

**When the Dragon Dances on the Roof of the World:
Chinese Influence on Tibetan Refugees in Nepal**

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Introduction

Nepal, situated between two Asian giants, India and China, has long been a strategic focal point in South Asian politics. Historically, Nepal has served as a safe haven for Tibetan refugees fleeing political and religious persecution in China. Following the 1959 Tibetan Uprising, nearly 20,000 Tibetan refugees fled to Nepal, and the International Red Cross estimates that an additional 10,000 Tibetans arrived in Nepal in the early 1960s.¹ Over the past two decades, Nepal's relationship with China has deepened significantly, driven by economic investments and strategic partnerships.

This growing Chinese influence has had profound implications for Tibetan refugees in Nepal. As China's political and economic authority in the region has increased, Nepal has faced mounting pressure to align its policies with Chinese interests, often at the expense of the Tibetan refugee community. The impact of Chinese influence on Tibetan refugees in Nepal is a critical yet under-researched area. Understanding how this influence shapes the lives of Tibetan refugees is essential for policymakers, human rights advocates, and scholars seeking to address the humanitarian challenges faced by the Tibetan population in Nepal..

The primary objective of this study is to determine if the increase of Chinese interference, in particular through foreign direct investment, or FDI, in Nepal has had a negative impact on Tibetan refugees living in Nepal. I will begin with providing context on China, India, Nepal, and Tibetan refugees in Nepal. I will then conduct a brief review of literature on the subject. From there, I will outline my methodology and the results of my research. Finally, I will analyze and discuss the implications of my results.

China, India, and Nepal

¹ International Campaign for Tibet, "2001 Refugee Report," 2002

Nepal's positioning between India and China gives it huge geostrategic importance to the two global powers. Situated in the Himalayas, Nepal serves as a critical buffer zone and a strategic corridor for both countries. This unique geographical location has made Nepal a focal point for regional politics and economic initiatives, with both India and China vying for influence in the small but strategically significant nation.

On April 25, 2015, a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal, with its epicenter located 77 kilometers northwest of the capital, Kathmandu. The earthquake and its subsequent aftershocks resulted in widespread destruction and loss of life. Approximately 9,000 people were killed, nearly 16,800 were injured, and more than 600,000 structures in and around Kathmandu were damaged or destroyed. The United Nations reported that over eight million people were affected by the earthquake, highlighting the immense humanitarian crisis that ensued.² In the aftermath of the disaster, both India and China extended aid and assistance to Nepal, but it was China's swift and substantial response that marked a turning point in its relationship with Nepal. China's prompt delivery of relief supplies, medical teams, and reconstruction efforts contrasted with India's more measured response, which was perceived by some in Nepal as slow and bureaucratic.

The strategic alignment between China and Nepal reached a significant milestone in 2017 when Nepal formally joined China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI, President Xi Jinping's flagship global infrastructure project, aims to enhance connectivity and cooperation across Asia, Europe, and Africa. For Nepal, a landlocked country, the BRI offered a promising avenue for economic development and regional integration. During the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in 2019, Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari emphasized the importance of this partnership, stating:

² Rafferty, "Nepal earthquake of 2015"

“For a landlocked country like Nepal, connectivity is of paramount importance in its socio-economic development. With enhanced connectivity, vast opportunities for trade, investment, tourism, and people-to-people relations will open up.”³

Nepal’s participation in the BRI has been driven by the need to diversify its economic and strategic dependencies, reducing its traditional reliance on India. The BRI promises to bring significant infrastructure investments to Nepal, including roads, railways, and hydropower projects, which are crucial for the country’s development. However, this alignment has also raised concerns about Nepal’s growing dependence on China and the potential for increased Chinese influence in the region.

Tibetan Refugees in Nepal

The International Campaign for Tibet’s 2001 report “Dangerous Crossing – Conditions Impacting the Flight of Tibetan Refugees” explains in detail the changes in the process to flee to Nepal between 1959 when the first wave of refugees arrived until 2001 when the report was written. From 1959 to the mid-1970s, Tibetans were permitted to stay in Nepal but with no legal status. In 1974, the Nepalese government registered 15,000 Tibetans as residents, but this was followed by a 15 year hiatus in registrations. In 1999, in response to pressure from the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR) and interested governments, Nepal resumed registrations, but only for refugees who arrived prior to December 1, 1989.⁴

In 1991, the government of Nepal adopted immigration laws that class Tibetan refugees as illegal immigrants, rather than refugees. In response, the UNHCR worked with the Nepalese Home Ministry and Department of Immigration to draft an unwritten agreement, referred to as

³ Murton and Lord, “Trans-Himalayan power corridors”

⁴ International Campaign for Tibet, “2001 Refugee Report,” 2002

the “Gentleman’s Agreement,” to allow Tibetan refugees to use Nepal as a transit point, provided that they depart expeditiously to a third country.⁵

In theory, every Tibetan who arrived in Nepal prior to December 1, 1989 and their children should receive a RC, a registration certificate that provides proof that the bearer is residing legally in Nepal and grants them limited ability to travel within the country. In 1995, and on a smaller scale 1999, Nepal issued RCs to Tibetans living in settlements, but the issuance of RCs is limited, particularly for Tibetans residing outside of settlements. RCs also have to be renewed annually, which is a burdensome and inefficient process that leaves many resident Tibetans without up to date cards. Without an RC, Tibetans cannot apply for refugee travel documents, purchase motorbikes, work in certain fields, apply for a drivers’ license, and more.⁶ From his personal communication with exile Tibetan authorities, Acharya writes that

“Of the total 13,465 Tibetans living legally, 1,614 males and 1,931 females hold RC; 3,478 males and 3,956 females above the age of 16, and 1,318 males and 1,168 females below 16 years old are without RC. This data shows that 3,545 Tibetan refugees are RC holders and 9,920 do not have RCs. This data clearly shows the identity problems of the authorized Tibetans in Nepal.”⁷

Review of Literature

Scholarly research about Chinese influence on Tibetan refugees in Nepal is very limited. The only scholarly paper I could find on the subject was written by Jeffrey Reeves in 2012, entitled “China’s self-defeating tactics in Nepal.” Although his main argument surrounds public opinion about Chinese involvement in Nepal, Reeves argues that “China’s use of coercion and its

⁵ International Campaign for Tibet, “2001 Refugee Report,” 2002

⁶ Tibetan Justice Center, “Tibet’s Stateless Nationals,” 3.

