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**FOREIGN POLICYMAKING AND PERSPECTIVE:  
NEOCONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY AND THE  
POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE**

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## INTRODUCTION

### *THE POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE*

Director of Central Intelligence, Porter Goss, wrote in a memo to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees on November 17, 2004 that they should “provide the intelligence as [they] see it – and let the facts alone speak to the policymaker.”<sup>1</sup> Goss’s memo also stated that the role of CIA officials is to “support the administration and its policies in [their] work.”<sup>2</sup> His comments initially seem to contradict one another. First he asks employees to be objective in their reports of intelligence. He then asks them explicitly to support the administration’s policies. However, a more in depth understanding of the Bush administration’s view of intelligence suggests that CIA employees’ objectivity may, in fact, be entirely consistent with a kind of support for the administration’s policies.

Goss’s memo reflects a belief about intelligence held by most Bush administration officials: they are skeptical about the findings and reports of the traditional Intelligence Community. They argue that CIA reports often fail to

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<sup>1</sup> Douglas Jehl, “New C.I.A. Chief Tells Worker to Back Administration Policies,” *The New York Times*, 17 November 2004, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

reflect the level of certainty required for making critically important foreign policy decisions. Condoleezza Rice described the Bush administration's perception of threats in Iraq in a way that is characteristic of the administration's perspective on uncertainty in international affairs, "The problem here" she explains "is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly [Saddam Hussein] can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."<sup>3</sup> The administration saw the need for more skeptical intelligence assessments of the threat posed by Iraq. If intelligence must allow room for error, they assume that it is better to err on the side of caution, and to be *over* prepared rather than under prepared.

Goss's memo served as a warning to CIA employees to do their jobs, collecting information and composing intelligence reports, without using this information to arrive at their own conclusions. The Bush administration's mistrust of intelligence comes, in part, from its unique perspective on international affairs. As a result of this viewpoint, the administration defines external threats in a way that is incompatible with the Intelligence Community's estimative reports (e.g. language like "we think . . .", "it is possible . . .", "while some analysts disagree, we judge . . ."). Administration officials believe uncertainty in traditional intelligence reports often results in policy measures that are too weak to address the full force of potential threats.<sup>4</sup> For this reason

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<sup>3</sup> Condoleezza Rice as quoted in Scott Lindlaw, "Cheney says Saddam is actively and aggressively seeking nuclear weapons," *Washington Dateline*, 8 September 2002.

<sup>4</sup> They cite as examples the CIA's failure to foresee India's 1998 nuclear test, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, or the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000. ~ Richard W.

unanalyzed, raw information that lets “the facts alone speak to the policymaker” is actually supportive of the administration; it allows policymakers to analyze the information themselves and ultimately arrive at their own conclusions about the nature and extent of threats. Policymakers are then free to use these conclusions to justify policy measures that reduce their uncertainty about external threats in the global sphere.

Critics have accused the Bush administration of politicizing intelligence in the decision to go to war in Iraq largely as a result of what they perceive to be a lack of intelligence information directly implicating Saddam Hussein in 9/11 and a lack of information confirming the existence of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) buildup in Iraq. In January of 2001, Bush met with his new national security team to discuss plans for the Middle East. At this meeting, Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, stated that, ““There was no confirming intelligence”” that clearly implicated Iraq in the production or stockpiling of Weapons of Mass Destruction.<sup>5</sup> However, in the same meeting, the Bush foreign policy team was already discussing plans to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Bush administration’s early decision to pursue a foreign policy in the Middle East involving the removal of Saddam Hussein in spite of little clarity in intelligence reports has led to the belief that the administration ignored and distorted intelligence information in making the decision to go to war in Iraq.

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Stevenson, “President Asserts He Still Has Faith in Tenet and CIA,” *The New York Times* (July 12, 2003), cited in James Bamford, *A Pretext for War* (Toronto: Doubleday, 2004), 129-30.

<sup>5</sup> Bamford, 267.

The administration did not trust the information provided by the Intelligence Community suggesting a lack of connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda nor did they trust reports that failed to find WMD stockpiles in Iraq. The Bush administration assumed the CIA's Iraq assessment was yet another example of the Intelligence Community's underestimation of (or failure to predict) an existing threat to America. They cite as examples the CIA's failure to foresee India's 1998 nuclear test, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, or the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.<sup>6</sup>

*Foreign Policymaking in the Bush Administration: A New Approach to  
Uncertainty*

Throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, liberal and conservative approaches to foreign policymaking represented diametrically opposed perspectives on global affairs. Some administrations have made use of both organizational approaches at different periods throughout their time in office, but we can usually characterize individual policy choices in terms of one broad approach or the other. However in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, a new approach to foreign policymaking – one that essentially combined liberal multilateral cooperation with conservative realism – began to emerge.

Over the course of the last fifty years, the belief system responsible for this foreign policy approach has expanded its sphere of influence. It now

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<sup>6</sup> Stevenson, cited in Bamford, 129-30.

challenges and competes with the traditional liberal and conservative approaches to American foreign policy as the dominant decisionmaking approach in the Bush II administration. Like the approaches of multilateral cooperation and realism for liberals and conservatives, this new foreign policy approach reduces causal uncertainty for officials in the Bush administration. However, the ability of this approach to reduce uncertainty for policymakers depends on their unique definition of external threat and their unique view of intelligence – both products of their belief system.

I will argue in this thesis that the Bush administration's tendency to distort intelligence for political purposes is a direct result of the global perspective held by many administration officials. This ideology, commonly called neoconservatism, took root in the Truman administration and has developed over the course of the last half century. Policymakers who adhere to this belief system hold qualitatively different beliefs about the nature of international politics than traditional liberal or conservative policymakers, especially in their perception of external threats to the United States.

Certainly the traditional liberal and conservative approaches to foreign policy differ in almost every significant way. But they share one similarity that sets both traditional approaches apart from the neoconservative approach of the Bush administration: their view of intelligence. Since the creation of the CIA in 1947, neither liberals nor conservatives have challenged the basic project of the Intelligence Community – to collect/analyze information and to organize this



information into reports based on likely probabilities. This process requires analysts to draw conclusions based on the raw information. In an effort to make the process as accurate as possible, a number of different people analyze the same raw information bringing different perspectives and assumptions into the final estimate. The Intelligence Community recognizes the imperfections and inaccuracies inherent in a process that makes accuracy its ultimate objective but believes that if the project of intelligence is to inform policymakers, they must work with the imperfections by recognizing these inaccuracies and fixing them when possible.

Neoconservatives refuse to accept the imperfections that are an unavoidable consequence of the traditional Intelligence Community's estimates. Because of the "liberal sensitivities" of the Intelligence Community that are allegedly responsible for a majority of past intelligence failures, neocon policymakers and intelligence theorists advocate a different approach to intelligence.<sup>7</sup> This approach takes the final estimative steps of the intelligence process away from the Intelligence Community and places them under the judgment of policymakers. Instead of drawing conclusions based on raw

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<sup>7</sup> Jehl, p. 1; Robert Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA," *The American Prospect*, 16 December 2002, page online; "A Nation's intelligence community reflects the habits of thought of its educated elite from whose ranks it is recruited and on whom it depends for intellectual sustenance. The CIA is no exception. Its analytic staff, filled with American Ph.D.'s in the natural and social sciences along with engineers, inevitably shares the outlook of U.S. academe, with its penchant for philosophical positivism, cultural agnosticism, and political liberalism. The special knowledge which it derives from classified sources is mainly technical; the rest of its knowledge, as well as the intellectual equipment which it brings to bear on the evidence, comes from academia." – Richard Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth" *Commentary* 82 (1986): 29.

information, the Intelligence Community simply collects and organizes the raw intelligence and then gives these “fact-based” reports to policymakers, allowing them to draw their own conclusions entirely unrestrained by the estimates of a more diverse, pluralistic body of analysts.

Participants in a 2004 roundtable discussion on the evolving relationship between intelligence and policymaking recognized this phenomenon in the Bush administration. Officials seem to prefer raw information over finished intelligence reports. There is nothing unusual about policymakers requesting raw, unanalyzed intelligence *in addition to* analyzed estimates. This allows policymakers to intelligently question the judgments of CIA analysts. However, one discussion participant objected specifically to policymakers who request *only* raw intelligence. They “‘bowl over’ [intelligence] analysts by using data selectively.”<sup>8</sup> When policymakers take on the role of *both* policymakers and intelligence analysts by requesting only raw “facts” from the Intelligence Community, the supportive role of intelligence in the policymaking process is contrived, manipulated, and distorted for political purposes.

Whereas the Intelligence Community has built in mechanisms for producing estimates based on a number of different dissenting viewpoints, policymakers, especially in the Bush administration, tend to share the same broad belief system. When policymakers are given only raw information and are left to arrive at their own conclusions, the lack of diverse perspectives results in

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<sup>8</sup> United States Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Roundtable Report on Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, November 10, 2003), 13.

intelligence estimates that are favorable to the limited and self-interested beliefs of the policymakers themselves. I refer to this phenomenon as the politicization of intelligence.

In 1975, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under Chairman Frank Church conducted the first major evaluation of the Intelligence Community since its creation in the late 1940s. The impetus for the investigation was the alleged association of CIA with a number of plots in the early 1970s to assassinate foreign leaders in Cuba, the Congo, Chile, South Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic.<sup>9</sup> The assassination investigation turned into a much larger investigation of the Intelligence Community.

The Committee recognized the politicization of intelligence as one of the major problems with the intelligence/foreign policymaking relationship:

In recent years there has been a tendency on the part of high officials, including Presidents and Secretaries of State to call for both raw reporting and finished intelligence to flow upwards through separate channels, rather than through a centralized analytical component. This has resulted in many cases in consumers doing the work of intelligence analysts. . . . By circumventing the available analytical process, the consumers of intelligence may not only be depriving themselves of the skills of intelligence professionals; they may also be sacrificing necessary time and useful objectivity. In making his own intelligence judgment based on the large volume of undigested raw intelligence instead of on a well-considered finished piece of intelligence analysis, a high official may be seeking conclusions more favorable to his policy preference than the situation may in fact warrant.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, *An Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94<sup>th</sup> Cong, sess. 1, 1975, xxii-xxvii.

<sup>10</sup> Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, 94<sup>th</sup> Cong, 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., April 26, 1976, v. 1, p. 267.

Less than thirty years after the Intelligence Community was formally established, the Church Committee recognized the conflict of interests that occurs when policymakers interject themselves into the intelligence process. However, it is only now with the gift of hindsight that we can develop a theory of how or why this politicization occurred.

At the time of the Church Committee investigation, the problem of policymakers usurping the estimative responsibilities of intelligence analysts could be explained only on an ad hoc basis, usually in terms of a policymaker skewing reports to justify a particular policy measure. However, a retrospective examination of intelligence around the time of the Church Committee investigation suggests these “ad hoc” cases actually have links to the past and reoccur in the future. The element that causally connects the problem of politicized intelligence throughout the post-World War II era from before the Church Committee to the Bush II administration is the belief system of policymakers who have consistently mistrusted traditional intelligence and as a result have tried to create a more active role for policymakers in the analysis of intelligence information.

In order to understand why the Bush administration and past ideological equivalents have consistently criticized and mistrusted the methods and findings of the intelligence establishment, we must understand the way administration officials perceive the world. It is their belief system that leads them to their unique definition of threat and subsequently to their means for reducing threat-

related uncertainty. Their view of intelligence is consistent with their beliefs about causal uncertainty.

My objective in this thesis is to demonstrate a historical pattern relating the mistrust and politicization of intelligence by a particular group of policymakers to the beliefs that comprise neoconservative ideology. In order to develop my argument I have divided my analysis into six chapters. Chapter one establishes the historical framework for my analysis. Chapter two will focus on the origins of the Cold War and the emergence of beliefs that will by the late 1960s play a central role in American foreign policymaking. The Soviet challenge to American power in the immediate post-World War II era presented a new kind of threat to American policymakers. Liberal and conservative policymakers integrated this new threat into their traditional foreign policy approaches, but a new group emerged who believed the Soviet threat required a new policy approach. Cold War liberals saw the new threat posed by Soviet Communism as far too pervasive to be dealt with by either traditional foreign policy approach alone. Out of their unique perception of the threat, Cold War liberals created a new foreign policy approach.

Chapter three discusses the rise to prominence of this new foreign policy approach in the 1970s as a serious challenge to traditional liberal and conservative approaches. The inherent tendency of the Cold War liberal belief system to cause policymakers to politicize intelligence becomes clear through their challenges to the traditional Intelligence Community. Chapter four examines the politicization

of intelligence by the Reagan administration in the Iran-Contra affair. Reagan's presidency was the first administration in which neocons enjoyed control over the policymaking process since their formation of a coherent political movement in the late '60s. The politicization of intelligence by administration officials who aligned themselves with neoconservatism occurred in an unprecedented way under Reagan.

Chapter five demonstrates major parallels between intelligence in the 1990s and intelligence in the 1970s (chapter 3). Like the '70s, neocons failed to dominate major policymaking positions in the '90s. However, this factor did not prevent them from mounting major attacks against the Intelligence Community. This approach was similar to the one employed by neocons in the '70s for advocating their perspective on external threat, publicizing the inadequacy of existing traditional policy measures for dealing with existing external threats, and expressing the need for a more radical policy approach – such as their own – to reduce threat-related uncertainty in the global sphere. Chapter six will examine the neocons' rise to power for the second time since they became a real challenge to liberals and conservatives in the 1960s: the George W. Bush administration.

As I have suggested in this introduction, the Bush administration provides the most explicit evidence that the neoconservative belief system predisposes adherents to distort intelligence for political purposes. The administration's treatment of intelligence information related to 9/11 and the Iraq War follows the pattern established throughout the post-World War II era. To remedy the

problems they attribute to the CIA's uncertain estimates, they request raw intelligence from the analysts instead of completed reports. These worst case reports allow policymakers to make final estimative judgments, giving them an active role in the intelligence process, and creating a conflict of interests between policymaking and intelligence.

## CHAPTER I

### *A WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY: BELIEFS, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY*

The problem of uncertainty in foreign policymaking is hardly a new one. No amount of information can ever provide a policymaker with absolute certainty of the outcomes resulting from his policy choices. According to a former Director of Central Intelligence:

In a world of perfect information, there would be no uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capabilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information, however, is bound to be imperfect for the most part. Consequently, the Intelligence Community can at best reduce the uncertainties and construct plausible hypotheses about these factors on the basis of what continues to be partial and often conflicting evidence.<sup>11</sup>

Even if it is possible to describe a situation in the international sphere with absolute precision and to use this description to predict potential policy outcomes, it will still be impossible to be completely certain of the actions taken by other countries that might ultimately affect the policy outcome. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when sustained global interactions between nation-states became a new political reality, policymakers had to develop ways for dealing with the

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<sup>11</sup> Schlesinger Report, *A Review of the Intelligence Community*, March 10, 1971, quoted in Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, 94<sup>th</sup> Cong, 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., April 26, 1976, v. 1, 268.



uncertainty inherent in global interactions. Decisionmakers with different beliefs about the world approached the problem of uncertainty in different ways suggesting the vitally important role of ideas to foreign policymaking.

### *Conservative Foreign Policymaking: Realism in Action*

Although a number of different theoretical approaches to foreign policymaking have made their way into the literature on international relations, these theories generally fall into two broad categories – conservative and liberal.<sup>12</sup> Conservatives tend to have realist tendencies. They organize the world according to structural factors like military and economic power, and they focus on the rational behavior of geographically organized nation-states often as it relates to matters of war and peace. They also believe strongly in the self-interested nature of their own state's actions as well as the actions of other states in the international sphere resulting in a preference for unilateralism.<sup>13</sup> In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Theodore Roosevelt is an illustrative example of a conservative policymaker with realist tendencies. He tried to turn America into a global power by developing a strong navy and modeling America's role in the world after that of other global powers.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy," in *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 36-7.

<sup>14</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue?" *International Security* 21 (1997), 96.

