli War (1973),” 251.

¹⁷³ Peretz, “Arab-Israeli War (1973),” 251.

¹⁷⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 46.

¹⁷⁵ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 336.

¹⁷⁶ Metz, *Jordan*, 46.

¹⁷⁷ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 336.

organization.”¹⁷⁸ This declaration was vehemently protested by the Jordanian representatives as this act would give the PLO power over half the population of the East Bank. In addition to that, the West Bank had been annexed by popular vote of those residing in that province. By the end of the conference, a declaration was made recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians and acknowledged the Palestinian right to their own homeland though this area was not defined.¹⁷⁹ Hussein only signed this declaration after being promised large sums of money from oil rich states; and, after the summit, declared the document ambiguous and open to interpretation.¹⁸⁰ The gulf between the two groups continued to widen. Hussein then forced Palestinians in the East Bank to choose either Jordanian or Palestinian identity.¹⁸¹

The new political situation caused by the Rabat Summit led to changes in the Jordanian government. Hussein amended the constitution to expand his powers. The king was now able to delay elections at his will and also dissolve the House of Representatives;¹⁸² he utilized this power and shut down the House of Representatives. He also directed his prime minister to form a new government without Palestinians from the West Bank. Hussein was trying to remove forces that could disrupt his rule or lend support to the PLO. However, he did not try to remove Palestinians from the army nor did he stop paying civil servants in the West Bank. In order to try to end the schism between the PLO and Jordan, the PLO accepted the restrictions the monarchy placed on it in Jordan and stopped playing antigovernment programs on the radio.¹⁸³ Hostilities

¹⁷⁸ Metz, *Jordan*, 46.

¹⁷⁹ Metz, *Jordan*, 47.

¹⁸⁰ Terrill, *Jordan*, 18.

¹⁸¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 48.

¹⁸² Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 336.

¹⁸³ Metz, *Jordan*, 48-49.

resumed after a summit in Cairo in 1976 in which Jordan declared it had no responsibility to negotiate with Israel in order to get them to leave the West Bank.¹⁸⁴

Hussein indefinitely suspended elections in 1976 due to the situation in the country. He also eliminated the Jordanian National Union.¹⁸⁵ Hussein chose a new prime minister, Mudar Badran, who created the Bureau of Occupied Homeland Affairs. This bureau was created in order to advise on Palestinians. The PLO felt that this organization was a front for the promotion of pro-Jordanian government officials in the upcoming election.¹⁸⁶ This was denied by the Jordanian government who assured the PLO that the Palestinians in the area were deciding their own future. The elections that had been postponed were finally held in 1977 and candidates supported by the PLO won the majority.¹⁸⁷ Hussein had a very different image of the future of Palestine than the Palestinians and for this reason tensions between the two remained high.

The Camp David Accords of 1978 were seen as a final push towards a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These accords were created and signed by the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and American President Jimmy Carter.¹⁸⁸ It stated:

Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. ...A strong local police force will be

¹⁸⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 49.

¹⁸⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 49.

¹⁸⁶ "Jordan," in vol. 1 of *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005), 217.

¹⁸⁷ Metz, *Jordan*, 50.

¹⁸⁸ "The Camp David Accords (September 1978)," *Jimmy Carter Library*, <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml>.

established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.¹⁸⁹

Within the Accords, there are multiple mentions of the future role of Jordan, yet Jordan was not consulted before the Accords were signed. Hussein was angered that Jordan was mentioned in these Accords without his prior knowledge. He felt that Sadat was more concerned with regaining the Sinai than actually brokering a long-lasting peace. Israel also refused to negotiate over East Jerusalem with Jordan and declared sovereignty over that section of the city. Jordan, who had been the most affected by the creation of Israel and the plight of the Palestinians, was alienated from the peace talks and thus refused to cooperate with the Accords.¹⁹⁰ In response, Jordan joined other Arab states in Baghdad where they rejected the Camp David Accords and distanced themselves from the actions of Egypt.¹⁹¹

In 1979, the Iranian Revolution led to an aggressive regime change which was anti-Western. The close proximity to Jordan caused the state to feel threatened.¹⁹² Hussein created a plan to deal with Iran both domestically and internationally. He sought to improve relations with Iraq. In 1981, Jordan and Iraq created an Iraqi-Jordanian Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation.¹⁹³ With the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Hussein showed support by creating a brigade of volunteer soldiers who would assist Iraq. After Iran made significant progress in the war, Jordan increased their support for Iraq.¹⁹⁴ The Middle East was fractured and Hussein used this to position himself in a place of power. Proof of Jordan's increase in status was

¹⁸⁹ "The Camp David Accords (September 1978)."

¹⁹⁰ Don Peretz, "Camp David Accords (1978)," in vol. 1 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, Ed. Philip Mattar (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 561.

¹⁹¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 53.

¹⁹² Metz, *Jordan*, 55.

¹⁹³ Metz, *Jordan*, 56.

¹⁹⁴ Terrill, *Jordan*, 18.

evident when it became the location for the Arab summit of 1981.¹⁹⁵ Syria boycotted the summit and moved troops to the Syrian-Jordanian border. Hussein, in response to this threat, amassed troops on the border. Due to Saudi interventions, no conflict occurred but the hostilities remained.

In 1987, the first Intifada in Palestine started and in response to pressure, Hussein severed Jordan politically from the West Bank.¹⁹⁶ This came about with the decline and then end of the Cold War. With the Soviet Union withdrawing from the area, the United States became the dominant global power in the Middle East. After the Gulf Crisis, Jordan became very isolated from other Arab states. In response to all of these changes, domestically Jordan became more democratic. And, “under a mandate from King Hussein, leaders from all political streams wrote a national charter defining the general principles for political life in the country. They include democracy, pluralism, and the recognition of the legitimacy of the Hashemite throne.”¹⁹⁷ This helped bolster Jordan’s relationship with the United States.

With the support of the United States, Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 after the Oslo Accord created peace between Israel and the PLO.¹⁹⁸ In 1999, Hussein shocked the nation by removing his brother Hassan from the position of crown prince and replacing him with Abdullah II, his oldest son.¹⁹⁹ Within a couple of weeks, Hussein died of cancer on February 7, 1999.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 56.

¹⁹⁶ Don Peretz, “Intifada (1987 – 1991),” in vol. 2 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 1106.

¹⁹⁷ Peter Gubser, “Jordan” in vol. 2 of *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed (New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 1245.

¹⁹⁸ Terrill, *Jordan*, 19.

¹⁹⁹ Terrill, *Jordan*, 19-20.

²⁰⁰ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 337.

Abdullah II

Abdullah II is the current king of Jordan. He was 35 years old when he assumed the throne after his father's death in 1999.²⁰¹ He has strengthened the ties between Jordan and the United States. He, however, faces monumental issues that his own father dealt with for his whole regency. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is on hold but every day tensions grow. The Jordanian economy also relies heavily on foreign aid;²⁰² Abdullah II has worked hard to increase foreign investments and set up special economic zones to boost the economy.²⁰³ In 2009, Abdullah named his own son Hussein as the crown prince of Jordan.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 337.

²⁰² "Jordan," in vol. 1 of *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*.

²⁰³ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 337.

²⁰⁴ "Profile," *King Abdullah's Official Site*, http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/148.html.

Chapter II: Utilizing the Political System

The Jordanian and the Moroccan monarchs manipulate the structures of their governments in order to maintain power and deflect dissatisfaction with the government away from themselves. The manner in which this occurs differs between each monarchy yet the results are the same, when the people approve of the government, then the monarch claims the praise while disapproval is foisted upon the government below the king. The monarch is often seen as slightly separate from the government. These two governments have a particular structure that allows for the monarch to garner support, while at the same time allowing him to use the rest of the government as scapegoats.

Structures of the Government

Morocco

The Moroccan political system is a reflection of the political system of the *siba* (pre-20th century). In that system, a Sufi mystic was utilized as an arbitrator for inter-tribal conflicts.²⁰⁵ Within the modernized version, the king is the arbitrator between political parties. He, endowed with his religious and political wisdom, is able to make the best, unbiased decision for his people.²⁰⁶ This system has assisted in the separation of the monarch and the government. It allows the king to rule without being forced to take sides. As political parties battle for power, any citizens of Morocco dissatisfied with the current political ways of the nation rail against the parties who seem to be more focused on fighting each other than helping the people. It is at this point that the monarch is able to enter the fight and make a decision. He is always in the position

²⁰⁵ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 12.

²⁰⁶ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 399.

of the problem solver and he appears to have a special wisdom or power, *baraka*, within him that allows him to create peace. The monarch is the “dispenser of justice.”²⁰⁷

In reality, the monarch is utilizing the system to maintain his role in the center of society. He fosters a need for the monarchy. The king becomes a necessary position because he can so readily solve disputes for the public. In addition to fostering positive public sentiment for the monarchy, the system has also created an outlet for opposition groups and the public.

The system of the *siba* is the model for the current government; however it exhibits high levels of bureaucracy which is attributed to modern governments. The Moroccan government is made up of three branches; these are the legislative, executive, and judiciary segments of the government. The king is the head of these branches.

A majority of the king’s power is associated with the executive branch of Morocco which he leads. Beneath him is the prime minister, and the Council of Ministers. The job of this council is to administer national affairs as well as execute the laws of the land.²⁰⁸ These top officials, as well as the prime minister, are chosen by the king at will from any political party; he also retains the power to dismiss any and all ministers at will.²⁰⁹ The monarch's ability to execute such power allows him to retain a dominant position in the government. The king is completely in charge of appointing the most powerful positions in the Moroccan government which lets him control the atmosphere of the state. The monarch can show favoritism and displeasure of specific political parties by appointing and dismissing certain ministers. It is this power that has allowed the patron-client power structure to be maintained in Morocco.

The king is the center and focus of the system as political organizations strive to please him in order to gain political power through a government appointment. The Moroccan monarch

²⁰⁷James N Sater, *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco* (London: Routledge, 2007), 35.

²⁰⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 400.

²⁰⁹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 400.

has an abundance of power which allows him to grant favors to his loyalists. He does this through bequeathing posts to groups that support him. This type of favoritism is a reflection of the patron-client system. The patron-client political system is used “to characterize relations between two persons or groups, one of whom is in some way in a superior or more favorable position than the other.”²¹⁰ The dominant party provides the submissive party with protection, gifts, and favors, in return for loyalty.²¹¹

Consequently the king controls the most desirable administrative posts, and he manipulates appointments in the same manner that he distributes economic sanctions and rewards: to hold his secular clientele in line, attract new recruits, and keep opponents off balance.²¹²

This type of political system, in conjunction with the king's position of arbitrator, allows the monarch to control the political parties and force them to rely on the monarchy for political power. For example, in 1998, in order to accommodate an opposition party, he appointed Abdurrahman Youssoufi as prime minister.²¹³ However, Youssoufi was later removed from power and exiled for criticizing the crown. The position of the prime minister is a powerful one. The king gifted this position to an opposition group in hopes of gaining loyalty and legitimacy. Yet, when that loyalty was not returned, the king banished Youssoufi from the kingdom. In addition, if a party wants a piece of their agenda to pass, they need the support of the monarch. He is the only one in the Morocco that has the power to support political movements on such a

²¹⁰ Michael Gilsenan, “Against Patron-Client Relations,” in *Patron and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, ed. Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (London: Center for Mediterranean Studies of the American Universities Field Staff, 1977), 167.

²¹¹ Gilsenan, “Against Patron-Client Relations,” 167.

²¹² John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: the Moroccan Political Elite – A Study of Segmented Politics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 152.

²¹³ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 400-401.

scale. Politicians know how to play the game and they know that being on the bad side of the king will result in a significant reduction of the power. What's more is the fact that the enormous political power that is held by the king is legitimized in the Moroccan constitution.²¹⁴ The king is able to wield such power and he is still following the letter of the law.

In addition to sustaining the patron-client system, the monarch can also destroy any loyalties that emerge between ministers and organizations by reorganizing the ministers. This occurred frequently under Hassan II. Within a 28 year period, there were 20 new governments.²¹⁵ This does not mean that the ministers were new to the system or to being a minister; they were just placed in a new position. This meant that the loyalty of the minister remained to the king and the minister was unable to form long-lasting alliances with others in the government. This is also a common strategy used when the government is under distress and public upheaval. By rearranging the government officials, an appearance of change is achieved with very little structural adjustment.