⁷ Acharya, “Tibetan Refugee Issues in Nepali Press,” 43.

myopic focus on Tibetan issues in Nepal are undermining Nepalese public support for China's involvement in Nepal,"⁸ referencing the notion that China is deeply focused on Tibetan issues as a main term of relations. He identifies four key policy outcomes that China is trying to achieve: first, the establishment and maintenance of government-to-government relations, second, the expansion of economic linkages by building trade relations, expanding Chinese aid and technology transfers to Nepal, establishing joint venture activities in Nepal, and continuing foreign direct investment into Nepal, third, the deepening of cultural, education, and science and technology exchange, and fourth, the use of traditional Nepalese–Tibetan relations to advance overall Sino-Nepal relations. These objectives are backed up by the 2012 joint statement between the People's Republic of China and Nepal.⁹

Reeves provides a brief but excellent account of Chinese influence in Nepal prior to 2012, but in the decade since, the ties between China and Nepal have only gotten stronger, particularly though Nepal's inclusion in the BRI in 2017.

Methods

The purpose of this study is to identify any correlation between increased Chinese presence in Nepal and anti-Tibetan actions. Although this framework is common in Tibetan activist spaces, until now there have been no academic studies about how Sino-Nepalese relations have impacted Tibetans living in Nepal since 2012. There have also been no studies that focused on Chinese FDI as a vehicle for anti-Tibetan change in Nepal. This indicates a conceptual gap in the current academic sphere. For this study, I utilized a mixed methodology of

⁸ Reeves, "China's self-defeating tactics in Nepal," 525.

⁹ Chinese Embassy in Nepal, "中华人民共和国和尼泊尔联合声明"

data analysis on Chinese FDI projects in Nepal and qualitative historical analysis of anti-Tibetan actions in Nepal since 2000.

Establishing Timeline

In order to establish a timeline of Anti-Tibetan action in Nepal, I aggregated information from Human Rights Watch's reports on Nepal, the International Campaign for Tibet's (ICT) yearly "Dangerous Crossing" reports, and various Nepalese and international newspapers. Any situations of refoulement, suppression, arrest, and institutional violence were compiled into a timeline with the approximate date and a brief description of the situation.

Data Analysis

For data analysis, I utilized William and Mary's AidData's Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 3.0 for a list of Chinese foreign investment projects in Nepal from 2000 to 2021. For this study, the number of projects, the value of projects, their flow classification, and year of commitment were used. Using Microsoft Excel, I compiled Nepal specific data and generated charts based on these variables.

The 2015 Nepalese earthquake creates complications in this data, given that it caused a significant increase in emergency response FDI from China. In order to mitigate the confounding nature of this variable, I chose to filter out all projects in the emergency response sector. Because these projects only make up a small percentage of the total value and number of projects, their exclusion will not create a notable discrepancy in the data.

There is also one project that is disproportionately large in size. The 2012 project titled "China Eximbank pledges \$1.6 billion in concessional and commercial debt for 750MW West Seti Dam Construction Project" was almost \$1.9 billion in 2021 USD. The second largest project in terms of value was \$535 million, less than one third of the size of the largest. Because the

project in 2012 acted as such a massive outlier (using the Grubb's Test it was found to be an outlier at $\alpha = 0.01$), it was excluded from the value charts.

One metric I utilized for were the flow classifications of the projects, specifically whether they were considered Official Development Assistance (ODA-Like), Other Official Flows (OOF-Like), or Vague. Researchers at AidData classified the projects into these categories based on the OECD-DAC methods. AidData uses the following criteria to classify projects as ODA-Like:

First, the primary purpose of the project/activity must be the promotion of economic development and welfare in the recipient country (i.e., have development intent). Second, the project/activity must take place in a country that qualifies for ODA based on its income level. Third, the official commitment supporting the project/activity must be concessional in nature (i.e., grant, technical assistance, scholarship, debt forgiveness, or loan with a grant element meeting a specified threshold).¹⁰

Data on Tibetan refugees was sourced from Human Rights Watch and the International Campaign for Tibet and aggregated using Excel. Because data from certain years was missing, approximations were made using averages for periods of time.

Limitations

One major limitation of this project is the lack of data on a variety of factors concerning Tibetan refugees in Nepal. One of these factors is data on refoulement and arrests in Nepal. The ICT's yearly "Dangerous Crossing" reports provide a detailed overview from 2001-2011, but they stopped publishing in 2012, leaving the only aggregated information from the Human Rights Watch. Additionally, the ICT reports that as Chinese involvement has increased in Nepal, information has been harder to come by. Another factor is the number of Tibetan refugees

¹⁰ Custer et al, "Tracking Chinese Development Finance,"

entering Nepal by year. While the UNHCR released approximate numbers in their global reports for 2000-2010, for 2010-2012 only broad estimates were provided and there is no data from 2014 onwards.