This foreign policy approach typically assumes a Hobbesian perspective on threat. Hobbes believed that humans are by nature equal and that this equality drives people to desire similar ends:

[I]f any two men desire the same thing which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End . . . endeavor to destroy, or subdue one an other. . . And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation: that is, by force or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him . . .<sup>15</sup>

Individuals can secure themselves by creating Leviathans, but states cannot enjoy the same sort of security as individuals. Given the similar desires of nation-states, the only means of security is pure, unadulterated power over all other states in the international sphere. In the renowned language of Hans J. Morgenthau, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”<sup>16</sup> The Hobbesian perception of threat is based on the economic and military power of nation-states. Conservative policymakers in America with realist tendencies assume this structural nature of threat, which informs their approach to dealing with uncertainty through policy measures.

A conservative policymaker can reduce problems associated with uncertainty simply by making America stronger – increasing the size of its military and rallying nationalist sentiments to prepare for the possibility of

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<sup>15</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 87-88.

<sup>16</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1948), 28.

exercising America's power over an opposing military threat.<sup>17</sup> Conservative policymakers can secure America from potential threats without an absolutely certain understanding of the size or scope of these threats because security measures are largely internal and unilateral. Conservatives in the Hobbesian tradition believe that threats will always exist in the world. However, by making one's state powerful *enough* to counter any attack against it, this state becomes the most threatening state in the international sphere. Threats still exist, but power allows the beholder to control threat even in the face of uncertainty.

### *Liberal Foreign Policymaking: Multilateral Cooperation*

Realist tendencies have dominated foreign policymaking throughout history. However, it would be incorrect to characterize most liberal policymakers as having realist tendencies to the same extent as conservatives. Like conservatives, liberals differ throughout American history in their approaches to foreign policy, but they generally challenge the focus of conservative realist policymakers on issues of war/peace and the nation-state.<sup>18</sup> "Indeed many liberals define security in terms that are broader than the geopolitical-military

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<sup>17</sup> Torbjorn L. Knutsen, "Re-reading Rousseau in the Post-Cold War World," *Journal of Peace Research* 31 (1994): 247; Charles W. Toth, "Isolationism and the Emergence of Borah: An appeal to American Tradition," *The Western Political Quarterly* 14 (1961); "Rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits." – Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973), 5.

<sup>18</sup> Holsti, "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy," 43.

spheres, and they emphasize the potential for cooperative relations among nations.”<sup>19</sup>

Liberals usually allow for the possibility of non-structural factors to influence their foreign policy decisions and the policies of other international actors as well. Woodrow Wilson exemplified liberal foreign policymaking in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He did not reject America’s important role in global security, but his approach to this role depended on multilateral global agreement rather than raw military power.<sup>20</sup>

The liberal multilateral cooperation approach to foreign policy assumes a more Kantian perspective on international relations. Immanuel Kant’s theory of perpetual peace is based on a guarantee “given by no less a power than the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*) in whose mechanical course is clearly exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony spring from human discord, even against the will of man.”<sup>21</sup> For Kant, the natural order of international relations is peaceful. Tensions between nation-states are deviations from this norm. Even when men act in ways that exacerbate conflict, order and peace will ultimately prevail. While Kant is often negatively associated with idealism, the part of his theory relevant to the liberal foreign policy approach of Wilsonian multilateral cooperation is Kant’s perception of threat. If perpetual peace is

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ruggie, 95.

<sup>21</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, trans. Mary Campbell Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 143.

indeed the natural state of global affairs, this fact presumes the real possibility of eliminating threat from the international sphere.

Liberals deal with uncertainty in foreign politics by fostering a cooperative, multilateral global system. In a cooperative system, the interests of one state become the interests of all states thereby reducing the deception and secrecy that is an inherent part of the pessimistic Hobbesian perspective.

Cooperative multilateralism allows liberal policymakers to be more certain of the actions of other states and thus more certain of the likely outcomes resulting from their own policies.

These broad characterizations of liberal and conservative approaches to American foreign policymaking do not accurately describe every policy decision made by liberal and conservative policymakers throughout American history nor do they necessarily have the desired effect of *actually* reducing uncertainty in foreign policymaking.<sup>22</sup> But for the purposes of analyzing the problem of uncertainty in world politics, these categories effectively capture the two major competing organizational approaches of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The factor that determines a policymaker's decision about which approach will ultimately lead to the most effective and least uncertain policy measures is his belief system. Max Weber defended the vital importance of ideas in

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<sup>22</sup> Kenneth Boulding in *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956) suggests that policymakers react not to reality but to their perception of reality. This idea is true of uncertainty as well. The question of whether the foreign policy approaches of realism or multilateral cooperation actually allow policymakers to be more certain of the outcomes of their policy decisions is irrelevant. The relevant factor is that policymakers *believe* their approach to foreign policymaking reduces the presence of uncertainty in the international sphere.

determining how a person's interests ultimately influence his actions, "Not ideas but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest."<sup>23</sup> Ideas shape interests, and interests determine actions (or policies). These influential ideas can be organized and understood in terms of coherent belief systems, which dictate both how policymakers view the world and how they believe they can best deal with the uncertainty of international relations through their policy choices.<sup>24</sup>

Beliefs, ideas, and values guide people's perceptions of the world. "[They] lead directly to political action when decision-makers adopt concrete objectives."<sup>25</sup> We can use a model of belief systems to understand the relational influence of abstract values on concrete policy objectives. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane have developed a theory for understanding different kinds of beliefs and the role that each type of belief plays in the policymaking process. The different classifications of values/ideas are worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. By breaking ideas and beliefs into different levels of influence and looking at the interaction of ideas within and between levels, we can begin to understand how abstract ideas have a very real impact on concrete policy choices.

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<sup>23</sup> Max Weber, "Social Psychology of the World's Religions," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Berth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 280.

<sup>24</sup> Jon Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention," *International Security* 26 (Spring 2002): 117.

<sup>25</sup> Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 136.

### *Worldview*

Worldview is the most fundamental level of belief at which ideas define, in the broadest sense and with the most impact, the entire realm of possible policy action. These beliefs are normative as well as cosmological, ontological, and ethical. One's worldview is often formed by religious beliefs or adherence to principles of scientific rationality.<sup>26</sup> Worldviews include beliefs about the modern international order of individual sovereign states, ideas related to economic organization, i.e. capitalism or communism, and conceptions of the public/private distinction.<sup>27</sup>

#### INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY

The mid-17<sup>th</sup> century Peace of Westphalia ended the thirty years war and established a world composed of independent, sovereign nation-states.<sup>28</sup> Despite theoretical arguments that globalization may change this system of world order, the fundamental notions of sovereignty and the nation-state still dominate American policymakers' general view of the world. It would be inconceivable even for liberals who believe in the importance of international organizations like the United Nations to challenge, in any overarching way, the basic existence of nation-states or the principle of sovereignty.

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<sup>26</sup> Max Weber, 280.

<sup>27</sup> Memo prepared for the SSRC-sponsored conference on ideas and foreign policy, Stanford, California, January 18-20, 1990, cited in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 8.

<sup>28</sup> Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," *The American Journal of International Law* 42 (1948): 20.

At the fundamental level of worldview, most policymakers accept the basic principle of freedom and emphasize the importance of American security and prosperity in the broader global sphere.<sup>29</sup> They also seek a peaceful existence as a basic foreign policy goal. One final aspect of worldview critical to my analysis is a belief about economic order – that capitalism is the only viable economic system. This aspect of worldview plays a critical role in both the liberal and conservative worldviews. In terms of the beliefs discussed in this thesis relating primarily to American politics since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the worldviews of policymakers, even those with very different foreign policy approaches, remain consistently the same. Differences in belief become evident at the level of principled beliefs.

### *Principled Beliefs*

Principled beliefs serve as mediators between worldviews and causal beliefs. Worldviews are so fundamental on the spectrum of belief systems that two people could share the very same worldview and make consistently opposite policy decisions because of the different ways they translate their abstract worldviews into applicable guidelines for action.<sup>30</sup> Beliefs at this level range from assumptions about the nature of interactions between sovereign states in the international sphere to the importance of human rights. While both liberal and

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<sup>29</sup> Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 36.

<sup>30</sup> Goldstein and Keohane, 9-10.



conservative policymakers agree that the world is composed of sovereign states, that capitalism provides the only acceptable form of economic organization, and that democracy is a superior form of government, they disagree about the implications of these worldviews. Principled beliefs include the opposing liberal and conservative perceptions of threat, which are based on different assumptions about the nature of international relations, the available indicators that contribute to policy decisions, and the primary actors in world politics.

### *Causal Beliefs*

Causal beliefs form the strategic basis of belief systems. These ideas suggest specific means through which individuals can achieve their goals and objectives. Causal beliefs are the least fundamental and change frequently, bearing primary responsibility for most policy shifts. Whereas principled ideas allow decisionmakers to make decisive choices in spite of causal uncertainty, causal ideas respond to uncertainty by decreasing it.<sup>31</sup> Causal uncertainty is simply the inability to know the exact circumstances involved in a foreign policy decision or the implications of that decision. Uncertainty results from the inability to determine the exact size or nature of external threats in the international sphere. However, because liberal and conservative policymakers define threat in different ways, they have different causal beliefs about how to decrease uncertainty. These different beliefs are embodied in the opposing 20<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

century approaches to foreign policymaking: liberal multilateral cooperation and conservative realist power politics.

*Traditional Foreign Policy Approaches and the Role of Intelligence*

The reader should now have a reasonable understanding of important organizational beliefs related to traditional liberal and conservative foreign policy approaches. In this section I will discuss the way that these foreign policy approaches tend to use intelligence information in the decisionmaking process. I will establish a connection between both traditional foreign policy approaches and favorable views of the American Intelligence Community. The belief systems of foreign policymakers influence the role they attribute to intelligence indicators in making their decisions:

All [policymakers] face the problem of selecting the essential from among countless bits of information or indicators, especially regarding threats and opportunities. . . . [T]he indicators that individual policymakers deem critical may be extremely diverse: some would favor the size of a nation's gold reserve, whereas others would consider the number of lights left on in government buildings after working hours; some would put more emphasis on battleships and others, on the revolutionary potential of an adversary's populace. The type, number, weighting, and combination of indicators selected for any given issue sets the limits of the known world. Hence, any decision in world politics, as an outcome of all the methods of information collection and analysis, is informed by the initial choice of indicators. These indicators in turn shape strategy even *before* calculations of power balances, rationality, cognitive or psychological constraints, or bureaucratic politics begin to play their part.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Mikhail A. Alexseev, *Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle* (New York: St. Martins, 1997), 2.

Both traditional approaches typically accept the type of indicators provided by the traditional Intelligence Community as useful information in the decisionmaking process. This view of CIA intelligence assessments is causally related to traditional liberal/conservative belief systems. These belief systems determine a use for intelligence that is largely consistent with the type of information produced by CIA intelligence reports.

In his senate committee's 1976 review of the American intelligence system, Senator Frank Church describes intelligence as a linear process: policymakers request an intelligence report, information is gathered, *analyzed*, put into a report, and given to the policymaker to use in a policy decisions.<sup>33</sup> This view of the process assumes that the intelligence report is an end in itself. It is a product of the Intelligence Community's scrutiny and analysis; once it reaches policymakers, it is an alterable but nevertheless complete product.<sup>34</sup>

Policymakers are encouraged to question the reasoning behind Intelligence Community reports, but they can reasonably presume that the reports are based on many different competing assessment of raw intelligence information.<sup>35</sup> The reports given to policymakers are intelligence *estimates* and therefore include an

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<sup>33</sup> Church Committee Report, v.1, 18.

<sup>34</sup> "[T]he task of [intelligence] is to present as a basis for the decisions of policymakers as realistic as possible a view of forces and conditions in the external environment." – Tyrus G. Fain, Katharine C. Plant, and Ross Milloy, *The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues* (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1977), 44.

<sup>35</sup> Sherman Kent notes that, "What is desired in the way of hypotheses, whenever they may occur, is quantity and quality. What is desired is a large number of possible interpretations of the data, a large number of inferences, or concepts, which are broadly based and productive of still other concepts." – *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 174. Kent expresses an assumption widely held by the American intelligence bureaucracy – that a plurality of interpretations all aimed at creating accurate estimates will ultimately lead to the best and most useful intelligence.

element of uncertainty, but these estimates are nonetheless considered by both traditional foreign policy approaches to be an invaluable component of decisionmaking.

Traditional liberal and conservative foreign policymakers can utilize intelligence estimates in spite of their inherent uncertainty because of the nature of their belief systems. Multilateral cooperation seeks to create shared interests between states giving policymakers some idea of how other states will act even in the absence of absolutely certain intelligence predications. Realism uses power to establish global military dominance preventing potentially threatening states from considering the use of military force against the United States.

Intelligence estimates based on the military capabilities and intentions of opposing nation-states are useful to conservative realist policymakers even when these estimates do not reflect with absolute certainty the military threat posed to the United States. The U.S. must only remain more powerful than the next most powerful country. The presence of (limited amounts of) uncertainty in intelligence estimates does not significantly impede realist policymakers from maintaining America's global military dominance. Neither liberals nor conservatives view external threats as so pervasive that they require radical policy approaches. Traditional policymaking perspectives, while different, are based on limited perceptions of external threat, allowing these groups to accept the inherent

uncertainty that accompanies traditional intelligence methods without seriously jeopardizing America's security.<sup>36</sup>

While all administrations, in spite of differences in belief systems, utilize intelligence collected from both human and mechanical sources, commentators recognize a "long standing" problem involving "the intrusion of politics into intelligence collection."<sup>37</sup> These critics argue that policymakers will make use of the Intelligence Community in different ways depending on their broader beliefs about the world and about global interactions. Policymakers reflect the causal connection between beliefs and intelligence by the type of the information they request from the Intelligence Community. Their requests impact both analysis and collection methods.<sup>38</sup> Since its founding, the CIA has widely embraced mechanical collections methods. The Intelligence Community believes that SIGINT (signal intelligence) and other forms of mechanically obtained information are far less fallible than HUMINT (human intelligence - espionage).<sup>39</sup>

Because of SIGINT's ability to contribute information free from human interpretation to intelligence estimates, it is unsurprising that it would be embraced by traditional foreign policy approaches that rely on the Intelligence Community's probability estimates in their decisionmaking processes. The

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<sup>36</sup> While it is true that the liberal belief system holds a broader definition of potential threats than the conservative belief system, it is also true that liberals are predisposed to hold a more optimistic perspective of the ability for policy measures to reduce these threats. Both policy perspectives hold a limited perception of threat, although they are limited in different ways.

<sup>37</sup> Allan E. Goodman, "Reforming U.S. Intelligence," *Foreign Policy* 67 (1987): 123.

<sup>38</sup> Fain, et. al., 44-5.

<sup>39</sup> Roy Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1970-1982).

confidence of liberal and even conservative policymakers in the Intelligence Community's use of SIGINT during the Cold War "can be understood as a reassertion of America's optimistic outlook after the harsh realities of international relations during and after World War II."<sup>40</sup> It elevates the importance of analysis shifting the organizational purpose of intelligence away from presupposing a clash between nations and more toward a cooperative system of interactions.

*Neoconservative Foreign Policymaking: Realist Multilateral Cooperation*

The conservative realist and liberal cooperative approaches to foreign policymaking differ substantially. However, in comparison to a third, more obscure belief system that began to develop mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, both traditional approaches seem to be alike in a significant way. The traditional approaches' perspectives on uncertainty and external threat – evidenced by their views on intelligence – suggest that they actually share a perspective on the world and differ only in their perceptions of this perspective. The third policy approach, neoconservatism, seems to depart from this perspective.

The major underlying theme of the neocon belief system is the idea that, "Weakness invites aggression, strength deters it. Thus American strength holds the key to [America's] quest for peace and to our survival as a free society in a

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<sup>40</sup> Abram N. Shulsky, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1991), 170.

world friendly to our hopes and ideas.”<sup>41</sup> The belief that “weakness invites aggression, strength deters it” seems to be consistent with a realist approach to foreign policy. However, the notion that “[America’s] quest for peace and . . . survival as a free society in a world friendly to our hopes and ideas” sounds very much like Wilsonian multilateral cooperation. If realist tendencies distinguish these new ideologues from the Old Left, a belief in the influential nature of ideas distinguishes them from traditional conservatives, “[Neoconservatives] still believe in the power of ideas – the conviction that if you can get the analysis of society straight, you’ll accomplish great things.”<sup>42</sup> This way of thinking represents a confluence of the two traditionally opposed organizational approaches to international politics in the post-World War II era – conservative realism and liberal multilateral cooperation. The neoconservative worldview is basically the same as the worldviews of the traditional policymaking approaches described above, so I will begin with a description of principled beliefs.