The 1996 Constitution created a bicameral legislature. The lower chamber is the Chamber of Representatives. The members of this chamber are elected directly for a five year term while the members of the upper chamber, the Chamber of Counselors, are elected indirectly through a system similar to the American Electoral College for a nine year term. However, this legislative institution has never had a plethora of power. While they are technically the initiators of legislation, very little occurs without the king's approval. The powers of the parliament have been expanded in recent constitutional changes in order to expand their role to include "budgetary matters, approval authority, and establishment of commissions of inquiry to

²¹⁴ *Constitution of Morocco (1996)*, <http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm>.

²¹⁵ Nelson, *Morocco*, 243.

investigate the government's actions"²¹⁶ as well as the lower chambers ability to dissolve the government based on a majority vote of no confidence, though this has never been done. While the powers of the parliament have been expanded, they are still searching for an independent role in government. This is the branch of government is elected by the public, yet it has very little authority. The public is able to gain participation in their government and feel as though they have a say with very little sacrifice to the monarchy. It is also the platform for opposition. Even if they gain significant power, they are still restricted by their position in the government. All of this insures that the monarch maintains his dominate position in the political system. The impact of the parliament is slim; however, in the future this is the institution that will demand the most reform and an increase in power by the public.

The third and final branch in this system is the judiciary branch. The judiciary branch is independent from both the executive and the legislative branches and it is lead by Supreme Court of Magistracy which is presided over by the king. All sentences that occur are passed and executed in the name of the king. The king has ample influence in this branch of the government.²¹⁷ The king appoints all magistrates to the bench based on the recommendations made by the Supreme Court of Magistracy.²¹⁸ This position allows him to control the tone of the government through its judicial decisions. As one who can appoint magistrates, he again gains power as the patron in the patron-client system. As long as only the king can appoint these positions, he maintains a large monopoly of power and he can orchestrate the government around his needs.

²¹⁶“Morocco: Government,” in *GlobalEdge*, Michigan State Univeristy, <http://globaledge.msu.edu/Countries/Morocco/government>.

²¹⁷ Nelson, *Morocco*, 255.

²¹⁸ “Articles 82, 83, and 84”, *Constitution of Morocco (1996)*, <http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm>.

The Morocco king plays government factions off of each other. Everyone is competing for the attention of the king who can then grant that person or group power and prestige over another. “This political culture facilitates the maintenance of the monarch’s power.”²¹⁹ This means that instead of banding together against the monarchy, the groups are fighting among themselves. The king is the like the conductor of an orchestra and everyone is fighting for first chair. This allows the king to appear above the system as a mediator. In 1998, Hassan placed the oppositionist Youssoufi in the position of prime minister. By doing so and “by co-opting the opposition into power, Hassan put himself in a position to deflect criticism of the state of the economy”²²⁰ onto the opposition group. The political system of Morocco is utilized by the king to keep the monarchy stable and in power.

Jordan

The system of government in Jordan is very similar to the system of government in Morocco. Within Jordan the monarch maintains an enormous amount of power and prestige which is reinforced by his political powers and his place at the top of the government. It is inconceivable for most to think about the government without the monarch because of his central role in its functions. The king is the head of the executive and legislative branches and instrumental in the judiciary branch within the Jordanian government.

The king of Jordan leads the executive branch the government; all of his powers to do so are granted to him by the Jordanian constitution.²²¹ It is the king’s responsibility to appoint members to the Council of Ministers which runs the executive branch with the king, the prime minister, the members of the Senate in the legislative branch, as well as judges in the judiciary

²¹⁹ Gregory W. White, Mark A. Tessler, and John P. Entelis, “Kingdom of Morocco,” in *the Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. David E. Long and Bernard Reich (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2002), 409.

²²⁰ White, “Kingdom of Morocco” (2002), 405.

²²¹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 339.

branch.²²² He also appoints an assortment of senior government officials and military functionaries. This allows the monarch to be central and necessary in all of the branches; without him, no one could appoint leaders in the government. Just as this system creates power for the king in Morocco, it does too for the Jordanian monarch. The monarch is in a place of prestige and with his special powers, he is able to show favoritism to people and political parties that support him. He is also able to show his displeasure by dismissing any of them at his will. In addition, to being able to place his people in government positions, the king also has a plethora of other political abilities that make his position supremely powerful and indispensable. The king not only has the sole power to declare war and to create peace but he also commands the armed forces.²²³ His military power is extensive. Legislatively, the monarch must convene and adjourn legislative sessions as well as dissolve or suspend the legislature. He also calls for or postpones elections in Jordan and has a veto that can only be overridden by two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the legislature.²²⁴ The magnitude of the powers of the monarchy in the Jordanian government is enormous which makes the king the focus of politics. His ability to appoint positions in the government allows a patron-client system to flourish. The king is able to shape the government through his ability to veto laws, appoint new ministers, and hold legislative sessions and elections. Everyone in the system is accountable to the king yet “the king is the head of state and is immune of any liability and responsibility.”²²⁵

Beneath the king within the executive branch is the prime minister, then the Council of Ministers. As stated above, the prime minister is appointed by the king. The prime minister is in

²²² *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.

²²³ Metz, *Jordan*, 185.

²²⁴ *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.

²²⁵ “Article 30”, *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.

charge of the Council of Ministers, which totals 26 ministers in all.²²⁶ The Council of Ministers is also appointed by the king but the prime minister assists the king in the decision making process though the final selection rest solely on the king. The new cabinet and their plans for the country must then be approved by the House of Representatives with a two-thirds vote. If the two-thirds majority vote is not achieved, then the cabinet is given a vote of no confidence and must resign. These cabinet members run different sectors of the country “at the pleasure of the king,”²²⁷ from agriculture and defense to health and higher education.

The legislative branch of the Jordanian government is called the National Assembly and is a bicameral legislature.²²⁸ It is composed of the Senate, or the House of Notables, which is the upper house and the House of Representatives, or the Chamber of Deputies, which is the lower house. The Senate cannot have more than half the number of members as the House of Representatives. The Senate is selected by the king while the House of Representatives is elected. Neither of these two houses has a large amount of legislative power. All members serve for a four year term. In order to be appointed a senator, the member must be forty years of age and have served the government in a senior governmental or military position prior to being chosen. Members of the House of Representatives must be Jordanian citizens, thirty years of age. These representatives cannot be a blood relative of the king nor can they have any personal interest in foreign investments or government contracts. A number of these seats are also set aside for minorities. There are over thirty political parties that vie for spots in the government including opposition groups. Much like in Morocco, this system gives the public and the opposition movements a place to air their grievances and allows them to vie for power. Elections create the belief that the public has a say in the government and in the state, while the king still

²²⁶ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 339.

²²⁷ Metz, *Jordan*, 187.

²²⁸ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 339.

retains a majority of the power. The National Assembly of Jordan is, in reality, limited in scope and power. As recently as 2009, King Abdullah dissolved parliament.²²⁹ While they are able to vote on legislation, the king is the one who must sign it into law and then promulgate it. He also has the ability to veto the law. This means getting a piece of legislation to become law requires the support of the monarchy.

The third branch of the Jordanian government is the judiciary, an independent branch. The laws of Jordan are a combination of shari'a, traditional code, and secular European law.²³⁰ Within the judiciary, there are three types of courts. The main court is the civil court which handles all civil and criminal cases. There are four levels within the civil courts, with the highest level being the Court of Cassation whose judges are appointed by the king.²³¹ The other two courts are the religious courts and the special courts; cases must be reserved for these courts explicitly. The religious courts focus on family law such as issues of divorce, inheritance, and child custody.²³² These religious courts are not only Islamic but there are also Christian courts. Rulings for these courts are made by *qadis* (religious judges) who have devoted themselves to the study of Islam and Islamic law while the Christian courts are run Christian clerics. For inter-religious disputes, the civil court takes precedence unless the parties agree to submit to one religious court or the other. The special courts handle matters such as irregular offenses and offenses that involve cabinet members; it also includes the High Tribunal which handles matters with the constitution. While this is an independent branch, the king has quite a bit of power in

²²⁹ "Jordan's King Abdullah Dissolves Parliament," *BBC News*, 24 Nov 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8376225.stm.

²³⁰ Curtis B. Ryan, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," in *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. David E. Long (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011), 308.

²³¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 191.

²³² Metz, *Jordan*, 191.

this arena. He has the power to pardon any person or remit a sentence.²³³ He also must approve of all sentences that demand execution as a precautionary measure. The monarch is able to influence the direction of the nation through the judicial system by appointing either liberal or conservative judges. The king again has the final say in all matters in Jordan.

The Jordanian king has complete control over the government. He is embedded into every segment of the system. The power of the government comes from the king; he grants everything and everyone legitimacy in their positions due to his ability to give governmental appointments. Those with power owe it to the king who has graced them with their positions, but can take it away just as easily. By being the center of the system, the king has made it impossible for the government to run without him. He has become the key to running the political system.

Conclusion

Both of the monarchs in Morocco and Jordan are manipulating the political systems of their country to maintain their power. They have made themselves indispensable to the system. This is not to say that the system is absent from other actors such as political organizations, public sentiment, or civil society however, the monarchies have created a system where even these external actors who may fight against the system, have to work within it to get anywhere with their agendas. While the kings are reinforcing the necessity of a monarch in the system, they are also managing their opposition groups and their supporters through a patron-client system. The kings are integral in the system; it cannot be conceived without them. They have created electoral spaces that have little power but which allow the public opinion to have a place to be discussed. This is an outlet for the public and a veneer of democracy for the international community. While the real power lies with the monarchs in these systems, they hide it behind a

²³³ "Article 34," *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.

complex maze of officials and legalese. The monarchs have best configured the system to support the monarchy, to give them a maximum amount of power with a minimal amount of public accountability. In addition to this, all they do is legally affirmed by the countries' constitutions.

Constitution

Both the Jordanian and the Moroccan monarchies are technically constitutional monarchies. The terms and parameters of a monarch's power have been written down and these laws are supposed to supersede all else. With a constitutional monarchy, the monarch is not above the law; he is subject to the constitution just as all citizens are in the country. This allows the monarchs to abide by the internationally popular 'rule of law'. However, while the purpose of a constitutional monarchy is to restrict the powers of the monarch, as they do in England, and create a space for the people in the government, the constitutions of Morocco and Jordan leave much of the power to the king. In reality, the king is "accountable to no one."²³⁴ These constitutions have allowed the monarchies to give an appearance of limitation and they have satisfied the general public's need for a say in their own government.

Morocco

In addition to utilizing the multi-party system to diffuse demands on the monarch, the king also has created, in the constitution, a legal basis for his rule. Within a monarchy, a constitution is generally an agreement of concession of power by the monarch. Within Morocco, the constitution does grant rights to the people but it does little to curb the influence and power of the monarchy. In fact, the constitution of Morocco legitimizes and emphasizes the role of the monarchy with the country.

²³⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 185.

It was in 1958 that King Mohammed V declared that he would institute a constitutional monarchy in Morocco; he constructed a committee of members from the Isqal party to construct a constitution.²³⁵ He died before it could be realized. King Hassan II then replaced those committee members with his own personal advisors. This movement allowed Hassan II to have total control over the content of the constitution and it was written with several clauses that granted unquestionable authority to the monarch while making some concessions to personal freedom for the citizens of Morocco. This constitution was ratified in 1962. It was then suspended in 1965 by Hassan II who declared a state of emergency and ruled directly until 1970; a power granted to him in the constitution. However, there was a 99% favorable vote for a new constitution which came into being in 1972.²³⁶ This constitution reinforced the position of the cabinet and restricted the ability of the king to dissolve them. The king's powers were not truly limited in any prolific manner. He is still the "Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof"²³⁷ and he still has the final say in all matters in his country. Though there have been a multitude of constitutions, the core of the 1962 constitution remains until today. As stated on the Moroccan embassy's website, "the Monarchy is the institutional pillar of Morocco."²³⁸

The most current constitution of Morocco was created in 1996. This constitution reinforces the place of the monarch as head of the state and the center of the nation. It declares the national motto "God, the Country, the King."²³⁹ This small sign reveals how integral the monarchy is to the government and to the society; the focus is on the king as the political core of

²³⁵ Lauzière, "Morocco: Constitution," 1572.

²³⁶ Nelson, *Morocco*, 237.

²³⁷ "Constitution of Morocco," 1996, <http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm>.

²³⁸ "Monarchy", *Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco*, <http://www.moroccoembassyin.org/monarchy.html>.