Another data related limitation of this project is the lack of data points for value within the AidData dataset. This is due to the lack of accurate and concise data reporting from the Chinese government on their global financial activities. There are two agencies that compile FDI statistics in China, and “two agencies separately publish quarterly and annual data on their respective parts, and sometimes on estimated overall FDI data.”¹¹ The dual-agency system leads to a lack of concisely compiled data. While outside agencies such as William and Mary can attempt to generate a full picture of the data, some information is still missing. In the case of Nepal, only 55% of projects recorded on AidData have value data.

Results

Qualitative Findings

In order to analyze my qualitative findings, I have selected a few examples of changes in the actions of the Government of Nepal. This allows me to analyze how Nepalese authorities respond to similar situations over time. A full timeline of events can be found in Appendix A.

Table 1 contains a brief timeline of how the Nepalese government handled events and celebrations for Losar, the Tibetan New Year from 2000 until 2011. In each year recorded, the events become more and more strained until the outright ban in 2011.

Table 1: Losar (Tibetan New Year)
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¹¹ Center for Integrated and Private Enterprises, “A Study of Chinese Capital Flows to Six Countries,” 11.

Year	Description
2000	No evidence of disruption by Nepalese authorities
2001	Nepalese police curtailed traditional events surrounding the Tibetan New Year celebration at Bouddhanath Stupa. Police allowed the large photograph of the Dalai Lama to be put out for only five minutes before ordering it removed under order of the Home Ministry
2002	Local police prohibited the public display of the Dalai Lama's portrait at Tibetan New Year in Bouddhanath
2003	Tibetans were forced to confine their Tibetan New Years celebrations to the compound of a small monastery in order to avoid police harassment
2004	Local authorities denied Tibetans permission to hold a gathering at the Boudha stupa with the display of a portrait of the Dalai Lama for Tibetan New Year; community prayer gathering was held at the nearby Samtenling Monastery compound
2010	14 young Tibetans were arrested in Kathmandu while celebrating Losar after being accused by the police of planning a "free Tibet" protest. Freed only after paying bail ¹²
2011	Government banned Tibetans from celebrating during the Tibetan New Year

Table 2 contains a timeline of confirmed and alleged refolements of Tibetan refugees. Although there have only been three confirmed cases, there have been a significant number of refolements reported by other Tibetan refugees.

Table 2: Confirmed and Alleged Refoulments	
Date	Description
2000	human rights groups reported that at least 60 Tibetan refugees had been forcibly handed back to the Chinese (alleged)
2001	November 25 - December 21 – ~15 Tibetans escaping Tibet have been deported by

¹² International Campaign for Tibet, "2011 Update," 83.

	the Nepalese authorities ¹³
2001/02	December 01 - January 02 – at least 25 deportations at Dram reported by human rights monitors following the eruption of Maoist violence in the countryside and after the Nepalese government instituted a state of emergency (alleged)
2002	no official UNHCR reports of refoulement or forced repatriation at the Nepal-China Friendship Bridge, accounts of refoulement from Tibetans who had made a successful re-attempt to cross the border and had arrived safely at the Tibetan Refugee Transit Center (TRTC) in Kathmandu
2003	Nepalese authorities loaded 18 Tibetan refugees from Hannaman Dhoka prison in Kathmandu onto a Chinese Embassy vehicle; first confirmed instance of direct involvement by Chinese embassy officials in the refoulement of Tibetan refugees from Kathmandu (CONFIRMED)
2003	Tibetan woman reported to the TRTC that her 15-year old cousin and three other children had been forcibly repatriated from Tatopani, army reportedly handed these four children over to police or immigration officials in Tatopani, who then turned them over to Chinese custody (alleged)
2004	Nepalese immigration authorities refouled one group of 11 and another group of four Tibetan refugees (alleged)
2004	The Himalayan Times reported the refoulement of 21 Tibetan refugees, local immigration officials there denied (alleged)
2004	Police officials at a checkpoint in Barabise refouled four new arrivals among a group of nine (alleged)
2007	young Tibetan man who had been living in exile in India after escaping from Tibet has been handed over to the Chinese authorities by the Nepalese government after being held in custody of the immigration department in Kathmandu ¹⁴
2010	Nepali authorities forcefully deported three Tibetan new arrivals from Humla district (aged 20, 21, 22), two of the Tibetans were put in jail and would serve around six months (CONFIRMED)

¹³ International Campaign for Tibet, “Increased deportation of Tibetans from Nepal”

¹⁴ International Campaign for Tibet, “New refoulement case in Nepal”

Data-based findings

Figure 1 depicts the number of Chinese FDI projects compared to the number of Tibetan refugees counted entering Nepal each year. The highest number of Tibetan refugees entering in one year was 4,000 in 2005. The highest number of FDI projects was in 2021, with the commitment to 20 projects. In general, the number of Tibetan refugees arriving in Nepal has decreased over the time period recorded, with around 2,500 refugees arriving in 1994 and less than 200 arriving in 2013. Both variables vary a lot year by year, but follow general trends over the full period. See Appendix B for the full data.

Figure 1:





Figure 2 depicts the percent of the total value of Chinese FDI in all countries versus just in Nepal. Chinese investments globally tend to be heavily concentrated (around 70%) in OOF-like funding, which is generally money in the form of loans, while Chinese investment in Nepal is

concentrated in concessional ODA-like projects. Nepal is consistent with the rest of the world in terms of the proportion of financing considered vague. See Appendix C for full data.

Figure 2:



Discussion

This study attempted to answer the question of if the increase of Chinese interference, in particular through FDI, in Nepal has had a negative impact on Tibetan refugees living in Nepal. My results suggest that Chinese involvement in Nepal has caused the Nepalese government to take more aggressive stances on Tibetan issues since 2001.