### *Principled Beliefs*

#### AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: POWER AND COOPERATION

Traditional liberal and conservative approaches to foreign policy accept a basic belief in American exceptionalism – the idea that America is somehow special, unique, and different from all other nation-states by virtue of its people, its history, its politics, or its values. According to Robert J. Lifton, an American

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<sup>41</sup> Charles Tyroler II, ed., *Alerting America* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1984), 15.

<sup>42</sup> Gary Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 18.

psycho-historian, “In the psychological life of Americans [American exceptionalism] has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success.”<sup>43</sup> Wilsonian liberalism appealed to the public’s sense of its own uniqueness as Americans. Wilson asked people to accept America’s global engagements as part of its exceptional duty to lead other nations in America’s image.<sup>44</sup>

Whereas the liberal foreign policy approach explicitly relies on America’s exceptional character, the conservative realism of Teddy Roosevelt implicitly appealed to American exceptionalism. Although Roosevelt pushed America to behave like past great powers,<sup>45</sup> the very idea that America should be the most (unilaterally) powerful nation in the world rests on an implicit recognition that America is, indeed, unique and special enough to hold this position. Discussions of American exceptionalism have surfaced and resurfaced throughout America’s existence, but this belief took on a new importance in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as the basis of an emerging new belief system.

The nature of this belief system, an unlikely combination of liberal and conservative ideals, heightens the neocons’ belief in America’s exceptional character. It combines the explicit exceptionalism of Wilsonian cooperative multilateralism with the implicit exceptionalism of conservative realism, emphasizing both the uniqueness of American ideals as well as the importance of

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<sup>43</sup> Robert Jay Lifton, *Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World* (New York: Nation Books, 2003), 127.

<sup>44</sup> Ruggie, 96.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.



American military preeminence in global affairs. The policy statement of the Committee on the Present Danger expressed the simultaneously liberal and conservative nature of neoconservative ideology: “Unless decisive steps are taken to alert the nation [of existing dangers], and to change the course of its policy, our economic and military capacity will become inadequate to assure peace with security.” This idea focuses on factors like the economy and the military as the essential elements of national security. However, the policy statement then refers to traditional realist “power politics” in terms of their relevance to multilateral cooperation:

A conscious effort of political will is needed to restore the strength and coherence of our foreign policy; to revive the solidarity of our alliances; to build constructive relations of cooperation with other nations whose interests parallel our own . . .<sup>46</sup>

The liberal impetus to cooperate with other nations who share America’s (unique and special) interests combined with the conservative emphasis on the importance of preeminent power results in a form of exceptionalism that is much more overtly influential on neocon policymakers than the exceptionalism of those who adhere strictly to one traditional perspective or the other.<sup>47</sup>

At this point we must consider the basic beliefs that drive neocon policymakers to combine two dichotomously opposed policy approaches into one. Their beliefs about the nature of international relations are fundamentally different from the beliefs of either liberals or conservatives. In one sense, they

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<sup>46</sup> Tyroler, 3.

<sup>47</sup> This strategy is clearly outlined in a piece by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Benevolent Global Hegemony,” in *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the new Pax Americana*, ed. Gary Dorrien and the Project for a New American Century (New York: Routledge, 2004), 126.

interpret the global sphere from a Hobbesian perspective. Like traditional conservatives, they believe that the international sphere is inherently insecure and that under present conditions, threats will always exist. However, the ideas underlying this Hobbesian perspective are different for neocons and traditional conservatives.

Neocons accept the conservative definition of threat as economic and militaristic, but they also believe that the reason an enemy's military forces become threatening in the first place is a result of clashing values. Samuel Huntington "clash of civilizations" argument illustrates this belief. He argues that inherent differences in values and beliefs between different cultures prevent the possibility of global tranquility.<sup>48</sup> However, neocons reject the second part of Huntington's argument – that this state of global affairs is permanent and unchangeable.<sup>49</sup>

The neocons' heightened sense of American exceptionalism allows them to accept the very real possibility that American values could (and should) be replicated on a global scale. In a world of universal values, they believe structural threats become virtually irrelevant. This belief departs from the logic of Hobbes,

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<sup>48</sup> Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 236-7.

<sup>49</sup> "Historical experience shows that political unity is achieved by cultural diffusion plus military conquest. . . . The Roman legions plus the Roman educators and architects and language could unify Gaul and Italy; the soldier and priests of Ancient Egypt could unite, politically, the valley of the Nile; Kultur plus diplomacy plus the best trained soldiers of Europe could bring together the small German states . . . But we find in history almost no examples of the political unification of hitherto separate autonomous communities brought about by deliberate, voluntary decision." This author also cites globalization as a technological and physical reason for the feasibility of a "World Government" in the modern international system. – James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World* (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), 45, 19.

and it is, instead, Kantian in nature. According to the neoconservative belief system, threats are primarily ideological and only secondarily militaristic or economic. This perspective on threats makes them appear pervasive and existential. Multilateral cooperation alone will allow ideological differences to persist and realism alone ignores the possibility that “abstract ideas” can actually pose a threat to security. However, the use of realist power politics to remake the world in the image of America has the potential to create a lasting Kantian peace.

### *Causal Beliefs*

#### REMAKING THE WORLD IN THE IMAGE OF AMERICA

The neoconservatives’ principled belief in the possible existence of a Kantian peace must not be mistaken for liberal multilateral cooperation in its purest form. The difference between liberal idealism and neoconservatism becomes increasingly apparent at the level of causal beliefs. The liberal cooperative approach to policy revolves around the notion that cooperation will foster shared interests, and create an incentive for states to share similar values. The neoconservative policy approach views the liberal approach as “soft.” Shared values are a *precondition* (not a result) for cooperative multilateralism to be effective. Neoconservatives advocate the use of power and force to create the precondition of shared values.

Some commentators argue that one source of the neoconservatives’ belief in a universal system of values comes from the political ideology of a mid-20<sup>th</sup>

century political theorist, Leo Strauss. Strauss believed that the greater problems of modern society could be explained in a critique of positivistic social science, which he calls “value free.” He claims that this ethical neutrality affects the way in which political theorists approach the study of politics. “[T]he ground which is common to all social scientists, the ground on which they carry on their investigations and discussions, can only be reached through a process of emancipation from moral judgments, or of abstracting from moral judgments . . .”<sup>50</sup> Without moral judgments he sees a lack of distinct goals and objectives in politics. He criticizes the scientism and historicism of political science and arguably makes the case for a universal ethical code.<sup>51</sup>

Neoconservative ideology is a combination of ideas from traditionally opposing belief systems. In principle it combines Hobbesian and Kantian perspectives of the world accepting the importance of both conservative realism and liberal multilateral cooperation. Neoconservative policymakers causally connect their policy choices to their principled beliefs by using power to remake the world according to the values of the United States. Neocons believe that this approach to international relations reduces the threat to the United States, which they perceive to be primarily ideological in nature.

### *The Neoconservative Policy Approach: Uncertainty and the Role of Intelligence*

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<sup>50</sup> Leo Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?” *The Journal of Politics* 19 (1957), 347.

<sup>51</sup> Richard Pipes – Harvard historian, neoconservative, and head of the Team B intelligence project in the 1970s – expresses these Straussian views of scientism and historicism quite explicitly in “Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth,” *Commentary* 82 (1986): 26.

The reader should now have a reasonable understanding of some important aspects of the neoconservative belief system: worldview, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs. In this section I will discuss the importance of these beliefs to this group's view of intelligence as it is used in the foreign policymaking process. I will establish a connection between the neoconservative belief system and a policymaking perspective on intelligence that rejects the methods of collection and analysis used by the traditional Intelligence Community and subsequently distorts intelligence in an effort to utilize methods of collection and analysis that are more consistent with its belief system.

The fact that neocons have consistently and repeatedly politicized intelligence throughout the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century suggests that the reasons for this politicization extend much deeper than the interests associated with individual and unrelated policy measures. It is instead an unavoidable result of the way that neoconservative principled beliefs define external threats and reduce uncertainty resulting from these threats through radical policy measures. Their beliefs determine the role they assign to intelligence information in the foreign policymaking process.

Both traditional liberal and conservative approaches allow foreign policymakers to use intelligence estimates in the decisionmaking process even though these estimate cannot reflect absolute certainty on the part of the Intelligence Community. They recognize that limited amounts of uncertainty are an inherent part of intelligence estimates. While uncertainty is never desirable,

liberal and conservative perceptions of threat allow these policymakers to use uncertain estimates that at least *aim* to provide the policymaker with accurate information without seriously jeopardizing national security.

Liberal and conservative policy approaches deal with uncertainty in different ways. However, both approaches work to reduce uncertainty in a way that is consistent with the traditional Intelligence Community's approach to collecting and analyzing intelligence information. The neoconservative belief system produces a perception of external threat that is so qualitatively different from both traditional approaches that it cannot accept the uncertainty inherent in the traditional Intelligence Community's estimative reports. Because neoconservatives perceive threats to be pervasive and ideological, they are unmanageable by the limited traditional policy approaches and instead require extreme and pervasive policy measures.

As a result of this view of threat, estimative intelligence reports that are inherently uncertain pose a serious concern for national security. If the uncertainty results in the underestimation of threats, policies developed according to these estimates will be insufficient for dealing with the full force of the threat. In order to reduce threat-related problems associated with uncertainty, neoconservatives advocate an approach to intelligence that is not useful to liberal and conservative policy approaches and is not traditionally used by America's Intelligence Community.

This approach produces intelligence estimates based on extreme possibilities rather than likely possibilities. According to one neoconservative intelligence theorist, the traditional liberal approach to intelligence that aims to provide an accurate assessment of the opposition is doomed to failure. He claims that “truth is not the goal [of intelligence] but rather only a means toward victory,” which suggests that “accuracy” (or truth) in intelligence reporting is a matter of perception and can be whatever a policymaker needs it to be in order to prevail over the enemy.<sup>52</sup> By estimating worst case scenarios and ignoring attempts to define actual scenarios, neocons believe that they can reduce the uncertainty present in traditional intelligence approaches and create foreign policy that sufficiently addresses external threats to national security despite the pervasive and seemingly unmanageable nature of these threats.

Positing worst case scenarios as valid threat estimates creates a role for intelligence in policymaking that is compatible with the neoconservative belief system. Neocons associate past intelligence failures with the Intelligence Community’s ineffective approach to intelligence and emphasize these cases when arguing in support of the use of worst case estimates. They cite as evidence the CIA’s failures: to predict the fall of Czechoslovakia, to foresee Tito’s defection from Moscow, to predict the fall of the Chinese Nationalists, to foresee

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<sup>52</sup> Abram Shulsky, *Silent Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991), 179.

the Israeli victory in Palestine, or to judge the mood of the Latin American states at the Bogotá Conference of 1948.<sup>53</sup>

The Intelligence Community believes that worst case analysis falls short of achieving the purpose for which intelligence is intended. To the CIA, worst case assessments are merely one step in the intelligence *process*, something to be taken into consideration in final estimates. However, they are not a finished product. Giving a policymaker a worst case assessment and *only* a worst case assessment could be likened to an architect giving a builder half-finished blueprints and telling the builder to finish construction as he sees fit. Because neoconservatives perceive threats to be much more insidious than liberals or conservatives, when given a worst case threat assessment, they tend to tailor their policies to this extreme, resulting in excessive measures of threat prevention. These measures include (but are not limited to) U.S. intervention in foreign countries intended to remake the nation in the image of America.

By instilling American values in countries that threaten America, neocons believe they create the possibility for future multilateral cooperation (and a Kantian perpetual peace). For this reason Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense under Reagan, unequivocally advocated his administration's use of worst case intelligence assessments:

‘Yes we used a worst-case analysis. You should always use a worst-case analysis in this business. You can’t afford to be wrong. In the end, we

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<sup>53</sup> John Ranelagh, *The Agency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 188.



won the cold war, and if we won by too much, if it was overkill, so be it.’<sup>54</sup>

The key sentence in Weinberger’s statement is “You can’t afford to be wrong.”

Proponents of worst-case analysis often say that overestimation may waste money, but underestimation wastes lives.<sup>55</sup>

Since the neoconservative foreign policy approach to dealing with external threat recognizes the potential that policy measures may realistically involve U.S. intervention abroad, they believe that effective intelligence “must include the knowledge to support the actual use of military forces to pursue national goals . . .”<sup>56</sup> Intelligence reports should also “emphasize those factors [of enemy states] that can be manipulated or changed [since] the consumer of the analysis is, after all, typically interested in affecting that political situation . . .”<sup>57</sup> Whereas liberal idealists might agree that the U.S. should actively seek to alter harmful political situations abroad, they would do this through negotiation rather than military intervention. Similarly while traditional conservatives might agree with the use of military capabilities abroad, they would disagree that these capabilities should be used to intervene in the domestic politics of foreign countries.

Analysis is not the only part of the intelligence process that neoconservatives have politicized. In a 1987 *Foreign Policy* article, Allen Goodman argued, specifically in the context of the Reagan administration and the

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<sup>54</sup> Caspar Weinberger as quoted in Tim Weiner, “Military Accused of Lies over Arms,” *New York Times*, June 28, 1993, 10.

<sup>55</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, “On Estimating and Imputing Intentions.” *International Security* 2 (1978), 22.

<sup>56</sup> Shulsky, 173.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

Iran-Contra affair, that the neoconservative policy elite also politicizes the *collection* of intelligence. Policymakers can sway collection methods by carefully selecting the types of reports they ask the Intelligence Community to produce.<sup>58</sup> I am not suggesting that certain collection methods are consistently used to achieve political goals while others are not. I am, however, suggesting that the parameters of intelligence are determined by the types of information and the kinds of reports policymakers request from the Intelligence Community, which in turn affects the types of collection methods utilized.

Since SIGINT became an available method of intelligence collection, the American Intelligence Community has significantly relied on it as a source of information. They believe that mechanically obtained information is often more reliable than HUMINT. However, neoconservatives argue that SIGINT is frequently to blame for intelligence failures resulting from a misrepresented threat.<sup>59</sup> Because neocons believe that threats are first and foremost ideological, they are easily manipulated by the enemy. SIGINT fails to take into account the possibility that an enemy may be purposely misrepresenting itself. Even if SIGINT correctly assesses the *apparent* threat, it may not be able to gain all the information necessary to assess the *actual* threat. HUMINT is naturally more conducive to requests by policymakers for worst case reports. A worst case report of raw “facts” based on HUMINT can include the worst intentions of an enemy as

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<sup>58</sup> Allen E. Goodman, “Reforming U.S. Intelligence.” *Foreign Policy* 67 (1987): 123.

<sup>59</sup> Richard Pipes argued that the CIA, with its reliance on SIGINT, treated the Soviet threat as something that came from inanimate objects rather than from the people who were manipulating the inanimate objects. – *Commentary* 82 (1986): 33.

well as the enemy's worst capabilities. This, in turn, creates a heightened view of threat that is more consistent with the view of threat inherent to the neoconservative belief system.<sup>60</sup>

### *Summary and Conclusions*

The politicization of intelligence is not a new problem. Intelligence theorists and analysts have worried about abuses of the policy/intelligence relationship since the creation of a modern intelligence establishment. However, the problem of politicization is much larger than individual, unrelated instances of policymakers misusing information for political purposes. In fact, the politicization of threat-related intelligence is intrinsically connected to a particular system of beliefs held by an elite group of policymakers throughout the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In this chapter I have established the important influence of ideas on foreign policy. I have introduced the two major foreign policy approaches of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and described their relationship to the two major organizational belief systems in international relations. I then suggested the emergence of a new approach to foreign policymaking based on an unusual and unlikely combination of two traditionally dichotomous belief systems: liberal cooperative multilateralism and conservative unilateral realism.