²³⁹ "Chapter 1. Article 7", *Moroccan Constitution of 1996*, <http://www.moroccoembassyin.org/constitution-ch1.html>

the nation. The second chapter of the constitution is devoted to the powers of the king.²⁴⁰ Under this chapter, he has the power to hire or fire the prime minister, appoint cabinet members, and dissolve the bicameral houses under in a declared state of emergency. It also declares “the person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable.”²⁴¹ These articles place the monarch in a highly elevated context. This constitution contains loopholes for the monarch to circumvent the political system which was set up to limit his power. He is given the power of the military in Article 30; he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Armed Forces, and has power to appoint civil and military positions within the military structure.

Recently, there has been a referendum to the constitution as a result of the protests in Morocco. The changes caused by this referendum have allowed the parliament slightly more power. However, this referendum reads more of a promise for change by the monarch. Many parts of the referendum are ambiguous or will be finalized by committees selected by the king. Key reform positions include making the king select the prime minister from the most populous party in parliament, giving the prime minister more power, making the Berber language an official state language, and giving women civil and social equality.²⁴² The referendum does not offer concrete restrictions on the power of the king. He is still granted a monopoly of the power in Morocco by the constitution. It allows the king to do as he please while still appearing to subject himself to the rule of law.

²⁴⁰ “Constitution of Morocco,” 1996, <http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm>.

²⁴¹ “Chaper 2. Article 23,” *Moroccan Constitution of 1996*, <http://www.moroccoembassyin.org/constitution-ch2.html>.

²⁴² “Q&A: Morocco’s Referendum on Reform,” *BBC World News*, 29 June 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13964550>.

Jordan

The Jordanian Constitution was first created in 1952.²⁴³ At this time in the Middle East, Arab nationalism and republicanism were on the rise; 1952 was also the year of the Free Officers coup d'état in Egypt. These new political forces were causing revolts and coups and stirring up the general populace of the Middle East. The Jordanian government realized that it too would have a problem on its hands if it did not give some power to its people. The constitution allowed for the people to feel secure in their rights and for the monarch to retain almost all of his power. The constitution puts the king at the head of the government and allows him to appoint all cabinet members. In Jordan the king has few limitations on his power while the constitution's sections and loopholes reduce the few limitations to nothing.

The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been amended multiple times.²⁴⁴ These amendments, unlike the changes seen in the Moroccan constitution, generally granted the monarch more power such as the ability to dissolve senate in 1974 or the 1976 amendment which allows the king to indefinitely postpone parliamentary elections.²⁴⁵ In order to sustain the monarchy, the constitution does not permit any amendments to be made about the powers of the king. The Jordanian constitution provides for a much stronger monarchy than that presented by the Moroccan constitution.

Conclusion

The Moroccan and Jordanian monarchs created constitutions in order to appease their citizens. The people want to have a formal document stating their rights. However, these documents do little by way of limiting the powers of the kings. These constitutions have provided a legal basis for unlimited monarchical power. Both kingdoms uphold the rule of law

²⁴³ Metz, *Jordan*, 182.

²⁴⁴ Metz, *Jordan*, 182-183.

²⁴⁵ Metz, *Jordan*, 183.

by obedience to the constitution but when the constitution grants such sweeping power to the kings, it's not a difficult endeavor for the monarch. They have almost absolute authority in all matters in their respective countries. It was intelligent to grant these small concessions to their people because the constitutions create a stable and legal platform for the monarchies. They legitimized the king's rule and powers by creating laws that allowed them to continue to rule in the same manner they always have.

The Use of Scapegoats and Repression

In addition to manipulating the political system, these kings must manage their citizens. Through the patron-client system, monarchies utilize the loyal elite class but without the support of the general populace, the kingdom will not be able to stand, especially in a modernizing society where the public expects the government to fulfill their needs. When situations of unrest occur these two governments have both reacted in two ways. The first is with brutal repression, and the second, the use of scapegoats in order to deflect blame. These two responses keep the public at bay.

Morocco

Repression in Morocco, under the firm hand of Hassan II was no secret. He brutally punished all he thought might oppose him. The secret police was widely used and fear was the norm for the general population. This harsh period is known as the "years of lead". Hassan II had "the police and the army... under direct control of the royal house"²⁴⁶ and he used them to rule his country with an iron fist. Under the state of emergency, which Morocco came under in 1965, Hassan disbanded the parliament and crushed civil society. Any and all students on strike were quickly expelled. People were being abducted from their homes and detained and tortured for

²⁴⁶ Abdellah Hammoudi, *Master and Disciple: the Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 27.

untold amounts of time.²⁴⁷ Mohammed VI came out and called for truth-seeking mission of this era in hopes of dispelling the unrest that ran through the country. Many have been satisfied by the creation of a permanent historical record however most of the council recommendations have not been implemented. Even today, the fear that was felt during these years is still alive. Though the repression under Hassan II has ended, there is still repression in civil society through not as blatant as it once was. One reporter, Benchemsi, created a poll asking the people for their opinion on the monarchy. The response was astounding with a “ninety-one percent expressed approval of His Majesty – a stratospheric approval rating like that would be the stuff of sweet dreams for western politicians. Yet the palace declared the very idea of such a poll intolerable, and the king beyond questioning.”²⁴⁸ The use of repression allowed the government to crush coups and rebellions; the king was able to rule the country firmly. But it did not last, the people could not accept this form of government indefinitely and the monarchy had to let up.

The Moroccan monarchy switched to a different type of control. It started to use scapegoats; it blamed others for its mistakes and distasteful deeds. The king, in reality, holds all of the power and can manipulate parties in order to remove himself from the underhanded politicking. Scapegoats are more publically accepted because the people feel as though someone at fault is being punished versus blatant repression which had a negative impact on the public. As shown above, the government is set up so that Morocco cannot ever be a single-party system, which allows the monarch to appear as a benevolent mediator. By being seen as separate and above the political system, he isn't soiled by bad politics and when he interjects himself into a problem, he's seen as a savior. This system clearly allows the Moroccan monarch to rule without getting his hands too dirty.

²⁴⁷ Nelson, *Morocco*, 79.

²⁴⁸ Sohrab Ahmari, “The Death Knell for the Moroccan Free Press,” *Guardian.co.uk*, 2 Oct 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/oct/08/morocco-press-freedom>.

This is the tactic preferred by Mohammed VI, instead of the brutality shown by Hassan II. However, due to unrest caused by the “Arab Spring”, there has been a resurgence of arrests and media censorship. The number of police at the protests in Morocco is rising and one man “blamed the declining number of demonstrators over the past few weeks on police repression and the hiring of thugs by pro-government supporters to harass the protesters.”²⁴⁹ There were also incidences of Facebook hacking and interference with the media. These particular tactics are well known in Morocco where “publications have been shut down and journalists blacklisted for crossing the country's three red lines: Islam, the Western Sahara, and the monarchy. Though the Moroccan government blocks only a few websites, bloggers have in the past been arrested for content posted online.”²⁵⁰ Mohammed VI is using his political power to limit forms of communication within his country. The king is taking these protesters seriously due to the revolutionizing effect they have had elsewhere in the world. The lack of independent media sources has led to an explosion of civilian reporters utilizing the internet to spread news.²⁵¹ The monarchy is hoping to quell the protests through reform and through reminding them of the “years of lead”. Mohammed VI is reminding the people that he has the power to utilize harsh force; shouldn't they enjoy the more peaceful life he has brought them?

Jordan

The King of Jordan has used similar tactics, both when it comes to repression and when it comes to scapegoating. While the repression in Jordan is not as widespread as it was in Morocco under Hassan II, force is a tool to be used when necessary. One such example is when the Palestinians on the West Bank tried to rebel and kill King Hussein. This rebellion caused by the

²⁴⁹Paul Schemm, “Thousands Protest across Morocco Despite Reforms,” *U-T San Diego*, 3 Jul 2011, <http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/jul/03/thousands-protests-across-morocco-despite-reforms/>.

²⁵⁰Jillian C York, “Morocco’s Uphill Struggle for Media Reform,” *Al-Jazeera English*, 26 May 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/05/2011526141810252734.html>.

²⁵¹York, “Morocco’s Uphill Struggle for Media Reform.”

fedayeen was quickly put down by the loyal Jordanian army.²⁵² It is not uncommon for “private citizens [to be] arrested... for criticizing the king”²⁵³ and, in 2009, “Laith Shbailat, a prominent Islamist opposition leader, was beaten by unidentified assailants after he gave a televised interview accusing the government of corruption and calling for abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel.”²⁵⁴ These typical scare tactics are used to keep the public submissive.

In Jordan, the king frequently shifts public blame onto others while remaining well loved and respected by his people. During the 2011 uprisings, there were several protests in Jordan which called for political and social change. Faced with uprisings, and nervous about the incident in Tunisia, Abdullah throws out his old cabinet and gets a new one.

King Abdullah of Jordan has sacked his government and appointed a new prime minister, Marouf Bakhit, ordering him to carry out political reforms. The move follows demonstrations against poverty, unemployment and what protesters say is a lack of political freedom in the country. Ayman Safadi, the former Deputy Prime Minister of the Jordanian government, told the BBC's Lyse Doucet it marked a fresh start for Jordan.²⁵⁵

King Abdullah II foisted the blame onto the former prime minister even though Abdullah, with his monopoly on political power and authority, played a role in constructing current issues. The prime minister was not calling all of the shots by himself. However, the public accepted the king's promise for change and must have believed that the prime minister was the person culpable for their social and economical problems as the riots have abated since his dismissal.

²⁵² Metz, *Jordan*, 38-44.

²⁵³ “Freedom in the World: Jordan,” *Freedom House*, (2010), <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/jordan?page=22&year=2010&country=7849>.

²⁵⁴ “Freedom in the World: Jordan,” *Freedom House*.

²⁵⁵ “New PM,” *BBC World News*, 1 Feb 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12339646>.

This is not the first time such arrangements have occurred. However, the Jordanian king seems able to distance himself from his own government and his people accept this.

Conclusion

Both monarchies have used brutal repression and both have deflected problems onto politicians and political organizations away from where the real power and decision making abilities lie, with the king. However, it seems pertinent that both of these mechanisms are used. Recently in Egypt, it has become obvious that the use of only repression is not enough to subdue the public; eventually the people have nothing left to lose and the use of force is no longer an effective tool. The other side of that coin shows that the over use of scapegoating can cause a strong reaction from the public. A monarch can only blame so many people, so many times before the public becomes disenfranchised with the monarch and his excuses. These monarchs have become the state, however they have been working through other men so that when unrest occurs, the finger is not pointed at the king like it was pointed at Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. Both Jordan and Morocco are able to mix repression and scapegoating into a method of control that allows the monarchy to remain virtually untouched by nay-sayers.

Conclusion

Within the countries of Morocco and Jordan, the political atmosphere has been created and is utilized by the monarchs in order to maintain structural stability and power. While small concessions towards democratization have been made, the political power of these two nations remains firmly in the hands of the kings. The challenge for the monarchy within the last twenty years was creating a system that maintained their enormous political power while given the illusion that the power was in the hands of the people and creating a system that made the place of the monarch essential. Both of these goals have been achieved. Even in the face of the “Arab

Spring”, Abdulllah II and Mohammed VI were able to foist the blame onto their governments and still appear as benevolent leaders striving towards democracy. This balancing act is an impressive feat, and key in allowing both kings to stay in this position. As dictatorships toppled around the Middle East, the political atmosphere that gave an outlet to grievances that in combination with the public’s fear of anarchy, allows the monarchies to maintain their primacy in their country.

Chapter III: Managing Civil Society

The process of modernization leads to an increase in public demands which can rest heavily on the state. Civil society can alleviate that pressure and create a buffer between the state and the people. Civil society benefits the monarchy “by providing political space for the frustrations of groups.”²⁵⁶ It helps lessen the demands on the state by creating a public sphere for non-state actors, such as opposition movements, media outlets, and NGOs, to assist the people. Traditionally this is also from where “the most persistent voices of change come.”²⁵⁷ Many authoritarian regimes fear the power and organization of the masses that can come from civil society due to the assumption that “civil society fosters political liberalization and leads to increased civic participation in the public sphere,”²⁵⁸ yet both Morocco and Jordan have viable civil societies which are comparatively free within the Middle East and North Africa. Civil society is a stabilizing mechanism that facilitates the power and strength of the monarchy. Any discontent that occurs needs an outlet or it will cause eruptions of riots as seen in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011; civil society is that outlet. While civil society is often viewed as a “prelude to democratization,”²⁵⁹ in Jordan and Morocco it “serve[s] as a substitute for it.”²⁶⁰ The monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have chosen to use civil society to relieve political pressure, to formalize opposition groups which allow the government to track them better, and to organize supporters more effectively.

