Penn, MichaelHagen, DanielVavova, KatiaMehta, Rani2015-05-112015-05-112015-05-11http://hdl.handle.net/10166/3632This paper is an in-depth philosophical account of niceness. It examines what it is to do nice acts and be nice people, if we have a moral obligation to be nice people or to do nice acts, and if there are cases where the nice thing to do conflicts with the good thing to do. I use concepts such as caring about others and responding to the expected feelings or desires of others to construct definitions for the nice person and the nice act. I use a case study and some non-traditional accounts of the supererogatory to determine that it is not morally obligatory to be nice or to do nice acts. I then use my definition of nice acts and nice people to explain why it is sometimes wrong to be nice.en-USphilosophy of nicenessnicenicenessethicsphilosophymoralityThesispublic