I established a connection between this new foreign policy approach and an increasingly coherent belief system called neoconservatism. I then related the

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<sup>60</sup> Shulsky, 174.

view of intelligence held by officials in the Bush administration to a deviant (deviating from both traditional foreign policy approaches) view of intelligence that is an unavoidable result of the neoconservative approach to reducing threat-related uncertainty in their foreign policies. While the Bush administration may represent the most recent and most explicit example of an administration that politicizes intelligence, this sort of politicization actually takes root in a thirty year history in which a core group of policymaking elites have consistently mistrusted the intelligence bureaucracy and assumed a contrasting view of intelligence based on the very ideas that drive their mistrust.

## CHAPTER II

### *INTELLIGENCE, IDEOLOGY, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR*

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, America enjoyed the status of a global superpower. Truman took advantage of America's power and its victories in the war appealing to the same public sense of exceptionalism as Woodrow Wilson:

American nationalism . . . is a civic nationalism embodying a set of inclusive core values: intrinsic individual as opposed to group rights, equality of opportunity for all, antistatism, the rule of law, and a revolutionary legacy which holds that human betterment can be achieved by means of deliberate human actions, especially when they are pursued in accordance with these foundational values. . . . The multilateral world order principles invoked by . . . Truman . . . bear a striking affinity to America's sense of self as a nation: an expressed preference for international orders of relations based on a 'universal or general foundation open in principle to everyone,' not on discriminatory or exclusionary ties.<sup>61</sup>

Truman had little difficulty rallying nationalist support for his policies, especially when the Soviet Union began to challenge America's superpower status.

As it became apparent that the U.S.S.R. was determined to expand its global sphere of influence, American policymakers recognized the potential for the Soviet Union to become a serious threat to the U.S. However, the vague

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<sup>61</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, "The Past as Prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," *International Security* 21 (1997): 110-11.

nature of this threat led different policymakers to interpret it differently.

Conservative realists saw the threat as primarily militaristic. When the Soviets acquired nuclear capabilities, realist policymakers recognized the threat these weapons posed to the U.S.<sup>62</sup> In contrast, liberals typically saw the Soviet threat as less militaristic and more as the result of clashing values between the two countries. In response to the realist preoccupation with the Soviet military threat, one commentator wrote:

I am emphasizing the importance of a central core of ideas in the Soviet Communist pattern of thought and communication because I believe there is a danger in our current preoccupation with Soviet military and political strategy and tactics to overlook the fact that at the basis of this whole movement and process lies the ideology [of Communism].<sup>63</sup>

Different policy approaches designed to protect the U.S. from possible Soviet aggression developed according to different perceptions of the nature of the threat.

The beginning of the Cold War forged new divisions and realignments within established political groups, perhaps most notably within the Democratic Party – between liberals who saw the Soviet threat as ideological but sought to reduce this threat through the traditional liberal policy approach of multilateral cooperation and liberals who agreed that the Soviet threat was ideological but did not agree that multilateral cooperation would be successful in containing the

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<sup>62</sup> “The problem of Soviet imperialism would not engage our attention nearly so much if it were not for the fact that among the other components in the arsenal of the Soviet bloc, there is a large and very effective base of military economic potential.” – Harry Schwartz, “Economic Realities and Prospects of the Soviet Bloc,” in *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*, ed. C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), 139.

<sup>63</sup> Frederick C. Barghoorn, “The Ideological Weapon in Soviet Strategy,” in *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*, 82.

threat.<sup>64</sup> According to James Burnham, “A World Government [cooperative multilateralism] would be the best solution to the present crisis. But the truth, even if it was far more generally accepted, is not *enough* to bring a World Government into being.”<sup>65</sup> Cooperative multilateralism was not a sufficient policy measure for addressing the Soviet threat. The policy approach of liberals who followed the logic of Burnham departed from both traditional policy approaches of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

These policymakers accept the liberal perception of threat as something more than just military and economic power, and they recognized the important role of cooperation in ultimately reducing this threat. However, they advocated power politics as a means to creating a united and cooperative “World Government.”

Defensive strategy, because it is negative, is never enough. . . . It would make more difficult the communists’ path toward their final goal, and would delay their arrival. Communist victory would, however, still be the end result. . . . The communist plan for the solution of the world crisis is the World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics: that is, the communist World Empire. . . . [The] alternative can only be another, a non-communist World Federation . . . No world federation will, we have seen, be attained voluntarily in our time. Besides the communists, only the United States holds power enough to force a federation into being. It can be brought about only if the United States, retaining for itself monopoly control of atomic weapons, assumes responsibility for world leadership.<sup>66</sup>

Burnham combines liberal and conservative policy approaches in this ultimate solution to the Soviet threat. Most policymakers who accepted this new approach

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<sup>64</sup> Jay Winik, “The Neoconservative Reconstruction,” *Foreign Policy* 73 (Winter 1988-89): 138.

<sup>65</sup> James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World* (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), 45 (italics added).

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 181-2.

were liberals who believed that the unique nature of the Soviet threat required a forceful solution. However, some conservative realists who already agreed with the basic premise of power politics began to recognize the threatening, albeit non-structural nature, of Soviet communism.

Those liberals and conservatives who defected to this new policy approach began to formulate a coherent belief system that would allow them to rationalize their policy objectives, and when challenged, they vehemently defended their new beliefs. They argued that those who remained supportive of traditional conservative or liberal policy approaches:

. . . have failed to come to grips with the realities of contemporary international politics because their studies and prescriptions proceed from theories that, among other deficiencies, neglect the institutional and ideological bases of war; misinterpret the fundamental nature of the enemy; and failing to understand the conditions of peace, lack any relevance to contemporary problems of international politics.<sup>67</sup>

Policymakers in the Truman administration held a number of different perspectives on containment of the Soviet threat. However, the policy approach that combined realist power politics with multilateral cooperation ultimately surfaced as a dominant approach.

### *Morality: Communism vs. Freedom*

Before discussing the different policymaking approaches of the Truman administration, it is necessary to understand some of the beliefs that became a part

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<sup>67</sup> Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," *The American Political Science Review* 68 (1974): 219.



of the Cold War liberal belief system. One such belief was the moral dichotomization of “communism” and “freedom.” This moral perspective is particularly difficult to characterize. In order to gain an accurate picture of Cold War liberal “morality,” we must look back to divisions between leftist groups in the 1930s.

The left of center political groups in pre-World War II America were divided into Communists who were basically American Stalinists, Progressives who tolerated cooperation with Soviet Communists but primarily sought their own drastic changes in America, and liberals who argued for social change in America independent of the untrustworthy Stalinist Soviet Union.<sup>68</sup> The status of Soviet fascism caused a number of alignments and realignments in the ‘30s and ‘40s.

As fascism established itself in Europe in the 1930s, many Progressives and liberals became more supportive of the U.S.S.R. However, liberals in particular disapproved of the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939 because it implicated the Soviets in Europe’s fascist movement. After Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. in 1941, Progressives and liberals threw their support back to the Communists. It was not until after World War II that liberals and Progressives split over an argument about America’s role in the rising tensions with the Soviet Union. Liberals sided with America, hailing its adherence to the principle of freedom and

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<sup>68</sup> John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 3.

reprimanding Stalin's dictatorship.<sup>69</sup> While progressives went on to defend liberalism from the right, liberals went on to defend liberalism from Communism.

The association between Communism and fascism spurred left wing liberals' intellectual revolt against the Soviet Union and also formed the basis for the morality of Cold War liberals' political movement. This intellectual movement first merged with a mainstream political movement in the late 1940s when liberals chose to support Truman's Marshall Plan, which Progressives opposed as "a clever disguise of traditional Truman anti-Communism."<sup>70</sup> Liberals associated with this intellectual movement adopted Truman's foreign policy perspective, and the Truman administration developed a distinct disdain for Stalin's fascist Communism.<sup>71</sup> Cold War liberals' view of communism as "evil" made their policy approach – to destroy the evil empire – more desirable and certainly more necessary.

In terms of a Cold Warrior's perception of external threat, the association of Communism with "evil" resulted in a belief that threats to ideological security can pose equal or greater risks to America than physical threats. Whereas traditional liberals would agree that Communism was ideologically threatening to American freedom and democracy, they never added this absolute moral dimension to Communism. Morality for the Cold Warrior was intrinsically connected to the "good" of freedom and democracy and the "evil" of

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 8-10

<sup>70</sup> Mary McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1978), 31, cited in Ehrman, 13.; Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 165, cited in Ehrman, 13.

<sup>71</sup> Ehrman, 12-13.

Communism, and this belief explains, in part, why they saw the traditional liberal policy of containing Communism as insufficient. American exceptionalism provided a precondition for Cold War liberals' moral dichotomization of "evil" Communism and "good" freedom/ democracy. Morality, in turn, armed liberals with a key strategy for the elimination of the external threat posed by Communism and the Soviet Union: universalizing American values.

The logic behind the concept of universal values assumes that principles are inherently right or wrong by virtue of themselves. The problematic nature of this logic is rooted in ongoing historical debate and can be summed up in one question - whose values do we universalize? The moral element of Cold War liberalism answers this question – we universalize values that will destroy the external threat posed by "evil" Communism. Cold Warriors believed that forcibly extending and universalizing America's values would create a stability that otherwise could not exist.

### *The Truman Administration*

Cold Warriors in the Truman administration accepted the basic tenets of realist power politics, though with the added dimensions of cooperative multilateralism distinguishing the administration from both traditional liberal and conservative policy approaches. The Truman Doctrine emphasized the importance of maintaining America's power and using this power to aid countries like Greece and Turkey in their fight against communism. The ultimate goal was

to deter the rising Soviet influence. On January 30, 1950 President Truman requested a joint State and Defense department reexamination of America's war and peace posture in light of a potential Soviet increase in power mostly resulting from changes in its nuclear capabilities.<sup>72</sup> From this examination, Dean Acheson, Truman's Under Secretary of State, and Paul Nitze, head of policy planning in Truman's State Department, drafted one of the most important foreign policy document's of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – NSC-68.

Acheson and Nitze argued in NSC-68 that “in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its ideas, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.”<sup>73</sup> According to this view, the strength of American ideals like freedom and democracy could effectively maintain America's power and influence in the world without military aid. However, this softer view was overshadowed by the objectives for dealing with the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, which were outlined in the document. The three objectives for U.S. foreign policy laid out in NSC-68 maintained a belief in the power and influence of shared ideas.

The first objective was to resolutely affirm America's own values in its domestic national conduct. George Kennan, deputy head of the U.S. mission in Moscow from 1944 to 1946, agreed with this first objective and perhaps even the second – to “lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic

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<sup>72</sup> NSC-68: United State Objectives and Programs for National Security, Washington, D.C.: April 7, 1950, page online.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

system in the free world.”<sup>74</sup> But he would not have agreed with Acheson and Nitze’s third objective, “to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step.”<sup>75</sup> NSC-68 developed the foundations for the importance of power in politics, a perspective that would be reaffirmed and expanded in the future, especially in the Reagan administration.

The disagreement between Kennan and Acheson provides foresight into future divisions, related to differing views of threat, that would affect foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. In terms of threat perception, adherents to a theory of power politics assume that between opposing forces, the more powerful nation-state is necessarily a threat to the weaker nation-state. While Truman was developing power politics in American foreign policy, he was simultaneously invoking another distinctive characteristic of Cold War liberalism – a belief in American exceptionalism.

The Truman Doctrine illustrated the notion of American exceptionalism with an added protectionist obligation in the aftermath of World War II. In his speech to the Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947, Truman asserted that “Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance . . . There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.”<sup>76</sup> Truman made it clear

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> “The Truman Doctrine,” 12 March 1947, *Modern History Sourcebook*, page online.

that America had the power and subsequently the obligation to aid Greece in its pursuit of democracy.

Also taking root in the Truman administration's reinvigoration of American exceptionalism was the basic premise that multilateral action is not initially necessary or helpful to achieving America's goals. The Truman Doctrine alluded to the necessarily unilateral nature of *intervention* in Greece:

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.<sup>77</sup>

Thus, the Truman Doctrine belief that “only the firm and active projection of American power can ensure and protect global stability”<sup>78</sup> connects the ideas of realist power politics and American exceptionalism. If, as Cold War liberals believed, power politics determines the threat to “weaker” nation-states, then American exceptionalism determines America's unique ability to ultimately destroy this threat – first by establishing American freedom as decisively “good,” in opposition to “evil” Soviet Communism, and then by providing Cold War liberal policymakers with a strategy for ridding the world of threat – by remaking the world in the image of America.

Cold War liberals thought that by universalizing American values, they could stop the spread of Communism and eventually undermine the Soviet system of government. They adhered to the kind of containment, advocated by Dean

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Jon Western, *Bush Grand Strategy: The Doctrine of Moral Realism* (Submitted November 3, 2003), 2.

Acheson, which dominated policy in the Truman administration. It sought to *force* the Soviet collapse that George Kennan argued would come naturally from domestic factionalism in the Soviet government. The belief that America needed to play an active role in undermining the Soviet system came from the Cold War liberals' perception of the Soviet threat as both political/ideological *and* militaristic. This perception was the result of a broader belief system that included a pessimistic view of state interactions, an absolute moral opposition to Communism combined with the real possibility of eliminating it from the world, and the ultimate futility of multilateral cooperation. Cold War liberals used these beliefs to inform a foreign policy that they believed would effectively eliminate (their view of) the Soviet threat.

George Kennan challenged Acheson and Nitze by defending a traditional conservative realist approach to foreign policy with the Soviet Union. In spite of his misinterpreted "X" article in the July 1947 issues of *Foreign Affairs*, which Truman administration officials took as a cue for actively resisting communism everywhere in the world, Kennan's experience in the Soviet Union led him to believe that the Soviet Union's domestic factionalism would prevent it from ever having the capacity to overthrow any Western nation-states and furthermore would eventually cause the Communist regime to collapse internally. According to this logic, America needed only to remain strong domestically and contain Soviet expansion but did not need to pursue a policy aimed at fundamentally altering the Soviet system from the outside.

With little success, Kennan urged the Truman administration to continue to work with the U.S.S.R. on their differences. He claimed that the Soviets were “not like Hitler.”<sup>79</sup> Acheson continued to favor a more aggressive, hard-line perspective of containment, in contrast to the softer, more defensive type of containment defended by Kennan. The difference between Acheson’s and Kennan’s containment policies is important because, as American power began to decline – especially after the internal fragmentation over Vietnam, Acheson’s form of containment hardly seemed possible. Despite what appeared to be America’s inevitable hegemonic decline, policymakers in the ‘50s and ‘60s who followed Acheson’s lead continued to argue that steps had to be taken to counteract this decline.

*Intelligence: The CIA and the Beginning of the Cold War*

While hard-line policymaker in the 1940s were challenging the policy approaches of traditional liberals and conservatives, another important event occurred. Truman passed the National Security Act of 1947 creating the CIA, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the U.S. Air Force. The significance of the fact that the formal Intelligence Community came into existence at the same time as a new political belief system can only be understood in terms of a retrospective analysis that causally connects this belief system with a consistent mistrust of the CIA beginning as early as 1949 when CIA failed to

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<sup>79</sup> George Kennan, interview by David Gergen, *PBS*, April 18, 1996, page online.



predict the timing of the Soviet bomb.<sup>80</sup> Acheson recounts in his memoir the direct impact of the Soviet explosion on the Truman administration's review of its military and foreign policies.<sup>81</sup>

To Cold War liberals, the CIA's failure to predict the Soviet nuclear explosion presented a much greater problem than it did to traditional liberals and conservatives. Because of the ideological nature of the Communist threat, which was compounded by the Soviet's intentions to expand militarily, the U.S.S.R. was uncontrollable and had to be dealt with from an offensive perspective. However, if America's intelligence system could not properly estimate the threat posed by the Soviets (as indicated by the CIA's failure to predict the 1949 explosion), an offensive military campaign against the U.S.S.R. would be virtually impossible. Out of this dissatisfaction with traditional intelligence methods a unique, new view of intelligence developed. It focused on new methods of analysis, but ultimately affected collection methods as well.

The CIA's method of analysis criticized by Cold War liberals was largely based on a system of analysis described by Sherman Kent in *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. Analysts in the CIA, especially during its early years of existence, used Kent's guide to analysis to compose National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Donald P. Steury, "Origins of the CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union," in *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union*, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett (Washington, D.C.: United States Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003).

<sup>81</sup> Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 345.

<sup>82</sup> Mikhail A. Alexseev, *Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle* (New York: St. Martins, 1997), 185.