Tables 1 and 2 depict timelines of Losar celebrations and of refoulements respectively. Table 1's depiction of Losar indicates clearly that the government of Nepal became less tolerant of Tibetan celebrations from 2000 through 2011. Table 2 indicates that the number of

refoulements has remained relatively consistent over the period, despite Nepal's Gentlemen's Agreement stating that they should not be refouling Tibetans.

Figure 1's depiction of the general trend of increase in Chinese FDI and decrease in the number of new refugees indicates the general trend of the two variables. Although not directly correlated to each other, combined with qualitative evidence this chart clearly indicates that Chinese financial influence has increased since 2001 and that Nepal's border control has become significantly more restrictive between 1994 and 2013.

Figure 2 depicts China's over-emphasis on ODA-like loans in Nepal in comparison to their investment in the rest of the world. Dreher et al. find that "China uses ODA flows (and grants) mainly to promote its foreign policy goals, while less concessional forms of official financing (and loans) follow China's economic interests,"¹⁵ indicating that Chinese FDI in Nepal likely comes with strings attached. This is supported by accounts of Chinese pressure on the Nepalese government to work against Tibetans in the country. After the closure of the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office in Kathmandu, for example, the head of the office stated that "There is 100 percent Chinese pressure... Any Tibetan office or any activity in the name of His Holiness the Dalai Lama is not liked by the Chinese. We know for sure that the Chinese are exercising pressure on the Nepalese government," and that "The Nepalese government told [him] that [he] should not be involved in any activity in the name of His Holiness the Dalai Lama which they recognise as a political activity against Chinese interests," although the Nepalese Foreign Ministry denied that Chinese pressure prompted the decision.¹⁶ Sources at the Home Ministry also alleged in 2009 that China has asked Nepal's government to tighten security along Nepal-China border for fear of Dalai Lama supporters infiltrating into Nepal.¹⁷ In 2010, a

¹⁵ Dreher et al., "Apples and Dragon Fruits," 183.

¹⁶ Himalayan Times, "China pressed to shut Tibetan offices"

¹⁷ My Republica, "Police arresting Tibetans 'arbitrarily'"

recording of a phone call between a senior Maoist leader, Krishna Mahara, and an unknown Chinese man discussing the use of \$6.75m to bribe members of parliament to elect a Maoist prime minister was released.¹⁸ While the bribe was denied by Mahara, scholars generally view this instance as one of the clearest pieces of evidence that China is directly influencing the Nepalese government.

There is also clear evidence of less overt influence by the Chinese government in Nepal. Reeves writes that “Chinese SOEs have also engaged in economic coercion aimed at Nepalese businesses and politicians to affect changes in domestic policy that benefits China” and that “In 2008... China’s Southwest Airlines pulled all advertising from Nepalese newspapers it viewed as ‘pro-Tibetan.’”¹⁹

This all begs the question: is Chinese investment in Nepal unique? China’s contingency of support in Nepal is consistent with their involvement in other countries. Dreher et al. finds that “that countries that do not recognize Taiwan receive 2,763 percent more Chinese official finance per year, on average,”²⁰ meaning that recognizing the One China Policy is a major determinant of if and how much FDI a country receives from China. The difference between this more general requirement and Nepal’s case is what recognizing the policy looks like. In Nepal, the mere recognition of Tibet as a part of China is not enough, it is contingent on “Nepal’s demonstrated commitment to a ‘one China’ policy through prevention of ‘anti-China’ activities by Tibetans.”²¹

As Human Rights Watch accurately points out, “The term ‘anti-China activities’ has no meaning or force in Nepali law.”²² and that there is no clear definition of activity against Chinese interests. This means ambiguity gives the Nepalese government the power to arrest anyone on

¹⁸ The Economist, “Rivals on the roof of the world”

¹⁹ Reeves, “China’s self-defeating tactics in Nepal,” 528.

²⁰ Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits,” 187.

²¹ International Campaign for Tibet, “2011 Update,” 10.

²² Human Rights Watch, “Under China’s Shadow”

suspicion of anti-China activity, allowing them to functionally arrest anyone who they suspect of being pro-Tibet.

One way in which this is enacted is the arrest or intimidation of any Tibetan or Nepali person or journalist who speaks out against Nepal's treatment of Tibetans. In an interview, Anurag Acharya, a well known columnist of Nepali Times & programme manager of Centre for Investigative Journalism stated that

“There are definite problems and challenges in reporting on Tibetan issue in Nepal, mostly due to government's overt and covert intimidation of media houses and journalists who report on forced /illegal detention of Tibetans. Besides, the community itself has been intimidated and persecuted to an extent that most of them are wary of talking to the media, fearing reprisal from the government”²³

In 2010, the Nepalese government limited the coverage of a visit of China's prime minister to only “three journalists representing state-owned media.” According to the Economic Times, “A senior government official at the Department of Information has recently said that the government has decided to limit the access to the media persons as per the request made by the Chinese authorities.”²⁴

Conclusion

This study aimed to determine how expanded Chinese influence in Nepal has impacted Tibetans living within the country. The findings reveal that increased Chinese influence in Nepal has led to stricter policies and surveillance on Tibetan refugees, limiting their freedom of movement and expression. Additionally, economic and political pressures from China have

²³ Acharya, “Tibetan Refugee Issues in Nepali Press,” 55.

²⁴ The Economic Times, “Nepal media upset over restrictions during Wen Jiabao visit”

resulted in a reduction of support and services available to Tibetan refugees in Nepal, such as the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office or the provision of registration certificates.