Media within Civil Society

The traditional place of media in society is “(1) ‘monitoring’ for reporting the power,

²⁵⁶ Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan”.

²⁵⁷ Bohdana Dimitrovova, “Reshaping Civil Society in Morocco: Boundary Setting, Integration and Consolidation”, *Centre for European Policy Study*, CEPS Working Document N.323, Dec 2009, pg 4, http://aei.pitt.edu/14587/1/WD_323_Dimitrovova_on_Reshaping_civil_society_Morocco.pdf.

²⁵⁸ Bohdana Dimitrovova, “Reshaping Civil Society in Morocco,” 4.

²⁵⁹ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 108.

²⁶⁰ Sorenson, *Modern Middle East*, 108.

2) ‘facilitative’ for serving civil society, 3) ‘radical’ for questioning the political system, and 4) ‘collaborative’ for serving the state and other power institutions.”²⁶¹ Whoever controls the media thus has power of these distinct yet interconnected areas of society. Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, under which these two monarchies are included, have “constructed national regulatory regimes for satellite television and telecommunications which undermine or inhibit the emergence of the three normative requisites for a civil political culture: freedom, equality and tolerance.”²⁶² This follows the collaborative model in which the media works under the government. However, the internet and satellite television have impeded the control of the government. In order to maintain the government’s monopoly on information, the state tries to control the public’s access to media.

Morocco

The Moroccan government has control over the media, an important power. By controlling the information that is released to the people, the monarchy can control the perceptions and beliefs of the masses. The Moroccan state currently manages “2 television broadcast networks with state-run Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM) operating one network and the state partially owning the other.”²⁶³

While there is a certain level of freedom of press in Morocco when compared to both the reign of Hassan II and many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, severe restrictions still exist in the country. For example, “the Minister of Communications has the right to prohibit all newspapers, as well as periodical or non-periodical prints published abroad from entering Morocco when he believes that they offend Islam, the monarchy or the territorial

²⁶¹ Kaarle Nordenstreng, “Media and Society,” Dept of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Tampere, 1 Apr 2012, <http://sockom.helsinki.fi/commedia/Nordenstreng%20Media%20and%20Society.pdf>.

²⁶² Emma Murphy, “The Arab State and (Absent) Civility in New Communicative Spaces,” *Third World quarterly*, 32.5 (2011): 959-80, *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)*, 1 Apr. 2012, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.578972>.

²⁶³ “Morocco,” *CIA World Factbook*.

integrity, or include material that lacks the respect due to the King or the public order, in addition to giving him the right to ban any foreign newspaper printed inside Morocco for the same reasons (Article 29).”²⁶⁴ Other scare tactics, for those that criticize the monarchy, are dubious arrests such as with “the managing editor of the daily *Akhbar al-Youm* was sentenced to six months in prison on dubious fraud charges in June 2010, having apparently escaped a suspended prison sentence and fine for publishing a cartoon of the king’s cousin after the cousin asked that the sentence be voided in late 2009.”²⁶⁵ The freedom of the press is often checked by a litany of political pressures and fine print laws. Restrictions and regulations are often explained as part of state security. These particular abilities belong to the Minister of Communications, whose position is dependent on the will of monarch. He is personally invested in keeping the monarchy stable at the expense of a free and honest press. “The Moroccan press still enjoys greater freedoms now than under the late King Hassan II... However, the freedoms media activists worked so hard to obtain at the end of the last century have rapidly begun to erode, particularly after the 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca.”²⁶⁶ The monarchy has continued to present a front of liberalization while actually increasing regulations behind the scenes. In 2004, Morocco was part of a conference on the role and place of media in the information society in Africa and the Arab States which took place in Marrakech.²⁶⁷ This conference created an action plan which laid out a list of liberal reforms that should take place within countries in Africa and the Middle East. If implemented, these reforms would create a free and liberal media with the capabilities to

²⁶⁴ The Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity, “Promoting the Rule of Law and Integrity in the Arab World: Report on the State of Media in Morocco”, http://www.acrli.org/Files/PDF/Media/English/P2/Morocco_MediaReportP2_En.pdf.

²⁶⁵ “Morocco,” *Freedom House*.

²⁶⁶ Agatha Koprowski, “Restrictions on the Press under King Mohammed VI and Morocco’s Obligations under International and Domestic Laws on Freedom of Expression,” *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights*, Vol 7, Issue 2, pg 1-31, March 2011, <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/mwjhr.2011.7.2/mwjhr.2011.7.2.1186/mwjhr.2011.7.2.1186.xml>.

²⁶⁷ Conference on the Role and Place of Media in the Information Society in Africa and the Arab States, “Action Plan,” 2004, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/wsis_official_plan_action.pdf.

critique the monarchy and the government. The ability to disseminate information about riots, unemployment, etc. would be highly detrimental to the stability projected by the monarchy, yet the monarchy also needs to address the demands for liberalization. It is here where the monarchy uses rhetoric to promote liberalization while at the same time creating complex regulations which leave the media unable to utilize any liberal reforms that exist. They remain dependent on the good will of the monarchy.

Jordan

The Jordanian government also has had a firm hand over the press. Much like in Morocco, the government utilizes regulations in order to curb the use of media “for anything other than educational, economically useful, or harmlessly leisure-oriented activities”²⁶⁸. In Jordan the “the radio and TV [are] dominated by the government-owned Jordan Radio and Television Corporation (JRTV) that operates a main network, a sports network, a film network, and a satellite channel.”²⁶⁹ The first independent broadcast occurred fairly recently in 2007.²⁷⁰ Media restrictions are vital to allowing the government to remain in a dominant position; especially when knowledge is power. Where an independent media would criticize the government, a media dependent of the monarchy allows the monarch to conceal any information they consider dangerous.

The Jordanian monarchy erected laws which restrict the media. While there has been some liberalization of these restrictions, the fact remains that the monarchy refuses to allow a truly free press within their country. “A study released in 2009 by the Amman-based Center for Defending Freedom of Journalists found that 43 percent of journalists admitted receiving some form of ‘incentive’ from the government, while 94 percent said they practiced self-

²⁶⁸ Murphy, “The Arab State and (Absent) Civility in New Communicative Spaces.”

²⁶⁹ “Jordan,” *CIA World Factbook*.

²⁷⁰ “Jordan,” *CIA World Factbook*.

censorship.”²⁷¹ The regime also “tried to control individual journalists by rewarding those deemed cooperative and by punishing those whose stories it considered critical”²⁷² towards the monarchy. Foreign reporters who criticize the government are not allowed back in the country. With the creation of the Higher Media Council and the Audiovisual Commission, the Jordanian monarchy feigned an opening up of the free press yet the organization was packed with officers and employees dependent on the monarchy, “leaving civil society unable to fully exploit the communicative potential of the new technologies, to engage in truly open digital spaces, or to elaborate the kind of conversations which can lead to a new normative consensus on the appropriate nature and role of state and society.”²⁷³ In addition to the commission, “the process of approving broadcast licenses to political conditions, overseen by the Commission but ultimately subject to the minister of information and the Council of Ministers”²⁷⁴ who need offer no explanation for the denial of such a license.

This continues today, “King Abdullah II says that he advocates a transparency in the press, indicating that there is nothing to hide and that Jordan has nothing to fear. However, there is only one press association in Jordan and all journalists are expected to belong to the Jordan Press Association,”²⁷⁵ which is clearly meant to control the flow of information. Abdullah II wants to appear as modern, liberal ruler but he refuses to allow anything to threaten his power as the monarch. This is a typical strategy used by the Jordanian monarchy in which they simulate liberalization while retaining the monopoly of power in order to appease internal and international pressure for democratization.

²⁷¹ “Jordan,” *Freedom House*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/jordan?page=22&year=2010&country=7849>.

²⁷² Metz, *Jordan*, 219.

²⁷³ Murphy, “The Arab State and (Absent) Civility in New Communicative Spaces”.

²⁷⁴ Murphy, “The Arab State and (Absent) Civility in New Communicative Spaces”.

²⁷⁵ “Jordan,” *Press Reference*, 2011, <http://www.pressreference.com/Gu-Ku/Jordan.html>.

Conclusion

In Jordan and Morocco, the media plays a dependent and submissive role to the monarchy. While there are efforts to increase the freedoms of the press, these movements are met with subversive actions by the state, allowing the government to maintain their monopoly over information. These “regimes use combinations of dependent regulatory bodies, arbitrary and expensive licensing arrangements, content prohibitions, financial penalties and criminalization, which tie owners, editors and journalists into a tight system of self-censorship.”²⁷⁶ This control allows the government to shape civil society. It places the monarchy at an advantage within the greater power structure of both Jordan and Morocco. These two monarchies utilize their control over the media in order to manage civil society and in turn stabilize their roles in their individual countries.

Opposition Movements

As previously discussed, the presence of multiple political parties has allowed the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco to act as mediators. The space provided for opposition movements, while limited, has moved these groups from underground to the public sphere allowing the monarch to monitor and limit the powers of these groups. The public and the international community have come to see this movement as a sign of political liberalism, but for the monarchy “it was a tactical strategy to ensure regime survival.”²⁷⁷

Morocco

Political parties are critical in the Moroccan political system and the position of the monarchy within that system. In order for the king to be the mediator between parties, he needs a multiparty system. Therefore it is necessary to have opposition movements. However, the power

²⁷⁶ Murphy, “The Arab State and (Absent) Civility in New Communicative Spaces.”

²⁷⁷ Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan”, 609.

of these movements must be limited. There is a fine line between an opposition movement being useful for the monarchy and it being dangerous. The monarchy exploits “the country’s fragmented political parties”²⁷⁸ in order to diffuse popular discontent facing the government.

The main opposition party in Morocco in the Islamic Justice and Development Party (PJD). In the 2007 elections, the “opposition parties, which had criticized the elections as unfair, gained fewer seats than expected. The largest, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), placed second with 46 seats.”²⁷⁹ While these legal political parties have some rights and power, other opposition movements are not so lucky. The Justice and Charity Movement “is illegal but generally tolerated by the authorities. Other, more explicitly nonviolent Islamist groups that criticize the monarchical system are harassed by authorities and not permitted to participate in the political process.”²⁸⁰ This type of harassment is typical of the government. The government refuses to allow dissenters to flourish; popular parties, groups that could gain popular support and prove a threat to the monarchy, are quickly shut down. However, by playing by the rules of the monarchy in order to legitimize their organizations and “by accepting a framework drawn up by the monarchy, the opposition shows its submission to royal power.”²⁸¹ Repression comes in the form of license denials, fines, the detention of members, and unwarranted or suspicious arrests, which was a tactic seen in the repression of the press.

Jordan

Political parties were made legal in Jordan in 1993 under the reign of Hussein. However, the space created and the powers available to these groups were severely limited. Political activities are restricted to political parties; no non-traditional actors are allowed to enter this

²⁷⁸ “Freedom in the World: Morocco,” *Freedom House*.

²⁷⁹ “Freedom in the World: Morocco,” *Freedom House*.

²⁸⁰ “Freedom in the World: Morocco,” *Freedom House*.

²⁸¹ Kostiner, 128.

sphere.²⁸² The importance of this space cannot be ignored. While it is a limited freedom, the existence of room for opposition allows the monarchy to appear democratic while monitoring anyone who may be a threat.

Political parties are restricted entities that must constantly fight for their freedoms. These organizations are frequently denied their right of assembly.²⁸³ In addition to this, there is constant harassment by the Jordanian security forces, which are traditionally highly loyal to the monarchy. “In 2007, security forces arrested nine members of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the main opposition party and the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, for ‘threatening national security’ ahead of that year’s municipal and parliamentary elections.”²⁸⁴ In 2008, a new law went into effect which required political parties to have broader membership bases, reducing the number of registered political parties from 37 to 14.²⁸⁵ These tactics are similar to those used to limit the power of the press. These liberalization policies, while diminished by the regulatory laws put in place by the monarchy, are still pivotal in alleviating pressure and discontent.

Conclusion

Opposition movements are important to the political system. Not only does this space show how liberal and progressive the monarchies are but it allows for a cathartic release of discontent by the public. However, opposition movements are a tool of these monarchies. They are severely restricted and limited so that they do not become unwieldy or pose a threat to the stability of the monarchies. Opposition groups are given an inch, and crushed by the government if they try to take a mile.

²⁸² Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan,” 611.

²⁸³ “Freedom in the World: Jordan,” *Freedom House*.

²⁸⁴ “Freedom in the World: Jordan,” *Freedom House*.