[T]he CIA estimated the likelihood or threat level of Soviet aggression in terms of set probability ranges, expressed in denotative language. No language markers referred to 100 percent probability level. Several phrases, including ‘it is possible that,’ ‘may’ or ‘might,’ and ‘could have,’ were reserved for situations in which CIA regarded evidence as inconclusive. This system of probability estimates implicit in every NIE, became an enduring part of the estimating process.<sup>83</sup>

The project of estimating probabilities inherent to the Intelligence Community’s method of analysis assumes that knowledge of the probable is vital to the policy process.

This project of estimating probabilities is precisely the project that Cold War liberals criticized. “If intelligence could reliably make the predictions implied in [Sherman] Kent’s discussion, the policymakers would indeed be foolish to ignore them. . . . [However, the] predictive abilities of intelligence are likely to remain much less than Kent envisaged.”<sup>84</sup> Because Cold War liberals perceived the Soviet threat to be immanent and all-encompassing in a way that traditional liberals and conservatives did not, their belief system predisposed them to challenge the inherent uncertainty of the intelligence bureaucracy’s methods and conclusions. To the Cold War liberal, *any* margin of uncertainty relating to the Soviet threat, however small it may be, presented a serious risk to national security.

To remove the uncertainty inherent in the CIA’s method of analysis, Cold War liberal policymakers began to advocate threat assessments based on worst

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 188.

<sup>84</sup> Abram N. Shulsky, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991), 176.

case scenarios. The use of worst case analysis is not itself an unusual project. However, usually worst case assessments are taken into consideration by the Intelligence Community in its final reports. But Cold War liberal policymakers began to request worst case reports from CIA for their own estimative purposes. At the same time, they rejected the usefulness of CIA's assessments. Their reports were more consistent with their belief system, especially their heightened perception of threat, and they provided better justification for the radical policy measures that Cold War liberals believed were necessary to national security.

The Cold War liberal view of intelligence also assumes the idea that threats will persist until they are actively undermined: "If intelligence is to provide the knowledge needed to conduct national security policy, it must include the knowledge to support the actual use of military forces to pursue national goals . . ."<sup>85</sup> Acheson and Nitze presented a similar idea in NSC-68. They argued that U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviets had to actively seek to undermine and ultimately destroy the Communist Soviet government.

However, the kind of containment advocated by George Kennan did not involve actively intervening in Soviet politics with the intention of changing their system of government. Kennan's approach, which he believed was represented in the intentions of the Marshall Plan "aimed at *creating* strength in the West rather than *destroying* strength in Russia . . ."<sup>86</sup> His traditional conservative belief system informed his policy of containment – a reaffirmation of America's

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 173.

<sup>86</sup> George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1950-1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 90.

principles combined with a cautious patience, which he thought would inevitably end in an internal Soviet collapse. Kennan believed the Soviet threat was primarily political, not ideological.

This perception of the Soviet threat prescribed a use of intelligence that focused on monitoring and containing the opposition to prevent the political threat from becoming imminent and militaristic. For intelligence to best serve this purpose, policymakers would look favorably upon the CIA's approach to intelligence as described by Kent. The use of SIGINT for collection logically follows from this perspective, since policymakers requested information about the status of Soviet programs, not information about how to best undermine these programs, obtained through espionage.

The rising Soviet threat at the beginning of the Cold War created the need for a peacetime intelligence community. Ironically, out of the same Soviet threat developed a belief system that challenged the very purposes and methods of this intelligence community. Adherents to this new belief system could not accept the intelligence methods of the CIA without jeopardizing national security; instead they advocated an approach to intelligence that was consistent with their view of the world and their policy measures for reducing threat-related uncertainty. This approach to intelligence becomes much more explicit in the 1970s when Cold War liberals form a coherent political movement. Unfortunately, the tendency to misuse intelligence for political purposes also becomes more explicit, lending

credence to my argument that neoconservative ideology predisposes adherents to politicize intelligence.

### CHAPTER III

#### *INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1970s: NIXON, CARTER, AND THE NEOCONS*

The beginning of the Cold War incited a process of Party realignment. Democrats who saw the traditional liberal approach to foreign policymaking as insufficient formed their own faction of Cold War liberals within the Democratic Party. Eventually this group decided that the Democrats were headed in a direction that would not accommodate their beliefs about how to best reduce the Soviet threat, and they sought a more accommodating environment among the realist conservatives of the Republican Party. Chapter three will discuss the entrenchment of these Cold War realignments into the Democratic and Republican parties replacing the faction within the Democratic Party between liberals and Cold War liberals with a faction in the Republican Party between conservatives and neoconservatives.

Distinctions between Cold War liberals and traditional liberals before the end of the 1960s were sometimes unclear. Many policymakers had *some* traditional liberal or conservative tendencies and *some* Cold War liberal tendencies in the late '40s, the '50s, and even the '60s. Kennedy and Johnson were Democrats with many distinctive hard-line tendencies, and Nixon and Ford

were Republicans who supported softer policies like *détente*. However, by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the association between neoconservative policymakers and a more clearly defined belief system became much more apparent.

As policymakers rigidly aligned their belief systems with a particular political party, competing views of intelligence became more entrenched in opposing belief systems. An understanding of the new political alignments that occurred in the late '60s/early '70s, will provide a background for understanding *why* neoconservatives in the Reagan administration (and the formative years leading up to the Reagan administration) began to overtly challenge the methods and findings of the traditional intelligence community and *how* they used these challenges for distinctly political purposes.

#### *The Transition: From Cold War Liberals to Neoconservatives*

While it would be impossible to provide a completely accurate characterization of neoconservatism as it existed in the late '60s, we can outline beliefs that were broadly characteristic of the belief system. The formal alignment of the group known as Cold War liberals with the neoconservative belief system first occurred in the late 1960s with the debate over further

development of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system and President Johnson's decision not to run for re-election.<sup>87</sup>

Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, authors of NSC-68 in the Truman administration, were involved in the political movement that supported the development of an ABM system. Albert Wohlstetter was a part of the academic movement supporting Acheson and Nitze's political push for ABM development. During the summer of 1969, Wohlstetter recruited two young graduate students who followed in his own intellectual tradition to move to Washington and aid the political movement supporting the development of an ABM system. Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle spent the summer using their intellectual training to formulate applicable arguments for a pro-ABM policy through a lobbyist group called the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy. Wolfowitz and Perle would become integral parts of the American foreign policy establishment in the later 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>88</sup>

The neocon movement countered the traditional leftist movement that opposed the Vietnam War in the 1960s. One could easily argue that in spite of its obscure beginnings, in comparison to the anti-war movement, neoconservatism has had "a more significant and enduring effect on American policy than did the antiwar movement."<sup>89</sup> Evidence of this fact is the strong emergence of these ideas in an early political movement led by Henry "Scoop" Jackson, a Senator from

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<sup>87</sup> Jon Western, *Bush Grand Strategy: The Doctrine of Moral Realism* (Submitted November 3, 2003), 25.

<sup>88</sup> James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (New York: Viking, 2004), 32-3.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.



Washington State. Since their inception in the 1960s, these ideas would eventually take hold of not one, but two, presidential administrations in the 1960s, while the “New Left” political movement of the 1960s failed to *significantly* influence any future administrations of the late 20<sup>th</sup>/early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Senator Jackson used Wolfowitz’s and Perle’s research during the summer of ’69 to argue in Congress for the production of an ABM system. Both of these young academics established a relationship with Jackson that influenced their developing belief systems and would endure into the 1970s, when Perle especially became an active critic of détente.<sup>90</sup>

By 1972, the group of Cold War liberals who supported the development of the ABM system in ’69 and opposed détente had formed the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) in an attempt to make a coherent place for themselves in the Democratic Party. However, the party’s choice of George McGovern as presidential nominee in 1972 signaled failure for the CDM. When the party chose Carter, another soft-liner, in 1976, many members of the CDM saw this failure as reason to seek a political environment more attuned to their ideas.<sup>91</sup> They saw more potential for an accommodating environment in an emerging new Republican faction – the neoconservatives.

### *Cold War Democrats become Neoconservative Republicans*

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>91</sup> Jay Winik, “The Neoconservative Reconstruction,” *Foreign Policy* 73 (Winter 1988-89), 138.

Neoconservatives joining the Republican Party in the '70s differed from the party's traditional conservatives in their approach to foreign policy. While traditional conservatives' foremost interest was to maintain America's physical security and stability, this was not necessarily true of neoconservatives. Paul Wolfowitz, a renowned neoconservative, believed that "[M]oral principles were more important . . . than stability or national interest."<sup>92</sup> Indeed for neoconservatives, when the interests of physical security conflict with the interests of ideological security, protection of ideals will consistently remain most important. Like traditional conservatives, they believe that militarism is a more effective foreign policy mechanism than negotiation, but in contrast, the neocon's impetus for using military force is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Indeed, the realism emerging in the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party in the 1970s was rooted in idealistic intentions -- militarism driven by a passionate ideological opposition to communism.<sup>93</sup>

The debate between neoconservatives and conventional realists played out at the highest levels of government in the mid-70s, toward the end of the Ford administration. Kissinger's first priority was to make America physically secure from the Soviet Union. Unlike some of his colleagues in the administration, for example Donald Rumsfeld, Kissinger viewed moral-based policies with skepticism. He argued that "[m]oral claims involve a quest for absolutes, a denial

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<sup>92</sup> Mann, 76.

<sup>93</sup> John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs 1945-1994* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 106.

of nuance, a rejection of history.”<sup>94</sup> Much of Kissinger’s distaste for the language of morals resulted from the desire of neoconservatives not only to involve American ‘principles’ in realist policy but to make this approach universal by creating a good verses evil dichotomy. Neoconservatives believed that universalizing American principles to form a global moral consensus was the only way to preserve American security. Kissinger, however, saw American security as a product of a global peace based on a balance of power.<sup>95</sup> These competing conceptions of the role power should play in American foreign policy reinforced divisions between belief systems and their prescribed policy approaches.

During this period of party realignment in the 1970s, hard-liners either reaffirmed their traditional conservative ideals or adopted the mindset of neoconservatives. Some soft-liners whose principled beliefs aligned with those of the emerging neoconservatives changed their causal beliefs to accommodate neoconservative power-based policies. Other soft-liners retained their causal beliefs in the power of multilateral cooperation and negotiation and established an adherence to beliefs that were reemerging under Carter, such as the inherent value in peace and human rights.

### *Carter’s Policy Approach*

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<sup>94</sup> Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 316.

<sup>95</sup> Mann, 76.

Jimmy Carter held a broadly Kantian perspective of relations between sovereign nation-states. In his acceptance speech at the 1976 Democratic National Convention in New York City, he made this perspective clear. He said:

The foremost responsibility of any President, above all else, is to guarantee the security of our nation – a guarantee of freedom from the threat of successful attack or blackmail, and the ability with our allies to maintain peace.<sup>96</sup>

For liberals like Carter, peace not war is the natural state of affairs, and in order for peace to really exist, external threats to American security must be removed – but *not* by force. While most policymakers in American politics would agree, in spite of differing political affiliations, that external threats to American security are intolerable, Carter’s liberal policy approach to reducing the Soviet threat involved the use of cooperation and negotiation to create shared interests between the United States and the Soviet Union. These shared interests reduced the uncertainty of the Soviet threat and ultimately sought to create a lasting peace.

### *Multilateralism and Hegemonic Decline*

In his acceptance speech, Carter emphasizes another principled belief related to his worldview of sovereign nation-states. When he talks about peace, he explicitly refers to “the ability *with our allies* to maintain peace” recognizing both the possibility and the importance for nation-states with similar interests to

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<sup>96</sup> Jimmy Carter, “Acceptance Speech at 1976 Democratic National Convention,” July 15, 1976 obtained online from Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, page online.

form lasting bonds and to deal with problems through joint effort (*italics added*).<sup>97</sup>

Carter's belief in the importance of multilateralism to establishing peace resulted in part from his recognition of America's inevitable and unpreventable decline from its status as the world's sole superpower:

The theory of hegemonic decline suggests that structural characteristics of the international system will contribute to the weakening of hegemonic power over time. Declining power will create pressures for the hegemon to adjust its policies to account for its weakened position . . . A declining hegemon should be expected to shed peripheral commitments abroad and seek ways of expanding resources internally.<sup>98</sup>

The Carter administration recognized the inevitability of America's decline and attempted to adjust its foreign policy to accommodate this decline. Bill Clinton also demonstrated "an awareness of the sources and nature of America's decline and strategic overextension" in the '90s.<sup>99</sup> Indeed, the liberal belief in multilateralism is based on recognition that conditions in the international sphere would not permit successful unilateralism. The implication of this view for the liberal perception of external threat is that threat can be most successfully deterred with help from other non-threatening nation-states

Neoconservatives in the '70s did not disagree with Carter's belief in the importance of multilateral cooperation. However, for Carter multilateral cooperation was a causal belief and a means to achieving peace. For the neocons, multilateral cooperation was a principled belief – an end brought about by a causal belief in the use of military power to create the necessary precondition of

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> David Skidmore, *Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), xvii.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 166

shared values. It was this causal belief that prevented neocons from accepting America's hegemonic decline.

*Morality (not Power) begets Respect*

Jimmy Carter introduced America to a new kind of presidency, which emphasized the importance of morality -- not as an oversight to policy measures, but as a driving force behind policy decisions. Gaddis Smith argues that Carter's morality was a result of his philosophy of repentance, which:

. . . prompted a satisfying litany of criticism directed against violations of human rights in the Soviet Union, Latin America, and by whites against blacks in Africa. It led to more open diplomacy, a reluctance to take covert action against unfriendly regimes, and new guidelines designed to limit the sale of American weapons to Third World countries.<sup>100</sup>

Carter effectively made morality in government a lasting part of the liberal belief system in America. According to this logic, struggles for power are themselves threatening and immoral. In an effort to move away from power-dominated foreign policymaking, Carter substituted morality for power, as a guiding principle for action.<sup>101</sup> The role morality played in Carter's foreign affairs is very different from the role of "morality" for neoconservatives.

Carter's morality cannot be understood independently of his liberal belief system. "In the liberal worldview there is no *animus dominandi* that is not subject to the ameliorating effects of rationality and/or moral duty."<sup>102</sup> The morality of

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<sup>100</sup> Gaddis Smith, *Morality Reason and Power* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 48.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>102</sup> Joel Rosenthal, "Rethinking the Moral Dimensions of Foreign Policy," in *Controversies in International Relations Theory*, ed. Charles W. Kegley (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 320.

neoconservatives is more closely related to the realist approach in which, “The choice is not between moral principles and national interest devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality and another set of principles derived from political reality.”<sup>103</sup> To a neoconservative, morality is associated with a good vs. evil dichotomization between communism (divorced from political reality) and freedom/democracy (derived from political reality).

*Containment and Détente: Softer Policy Perspectives on Threat Reduction*

To both traditional conservatives like Nixon whose administration developed the first formal policy of détente and liberals like Carter who, despite ferocious opposition, sought to maintain the policy throughout most of his time in office, détente was a useful policy for reducing the threat posed by the Soviet Union. President Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, formulated the new policy of détente as a response to America’s inevitable decline from the position of sole global superpower.<sup>104</sup> Kissinger’s perception of the Soviet threat can be traced back to similar perspectives in the Truman administration, though his view of threat was closer to that of George Kennan than Dean Acheson.

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<sup>103</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Germany and the Future of Europe*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 33.

<sup>104</sup> Michael Cox, “From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (1990): 32-3.

Kissinger recognized the threat not as pervasive and existential but as circumstantial, something that could be reduced through cooperation.

Both Carter and the neocons agreed that the Soviet Union posed a serious threat to national security. However, Carter sought to reduce this threat through a policy of détente while the neocons sought to reduce this threat through a policy of strategic nuclear superiority. While the objective of each policy was ultimately the same – to reduce the Soviet threat – the logic of each policy required very different means to achieve this objective.

Cold war “doves” like Carter believed that a policy of détente would reduce the Soviet threat by decreasing both the reasons for conflict and the means for conflict. Specifically, détente involved “a US-Soviet agreement not to use force or the threat of force in inter-state relations, an understanding that neither super-power would seek unilateral advantages over the other, and the adoption of measures to limit armaments, most notably in the case of strategic nuclear forces.”<sup>105</sup> Détente assumed that nuclear weapons should be used principally to *deter* actual military conflict. In order for mutual deterrence to function properly, the two superpowers had to maintain relatively equivalent strategic forces.