Due to the limited data, statistical conclusions cannot be drawn, and further research with additional data would allow for more clear conclusions. One area for further research is the role of international influence on international organizations for Tibetan refugees in Nepal. While the UNHCR is currently operating in Nepal, my research suggests that they have become significantly less involved since the early 2000s.

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Appendix A: Timeline of Anti-Tibetan Action in Nepal^{25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37}

Year	Description
2000	October - Nepalese police opened fire on a group of Tibetans after they crossed the border into Nepal, resulting in fatalities
2000	December - U.S. State Department's Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues raised numerous concerns, including forced deportations and the shooting death in the Nepal border region of Kunchok Gyatso, a 27-year old monk
2000	December - sizable deportations were confirmed, human rights groups reported that at least 60 Tibetan refugees had been forcibly handed back to the Chinese
2001	February - attacks on the Tibetan community in Pokhara after resentment was mobilized by the Maoists
2001	February - Nepalese police curtailed traditional events surrounding the Tibetan New Year celebration at Bouddhanath Stupa. Police allowed the large photograph of the Dalai Lama to be put out for only five minutes before ordering it removed under order of the Home Ministry
2001	March - police in the Solo Khumbu region told ICT that they did not want to travel with refugees as they feared for their personal safety from ambushing Maoists, UNHCR offered to reimburse expenses for double the number of police escorts to Kathmandu so that police would feel more secure, however, most police are still reluctant to accompany the Tibetans to Kathmandu
2001	May - Tibetan Refugee Transit Centre began issuing a temporary travel document for Tibetans in transit
2001	August 20 - two monks arrested in Kathmandu after they were unable to

²⁵ International Campaign for Tibet, "2001 Refugee Report," 2002

²⁶ International Campaign for Tibet, "2002 Update," 2003

²⁷ International Campaign for Tibet, "2003 Update," 2004

²⁸ International Campaign for Tibet, "2004 Update," 2005

²⁹ International Campaign for Tibet, "2005 Update," 2006

³⁰ International Campaign for Tibet, "2006 Update," 2007

³¹ International Campaign for Tibet, "2007-08 Report," 2009

³² International Campaign for Tibet, "2009 Update," 2010

³³ International Campaign for Tibet, "2010 Update," 2011

³⁴ International Campaign for Tibet, "2011 Update," 2012

³⁵ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2013: Nepal"

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2014: Nepal"

³⁷ Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2015: Nepal"

	show any refugee identity documents to police. Each was given a 10-year prison sentence after not being able to pay the 205,359 Nepalese rupees (US \$2,666) fine, both remain in Dilli Bazaar prison as of March 2002
2001	August 21 - eight Tibetans arrested while en route back to Tibet after completing their schooling in India. Each were fined 121,897 Nepalese rupees (US \$1,500) and given a 10-year default sentence when they were unable to pay the fine, all remain in Dilli Bazaar prison as of March 2002
2001	December - unnamed security official told the Kathmandu Post that Nepalese and Chinese officials had made an agreement in the second week of December 2001 to cooperate in “containing the terrorism” in the Tatopani area on the Nepal side of the border
2001/02	December 01 - January 02 - at least 25 deportations at Dram reported by human rights monitors following the eruption of Maoist violence in the countryside and after the Nepalese government instituted a state of emergency
2002	January - news circulated widely of increased Chinese patrols in the area around the Nangpa-la pass
2002	February 15 - local police prohibited the public display of the Dalai Lama’s portrait at Tibetan New Year in Bouddhanath
2002	March 10 - silent demonstration was held by a group of young Tibetans in front of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu, police broke up the demonstration by beating and kicking the Tibetans, most of the Tibetans were loaded onto police vans and driven to far away locations where they were released
2002	April 28 - celebration of the 13th birthday of the Panchen Lama and a cultural show of traditional Tibetan dances and folk songs planned by the Tibetan Youth Club were ordered cancelled by the Nepalese Home Ministry
2002	May - Two Tibetan men, one a monk were arrested in a restaurant in Bouddhanath, given default 10-year prison sentences
2002	July 6 - dinner in honor of the Dalai Lama’s 67th birthday at the Radisson Hotel was ordered cancelled by the Home Ministry
2002	July 25 - press conference called by the Dalai Lama’s Representative to address aspersions leveled by a religious sect in Kathmandu against the Dalai Lama was stopped by the arrival of the Nepalese police on orders of the Home Ministry. Two

	Tibetans were arrested when they peacefully confronted the police. They were interrogated and released
2002	August 17 - six Kathmandu-based journalists flew to Lhasa for a 17-day, all-expenses-paid trip to various places in the Tibet Autonomous Region
2002	September 2 - celebration of Tibetan Democracy Day was interrupted, Dalai Lama's Representative was taken by police and held for most of the day
2002	December - DOI told ICT staff and researchers that it was not bound by the "gentleman's agreement" and that it will continue to "enforce the law," which translates to the arrest and jailing of Tibetan refugees as illegal immigrants if they do not possess a valid travel document and visa
2002	December - Nepalese police arrested three new arrivals from Tibet: a 15-year-old boy, a 15-year-old girl, and their 30-year-old guardian. An administrative ruling was handed down, fining each of them 17,138 Nepalese rupees (US \$372) for illegally entering Nepal. None of them were able to pay the fines and, as a result, they were each given a default sentence of 3 1/2 years (all three were released in February 2003 after their fines were paid by non-governmental organizations concerned about the continued detention of the minors)
2002	no official UNHCR reports of refoulement or forced repatriation at the Nepal-China Friendship Bridge, accounts of refoulement from Tibetans who had made a successful re-attempt to cross the border and had arrived safely at the Tibetan Refugee Transit Center (TRTC) in Kathmandu
2003	March - Tibetans were forced to confine their Tibetan New Years celebrations to the compound of a small monastery in order to avoid police harassment
2003	April 17 - Nepali Immigration Department sentenced a group of 21 Tibetans to prison terms ranging between three and ten months in lieu of fines, tried to turn them in to Chinese Authorities May 29
2003	May 31 - Nepalese authorities loaded 18 Tibetan refugees from Hannaman Dhoka prison in Kathmandu onto a Chinese Embassy vehicle; first known instance of direct involvement by Chinese embassy officials in the refoulement of Tibetan refugees from Kathmandu
2003	July - written permission for a celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday obtained and verified orally, providing that there would be no public display of the Dalai Lama's photograph; late on the evening of July 5, the Representative received a telephone