²⁸⁵ “Freedom in the World: Jordan,” *Freedom House*.

NGOs/Aid Organizations

Non-governmental and aid organizations are a large part of civil society. This segment of civil society assists the government by absorbing some of the demands placed on the state. Organizations of this type include medical clinics, soup kitchens, human rights and support groups. Aid organizations alleviate the immediate needs of the people which increase the margin of acceptable living conditions for the public i.e. due to their needs being met by aid organizations, they are less likely to revolt against the government. The government does not overextend itself trying to fulfill the basic needs of their people because these basic necessities are being supplemented by aid organizations.

Morocco

NGOs are fairly active in Morocco however, these organizations are heavily monitored. “The authorities monitor Islamist groups and arrest suspected extremists.”²⁸⁶ After the terrorist attacks in 2003, NGOs with any link to extremism or any Islamic group faced harassment from the government. The high rate of unemployment in Morocco makes NGOs a necessity for stability. These organizations not only offer an alternative outlet for action but it also can help families survive through tough times. These groups include everything from caring for basic needs to religious counseling and job training. This area allows the public a place to vent and a place to feel useful. Comparatively in the Middle East and North Africa, NGOs in Morocco have more freedoms but “groups that offend the government face harassment.”²⁸⁷ These harassments include detainment and detention.

However, there have also been quite a few successes for civil society in Morocco in the last 20 years. NGOs in Morocco “led the current King Mohammed VI to directly establish the

²⁸⁶ “Freedom in the World: Morocco,” *Freedom House*.

²⁸⁷ “Freedom in the World: Morocco,” *Freedom House*.

first truth commission in the Arab world, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER)²⁸⁸ for the dark political period under his father Hassan II. In addition to the truth council, the changes in family code have been a victory for women's organizations. There are people who are fighting for change and who are succeeding however, this change comes only at the approval of the monarchy. Organizations must work within the small boundaries they have at the pleasure of the monarchy. Without monarchical approval or concession, very few of these successes would have occurred. With regards to the two examples mention above, it cost the monarchy very little to allow these changes while it gained stability and legitimacy both internally and internationally. NGOs are another tool for the monarchy. Its area of play in society is limited so that NGOs do not become a challenge to the monarchy. So long are NGOs are benefiting the monarchy, they will be maintained by the monarchy.

Jordan

NGOs in Jordan have more freedoms than political parties and the press. However, "the government is considering new legislation that would severely limit their independence. Under the measure, the government would be able to supervise NGO budgets, reject foreign funding, and veto individual programs planned by the organizations."²⁸⁹ This legislation has yet to pass though "the government currently puts occasional pressure on NGOs' activities."²⁹⁰ These groups are restricted from entering the political sphere. Political activism by NGOs is prohibited by two laws, "the first is the Law of Societies and Social Organizations, Law 33 of 1966" under which voluntary organizations "can only be formed 'to provide social services without any

²⁸⁸ Moha Ennaji, "Civil Society Transforming Morocco," *Common Ground News Services*, 29 June 2010, <http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=28059&lan=en&sp=0>.

²⁸⁹ "Freedom in the World: Jordan," *Freedom House*.

²⁹⁰ "Freedom in the World: Jordan," *Freedom House*.

intention of financial gains or other personal gains, including political gains.”²⁹¹ The second law is the Political Party Law of 1992 (Law 32) “which stipulates that ‘the use of the premises, instrumentalities, and assets of association, charitable organizations and clubs for the benefit of any partisan organization shall be prohibited.’”²⁹² The government demands that the political sphere not enter the sphere of non-governmental organizations. This demand is almost impossible to adhere to as any cultural organization with a problem would need to turn to politics to create change. For example, women rights organizations would address both political and cultural issues that women face in Jordan. In 1996, activists from the Center or Women’s Studies “met to discuss how to promote female candidates in the 1997 elections... After the meeting, leaders in the organization were detained by the mukhabarat (intelligence/ security forces) for questioning and told to desist from such activities.”²⁹³ The monarchy enforces particular laws in order to limit the space for organized rebellion. While both political parties and NGOs are heavily monitored by the government, all non-profit organizations must register with the Ministry of Social Development while other groups such as labor unions and political parties must register with the Ministry of the Interior. This is a continuation of the division of culture and politics. This is the monarchy's way of appearing to create democracy and freedom while still maintaining complete control over the situation; “democratization [is] neither a value nor a virtue but an instrument.”²⁹⁴ And the government utilizes this instrument to its full advantage.

Conclusion

NGOs lessen the demands of the people on the state. The pressure that the NGOs are able to alleviate allows the monarchy to manage the public. If basic needs are being met by NGOs

²⁹¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan,” *Middle East Journal* 53.4 (1999), *ProQuest Biology Journals*, Web. 2 Apr 2012, 609-610, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218553935/fulltextPDF/135D9FE88FC2829FCE3/5?accountid=12605>.

²⁹² Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan,” 609 – 610.

²⁹³ Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan,” 610.

²⁹⁴ Kostiner, 108.

and aid organizations, the people are less likely to rebel against the state. A recent article in Reuters had the head line: “Global food prices rose in March for a third straight month with more hikes to come, the UN's food agency said on Thursday, adding to fears of hunger and a new wave of social unrest in poor countries”²⁹⁵ which reveals how much stability rests on the basic needs of the people being met. If NGOs are aiding the people by giving away food, something the government also does, and then the people are less likely to rebel. The NGOs abilities to assist the people and the space that is proved permits minor dissent, allows the government to put its resources into other areas in order to maintain their power.

Maintaining a Supportive Base

The Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies maintained a strong supportive base within their countries in order to maintain control. A monarchy is nothing without citizens who follow it. While broad public support can go far, monarchs also need elite followers with money and power the keep their monarchies from crumbling. By supporting the military and the elites, the monarchy is able to keep them invested in the system. Jordan and Morocco maintain these bases in a similar manner, through the patron-client system.

Morocco

The patron-client system is well established in Morocco. The king uses the power to appoint positions as leverage in order to keep elite subjects loyal to him. The Moroccan monarchy rewards its loyal followers with positions of prestige. Hasan II granted more and more power the ulema and developed a mutual relationship with them in order to maintain the monarch's power. With Islamists uprising, Hasan II needed to appear more religious in order to

²⁹⁵ Svetlana Kovalyova and Veronica Brown, “World Food Prices Rise Further, Raising Fears of Unrest,” *Reuters.com*, 5 Apr 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-food-fao-idUSBRE8331CU20120405?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2FtopNews+%28News+%2F+US+%2F+Top+News%29.

maintain the public opinion. By improving the status of the ulema and the religious community, he was able to negate the criticisms of the Islamists. He granted close friends and loyalists prominent positions in his cabinet, such as the Minister of Interior. He also used positions and presents to sway elite members of society to his side; “the king did not neglect to consult them [the opposition], give them rewarding missions, offer them presents, or grant them favors.”²⁹⁶ Economic privileges are also granted through this system. This method of nepotism and clientelism allowed the monarchy to reward the loyal and maintain a strong base in society.

Jordan

During the 1940s and 1950s, the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was able to come together relatively smoothly at a time when most monarchies were facing rebellions and coups due to pan-Arab, nationalist, and socialist political movements. King Abdullah I was able to do this by exploiting the divide in the urban elite and by creating a strong military base from the Bedouin tribes. He created an elite military with the Bedouin tribes which gave the tribes prestige and money. This also helped incorporate the Bedouins into Jordanian society. It created a very loyal military which became the “unflinching protector of the existing power.”²⁹⁷ This supportive base in the military proved to be invaluable for the monarchy and still is today. During times of crisis, the Jordanian monarch rules by military power. The regime was able “to reward and maintain the loyalty of its original Jordanian subjects with ever-increasing incorporation into the bureaucracy, the military, and the other arms.”²⁹⁸ The Jordanian monarch was able to present new positions of power as rewards. These were not just positions in the

²⁹⁶ Remy Leveau, “The Moroccan Monarchy: A Political System in Quest of a New Equilibrium,” *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 127.

²⁹⁷ Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy,” 94.

²⁹⁸ Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy,” 92.

military but also include positions in the ministry for “‘old’ Transjordanians [who] remained loyal to the king during critical times.”²⁹⁹

Conclusion

This form of clientelism is rampant in both of the regimes. It creates a strong support base that can stabilize the monarchy in times of need. While this system exists, there is also social mobility based on merit; it is possible for lower classes to rise through the ranks. This keeps the lower classes appeased while the elites feel validated in their support of their monarchs. Monarchies have “sometimes come to be seen as a preferred system providing much-needed balance, stability, and authority for societies experiencing upheavals of social, economical, and cultural change,”³⁰⁰ elites are invested in keeping the monarchy around because they fear what will happen if the monarchy falls. The monarch is the source of their privileged treatment, without him they lose their social, political, and economical positions. The elites are now dependent on the king in order to maintain their way of life. This relationship creates dependency and a loyal base who have personal interests in the maintaining the monarchy.

Conclusion

The purpose of civil society is to give the public an open forum in which they can fully express themselves. Both Abdullah II and Mohammed VI act as champions for freedom and democracy by allowing civil society to exist. This appearance has given the both of the monarchies stability. The citizens of these countries do not overburden the political system with their demands nor do they expect the monarchy to fulfill all of their demands because civil society and political instruments act as a buffer between the monarch and the public. “Without

²⁹⁹ Tareq Ismael, *Middle East Politics Today: Government and Civil Society* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001) 295.

³⁰⁰ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New Explanations,” *Middle East Monarchies: the Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 37.

avenues of political participation ... [people] were unable to voice their concerns through formal political structures and instead carried their grievances into the streets”³⁰¹ but civil society creates outlet for these concerns other than the streets.

Opposition groups cannot claim that the government is not giving them space in the public sphere when both the electoral system and civil society have space for these organizations, though restricted. This small concession to opposition groups and the public allow both to feel as though they play a personal, political role in their government. In reality, civil society and democracy is, “for the regime, ... a sophisticated means of control.”³⁰²

The importance of civil society should not be understated. This is the arena the people can resist or push back against the government. The government on the other hand was able to construct this area with severe limitations. The monarchy did this so that even in areas in which they concede to the public, they still end up on top. One example of this is elections. The government holds them, at their pleasure, for the people whose vote is virtually insignificant due to the multitude of ways that the monarchy can manipulate the whole political system. Civil society is a necessary part of a public system because it limits the demands placed on the government. With the existence of a multi-party government, the public can interact with the political system in a way that seems meaningful. As political parties are an outlet for opposition, so are political parties an outlet for societal concerns. With multiple parties, citizens don't feel forced to take one path; they have choice in their government, where or not those groups actually have power, the people had a say. “Driven by a concern for stability, the contours of democratization are shaped by regime survival interests, not by democratic principles. As a

³⁰¹ Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan,” 608.

³⁰² Kostiner, 108-109.

result, democratic practices are accompanied by repression and continued authoritarian tendencies.”³⁰³

³⁰³Wiktrowicz, “The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: the Case of Jordan,” 620.

Chapter IV: The Monarch as a National Symbol

Instrumental in allowing the monarchical governments of Jordan and Morocco to maintain stability and power, is the strong identity that has been created between the state and the government. Both the Jordanian and the Moroccan modern identities have been built by the kings in such a manner that the complete identity of the nation and the people rest on the shoulders of the monarchy. In addition to national identity, personal identifiers such as religion have been adopted in order to strengthen the individual's connection to the king. Due to the tribal cultures that existed in Jordan and Morocco before the introduction monarchy, and still exist today, it is culturally historical to built unity and loyalty based on similarities while separating themselves from the other. Every nation and group creates identity by defining specific qualities that represent the group while creating a line of demarcation for the "other", everyone else in the world. This is clearly done in Morocco and Jordan. The strong religious and national identity that link the monarch to the people has lead to greater stability in these two governments and is necessary for the survival of these monarchies.

The Role of Religion in Maintaining Royal Legitimacy

Legitimacy and identity in the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies are strengthened through connecting the monarchies to Islam. Religion is an important component to the stability of both of these governments. It is through Islam that both monarchies create legitimacy. In Jordan, this legitimacy is claimed through lineage. While Morocco also claims a similar lineage, it has a more substantial connection to religion through Sufi traditions. Historically, Islam has a political nature in conjunction with the personal aspect. By emphasizing the connection between Islam and the government, the monarchy is able to set a pious tone to their ruling. Both

monarchies are utilizing popular Islam and creating a strong link between faith and the state. Islam has become both a pillar of nationalism and a pillar of the monarchy.