The neocons saw détente as an invitation for the untrustworthy Soviets to surpass America in strategic forces, while the U.S. naively reduced its own weapons stockpiles. “According to this view, during the Cold War a militarily powerful United States had been able to underwrite global stability. Since the

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<sup>105</sup> J. I. Coffey, “Détente, Arms Control, and European Security,” *International Affairs* 52 (1976): 39.



1960s, however, the United States had grown weak and international anarchy had been the consequence.”<sup>106</sup> For the Reagan administration, the only way to both deal with the Soviet threat and establish international order was to maintain America’s strategic and moral superiority throughout the world.

Carter’s belief system influenced the way he viewed the intelligence community. He advocated cooperation among states based on open diplomacy and shared interests. His favorable view of the intelligence community largely resulted from a confluence between the traditional intelligence bureaucracy’s principles of intelligence and Carter’s broader belief system. Morality and human rights defined Carter’s policy approach and also influenced his view of intelligence. “[His morality] led to more open diplomacy, a reluctance to take covert action against unfriendly regimes . . .”<sup>107</sup> His moral perspective on international affairs was inherently at odds with the use of intelligence for deceptive purposes, especially after the Church Committee’s report in 1976, which established a connection between CIA covert action and attempted assassination plots of foreign leaders. Carter’s morality prohibited the use of CIA covert action. Instead, he saw intelligence as primarily an informative aid to policymaking. His morality sharply contrasted with the neocons’ morality, which divided the moral world in black and white, good vs. evil. The neocon moral dichotomization of the world labeled as moral anything that furthered the cause of

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<sup>106</sup> Cox, 34.

<sup>107</sup> Goddis Smith, 49.

freedom, which made the use of intelligence for covert action not only acceptable but respectable.

*Intelligence in the 1970s: The Beginnings of Neoconservative Politicization*

For the first twenty years of its existence, the CIA enjoyed the support and respect of any other useful, legitimate governmental institution. However, by the end of the 1960s, the Nixon administration's attempts to displace blame for failure in Vietnam on the intelligence community began to de-legitimize both the purpose of the CIA and the intelligence it gathered. The weakening of the CIA coincided with the legitimization of neoconservative ideology as a mainstream belief system.<sup>108</sup> This process of legitimization benefited from the neocon's targeted opposition to the principles, ideas, and practices of détente.

Unlike the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the neoconservative opposition to détente recognized the use of nuclear weapons as a viable foreign policy option. Since neocons in the 1970s assumed that the intelligence reports produced by CIA were an unreliable source of information on the status of Soviet nuclear threats, the fact that these reports reflected the success of détente was irrelevant. Whereas many proponents of détente viewed the idea of nuclear parity and the possibility of America sharing its superpower status with the Soviet Union as a positive change in the world order, the neoconservative belief system challenged the possibility that détente could serve as a permanent

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<sup>108</sup> Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 606.

threat reduction measure. Assuming the very real possibility that the Soviet Union could use nuclear weapons and the inability of intelligence to reflect the probability of an attack with any *certainty*, neoconservatives in the '70s felt that they were left with no option besides opposing détente and advocating a policy of American strategic nuclear superiority.

The year of 1974 proved to be a significant turning point for neoconservative politicians and thinkers who opposed the idea of nuclear parity between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. On June 4, 1974 James Digby, senior analyst for the RAND Corporation, held a private dinner party at his home in California. He invited a group of people who shared his views on communism, the Soviet Union, and nuclear deterrence. Among the guests were people like Paul Nitze, a primary author of NSC-68 and the Gaither Commission report. Resistance to détente grew out of small gatherings like this one, and it was not long before those who held this viewpoint became vocal.<sup>109</sup>

Albert Wohlstetter was among these vocal ideologues. His article “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” which appeared in the summer 1974 edition of *Foreign Policy* appealed to the Digby dinner party types, but sparked controversy with the logic of the administration at that time.<sup>110</sup> Wohlstetter wrote about the “myth of overestimation” of Soviet strategic forces, which he claimed was responsible for America’s decreasing military superiority.

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<sup>109</sup> Ann Hessing Cahn, *Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 9.

<sup>110</sup> Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?” *Foreign Policy* 15 (summer 1974).

His central claim was that, contrary to popular belief, intelligence was not overestimating Soviet capabilities, but was actually underestimating them, resulting in “unacceptable” cuts to America’s defense budget and strategic capabilities. While cuts in budget and weaponry were made with the intention of reducing the threat of nuclear war, Wohlstetter and other neoconservatives saw no possibility of that outcome resulting from those policy choices.<sup>111</sup> Their sense of American exceptionalism formed the basis of their opposition. They believed that the only affective policy measure for addressing the Soviet threat was the creation of a shared system of values between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, because they believed the Soviets were pursuing a similar policy approach, the only way to resist Soviet force was to maintain strategic nuclear superiority.

When Paul Nitze’s 1976 article in *Foreign Affairs* raised the distinct possibility of Soviet strategic superiority over the United States, he struck a blow to the already weakened CIA, which was still reeling from intelligence “failures” associated with Vietnam.<sup>112</sup> Kissinger, on behalf of the Ford administration, responded to Nitze’s article by asking, “[W]hat, in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally . . .? What do you do with it?”<sup>113</sup> Kissinger soon realized the dangers of such a response. While he was correct in pointing out that strategic superiority is a unique combination of technology, weapons stockpiles, knowledge of one’s

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>112</sup> Paul H. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” *Foreign Affairs* 54 (1976): 207-32.

<sup>113</sup> Henry Kissinger, quoted in William G. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987), 25.

adversary, etc., at the time, the American public needed a strong and resolute confirmation that the already questionable American intelligence community was correct in its assessments of Soviet threat. Kissinger failed to provide that confirmation, and questions about the possibility of Soviet power surpassing that of the United States began to creep into the minds of the American public.

The politicians and strategic thinkers who raised the possibility of intelligence underestimation in opposition to détente did so to raise awareness of a specific problem. They believed that CIA threat assessments failed to provide policymakers with the *kind* of information necessary to formulate stringent policy measures for reducing the Soviet threat. In order to challenge the established (and widely well-received in the mid-1970s) pattern of arms negotiations, this group of ideologues had to find a point of entry. Coincidentally, the weakened CIA seemed to be perfect for challenging recent threat assessments.<sup>114</sup>

*PFIAB and Team B: The Emergence of “Independent” Threat Assessment Groups*

The neoconservatives who challenged the CIA’s alleged underestimation of Soviet threat choose to do so by producing their own threat assessments in accordance with their belief system. They took advantage of a mechanism for producing alternate threat assessments that had begun in the Nixon administration -- though Nixon had used this mechanism differently. In the 1960’s, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board began to serve an oversight

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<sup>114</sup> Cahn, 2.

function to the CIA.<sup>115</sup> Nixon used the PFIAB to provide alternate assessments to supplement the CIA's NIEs. The project of seeking alternate intelligence assessments is not problematic by virtue of itself. However, when the alternate assessments are created with political purposes in mind, by assessment or collection methods that naturally fulfill these political purposes, the situation becomes problematic.

In the 1970s, under Ford and Carter, the PFIAB estimates generally proved to be more conservative than the NIEs because of the political composition of the board.<sup>116</sup> In January of 1974 the CIA, under orders from a new Director of Central Intelligence, issued its first NIE of the New Year – a statement that the United States still enjoyed strategic superiority over the U.S.S.R. PFIAB responded with an alternate assessment suggesting that the U.S.S.R. was on the verge of achieving strategic superiority over the United States.<sup>117</sup>

This NIE and the PFIAB's response estimate proved to be a turning point both in U.S. politics and intelligence. Out of these conflicting assessments of Soviet threat grew a new project for American intelligence. John Foster, PFIAB member and one of the leading critics of the January 1974 National Intelligence Estimate, proposed an experiment in which a team of analysts outside of CIA would assemble to analyze the data presented to Agency analysts to see if the

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<sup>115</sup> Stephen J. Flanagan, "Managing the Intelligence Community," *International Security* 10 (1985): 70.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>117</sup> William Colby, letter to President Gerald Ford, May 18, 1974, obtained through FOIA, cited in Cahn, 110.

results would be different. He called the original team of Agency analysts the “A Team” and the new team of independent analysts the “B Team.”<sup>118</sup> DCI Colby adamantly opposed the Team B experiment and made his response clear to those in power. Instead of considering Colby’s concerns, the administration asked him to step down, and he was replaced by George H. W. Bush.<sup>119</sup> Soon after Bush became the new DCI, he authorized the Team B experiment. Bush’s replacement of Colby marked the first time that a President chose a Director of Central Intelligence for purely political purposes. With the appointment of Bush as DCI, PFIAB won its battle for Team B.

Meanwhile neoconservatives were organizing private groups intended to publicize the results of alternate intelligence assessments of the Soviet threat. These assessments relied on a worst case approach to analysis. The Committee for the Present Danger was officially reestablished in November of 1976, just three days after Carter’s election. It claimed to be a “wholly independent and nonpartisan” organization made up of “Independents, Republicans, and Democrats who share the belief that foreign and national security policies should be based upon fundamental considerations of the nation’s future well being, not that of any one faction or party.”<sup>120</sup> Certainly this open invitation to those of all political persuasions was not without implicit qualification. Participation was open to members of all parties who shared the Committee’s perspective on Soviet

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<sup>118</sup> Interviews with John Foster, May 9, 1990, and September 1, 1990, cited in Cahn, 111.

<sup>119</sup> Cahn, 122.

<sup>120</sup> Charles Tyroler, II, ed., *Alerting America: the Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1984), 1, 5.

threat. Its original policy statement in November of 1976 stressed as its *raison d'être*: a condition of imminent danger in the United States – a danger that was constantly increasing, while national awareness of this danger was steadily decreasing, as a result of détente.<sup>121</sup>

Members of PFIAB and Team B shared many of the beliefs associated with the Committee for the Present Danger. John Foster, the PFIAB member largely responsible for the creation of Team B, summarized the neoconservative perspective on intelligence analysis:

‘[H]istory shows that intelligence has always been conservative in estimating Soviet capabilities.’ [One] ‘does not get the same degree of concern from reading the NIEs as he would if intelligence told him the worst case the data will support and the best case.’<sup>122</sup>

The assumption made in this statement is that intelligence should present policymakers with two extreme possibilities and avoid probability estimates. Ultimately it leaves the policymaker with the task of deciding the true nature of the threat through his policy response to the two extremes provided by the worst and best case intelligence reports. When policymakers play this active role in the intelligence process, they can easily distort information for political purposes. “This procedure would leave the decision maker at the mercy of technical shamans with no basis for ascertaining which of these shamans’ analyses or predictions were more credible than their competitors’.”<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>122</sup> Henson DeBruler, memorandum for the record, December 9, 1975, obtained through FOIA, quoted in Cahn, 124-5.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.



Worst case analysis leaves the policymaker with no real idea of what is probable on the spectrum of best to worst case scenarios, with the exception of neoconservatives, who advocate this view of intelligence and whose belief system acts as a means for deciding where the threat lies on the spectrum of extremes. Because neoconservatives view external threat as pervasive and ideological in nature, when presented with two extremes, they are likely to take the worst extreme for truth and formulate their policies accordingly.

George Carver, CIA deputy director for National Intelligence Officers, responded to Foster's support for a worst case approach to analysis by defending the traditional intelligence community's probability-based estimates, "We can't give the policy-maker two extremes and stop there. We are called on to assess the most likely Soviet capabilities, and to judge how the Soviets themselves probably view their capabilities."<sup>124</sup> Carver believed that Team B/PFIAB's approach to intelligence was not only a threat to the CIA as a governmental agency but more broadly endangered the established, traditional function of intelligence, "[S]ome of the concrete proposals advanced by the Board [PFIAB] would be extremely difficult to accommodate without prostitution of the whole intelligence process."<sup>125</sup> Carver's argument assumes that intelligence is meant to be an informative aid to decisionmaking and that the alternate view of intelligence, a

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid., 124-5.

<sup>125</sup> George A. Carver, memorandum for Mr. Knoche, Admiral Murphy, and Mr. Proctor, May 5, 1976, obtained through FOIA, quoted in Cahn, 131

product of the neocon belief system, subverts this purpose by giving policymakers an active role in the creation of final intelligence estimates.

### *The Charge of CIA Underestimation*

Neoconservatives in the mid-70s charged liberals with underestimation of the Soviet threat. This process began with Wohlstetter's 1974 *Foreign Policy* article.<sup>126</sup> They tried to *prove* through PFIAB and Team B that the CIA was underestimating threats. Liberals have since charged neoconservatives with overestimating the threat from the Soviet Union. Who is correct? The answer is that they both are correct in some respects. The CIA may have slightly underestimated the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, retrospective studies show that the CIA assessment was ultimately much more accurate and much less damaging than the Team B assessment.<sup>127</sup>

There is an important difference between the CIA's underestimation of the Soviet threat and PFIAB/Team B overestimation of the Soviet threat. An explanation of this difference is essential to my argument. The most important point of emphasis is the idea that the CIA's underestimation results from the uncertainty that will *always* be present in intelligence assessments that aim to

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<sup>126</sup> The Team B estimate even began to influence media sources that were not controlled by neocons. These influences contributed to their ability to set Washington's agenda. For an example see "Arming to Disarm in the Age of Détente," *Time*, 11 February 1974. The NIE that was criticized by PFIAB and Team B came out in January of 1974. See also "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," *Commentary* 82 (1986): 39. Richard Pipes, head of Team B, argues that Team B changed both the public's perspective of the Soviet threat and the perspective within the beltway.

<sup>127</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff. "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities," in *Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), page online.

provide probable assessments of the intentions, capabilities, or threat posed by an enemy. Team B's overestimation, however, was not the result of unintentional uncertainty. Instead, it was the result of an approach to intelligence that requires policymakers with distinct political agendas to make final intelligence judgments based on best and worst case scenarios. A policymaker given this responsibility will make his decision based on his belief system. Because of the neocons' heightened perception of the Soviet threat, they take worst case assessments as probable assessments of threat.

Team B may have correctly estimated the worst possible intentions of the Soviet Union while the CIA may have correctly estimated the *likely* threat posed by the Soviets. According to this logic, the disagreement between these two groups should not be thought of in terms of who produced a "correct" assessment.<sup>128</sup> Both groups correctly assessed what they set out to assess, but Team B's assessment was an accurate picture of a different reality. The groups' parameters for assessment (indicators) were completely different, and Team B's final product had unforeseen implications. Even if the neoconservative worst case assessment *correctly* determined the worst possible threat posed by the U.S.S.R.,

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<sup>128</sup> In an interview, Richard Pipes, leader of Team B said, "There is not a great deal of difference between what one may call the Team A and the Team B view of the Soviet military buildup. The basic difference is in the significance one attaches to it and the way one explains the reasons behind it. The Team A point of view (I'm using this phrase in a figurative sense) is that the Soviet Union fundamentally reacts to the United States initiatives, that it is the United States that engages and has been engaging since World War II in a massive military buildup which the Soviet Union perceives as threatening, and that the most significant Soviet military moves are best explained as responses. We do not look at it this way. We see an internal logic to the Soviet military buildup, which proceeds largely independently of what we do." – "Peace with Freedom: A Discussion by the Committee on the Present Danger Before the Foreign Policy Association," 14 March 1978, in Charles Tyroler II, ed., *Alerting America* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1984), 25.

by allowing policymakers to play a role in the intelligence process, it introduced a distinctly political agenda to the assessment of threat.<sup>129</sup> By rejecting the project of estimating the probable Soviet threat, Team B asked *the policymaker* to decide the true nature of this threat, which the policymakers ultimately reflected in their policy choices.