	call from the Chief of Police in Bouddhanath concerning “fresh orders from the Home Ministry” that they were not allowed carry out the Dalai Lama’s birthday celebration at the school, hotel or anywhere, in any form, including in the monasteries
2003	August 5 - Tibetan woman reported to the TRTC that her 15-year old cousin and three other children had been forcibly repatriated from Tatopani, army reportedly handed these four children over to police or immigration officials in Tatopani, who then turned them over to Chinese custody, instead of escorting them down to Kathmandu for UNHCR processing or taking them into custody so they could be picked up by UNHCR
2003	November 18 - nine Tibetan refugees serving 10 year jail sentences on immigration charges were released into the care of the UNHCR in Kathmandu after their fines were paid by an anonymous source. Five of them were arrested while transiting Nepal, trying to voluntarily repatriate to Tibet. The other four were caught in the Bouddhanath area without proper documents.
2003	Early December - TRTC staff received a report that Royal Nepalese Army personnel operating in the Tatopani area reportedly arrested three Tibetans approximately 20 kilometers south of the Nepal-Tibet border. The army personnel transported the refugees in a van back to the border and turned them over to Nepalese immigration officials. DOI officials reportedly escorted them across the Friendship Bridge and handed them over to Chinese border security
2003	December 9 - Nepalese immigration authorities at Tatopani had attempted to refoule four Tibetan children
2003	December - incidents were raised during meetings with an ICT-sponsored congressional staff delegation to Kathmandu senior Nepalese government officials initially denied them, then blamed the army for any incidents that may have occurred
2004	January 12 - Nepalese immigration authorities refouled one group of 11 and another group of four Tibetan refugees
2004	January - The Himalayan Times reported the refoulement of 21 Tibetan refugees, local immigration officials there denied
2004	February 23 - local authorities denied Tibetans permission to hold a gathering at the Boudha stupa with the display of a portrait of the Dalai Lama for Tibetan New Year; community prayer gathering was held at the nearby Samtenling Monastery compound

2004	March 5 - 31 Tibetan refugees arrived at Solu Khumbhu after 13 of them had apparently been beaten and robbed by Nepalese security forces on arrival in Nepal
2004	April 26 and 27 - Police officials at a checkpoint in Barabise refoiled four new arrivals among a group of nine
2004	May 3 - ICT received reports of an attempted rape of three young women (aged 12, 17, and 24) among a group of 47 Tibetan refugees in Luklha by six security officials. Their cries led their attackers to flee and the same men took 1000 Rupees (approx. US\$12) from one of the girls
2004	May 15 - member of the TRRC staff sent to escort 14 Tibetan refugees from Lukla airport who were held there for 11 days by the armed police, TRRC staff was warned by local authorities not to come there again to escort Tibetan refugees
2004	Chief District Officer in Salleri issued instructions to Lukla's airport security not to allow Tibetan refugees UNHCR-assisted transit from Lukla airport, nor to pass on foot
2005	January - closure of the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office (TWRO) and Office of the Representative of the Dalai Lama
2005	February 22 - Tibetan monk from Kathmandu returning from Tibet with his two siblings and a small group of Tibetan refugees joined a group of more than 50 refugees in transit, police forced him to hand over money, and beat him so severely that he fell unconscious
2005	April - soldiers of the Nepalese Unified Command apprehended a group of 52 Tibetan refugees as they passed near Lukla airport, group included monks and laypeople, many of them were punched and beaten with clubs and rifle butts after refusing to name their guide
2005	October 12 - four Tibetan men detained by Nepalese police in Syabru Besi, received cash penalties for not being in possession of their national passport and necessary visa to enter Nepal
2005	October - Nepalese government stopped issuing travel documents necessary for resident Tibetan and Bhutanese refugees to leave the country; November - suspended issuing exit permits to Tibetan refugees transiting to India, resumed in May 2006
2005	December 8 - group of 18 Tibetan refugees who were arrested November 28 were freed after fines imposed on them were paid by the Tibetan community