Historically

The Prophet Muhammad received his first revelation from the Angel Gabriel in the 610 CE.³⁰⁴ The suras he received from 610 to 622 CE created a period of revelations known as the Meccan period; the topics covered in this part of the Qur'an focus on morals and virtues. However, in the year 622 CE, this changes drastically.³⁰⁵ This was the year of the Hijra when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers migrated to Medina. At this point, Muhammad became both the political and religious leader of the community. His revelations also took a more political bent. After the Prophet's death, the Muslim community continued to practice this tradition in which the political and religious systems are married together. It was believed that a great leader must be imbued with both political and religious knowledge because he who knew the most about the path to Allah could best lead the community to Allah.

The Islamic civilization then adopted a system of government maintained the status of the religious/political leader as the head of the state. Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the community continued to be led by religious leaders. The first four leaders after the death of the Prophet are known as the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. The first caliph was Abu Bakr, the first male to convert to Islam, who ruled from 632 to 634 CE.³⁰⁶ Abu Bakr short reign was followed by 'Umar from 634 to 644 CE.³⁰⁷ It was under 'Umar that the Muslim armies conquered land for the Muslim community and spread Islam outside of the Arabian Peninsula. 'Umar was followed

³⁰⁴ David Waines, *An Introduction to Islam* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2003), 14.

³⁰⁵ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 17.

³⁰⁶ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 501.

³⁰⁷ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 501.

by Uthman (r. 644-656 CE) who was less politically adept.³⁰⁸ At this time there were clashes between the Umayya and the Hashim clans over power. Uthman was killed by fellow Muslims who blamed him for the oppressive rule of the Umayya in Egypt. The last of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs was ‘Ali, the nephew and son-in-law to the Prophet, who ruled from 656 to 661 CE.³⁰⁹ Under the rule of Ali, a civil war occurred, and he was killed. All of these leaders were close to the Prophet and were perceived to be more knowledgeable about Islam and the right path for the Muslim community due to their connection with the Prophet Muhammad.

The following centuries were filled with caliphates that strived to gather more and more power. However, these governments still maintained a strong connection to Islam. Their leaders were not just political figures but also religious figures. After the death of ‘Ali in 661 CE, Mu’awia, a man from the Umayyad family, took control and created a new caliphate.³¹⁰ The Umayyad Caliphate was located in present day Syria. It was this caliphate that created a hereditary dynasty in the Islamic world, a notion that became part of popular Islam and can be seen today in the belief that *baraka* (blessing) is passed down through lineage. The Umayyad Caliphate was overthrown by the Abbasids in 750 CE.³¹¹ The Fatimid Caliphate was established in the 10th century.³¹² By the 13th century anarchy and small principalities ruled the area known as the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire, which would rule the Middle East until World War I, was established by Osman I around 1300 CE. During this period the sultan was “the absolute ruler of both the state and the Muslim community.”³¹³ While the ruler did not necessarily spend time on religious life, the connection between the leader and Islam granted legitimacy to the government.

³⁰⁸ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 501.

³⁰⁹ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 501.

³¹⁰ Waines, *Islam*, 46.

³¹¹ Hourani, *Arab Peoples*, 32-33.

³¹² Waines, *Islam*, 59.

³¹³ Tareq Ismael, *Government and Politics in the Contemporary Middle East*, 23.

The link between the political and the religious is deeply entrenched in Islamic societies. The Qur'an and the life of the Prophet implicitly link religion and politics. The period of the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs is considered the Golden Age of Islam. It is an idealized period where the Muslim community was peaceful, prosperous, and pious. This ideal has created a plethora of rhetoric which encourages a return to the Islamic Golden Age through specific practices; this includes integrating aspects of Islam into the government, just as the Prophet did. The Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have utilized religion to create legitimacy for their governments and to foster loyalty from their citizens.

Morocco

While the history of the entire Middle East is steeped in Islam, the Moroccan state has a unique connection with the religion going back to the spread of Islam under Caliph 'Umar in 634 CE. The warriors that set forth to push the boundaries of the Islamic empire felt that it was their duty to protect and spread Islam. These pious warriors lived on the edge of civilization and renounced the rest of the world. This caused Sufism to spread to Imazighen tribes and "Islam became firmly established among them."³¹⁴ The cyclical nature of the Imazighen dynasties also had a religious component. As previously mentioned, as a tribe grew weak, a new tribe would conquer them and then settle in their place, becoming the next dynasty. These religious outsiders saw the weakening dynasty as a corrupt and veering away from Allah; they "[had] (completely) forgotten the period of desert life and toughness, as if it had never existed."³¹⁵ The outside tribe would come in to revive Islam and create a more perfect governmental system that follows the path to Allah.

³¹⁴ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 332.

³¹⁵ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 345.

As tribes became more established, small states started to develop. Power extended from the center much like a spider's web and on the fringe of society were the Imazighen tribes. Islam then became a vital part to the peace keeping process among these Imazighen tribes. These tribes existed outside the control of the *makhzen*, the central government; they roamed the *siba*, the Moroccan "wild west". As explained in Gellner's *Saints of the Atlas*, tribal conflicts were often settled by "artificial outsiders [who] perform functions which enable the egalitarian, feud-addicted tribesmen to work their remarkably pure segmentary system."³¹⁶ This outsider, the *marabout*, was derived from the strong Sufi belief in saints. While it is *haram* (forbidden) to pray to saints, in popular Islam people pray through the saints to Allah. If the saint chooses to do so, he can intercept the prayer and bring it to Allah. It is believed that the descendents of these saints too have a closer relationship to Allah through their ancestors. From all of this comes the *marabout* who has a stronger connection to Allah through a saint and because of this, he is better equipped to make decisions that follow Allah's decrees. The *marabout* plays the role of the mediator between two tribes and is highly respected. In Morocco, the modern *marabout* is the king. He is a Sharifian and claims descendent from the family of the Prophet. This connection gives him *baraka* and allows him to commune more effectively with Allah. The current monarchy creates power by being the mediator. When Gellner refers "saints"³¹⁷ in his piece, he is referring to the *marabout*; today in Morocco, the king has assumed the role of the saint, peacefully mediating conflict and upholding sharia, the law of Allah. Islam was fundamental in the creation of the current Moroccan government.

Due to a strong foundation in Islam, the Moroccan monarch placed himself at the top of the religious hierarchy. He is not only a political leader but a religious one. His official state title

³¹⁶ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 64.

³¹⁷ Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas*, 1.

is *imer al-mu'meneen*, Commander of the Faithful. This elevates the king and helps stabilize his position. A religious leader with a strong familial connection to the Prophet Muhammad carries a lot of respect in Morocco due to their history with Sufism. Islam also permeates the legal system in Morocco. Their laws are a mix of shari'a and French law. Another symbol of Islam in the government is the flag of Morocco, which has a pentacle on it, a symbol of the five pillars of Islam.³¹⁸ The Moroccan monarchy has created a government that is heavily tied to the main religion of its people; 99% of the Moroccan people identify as Muslim.³¹⁹ The people are more heavily invested in this government and feel that it better represents their needs and desires because it follows Allah's commands. There is also a greater trust in the monarch because of his position as the country's *marabout*. Islam has become a large part of the national identity and an important stabilizer.

The permeation of Islam in the government originally gave the system and the state legitimacy. Now, the monarchy rests on the prestige of being a religious figure in the country. Today, Mohammed VI legitimacy has come from the transition from charisma to tradition. *Baraka* was originally successful not just due to the belief in the connection, but also due to the charismatic *marabout* who solved conflicts. This belief over the years has become a tradition which supports the monarchy. The parallels created between the system of the *siba*, a place of purity and true Islam, and the creation of the modern monarchy are not by happenstance. The monarchy was created in the image of the *siba*'s system so the Moroccan people could transfer their beliefs and traditions easily to the modern government. The Moroccan monarchy utilizes these beliefs and these traditions in order to maintain their own stability and the loyalty of the people to the monarchy. It's effective as demonstrated by the protests in Morocco in early 2012.

³¹⁸ "Morocco," *CIA World Factbook*.

³¹⁹ "Morocco," *CIA World Factbook*.

The people called for a new prime minister and for more freedoms but there was no movement to get rid of the monarchy.

Jordan

A strong connection between Islam and the monarchy can also be seen in Jordan. Though there isn't the same historical precedent, the Jordanian public elevates the monarch because of his religious status. The Hashemite monarchy traces its roots to the Hashim clan. This clan was a large group within the Quraish, the clan of the Prophet. Much like in Morocco, this familial connection to the Prophet invokes, for the general public, a spiritual connection between the king and Allah. The king has *baraka* and through him, so does all of Jordan. The Hashemite monarchy also focuses on its family's history as the protector of the Hejaz. King Abdullah I, the first king of Jordan, was the son of Sharif Hussein bin Ali who was the protector of both Medina and Mecca. The Hashemite clan traditionally protected the holy sites of Islam. Now it falls under the purview of Saudi Arabia however, the Hashemite clan still has a prominent record as protectors of Islam.

The king is able to use the public's faith to stabilize his own monarchy. He creates a strong personal connection between the government and the people through religion. According to the CIA World Factbook, 92% of Jordanians are Sunni Muslims.³²⁰ This homogenizes the population. Though the people's adherence to Islamic creeds varies across the populace, "devotion to and identification with the faith [is] high."³²¹ Islam is a major segment of the national identity of Jordan; it's part of the common culture of the people. The government utilizes this, thus Islam is heavily embedded within the government. King Abdullah stated that "the values of the faithful are at the heart of Jordanian society. Jordanians come from the

³²⁰ "Jordan," *CIA World Factbook*.

³²¹ Metz, *Jordan*, 103.

different faiths but they share a piety that is powerful and central to their daily lives.”³²² The monarchy emphasizes its connection to Islam through drawing a connection between the Prophet and the monarch, as well as showing the king to be a pious man who strives for an Islamic society. Many of the symbols of the Jordan state reveal this relationship. The Jordan flag is composed of red, white, and green stripes; “these colours were associated with the Prophet and his successors turned them into ‘charismatic’ colours imbued with divine power.”³²³ The colors have religious significance whether they are the color of the prophet’s banner or the color of his cloak, the use of these particular colors as the national flag reveals the significant connection the state has with Islam. In addition to the colored stripes on the flag, there is a seven pointed star on the flag which represents the first seven verses of the first Sura of the Qur’an. As Emile Durkheim states, banners are a manner “by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the visible mark of its personality”³²⁴ and the Jordanian banner marks the state as religious. Also the motto of the country is “*Allah, al –watan, al- malik*” which translates to “God, Homeland, and King”. Islamic themes are dispersed within the monarchy and the king uses Islam to create a viable connection to his people. Within the Jordanian constitution, the king must be a Muslim son of Muslim parents.³²⁵ These examples highlight the relationship between Islam and the government.

The Jordanian people want a government to reflect Islamic values much like many Americans want the United States to reflect core Christian values. The monarch has tapped into

³²² “Faith” listed under Vision, *King Abdullah II Official Website*, http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/150.html.

³²³ Elie Podeh, “The Symbolism of the Arab flag in Modern Arab States: between Commonality and Uniqueness,” in vol. 17 of *Nations and Nationalism* (2011), 419–442, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00475.x/full#>.

³²⁴ Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religion*, trans. J. W. Swain. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1976), 206.

³²⁵ “The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” 1956, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html.

this desire. The government builds code upon the moral grounds of Islam. While the government may be utilizing Islam as a tool, it is still accepted by a majority of people due to the fact that their morals are being incorporated into the government none the less. However, there are Islamist groups who do disparage the king for not implementing shari'a strongly enough. On Abdullah II's website, he has a segment devoted to the faith within his description of his vision for the country. "As a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), King Abdullah has made the Islamic principles of justice, peace, social harmony and tolerance central to his agenda for the nation."³²⁶ By putting the monarch in a place of religious significance, the people can connect to him on multiple levels; he's not just the political leader but also a paragon of the faith.

Conclusion

Religion is clearly influential in the lives of the Jordanian and Moroccan people. It is common throughout the world for individuals to turn to their religion in times of need. The monarchies in both countries, by being the face of Islam, give their people something tangible on which to focus. These monarchies "celebrate and reinforce identification with ... the universalist attachments - to a transcendent god... [and they] supply money to support... religious institutions and allow them space to operate publically."³²⁷ This broad connection to a vast majority of the population is important for both the Moroccan and Jordanian kings. They create an aura around them of piety and then are able to both deflect criticism and make sweeping decisions because they are respected as wise and pious Muslims with a strong connection to Allah.

³²⁶ Faith," listed under Vision, *King Abdullah II Official Website*, http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/150.html.