The gift of hindsight provides the possibility of judging the costs, benefits, realities, and myths of these two approaches in the '70s. Retrospectively, the impact of the neoconservative system of belief on practices of intelligence and the subsequent effects of these practices on the greater American society are distinctly negative – certainly more so than the dominant approach of the intelligence establishment. The truly detrimental nature of the neoconservative view of intelligence in the 1970s comes from our current understanding of the Soviet viewpoint on the situation at that time. The picture that emerges is completely contrary to the view suggested by worst case assessments. It appears that the U.S. may have been the first country to undermine détente, not the Soviet Union. U.S. overestimation of the Soviet threat led American policymakers to again seek strategic nuclear superiority. According to this logic, the escalation of Soviet nuclear forces was a *reaction* to the American threat, rather than a principled opposition to détente.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> [T]he very establishment of Team B to provide a more pessimistic alternative assessment, with no thought to a Team C with a more “optimistic” alternative approach, ‘was squarely predicated on the [worse case] fallacy – and has helped to sustain it.’ - Richard Pipes and Raymond Garthoff, “Rejoinder: A ‘Worst Case’ Analysis?” *International Security* 2 (1978), 202.

<sup>130</sup> Georgi A. Arbatov and Willem Oltmans, *The Soviet Viewpoint* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1983), 2.

Another area of CIA assessment challenged by neoconservatives in the 1970s was the Soviet military budget. The CIA never saw the Soviet military budget as the most important area of assessment. After all, it seemed to matter more how the U.S.S.R. spent this money, rather than how much of it they had. However, neoconservatives argued that estimates of Soviet capabilities depended as much on Soviet military budgets as on the number and kinds of weapons being stockpiled. To appease these people, the U.S. Government applied a concerted effort to the budget estimation process -- an effort that was doomed to failure from the very beginning.

Despite the inevitable failures of attempting to estimate the military budget of a country that does not want its military budget to be accurately assessed, the opposition forces in U.S. politics who were trying to prove that the CIA consistently underestimated Soviet capabilities insisted on the importance of an alternative budget assessment to the one created by CIA. The reexamination was a joint effort between the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. By the end of the study, it appeared that the CIA had underestimated the threat. However, it later became clear that the Soviets were purposely overstating their own budget in an effort to deceive.

According to neoconservative intelligence theory, the Soviet's attempts to deceive American intelligence efforts seeking to ascertain the military budget is evidence of the fact that intelligence should resort to worst-case analysis. However, a 1993 study by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

showed that original CIA estimates were actually quite satisfactory and that CIA's real error at the time was its failure to simply argue the irrelevance of spending figures to threat assessment, especially given U.S. alliances with other militarily strong, developed countries.<sup>131</sup>

Neoconservatives used intelligence assessments of the Soviet military budget for political purposes that advanced their policy perspective. The idea that overestimation is an inherent part of neoconservative intelligence practices lends support to notion that neoconservatives would be more likely to use intelligence as a political tool than those who support the project of the traditional intelligence community. In contrast, because of the way CIA reports are produced, it is much more difficult to argue that the CIA was driven by their political beliefs to *underestimate* intelligence. CIA estimates are scrutinized by analysts with many different, dissenting perspectives. Indeed, for most members of the intelligence establishment, the Team B experiment represented “an ideological, political foray, not an intellectual exercise” – especially given the beliefs of the people who were pushing for an alternate assessment.<sup>132</sup>

The Team B experiment proved to be important, not only for its challenge to the 1976 NIEs on the Soviet threat, but also for the precedent it set for the future. Indeed, the changes Team B proposed to the methods and purposes of American intelligence became mainstream practice in the Reagan administration.

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<sup>131</sup> James R. Millar et al., “Survey Article: An Evaluation of the CIA's Analysis of Soviet Economic Performance, 1970-90,” *Comparative Economic Studies* 35, no. 2 (1993): 47, 48.

<sup>132</sup> Interview with Hans Heymann, October 11, 1990, quoted in Cahn, 138.

The intelligence practices associated with the Iran-Contra affair substantiate this claim. In the 1990s Donald Rumsfeld oversaw a project modeled on Team B, which aimed to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Paul Wolfowitz set up an independent team of analysts in the Pentagon led by neoconservative intelligence theorist Abram Shulsky to assess terrorist threats.<sup>133</sup> Finally, the intelligence used by the Bush II administration in its decision to go to war with Iraq has also been identified as a product of worst case analysis. The mistrust of traditional intelligence methods resulting from neoconservatives' unique perspective of threat was responsible for the creation of each of these independent assessment groups and is ultimately responsible for their distorted intelligence reports.

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<sup>133</sup> Mann, 74-5.

## CHAPTER IV

### *REAGAN: INTELLIGENCE AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR*

Neoconservatives aligned themselves with the Republican Party in the 1970s hoping that Republicans would be more receptive to their foreign policy program than Democrats who seemed to be moving more toward Carter's soft-line perspective on international affairs than Wallace's hard-line perspective. Ronald Reagan was one of these former Cold War Democrats who found himself more in tune with the new neoconservative wing of the Republican Party. After an unsuccessful challenge to Ford in the 1976 Republican primary, Reagan received the Republican nomination in 1980 and went on to defeat Carter in the general election.

When he took office in 1981, Reagan appointed approximately sixty members of the Committee for the Present Danger to his administration.<sup>134</sup> These ideologues shared Reagan's neoconservative belief system and subsequently his mistrust of the traditional intelligence bureaucracy. Indeed, the members of the CPD in the 1970s were supporters of the Team B approach to intelligence. These appointments created a unique ideological consistency in the

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<sup>134</sup> Charles Tyroler, *Alerting America*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1984), ix-xi.



Reagan administration that had never before occurred in the post-World War II era. The beliefs of neoconservative policymakers, political theorists, and organizations found the Reagan administration to be a favorable environment. In this chapter I will use the Iran-Contra affair as a case study of the inherent tendency of neoconservative policymakers to mistrust the methods and reports of the Intelligence Community resulting in an alternative view of intelligence that politicizes the collection and analysis of information.

*Reagan, Neoconservative Ideology, and the Iran-Contra Affair*

Americans are educated to believe that, “‘It has been [America’s] fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.’”<sup>135</sup> Most Americans would agree with this statement even if they dislike it. The idea that America must *be* its own ideology is perhaps the most fundamental component of Reagan’s foreign policy approach in the early 1980s. Policymakers in the Reagan administration saw the unstable situation in Central America as an explicit challenge to the security of America’s broad ideology and hence to America itself. The Reagan administration felt increasingly threatened as Central American dictators fell to new communist regimes supported by the Soviet Union, “In Central America . . . the cause of freedom is being tested. And our resolve is being tested there as well. Here, especially, the world is watching to see how this nation responds.”<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Richard Hofstadter, quoted in Michael Kazin, “The Part of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American History,” *The Nation* 248 (1989): 242-3.

<sup>136</sup> Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union: 1987,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 53 (1987): 259.

To the neoconservatives in the Reagan administration, the loss of Central America to the Soviet Union symbolized a much larger threat to America than liberals or conservatives recognized.<sup>137</sup> The Reagan Doctrine served as Reagan's foreign policy guide for reducing the Soviet threat in Central America.

#### THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

The Reagan Doctrine rested on the pillars of neoconservative ideology. It was based on the idea "that peace is best achieved through strength [and] does not differentiate between what is vital and what is merely desirable."<sup>138</sup> As a result, it "commits the United States to resisting Soviet and Soviet-supported aggression wherever it arises; to building American-style democracies in Third World countries; and to rolling back communism by aiding anticommunist insurgencies."<sup>139</sup> While Reagan did not engage American troops in combat the way that George W. Bush has in Iraq and Afghanistan, his policy program, which combined realist power politics with multilateral cooperation was clearly responsible for his support of Contra military intervention and the active destruction of Nicaragua's communist Sandinista government. There were those in the Reagan administration who advocated a diplomatic approach to Nicaragua, but the administration rejected them early on considering the approach to be

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<sup>137</sup> "There is still time for [Congress] to reverse course, but they must act quickly, or all of us – Nicaraguans, Hondurans, Costa Ricans, and ultimately Americans – will reap a very bitter harvest indeed." – Mark Falcoff, "Nicaraguan Harvest," *Commentary* 80 (1985): 28; The Scowcroft Commission report suggests that the threat to the United States in the early '80s was significantly less than neocons were suggesting. – United States: President's Commission on Strategic Forces, *Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

<sup>138</sup> Jay Winik, "The Neoconservative Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy* 73 (Winter 1988-89): 141.

<sup>139</sup> Christopher Layne, "The Real Conservative Agenda," *Foreign Policy* 61 (1985-86): 77, 73.

insufficient, only a temporary solution to the problem.<sup>140</sup> Instead he used force via Nicaraguan “freedom fighters” to actively undermine communism.

Reagan’s program for reducing the threat posed to American by the mere existence of communism in Central America stemmed from his heightened sense of American exceptionalism, the idea:

. . . that our way of life is right and good, that it is accessible to others as well, that we do indeed believe that all men are endowed with “unalienable rights,” and that we are prepared, and even eager, to do what we can to help people everywhere to vindicate those right through the development of democratic political institutions.<sup>141</sup>

He defended the idea that democracy is not only inherently American, but it is inherently the “right and good” political system and therefore should be spread across the globe to all nations. By characterizing the situation in terms of a specifically American responsibility, Reagan appealed to the public’s growing sense of hope that America was uniquely strong enough to take care of the rest of the world in a way that other countries with similar resources could not.

The Reagan Doctrine exemplified characteristics of neoconservative ideology: the moral dichotomy between good American values and evil Communism, the necessity of militarily undermining ideological threats to America wherever they exist, and the exceptional responsibility of America to take unilateral steps to remove the threat. Reagan’s neoconservative perception of

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<sup>140</sup> James M. Scott, “Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua,” *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (1997): 242.

<sup>141</sup> Christopher C. DeMuth, et. al., *The Reagan Doctrine and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987), 6.

external threat led him, like past ideological equivalents, to question the view of intelligence accepted by the traditional intelligence bureaucracy.

The CIA's attempts to estimate the probable threat to America posed by the communist opposition seemed futile to Reagan since the true nature of the threat was of an inestimable nature. Probability estimates, even if they could reflect a more extensive threat, cannot ever be absolutely certain of their accuracy. The politicization of intelligence in the Reagan administration resulted from attempts to undermine the CIA. By using the NSC staff to conduct intelligence operations in Iran and Nicaragua, the Reagan administration created the same tension between goals of policymaking and purposes of intelligence on the departmental level that occurs with worst case assessments at the level of analysis.

#### POLICYMAKING AND INTELLIGENCE: NSC, CIA, AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

The National Security Act of 1947 created both the CIA and the National Security Council. The NSC was created for the express purpose of both aiding the president in the creation and implementation of security policy and restraining the president through dissenting opinions should he take too much initiative in security matters.<sup>142</sup> Certainly Congress' initial intention that the NSC would act in at least one respect as a restraint upon the president was an unlikely possibility in the Reagan administration since Reagan's NSC was composed of others who

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<sup>142</sup> Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 54.

not only agreed with many of his policy choices but who were guided by the same broad ideological view of the world.

The CIA on the other hand was intended to “correlate and evaluate national security-related intelligence, and . . . advise and report to the Council on all matters within this field.”<sup>143</sup> However, during the Iran-Contra affair, Reagan’s ideological equivalents take on a significant portion of CIA intelligence responsibilities turning two distinctly separate parts of the foreign policymaking process into one. The NSC staff’s responsibility for intelligence *and* policy in Nicaragua resulted in tailored intelligence and unchallenged policy. Intelligence became a justification for predetermined policies established by ideology instead of information. The attitude of NSC staffers was that, “The United States has a vital interest in the stability of Central America, and it needs no justification beyond that.”<sup>144</sup> The justification for Nicaragua became nothing more than protection of the ideology that drove the desire to intervene in the first place.

Although this is the picture of the NSC and the CIA that would likely be taught in a basic government class, alternative accounts of their creation and evolution suggest that the assumed role of the NSC as a resource for the President to make national security decisions but also as a source of restraint upon Presidential power may not be entirely correct. One commentator portrays the NSC from its founding as a potentially rogue body. She suggests that Congress

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<sup>143</sup> Stanley L. Falk, “The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 79 (1964): 404.

<sup>144</sup> DeMuth, 17.

was never significantly involved in the creation of the NSC and subsequently never really championed the group as a restraint to Presidential power. Indeed, after Truman created the NSC to “restrain” the president, he then used it as a means for enticing the Navy into his central defense department.

Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, the NSC began to usurp the State Department’s dominance in foreign policy.

[T]he system that emerged was one in which the president’s own appointed NSC staff – led by the special assistant to the president for national security affairs – managed the policy process, analyzed policy options, and offered policy advice with only the president’s interests in mind.<sup>145</sup>

This analysis suggests that the *potential* for a rogue NSC staff extends back to the very creation of the NSC. This potential became actuality in the Reagan administration. Reagan’s NSC staff usurped the function of the Intelligence Community and subverted a law passed by the United States Congress in order to continue providing aid to the anti-communist Nicaraguan Contras. But their motivation for doing these things ultimately became more important in the end than the questionable acts themselves.

The purpose of using the NSC staff to conduct supportive efforts for the Contras was originally an attempt to avoid the constraints of the Boland Amendment which stated that no agency within the Intelligence Community was to administer any sort of covert aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.<sup>146</sup> Oliver North

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<sup>145</sup> Zegart, 56.

<sup>146</sup> Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 2.

argued in his testimony during the Congressional investigation that the Boland Amendment was purposely vague in this respect:

[T]he Congress is to blame because of the fickle, vacillating, unpredictable, on-again, off-again policy toward the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, the so-called Contras . . . Armies need food and consistent help. They need a flow of money, of arms, clothing, and medical supplies. The Congress of the United States allowed the Executive to encourage them to do battle and then abandoned them. The Congress of the United States left soldiers in the field unsupported and vulnerable to their Communist enemies.<sup>147</sup>

The lack of clarity in Congress's Boland Amendment did indeed cause confusion over its true intent. Some argue that despite the creative loopholes discovered by administration officials, Congress clearly intended to stop all U.S. government aid to the Contras. Others, however, argue that the Congressional ambiguity was intentional; congressmen could appear to voters to be withholding aid while knowingly creating a loophole for the executive to exploit.<sup>148</sup> North capitalized on this Congressional ambiguity by making the affair a mistake of Congressional intent rather than the executive usurpation of power.

Technically the NSC staff is not considered a part of the formal Intelligence Community. The administration took advantage of this omission in the Boland Amendment using the NSC to maintain responsibilities for covert action in Iran and Nicaragua. It was of little consequence to the administration that the "NSC staff had no experience or structure for such extended covert

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<sup>147</sup> Robert Timberg, *The Nightingale's Song* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 436.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 438.

operations. It took over the work of the CIA without the CIA's resources."<sup>149</sup>

Although they followed the general guidelines of covert action, there was a key ingredient missing from the NSC staff intelligence operations in Iran and Nicaragua that would normally be present in CIA intelligence operations – oversight. Unlike the DCI, the National Security Advisor does not have to be confirmed by Congress nor does he have to testify before Congressional intelligence committees. Also whereas CIA covert operations coordinators must function under the DCI and within an entire agency focused on intelligence and knowledgeable on the topic, Oliver North ran Iran and Nicaragua largely by himself without involvement from the rest of the NSC staff answering only to the National Security Advisor. Furthermore, North took advantage of independent sources of help like Dick Secord who had no responsibility to any official agency.<sup>150</sup>

Ignoring the National Security Act of 1947 as a legal document and considering only the logical reasons for creating the CIA and the NSC with distinct and different purposes, North's monopoly on "intelligence" seemed to threaten the very nature and purpose of a national intelligence system by essentially providing the executive with a foreign policy "blank check." By placing a policymaking group in charge of intelligence activities, the Reagan administration manipulated and construed intelligence for political purposes. Whereas intelligence operations conducted by the CIA have internal oversight

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<sup>149</sup> Draper, 565.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 558.



mechanisms in the Agency as well as external oversight mechanisms like the Senate and House intelligence committees, the NSC staff operations in Iran and Nicaragua were kept as secret as possible and thus were subject to neither form of oversight.

*The Importance of Extreme Secrecy to the Neoconservative Manipulation of Intelligence*

The extreme secrecy surrounding U.S. involvement in Nicaragua allowed policymakers to manipulate intelligence. Secrecy in policymaking is a form of manipulation; it results in significant omissions and allows those who utilize it to carefully *handpick* their rationalizations for particular policies. If the established Intelligence Community, Congress, and the public have no knowledge of a situation or no way of knowing the source of a policymaker's knowledge, the policymaker cannot be held accountable for his decisions.