2006	August - group of five Tibetans including two monks were apprehended by Nepalese police near the China-Nepal Friendship Highway, threatened with deportation unless they handed over 4150 yuan (\$535)
2007	Prime Minister Prachanda had ruled out allowing the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Center to reopen their office in Kathmandu on the grounds that it would harm the country's "good relations" with its "friendly" northern neighbor China
2007	young Tibetan man who had been living in exile in India after escaping from Tibet has been handed over to the Chinese authorities by the Nepalese government after being held in custody of the immigration department in Kathmandu
2008	February 23 - Nepalese police conducted an unprecedented late night raid on the TRRC looking for Tsering Dhundup based on allegations that he had been involved in stabbing a Chinese man in Tibet, jailed in Nepal before being handed over to Chinese authorities
2008	March 10 - Tibetans living in Kathmandu conducted a series of protests against the Chinese government's harsh crackdown in Tibet. Nepali authorities opposed demonstrations and engaged in unnecessary and excessive use of force, arbitrary arrest, sexual assault
2008	June 19 - Three Tibetan community leaders, Kelsang Chung, Director of the United Nations funded Tibetan Refugee Reception Center, and Ngawang Sangmo and Tashi Dolma, president and vice president of the regional Tibetan Women's Association, were detained in police raids on their homes and taken to prison, released after a Supreme Court Order ruled that their detention was illegal
2008	September 9, 10, 11 - Nepalese authorities detained 137 Tibetan protesters on September 9, 10, and 11 and later handed them over to the UNHCR
2009	February 23 - members of the Young Communist League detained five Tibetans attempting to cross the Tibet-Nepal border before turning them over to local police in Sindhupalchowk, the group of Tibetans, seven in total, was eventually turned over to UNHCR
2009	February 27 - Twelve men and 17 women in Kathmandu were detained and were accused of illegally entering from India and Tibet to stage protests
2009	February 27 - More than a dozen Tibetan monks and nuns were detained, nuns were released later that evening, while the monks remained in detention

2009	February 28 - Nepalese police detained 16 Tibetans for protesting near the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu
2009	March 8, 9 - in anticipation of March 10th protests, up to 25 prominent Tibetans who were suspected of playing a leading role in protests in Kathmandu in 2008 were detained by Nepalese police, in some cases during police searches of their homes without providing warrants or reasons for the detentions, police in riot gear were stationed in Tibetan communities
2009	Prior to March 10 - Tibetan journalist working for a Tibetan language newspaper was accused of writing “anti-Chinese” articles and subsequently detained and his home searched, released after paying a large bribe to officials
2009	March 14 - three foreign nationals, from Norway, Denmark, and the UK, arrested after they wore ‘Free Tibet’ T-shirts and held a demonstration outside the Chinese embassy’s visa office in Kathmandu
2009	April 9 - almost three dozen Tibetans were detained by police in Kathmandu after participating in a protest, Tibetans carried photos of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan national flag and banners, and chanted prayers during the demonstration before being detained by police
2009	June 26 - group of 34 Tibetans, 26 men and eight women were detained before later being released by the Nepalese army as they made their way to the Friendship Bridge border crossing
2009	July 14 - police interrupted a demonstration and detained dozens of Tibetans in front of the UN office in Kathmandu
2009	October 1 - Nepalese authorities detained approximately 70 Tibetans for protesting near the Chinese embassy’s visa offices and elsewhere in Kathmandu
2010	January - Nepalese police apprehended a group of 22 Tibetan refugees and began to walk them back towards the Tibet border, three members of the group were suffering from frostbite, and their guide had been injured in a fall. Group was held overnight at the border, four escaped and remaining 17 were locked up in a farm building near the police station. The remaining Tibetans refused to move and were beat by Nepalese authorities. On January 17, they were driven to Kathmandu and handed over to Nepal Immigration, per the Gentlemen’s Agreement
2010	February 4-9 - 29 Tibetans detained, many were accused of illegally entering and living in Nepal without proper documentation

2010	February 14 - police seized Tibetan flags from Tibetans and did not allow them to wear T-shirts displaying the flags during a candlelight program
2010	February 17 - 14 young Tibetans were arrested in Kathmandu while celebrating Losar (Tibetan New Year)
2010	Week prior to March 10 - Nepalese police searched guest-houses almost every night in Boudha, Tibetans who did not have regularized legal status in Nepal were taken into custody and only released upon payment of a bribe, typically 10,000 Nepalese rupees
2010	March 7 - Thrinley Gyatso was taken to the Home Ministry by Nepalese police for questioning about Tibetan activities for the March 10 anniversary, warned that if protests occurred, police would be instructed to open fire on demonstrators
2010	March 9 and 10 - Nepal police and Armed Police Force arrested 28 Tibetans who staged protests to mark the 51st anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against the Chinese in Tibet
2010	March 10 and 14 - 23 Tibetans were detained in Kathmandu following the protests at the Chinese embassy
2010	April - nine Tibetans were charged and sentenced to long-term detention for entering the country illegally
2010	June - Nepali authorities forcefully deported three Tibetan new arrivals from Humla district (aged 20, 21, 22), two of the Tibetans were put in jail and would serve around six months
2010	July 6 - More than 100 Tibetans detained after Nepalese police set up checkpoints at stopping Tibetans heading toward the birthday celebrations of the Dalai Lama in Kathmandu
2010	July 11 - The Kathmandu Post reported Nepal Home Ministry had directed police across Nepal not to transfer detained Tibetan refugees to the Immigration Department for legal processing but to send the refugees back to Tibet
2010	October 3 - police in Kathmandu confiscated ballot boxes during annual elections held by Tibetan refugees to nominate candidates for the government in exile
2010	October 29 - members of the Tibetan community were prevented by police from attending a religious celebration held at Namgyal Middle School