³²⁷ Lisa Anderson, "Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive," *Middle East Monarchies: the Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Joseph Kostiner, Lynne Rienner Publishers (Boulder: 2000), 57.

Religion, Islam specifically, has created a common ground on which the monarchy is built. This strong, cultural identity has strengthened the place of the monarchy within society and with the people. It is utilized by both monarchies in order to maintain a supportive base and the people's loyalty. Due to the political nature of Islam, it was easy for the monarchies to adopt a religious tone. With such large portions of Moroccan and Jordanian populations identifying as Muslim, this identity has strength and weight in society. This isn't to say that religion is enough to keep a monarchy stable. Religion isn't strong enough to keep nations together, if it was then the Islamic empire would still exist today; "religious propaganda cannot materialize without group feeling."³²⁸ However, religion, as part of a national identity and as part of the monarchy, presents the kings in Jordan and Morocco on a platform with which most of the public can associate.³²⁹ This common bond is not enough on its own but in addition to other aspects, it affords the monarchy legitimacy and a broad public base.

Nationalism

"Nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond."³³⁰ This modern phenomenon we know as nationalism started to develop during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while European society was undergoing radical changes.³³¹ While it is critical to societies today, during the development of the modern states in the Middle East, it did not exist in the area. Far more prevalent was tribal allegiance; there were no states with central governments for nationalism to be built around. When the French and the British gained control over the Middle East in the early twentieth century, they arbitrarily drew boundaries. Nationalism needed to be created. Most people within these new boundaries felt no

³²⁸ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 322.

³²⁹ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 320-322.

³³⁰ Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 3.

³³¹ Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 1.

loyalty to each other outside of tribes and family. The monarchies were able to create and shaped nationalism as it formed. As nationalism was developed within these two modern states, the monarchs enhanced their standing in society by placing themselves at the center of nationalist fervor. The state image is crafted around the ruling families and therefore the nation becomes dependent on the monarchy as the symbol of their state. The nations of both Jordan and Morocco are so intertwined with the monarchy that a regime change would signal the end of the nation. These monarchs are now a vital part of that history and culture; so much so that their end would be a dramatic blow to the nationalistic feeling that has been building for many years. These monarchies now are essential to the identity of the state.

Morocco

The Moroccan king has put himself as the very center of every aspect of Moroccan life and has built the Moroccan identity around himself. The Moroccan monarch has a more historically legitimate link to the land and the people than the Jordanian monarch claims. The rise of nationalism in Morocco arose from anti-imperialism. The founding monarch, Mohammed V, was exalted as a nationalist for freeing Morocco from the French. The position of Mohammed V allowed him to center the identity and the freedom of the state on the Moroccan monarchy; the monarch was the epitome of Moroccan nationalism.

Symbols of the strong presences of the monarchy are apparent everywhere in Morocco. The national anthem focuses on the importance of the monarchy. The Moroccan monarchy's familial connection is the subject of their national anthem, "Hymn of the Sharif"³³² (see appendix II). This anthem refers to the king as the champion of the people who "has risen and answered

³³² "Morocco," *CIA World Factbook*.

your call.”³³³ The modern monarchy, and the Alaouite dynasty, is a deeply embedded in contemporary Moroccan culture. One of the national holidays in Morocco is called “Throne Day” and refers to the day that Mohammed VI ascended the throne in 1999. This festive celebration of the monarchy positively reaffirms his place in the lives of his people. Even the international airport in Casablanca is named after the founder of the kingdom, King Mohammed V. The Moroccan monarchy inserts itself into the daily life of its people; there are constant reminders of the monarchy. It would be near impossible for a day to pass by without some reminder of their king.

The Moroccan king has created a public image of a wise and pious Muslim, solving the problems of his people. Moroccan national identity is founded on the institution of the monarchy. The monarchy is prevalent in all aspects of Moroccan civil and political life; the Moroccan people have built their personal identity around the king’s presence in their lives. Mohammed VI is not just a religious and a political leader but the very symbol of what it means to be Moroccan.

Jordan

The rise of nationalism within Jordan was orchestrated by the monarchy. When trying to build nationalism within the citizens, Abdullah I placed the monarchy at the center of the identity of Jordan. This nation-state was completely constructed by the British in order to uphold the agreement made to Sharif Hussein Ali for his support during World War I. There was absolutely no concept of a Transjordanian identity before the creation of the state.

As previously discussed, the religious spectrum of Jordanian identity is a stabilizing factor in Jordan. Religion, however, is not a strong enough connection to hold people together.

³³³ “Moroccan National Anthem,” *Lyrics on Demand*,
<http://www.lyricsondemand.com/miscellaneouslyrics/nationalanthemlyrics/morocconationalanthemlyrics.html>.

There needs to be more. This is why nationalism is so important; it creates an emotional attachment to the state. Jordanians must bond with their fellow citizens in a manner that separates them from the rest of the world. Jordanian national identity is strongly represented by the monarch.

In Jordan, much is done to continue and protect the image of the king. It's highly frowned upon for tourists take pictures of the images of the king in the streets.³³⁴ The state doesn't want these pictures to end up displaying the king in a negative manner. The national anthem of Jordan is "Long Live the King of Jordan" (see appendix I) and the official name of the state both refers back not only to the monarchy but also to the family. Jordan is not just any type of kingdom but a Hashemite kingdom. This allows the monarchy to appear as a historical institution in the land. The king draws associations between the land and the monarch as if his family has always been there and will be forever. These titles tie the people to the king; the general public is reminded of their king every day. A Mount Holyoke student, who studied in Amman, Jordan for three months said "they let them [the king and royal family] do whatever they want,"³³⁵ showing that the monarch is held in such high esteem by the people that the monarch has very little restrictions on any of his actions. This is not to say that there aren't people who are dissatisfied with the monarchy or who want to end the monarchy but, even during the protests in Jordan in the spring of 2011, there was no call for the end of the monarchy. For the most part it seems as though the monarchy is so ingrained in the Jordanian identity that they are inseparable.

Integration of Tribal Identity

As both monarchies cultivate a national identity dependent on the king and the royal family, they have also started to embody the tribal identity of the Imazighen (Morocco) and

³³⁴ Hannah Howard, during an interview, 2011.

³³⁵ Howard, 2011.

Bedouins (Jordan). As these tribal groups seek to become a larger part of the national identity and discourse, the monarchs are moving to incorporate this culture into their public personas. The tribal culture has assisted in the foundation of both monarchies. In Morocco, the government is loosely based on the tribal rule of mediation from the *siba*. In Jordan, the King Abdullah I had support from the local tribes. Both cultures are incorporating tribal customs into their everyday lives. “Monarchies emphasize the primacy of kinship”³³⁶ within a society in order to legitimize dynastic succession. By including tribal identity in their state identity, these two monarchs are also able to elongate their history and emphasize their connection to the nation. Tribal culture has traditional authenticity while modernized cultures are often tainted and even seen as imported from imperialistic European cultures.

Conclusion

Nationalism grew rapidly in the Arab world after World War II and there were fierce fights for independence. At this time, many monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa were overthrown because the monarchies were seen as stooges of European powers. In these countries nationalism was built in opposition to the monarchs. However, the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies were able to make themselves the centers of nationalism in their countries. King Mohammed V was often seen as a hero for removing the French from Morocco while King Abdullah I was able to encourage and embody the nationalist feeling because he was creating it. Jordan was a new state being developed out of nowhere and Abdullah I was able to direct the growth of nationalism. By putting the monarchy and the royal families at the center of the state's nationalism, there is a strong, direct link between what it means to be either Jordanian or Moroccan and their respective kings. “The existence of the community [has] become completely

³³⁶ Anderson, “Dynasts and Nationalists,” 57.

identified with the authority of the monarchy.”³³⁷ This stabilizes the place of the king by making him intrinsically associated with the nation and the state. The public from the day they were born to the day they die connect the monarchy to the state. They become inseparable in the mind of the public.

³³⁷ Huntington, *Political Orders*, 180.

Chapter V: “Arab Spring”

On December 17, 2010, the self immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi was a turning point in the lives of peoples across the Middle East and North Africa.³³⁸ This young man, a fruit seller in Tunisia, who could no longer stand the injustice of his place and his society, lit himself on fire in front of the municipal offices in Sidi Bouzid. He would later die on January 4, 2010,³³⁹ never knowing the inspiration he became in the face of dictatorships in the Middle East and North Africa.

Protests and riots swept across the region and have ignited protests across the globe. In Tunisia, December was a month of protests and violence. The police that were sent in to crush the unrest opened live fire upon unarmed citizens. This typical behavior from the government and the intolerance of their lives, cause the people to fight back against the government. Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, the president of Tunisia, who had been in power since 1987, was forced to leave Tunisia within two months. The power and fervor behind these protests and the results that were achieved were unprecedented in the Middle East.

After the fall of the Ben Ali government, several other governments came under public pressure to either change or leave. Almost all of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa saw protests, including Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Jordan, and Morocco. While protests in Egypt resulted in the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s protests turned into a violent civil war that eventually forced Muammar Qaddafi out of power. Not all of the protests have gone

³³⁸Sofiene Chourabi, “ Special from Tunisia: Self-immolation by Desperate Youth Sets Off Rare Wave of Protests,” *Egypt Independent* (English), Dec. 26, 2010. <http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/280420>.

³³⁹Yasmine Ryan, “The Tragic Life of a Street Vendor,” *Aljazeera English*, Jan. 20, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html>.

smoothly and still they rage in Syria. As other, well established governments crumble under the demands of the people, the monarchies of Morocco and Jordan continue to maintain control.

Morocco

Protests arose in Morocco with a youth movement known as the February 20 Movement; “At least 2,000 protesters gathered in a square in Morocco's capital on Sunday to demand that King Mohammed VI give up some of his powers and clamp down on government corruption.”³⁴⁰ While protests such as this took place around the country, there was no call from Mohammed VI to step down nor was there any call for a regime change. The focus of these protests were constitutional reform and against corruption in the parliament. Mohammed VI position appears unthreatened in this uprising. Already he is seen by the public as a constitutional reformer. “In the 12 years since he assumed power, the King has instituted a number of reforms, including adapting the Family Law to improve women's rights, appointing a commission to investigate the state's crimes during the years of lead, and allowing limited forms of political protest — as long as no one criticizes the monarch or his family.”³⁴¹ This is great progress in comparison to the legacy of Hasan II and the situation in Morocco is considered far better than many of the lives of their Arab brothers and sisters in other countries. This shows the strength of the monarchy, to resist this wave of protests and when they do appear in Morocco, the focus is not on the king. “The call for the protest has been portrayed as a healthy sign by the authorities. The government has worked since the king came to the throne in 1999 to repair a bleak legacy of human rights abuses, poverty and illiteracy left after the 38-year rule of his father, King Hassan II.”³⁴² This is another example of how deeply ingrained the Moroccan monarchy is into Moroccan national

³⁴⁰“Mideast unrest hits Morocco as protesters demand limit on royal powers,” *Ruegers*, 20 Feb 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/mideast-unrest-hits-morocco-as-protesters-demand-limit-on-royal-powers-1.344593>.

³⁴¹Lisa Abend, “Protest in Morocco: Just Don’t Call It Revolution,” *Times.com*, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2045328_2045338_2052901,00.html.

³⁴²“Mideast unrest hits Morocco as protesters demand limit on royal powers,” *Ruegers*.

identity. As countries around them strip themselves of powerful governments, few Moroccans think about removing their monarch.

In response to these protestors, Mohammed VI presented a constitutional referendum on July 1, 2011. In this referendum, some major changes are implemented. These new powers that are being granted to others are an example of the balancing act that Mohammed VI plays. Some of the changes include gender equality, new powers to the prime minister and the parliament, a start to overhaul the judicial system, and the constitution no longer claims the king is sacred. In order to maintain his power Mohammed VI had to reduce his power. While this appears to be a textbook example of Samuel Huntington's "king's dilemma", the king retains a large amount of power through loopholes such as the fact that "many of the new constitution's articles refer to 'organic laws' that have not yet been written, making the extent of some changes uncertain [while] others depend on the creation of special commissions, mostly headed by the king."³⁴³

With this, Mohammed VI did his best to preserve his power. Recently, the Moroccan monarchy has faced accusations of corruption, torture, and suppression of the press. These issues have been the source of the public ire against the government. While it is clear that the Moroccan people desire more freedoms, it is also clear from the protestors that they are not willing to withstand violence in order to create change and "many Moroccans have been frightened by the attempted regime change in Libya and Syria."³⁴⁴ The Moroccan protests, which happen on a weekly schedule, are very mild in comparison to protests in other nations, such as Syria.