2010	November - police and government officials from Nepal's border areas attended a special training arranged by the Chinese government that focused on the issue of "anti-China" activities
2010	November 11 - five Tibetans were arrested in Boudha after police claimed they were planning to protest outside the Chinese embassy
2011	February 13 - Nepal police in riot gear raided three voting locations and shut down leadership elections for a local Tibetan community group
2011	March - government banned Tibetans from celebrating during the Tibetan New Year
2011	March 10 - Nepali riot police used force to prevent Tibetans from commemorating the 52nd anniversary of National Uprising Day
2011	April 18,19 - around 30 Tibetans carried forward in making their voices until plain-clothed and uniformed Nepal police broke up their private gathering at a community center in Kathmandu's Boudha neighborhood
2011	June 21 - 12 Tibetans detained after hundreds of Tibetans gathered for a candlelight vigil at the Boudha stupa in Kathmandu. One of the men was beaten with a bamboo baton and accused of being the main organizer of "anti-China" activities in Kathmandu and was coerced into signing a confession and then locked overnight without drinking water in a bathroom at the Boudhanath police station
2011	June 26 - Nepali authorities restricted birthday celebrations held for the Karmapa, the head of the Karma Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism, the first time that officials in Nepal interfered with this annual event
2011	June 28 - police in Boudha detained 39 Tibetans, including a 78-year old man, in three different areas of the neighborhood while they played cards and mahjong, accusing them of gambling
2011	July 6 - hundreds of Nepal police in riot gear were stationed in various areas of Kathmandu to prevent Tibetans from celebrating the Dalai Lama's birthday
2011	August 5 - police arrested and briefly detained Thiley Lama, the Dalai Lama's envoy to Nepal, and his assistant after they publicly asked for the inclusion of refugee rights in Nepal's new constitution and the issuance of identity cards for Tibetans in Nepal
2011	August 15 - Nepali security officials invoked the Public Offenses Act to justify the detention of eight Tibetans prior to the August 16 arrival of the highest level official Chinese delegation to visit Nepal in several years

2011	September 11,12,13 - Nepali authorities arrested 23 Tibetan refugees, including 8 children, for illegal entry. Refugees were transferred to UNHCR on September 21 only after a court intervened
2011	October 17 - four Tibetan community leaders were detained by authorities in Kathmandu
2011	November 1 - Nepal police detained 58 people after the Tibetan community in Bhanimandal gathered for a prayer service to commemorate the Tibetans who had self-immolated in Tibet
2011	November 10 - Tibetan monk named Butuk self-immolated at the Boudha Stupa, shouting “stop the violence in Tibet” and “long live the Dalai Lama.” Butuk was extinguished and survived.
2012	February 24 - Thirteen Tibetans detained after a peaceful protest outside the United Nations office in Kathmandu, freed March 6 following a total payment of NRs. 350,000 (US \$4,391) bail ³⁸
2012	March - 100 Tibetans were arrested during protests in Kathmandu to mark the 53rd anniversary of the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in violation of Nepal's Supreme Court
2012	September - police arrested seven Tibetans in Kathmandu. Six were released the same day, but the police charged one under the Public Offenses Act
2013	February 13 - Monk Drongchen Tsering (25) self immolates at Boudha Stupa
2013	April - Prachanda, former prime minister and chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal, assured China's President Xi Jinping that Nepal will repress any “anti-China” activities by Tibetan refugees
2013	August 7 - Monk Karma Ngedon Gyatso (38) self immolates at Boudha Stupa
2016	February - a Chinese security delegation urged Nepali counterparts to remain on high alert during March, when Tibetans mark a number of key political anniversaries
2016	March - Nepali authorities attempted to prevent Tibetans from participating in elections for the Tibetan government in exile
2016	July - Twenty-eight people detained and held in police custody for several hours at a

³⁸ International Campaign for Tibet, “Tibetan demonstrators remain in detention in Kathmandu,” 2012

	peaceful celebration for the Dalai Lama's birthday by the Tibetan community ³⁹
2018	April - Nepal and China held their first joint military exercise
2018	May - Nepal signed China's One Belt, One Road Initiative establishing wide-ranging plans for infrastructure projects including an airport and hydropower plants
2019	October - visit to Kathmandu by President Xi Jinping, the two countries negotiated a series of new agreements, including extradition treaty

³⁹ International Campaign for Tibet, "The Dalai Lama's birthday," 2016

Appendix B: Tibetan Refugees, FDI Projects, and FDI Values in Nepal by Year

Year	Number of Refugees	Number of Projects	Value of Projects
1994	2,542	-	-
1995	1,356	-	-
1996	2,125	-	-
1997	2,236	-	-
1998	3,109	-	-
1999	2,182	-	-
2000	2,319	3	\$ 34,285,496.23
2001	1,381	6	\$ 127,681,114.93
2002	1,268	1	\$ -
2003	1,815	1	\$ 2,354,509.87
2004	2,300	2	\$ -
2005	4,000	5	\$ 69,246,118.50
2006	2,400	6	\$ 30,584,847.75
2007	2,150	11	\$ 294,395,655.84
2008	600	4	\$ 175,357,872.74
2009	1,000	7	\$ 340,739,740.63
2010	870	14	\$ 54,376,304.66
2011	900	14	\$ 316,720,469.05
2012	900	15	\$ 310,734,591.77
2013	171	6	\$ 122,514,425.34
2014	-	5	\$ 22,150,264.58
2015	-	8	\$ 708,958,376.21
2016	-	15	\$ 440,818,290.80
2017	-	11	\$ 228,916,858.37
2018	-	16	\$ 243,607,337.10
2019	-	9	\$ 95,440,187.87
2020	-	15	\$ 2,543,777.43

2021	-	20	\$	148,888,062.40
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Appendix C: Projects and Value by Flow Class in World Versus Nepal

World				
Flow Class	# of Projects	% of Total	Value of Projects	% of Total
ODA-like	14224	67.78%	\$ 292,698,852,457.44	10.87%
OOF-like	5517	26.29%	\$ 1,945,817,020,623.02	72.28%
Vague (Official Finance)	1244	5.93%	\$ 453,614,114,296.08	16.85%
Nepal				
Flow Class	# of Projects	% of Total	Value	% of Total
ODA-like	199	89.64%	\$ 2,736,803,775.47	72.59%
OOF-like	18	8.11%	\$ 359,340,405.66	9.53%
Vague (Official Finance)	5	2.25%	\$ 674,170,120.94	17.88%