After the referendum was passed, the protests abated from a while. However, recently, protests have been gearing up again with demands for more reform. Mohammed VI, when he came into office championed reform yet now the people want more and this type of reform could

³⁴³ "Morocco's Referendum: A Very Small Step," *The Economist*, 7 Jul 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/18929381>.

³⁴⁴ "Morocco's Referendum: A Very Small Step."

lead to a weakening of the powers of the monarch. They called for a continuation of the constitutional change that was started with the 2011 referendum but what they really seem to want are jobs. Moroccan unemployment is extremely high.³⁴⁵ The protests reach a new level when five students set themselves on fire “over a lack of economic opportunity.”³⁴⁶ Self-immolation has become an extreme form of protest in the Middle East and North Africa since Mohamed Bouazizi started the Tunisian protests with his own self-immolation. In light of these new protests, the government has made a “strategy is to seek economic growth and curb corruption.”³⁴⁷ Unfortunately, the monarch’s ability to distribute favors upon his loyal elites, which has led to many years of stability and loyalty in Morocco, may suffer from this plan. Economic reform on a grand scale could turn the elite Moroccans against the monarchy and cause just as many problems for him as the protestors as now. Mohammed VI needs to find a way to balance these two opposing desires of his constituency while framing the reform so that the praise rises to him at the top but the blame stops at the parliamentary level. He has been successful as this before when in 2011, the protestors called for the removal of the prime minister but did not call for the end of the monarchy.

The Moroccan monarchy is in a difficult spot currently. While the Moroccan monarchy has historically dealt with the “king’s dilemma” in a productive manner, problems are now arising as the Moroccan people want more than stability, they want freedoms. However, this raises the classic political question: will people choose freedom over stability? At the current time, it seems that the stability that Mohammed VI was able to bring to Morocco in addition to the reforms he has already created has tempered the ire of the public. They so far appear

³⁴⁵ “Morocco,” *CIA World Factbook*.

³⁴⁶ Robert Mackey, “Self-Immolation Protest in Morocco Captured on Video,” *The Lede: Blogging the News with Robert Mackey, The New York Times*, 19Jan 2012, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/videos-capture-self-immolations-in-morocco/>.

³⁴⁷ Deborah Amos, “In Morocco, the Arab Spring’s Mixed Bounty,” *NPR*, 7 Feb 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/07/146526685/in-morocco-the-arab-springs-mixed-bounty?ft=1&f=1001>.

unwilling to sacrifice safety from freedom. Most Moroccans lived through Hasan II's government; they remember the fear that they faced. They see the chaos and fear that comes from instability in the countries around them. As long as Mohammed VI continues to appear as a reformer than it seems that the Moroccan people will continue with their daily lives. It appears that for now that the monarchy is safe, however change is racing across the Middle East and North Africa and no one can predict what will happen next.

Jordan

Jordan was not unscathed by the protests that swept across the Middle East and North Africa. However, protests in Jordan started small and remained so. Most protests have called for more political and social freedoms yet very few have rallied against the monarchy itself. "Thousands of Jordanians have taken part in anti-government protests in Amman and other towns, demanding political reform, better economic conditions and the resignation of the country's unpopular prime minister."³⁴⁸ Much like the protests in Morocco, the focus has been on the government not the monarch. This is a clear sign that the scapegoating of the monarchy is working.

In response to the protests, Abdullah fired the prime minister and promised reform, "a \$550 million package of new subsidies in the past two weeks for fuel and staple products such as rice, livestock, and liquefied gas for heating and cooking. It also includes a raise for civil servants and an increase in pensions for retired military and civilian personnel."³⁴⁹ These subsidies were supposed to quell the protestors however they were not completely successful. As one Muslim Brotherhood spokesman, Jamil Abu Bakr, stated "we will continue our protests until

³⁴⁸ "Wave of Protests Spreads across Arab World," *Samay Live*, 10 Feb 2011, <http://english.samaylive.com/world-news/676481631/wave-of-protest-spreads-across-arab-world.html>.

³⁴⁹ AP, "Pressure on Jordan's King Grows in Third Week of Friday Protests," *Boston.com*, 29 Jan 2011, http://articles.boston.com/2011-01-29/news/29347028_1_opposition-group-civil-servants-protests.

our demands are met.”³⁵⁰ As the protests grew, so did police presence. At almost every protest there were numerous street and riot police. Through this all, the call for change has focused on policy. “The protesters are not calling for the removal of the king or the monarchy, which many Jordanians still see as a vital unifying force in a country,”³⁵¹ this vital place of the king in society is assisting his survival. “Said Diab, a member of a leftist party, noted that insulting the king is banned in Jordan. Asked why the protesters were not criticizing the monarch, who holds ultimate power, he replied: “We can’t. We criticize the government — and ask him for things.”³⁵² The monarch is the source of all power and that combined with the public’s belief in his necessity will allow him to weather these protests.

It is vital to note that the monarch did give in to societal pressure. He was unable to ignore the protests neither in his country nor the effects they had had in other areas of the Middle East. The Jordanian monarch is still playing the balancing game between giving the people what they want and retaining his power. Abdullah’s decision to hold elections is a clear sign of his power. While he promised elections would come, he has not established a date for them which is a power only he has. These small nuances in his governance allow the people to support his reign without him giving away any true power.

Conclusion

The “Arab Spring” has allowed change to enter the Middle East and North Africa; it has toppled dictators and given the masses a taste of power. The people can create change in their countries; they can demand it from their governments. The citizens of Jordan and Morocco are also demanding changes of their own in their countries. However, the public is not demanding a

³⁵⁰ AP, “Pressure on Jordan’s King Grows in Third Week of Friday Protests.”

³⁵¹ Joel Greenberg, “More Demands in Jordan but No Call for King’s Ouster,” *The Washington Post*, 4 Mar 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/jordanian-protesters-ratchet-up-demands-but-stop-short-of-urging-kings-ouster/2011/03/04/ABz8uwN_story.html.

³⁵² Greenberg, “More Demands in Jordan but No Call for King’s Ouster.”

end to the monarchy nor is the change they ask for substantial in the face of events in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, or Syria. The stability of the monarchies has created a fear of anarchy. As the events in Syria unfold, the people of Jordan shy away from the violence that could potentially erupt in their own society should they push too far. The same is occurring in Morocco in the face of Libya. The death and violence in neighboring countries has more firmly entrenched the monarchy as a beacon of stability in both Morocco and Jordan. The “Arab Spring” hit the Middle East and North Africa unexpectedly and it is impossible to predict the future of such a ground breaking event. At this time though the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco appear stable and seem to be continuing their game of hiding their true power behind liberal rhetoric.

Conclusion

The stability of a government comes from a compilation of many factors. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Sharifian Kingdom of Morocco have endured through periods of revolt and change. These two monarchies found success through endearing themselves to their public and manipulating their political systems. Samuel Huntington, in his discussion on the “king’s dilemma”, illustrated two paths which the monarchy could follow yet both the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have escaped this fate. They found another path. The monarchies have made themselves invaluable to the state; the monarchy is so intertwined with the identity of the state that the country is hard to imagine without the monarchy.

The success the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies have seen is not necessarily permanent. No one can predict the future, just as no one predicted the rise and success of the “Arab Spring”. As a caveat to my argument, it seems necessary to outline some potential problems that may impede the continuing success of the monarchy.

The economic situations in both Morocco and Jordan are enormous problems. Morocco has an official unemployment rate of 9.2%³⁵³ though that number is reduced by migration and who is considered to be part of the work force; it’s likely that the real percentage is higher. Jordan faces a similar problem with an official unemployment rate of 12.3% with the unofficial rate being considered as high as 30%.³⁵⁴ Unemployment is creating instability with their states. The Jordanian government has tried to use subsidies on necessary goods in order to sway the people away from the protests. If the people’s daily needs are not being met, they have little to no reason to support the government. Improving the economic situation will be vital in quelling the protests and maintaining the stability of the government. Approximately 15% of the

³⁵³“Morocco,” *CIA World Factbook*.

³⁵⁴“Jordan,” *CIA World Factbook*.

Moroccan and Jordanian people are living below the poverty line.³⁵⁵ The high debt of both countries has led the countries to depend heavily on foreign aid, a large portion of which comes from the United States. This closely ties the two countries together and makes the façade of democracy all the more necessary. The Moroccan government needs to focus on “fighting corruption, reducing government spending, reforming the education system and judiciary, addressing socioeconomic disparities, and building more diverse, higher value-added industries.”³⁵⁶ Jordan must face issues of “high rates of poverty, unemployment, inflation, and a large budget deficit”³⁵⁷ and a lack of oil, water, and other natural resource. Economic crises tend to lead to instability and radicalism. The economy is having a negative impact on the image of the monarchies and this is a main concern of both Abdullah II and Mohammed VI, and it should continue to be a priority.

Another concern facing the monarchies is the place of their citizens. The people of both Morocco and Jordan have allowed the façade of democracy to continue to exist and have accepted limited power in return for a stable society. However, if the monarchies can no longer maintain stability then the people will not support them. The fear of anarchy and violence has forced the people to submit to their monarchs but if they lose that fear or think that another form of governance is better, they might risk the violence for more freedoms. The monarchs need to show that life in Morocco and Jordan with the monarchies is better than life without them. The people are emotionally tied to the monarchies. As long as this remains, then the monarchies will be able to maintain their supportive base. The monarch must remain indispensable to society. These are just a few examples of issues that could threaten the monarchies.

³⁵⁵ “Morocco,” *CIA World Factbook*. & “Jordan,” *CIA World Factbook*.

³⁵⁶ “Morocco,” *CIA World Factbook*.

³⁵⁷ “Jordan,” *CIA World Factbook*.

Today the “legitimacy [of the monarchy] as virtually unchallenged and unquestioned head of state”³⁵⁸ allows the king to rule freely. The original monarchs were very talented statesmen who then transferred their personal prestige onto their sons by creating a tradition of these men having prestige. It is incredible how similar these monarchies are and how well they’ve been able to retain their power through rebellions and uprisings. It may appear throughout this paper that there were not and are not those opposed to the monarchy but they do exist. However, for years they have been unable to succeed or gain much traction. Even as the “Arab Spring” rages throughout the Middle East and North Africa, these two monarchies appear to be holding steady. These monarchs have combined political institutions, nationalism, and religion to form a strong supportive base. These monarchies are deeply ingrained in every aspect of these two societies; they’ve created a strong dependency on the monarchies. The Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies have embodied their state wholly; without the state these men are nothing but without these men, the states are nothing

³⁵⁸Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: a Hashemite Legacy* (London: Routledge, 2001) 117.

Appendix I - Jordanian National Anthem

Long live the King!

Long live the King,

His rank exalted,

His flags flying high,

In sublimity.

O King of the Arabs,

You are greatly honored

By being a descendant of

The best Prophet,

A great lineage

That all major books spoke of.

We realized our aspirations,

When you regenerated for us

A renaissance that motivates us,

A renaissance that towers

Above the high, rising stars.

O King of the Arabs,

You greatly are greatly honored

By being a descendent of

The best Prophet,

A great lineage
That all the major books spoke of.
The glorified youth
Are your devoted soldiers.
Their resolve will never subside
And die away,
Because from you,
They learn perseverance.
O King of the Arabs,
You greatly are greatly honored
By being a descendant of
The best Prophet,
A great lineage
That all the major books spoke of.
May you always be
A light, a guide
And a master among people,
Delighted and exalted.
Under your flags,
The glory of the Arabs
Rises high.

O King of the Arabs,
You greatly are greatly honored
By being a descendent of
The best Prophet,
A great lineage
That all the major books spoke of.³⁵⁹

Appendix II – Moroccan National Anthem

Fountain of Freedom, Source of Light
Where sovereignty and safety meet,
Safety and sovereignty may you ever combine!
You have lived among nations with title sublime,
Filling each heart, sung by each tongue,
Your champion has risen and answered your call.
In my mouth and in my blood
Your breezes have stirred both light and fire.
Up! my brethren, strive for the highest.
We call to the world that we are here ready.
We salute as our emblem
God, Homeland, and King.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁹ “National Anthem,” Under about Jordan, *King Abdullah II Official Website*,
http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/154.html.

³⁶⁰ “Moroccan National Anthem,” *Lyrics on Demand*,
<http://www.lyricsondemand.com/miscellaneouslyrics/nationalanthemslyrics/morocconationalanthemlyrics.html>.

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