It is no coincidence that the two predominantly neoconservative presidents since World War II, Reagan and Bush II, have both utilized extreme secrecy in their administrations. The recourse to secrecy is a product of the neoconservative belief system, specifically the neocon perception of external threat as pervasive and existential. Because of their heightened and distressing perception of external threats, neocons believe that extreme secrecy is necessary to prevent the possibility of information becoming available to someone who could use the

knowledge to exacerbate the threat. Secrecy is a first principle of intelligence regardless of political belief system, but because of the neoconservative perspective on external threat, it plays a role not only in the intelligence process, but also in policymaking. The traditional intelligence bureaucracy tends to recognize clandestinity as only “*external* to the heart of the matter: intelligence work remains the simple, natural endeavor to get the sort of knowledge upon which a successful course of action can be rested.”<sup>151</sup> The neocon perception of threat, however, views secrecy as internal to intelligence work, and the shroud of secrecy over the Iran-Contra affair exemplifies this fact.

Secrecy was central to the Reagan administration’s success in putting its view of intelligence into action, and it was also central to Reagan’s justification for the affairs once they became public knowledge:

[Reagan] used the cloak of clandestinity to achieve his ends, yet, at the same time, he hyped the role of secret intelligence. Trust me, he told the American people, to twist the truth in your interest.<sup>152</sup>

The heightened role of secrecy in the Reagan administration’s view of intelligence represented a distinct contrast to Carter’s policy of open diplomacy. Although he used secrecy to subvert the authority of the traditional Intelligence Community and misuse intelligence in supporting the Nicaraguan Contras, who

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<sup>151</sup> Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), viii.

<sup>152</sup> Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 232.

were responsible for horrible atrocities in the counterrevolution,<sup>153</sup> his rhetoric made this secrecy and hence his alternative view of intelligence not subversive but acceptable to the American people. The public normally views justifications for presidential secrecy with a healthy skepticism. But the Reagan administration's use of its own executive office for intelligence operations in Iran and Nicaragua so blurred the barrier between politics and intelligence that Americans were tricked into accepting a perfectly acceptable justification for secrecy *in intelligence* when it was wrongly employed by the executive branch of government.

*The Unique Role of Public Opinion in the Neoconservative Politicization of Intelligence*

The Reagan administration's ability to misconstrue the secrecy of the Iran-Contra affair as perfectly acceptable suggests the importance of public opinion in neoconservatives' successful challenges to the traditional intelligence bureaucracy. Although Congress may not have been so easily fooled into accepting Reagan's application of arguments for secrecy in intelligence to the executive branch, public opinion on this issue overwhelmed Congress's ability to hold Reagan accountable for his misconduct.<sup>154</sup> Richard Neustadt noted that a president's power is directly related to the "private hopes and fears" of individual

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<sup>153</sup> For an excellent portrayal of the situation on the ground in Nicaragua (and the horrible atrocities committed by the Contras) see Christopher Dickey, *With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

<sup>154</sup> Louis Fisher, *Congressional Abdication on War and Spending* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000).

members of the public, “what a president should be is something most men see by light of what is happening to *them*. . . . Behind their judgments of performance lie the consequences in their lives.”<sup>155</sup> The neoconservative view of intelligence, by the very nature of its inherent tendency to overstate external threat, appeals to people’s private hopes and fears.

Their policy prescriptions that actively seek to undermine the overstated threat (i.e. strategic nuclear superiority combined with, for example, interventions like Nicaragua) take advantage of the internalized American belief that, “It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. . . . The idea of our separateness and safety from faraway conflicts has had importance from the time of the early settlers . . .”<sup>156</sup> Reagan used the overstated threat resulting from worst-case analysis to manipulate public fear:

[P]ublic perceptions of such matters as the state of the strategic balance depend heavily on official and expert information and can be influenced for manipulative purposes [i.e. provoking public fear of the ideological threat posed by communism]. Indeed, it is ironic that those who beat the drum loudest about a growing Soviet threat are often the same people who then seek to justify countermeasures on the grounds that they are needed to meet public perceptions of a growing Soviet threat.<sup>157</sup>

Neoconservatives manipulate intelligence information – in this case, threat assessments – to shape public perceptions of the Soviet threat. This process requires little effort because of the public predisposition to be acutely opposed to

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<sup>155</sup> Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 70.

<sup>156</sup> Robert Jay Lifton, *Superpower Syndrome: America’s Apocalyptic Confrontation with the World* (New York: Nation Books, 2003), 125-6.

<sup>157</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, *Perspectives on the Strategic Balance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 5.

American vulnerability. Neoconservatives then use the public's fear of the Soviet threat to justify their radical policy measures aimed at forcefully remaking threatening nations according to distinctly American values and ideals.

Public opinion is vitally important to the success of neoconservatives' alternative view of intelligence. Worst case assessments do not inherently result in politicized intelligence. The politicization occurs when policymaker use worst case assessments to overstate the extent and nature of threats and justify policy measures for dealing with the threats according to their own worst case assessments. The system works seamlessly when the policymakers in power are neoconservatives (e.g. Reagan and Bush II administrations). However, one might logically conclude that the inherent neoconservative tendency to overstate threats on the basis of worst-case reports would be irrelevant when, for example, liberals are the policymakers in power. The element of public opinion makes this logical conclusion incorrect. The combination of worst case assessments with the American public's predisposition to consider vulnerability "un-American" forces even non-neocons to sometimes tailor their policies to the public's heightened perception of a threat – a perception shaped by independent neocon groups:

The neoconservatives' power stems from their ability to set the policy agenda in Washington. Their views have been playing a leading role in such prestigious think tanks as the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, and the Manhattan Institute, and they dominate such important Republic-oriented outlets as the editorial page of *The Wall Street Journal*, *Commentary*, and the *Weekly Standard*.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> Leon T. Hadar, "The Friends of Bibi (FOBs) vs. 'The New Middle East'," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26 (1996): 92.

This factor more than any other makes the neoconservative politicization of intelligence most threatening.

If a liberal administration is in office, neoconservatives can produce worst case assessments independently of the established Intelligence Community, publicize the heightened nature of external threats to the public, and use the public fear they create to *force* the policymakers in power to tailor their foreign policy measures to a neoconservative agenda. This happened to Carter toward the end of his administration largely as a result of the Team B exercise, and to Clinton in some respects with the Rumsfeld Commission.<sup>159</sup> The ability of neoconservatives to manipulate public opinion makes their politicization of intelligence more of a problem. It allows them to indirectly affect foreign policy even when they are not in power.

### *Summary and Conclusions*

The Iran-Contra affair is a case-in-point that neoconservative ideology gives policymakers a view of intelligence that naturally lends itself to politicization. Reagan's use of a policymaking staff for an intelligence operation, his employment of intelligence principles to the domain of politics (i.e. extreme

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<sup>159</sup> Carter's policy shift toward the end of his time in office can be explained, at least in part, as a result of the neocons' overestimated threats. – David Skidmore, *Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996), 28-9; Clinton experienced a similar situation with the bombing of the Sudanese pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. The pressure to overstate intelligence reports on terrorist links forced the administration to respond to an immanent threat even though the actual threat was quite tentative. – Seymour M. Hersh, "The Missiles of August," *The New Yorker*, 12 October 1998, 39.

secrecy), and his manipulation of public opinion all result from his unique perception of the world, beliefs about the nature of international relations and ideas about how to causally relate these beliefs to actionable policies. In chapter five I will continue discussing the impact of belief systems on views of intelligence. Reagan's Vice President and immediate predecessor, George H. W. Bush held a belief system closer to traditional conservatives than neoconservatives. However, the neoconservative influence on foreign policy did not disappear entirely. Throughout the Bush I and Clinton administrations in the 1990s, neoconservatives maintained an influential presence in Washington. They were looking for an opportunity to reenter politics as a dominant force. Chapter five will discuss this period in recent neoconservative history, and its impact on the administration of George W. Bush.

## CHAPTER V

*INTELLIGENCE IN THE 1990s: BUSH I, CLINTON, AND THE NEOCONS*

Tensions with the Soviet Union lessened in the 1990s as they did in the 1970s. In the '70s détente was responsible for this lessening of tensions, whereas in the '90s the fall of the Communist Soviet Union had the same effect. However, détente in the '70s depended on an agreement that each country would limit its strategic forces. In the '90s after the Communists fell, Russia no longer had the power to challenge America, and this factor alone created an *ipso facto* peace leaving America with the freedom to decide its role in the future of international affairs.

The U.S. was an unchallenged superpower that could either seek to maintain its superiority over the rest of the world or reduce its power and build alliances to create a new world order based on cooperation. Liberals argued that America's decline from power was inevitable and that we should embrace rather than fight against it. Paul Kennedy argued in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* that all moral or political arguments aside, the faltering U.S. economy simply could not support a foreign policy based on military dominance.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987).



Neoconservatives held little sway in the George H. W. Bush administration, but they were vocal about their opinion on America's superpower status in the early '90s.<sup>161</sup>

Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for policy planning, played a major role in defending America's dominant position in foreign affairs – not on realist terms, but as a means to the continued project of creating a Kantian peace.<sup>162</sup> He told the House National Security Committee that:

‘American dominance gives us an opportunity to lead the world in building a peaceful relationship among the emerging great powers in the next century that will bring security to our children and our grandchildren . . . If we are unwilling to pay this price now, it will be like failing to buy insurance – there will be a much higher price to be paid later.’<sup>163</sup>

Although Wolfowitz recognized a decrease in the immediate Soviet threat, he believed there were new threats emerging in a new region of the globe: the Middle East.<sup>164</sup> Inhabitants of this region who disapproved of western involvement in regional affairs often expressed their disapproval as a general disdain for America. Neoconservatives interpret their value system, which is different from America's value system, as an ideological threat to America,

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<sup>161</sup> Robert Kagan and William Kristol argued in *Present Dangers* [(San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), 4] that in the post-Cold War era, “[T]he present danger is that the United States, the world's dominant power on whom the maintenance of international peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depends, will shrink its responsibilities and – in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference – allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.”

<sup>162</sup> James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (New York: Viking, 2004), 198.

<sup>163</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, “National Security Interests in the Post Cold War World,” testimony to House National Security Committee, June 6, 1996, quoted in Mann, 227.

<sup>164</sup> Wolfowitz was thinking about the threat posed by the Middle East as early as the 1970s when he wrote his doctoral dissertation on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons throughout this region. ~ Mann, 186.

similar to the threat posed by Communism during the Cold War.<sup>165</sup> Wolfowitz saw the Middle East as a new phase of America's project to forcefully create a peaceful global alliance based on shared American values. This project required America to maintain not only a defensive military force, but a force large enough to conduct offensive interventions.<sup>166</sup> However, in the 1990s neocons no longer enjoyed the support of the administration in power.

*A Traditional Conservative Administration: George H. W. Bush's Belief System*

The Reagan administration's blatant attempts to undermine the traditional intelligence bureaucracy did not carry over into the George H. W. Bush administration. Explanations for the differences between Reagan's administration and his former Vice President's administration center on the differing belief systems of these two presidents. Whereas Reagan's belief system could be broadly characterized as neoconservative, Bush's ideas aligned more with a traditional conservative approach to foreign policy. Even in the early '80s while he was actively serving as Reagan's Vice President, his beliefs departed from the administration's dominant way of thinking. He supported multilateralism and a

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<sup>165</sup> This emerging situation is representative of their general perspective on morality: good vs. evil.

<sup>166</sup> "Just as sensible Americans after World War II did not imagine that the United States should retreat from global involvement and await the rise of the next equivalent to Nazi Germany, so America statesmen today ought to recognize that their charge is not to await the arrival of the next great threat, but rather to shape the international environment to prevent such a threat from arising in the first place. To put it another way: the overarching goal of American foreign policy – to preserve and extend an international order that is in accord with both our interests and our principles – endures." – Kagan and Kristol, 12.

strong commitment to human rights.<sup>167</sup> In his 1989 inaugural address he established his traditional conservatism through his stated policy approach to American security, which focused on strengthening America *internally* rather than externally. “We will turn to the only resource we have that in times of need always grows: the goodness and the courage of the American people.”<sup>168</sup> We lead not through military strength but “[t]hrough strength of example and commitment.”<sup>169</sup>

For Bush, America’s strength and security depended largely on its domestic strength, not its global military preeminence. ““We don’t need radical new directions. We need strong and steady leadership. We don’t need to remake society, we just need to remember who we are.””<sup>170</sup> Clearly Bush had a fundamentally different perception of external threat and internal security than the neoconservatives. While Paul Wolfowitz was raising awareness in the early ‘90s about the threat posed by the Middle East, and the need to address this threat by actively defending American values, Bush was defending “a limited role for the United States abroad.”<sup>171</sup> Wolfowitz represented the far right in the Bush administration constantly pushing for active intervention and change in the

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<sup>167</sup> “A Conversation with George Bush,” (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 9.

<sup>168</sup> George H. W. Bush, “A New Breeze is Blowing,” delivered on January 20, 1989, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 55 (1989): 259.

<sup>169</sup> George H. W. Bush, “The Lessons of the Gulf War,” delivered on May 29, 1991, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 57 (1991): 514.

<sup>170</sup> George H. W. Bush as quoted in Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, *Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George Bush* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992): 22.

<sup>171</sup> David Mervin, *George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 158.

Middle East. However, when Bush finally intervened in Iraq, his intention was never to “remake” Iraqi society.

### *The Gulf War*

The Bush administration ordered an attack on Iraq only after Iraq had proven its aggressive intentions by invading Kuwait and only with the consent of the United Nations. “Our objectives are clear,” he stated in an address to the American public on January 16, 1991:

Saddam Hussein’s forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place, and Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions, and then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus enhancing the security and stability of the Gulf.<sup>172</sup>

His objectives in Iraq were to free Kuwait and restore peace and security to the Gulf region.

Bush’s perception of external threat as strategic and military rather than ideological allowed him to reduce external threats without fundamentally altering the nature and composition of threatening nations. On March 6, 1991 Bush announced that the gulf war was over and the threat from Iraq was eliminated in spite of the fact that Saddam Hussein still remained in power, “Tonight in Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His ability to threaten

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<sup>172</sup> George H. W. Bush, “War With Iraq: Enforcing the U.N. Resolutions” delivered on January 16, 1991, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 57 (1991): 226.

mass destruction is itself destroyed.”<sup>173</sup> Bush viewed America’s leadership in the Gulf War as the beginning of a New World Order.

### *Bush I and the New World Order*

Bush claims as his primary presidential legacy his vision of a New World Order.<sup>174</sup> However, his vision was nothing like the neocon’s vision of a new world order. Bush argued that this new order, made possible by the end of the Cold War and America’s success in the Gulf War, “springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment among nations large and small, to a set of principles that undergird our relations. Peaceful settlements of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.”<sup>175</sup> At the same time, Bush reaffirmed his traditional conservative stance on intervention, “We will not interfere in Iraq’s civil war. Iraqi people must decide their own political future.”<sup>176</sup> While Bush advocated a world order based on peaceful interactions between states, his traditional conservative beliefs – the crucial importance of national security, the commitment to leading by example, and the principle of nonintervention – still dominated his general approach to foreign policy.

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<sup>173</sup> George H. W. Bush, “The War is Over: A Framework for Peace,” delivered on March 6, 1991, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 57 (1991): 354.

<sup>174</sup> John Robert Greene, *The Presidency of George Bush* (Kansas: University Press, 2000), 182.

<sup>175</sup> George H. W. Bush, “The Possibility of a New World Order,” delivered on April 13, 1991, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 57 (1991): 451.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

*Bush I and Intelligence: The Absence of Politicization*

Unlike neoconservatives in the Reagan administration, Bush appeared to be quite fond of the intelligence establishment during his time in office. His approval of the CIA was in part a result of his personal connection to the Agency but was more importantly a result of his belief system. As he made clear in the Gulf War and in his plan for a New World Order, militaries are responsible for threats posed to America. Threats are real, identifiable, and quantifiable. This view of external threat is entirely compatible with the CIA's traditional approach to intelligence, which seeks to identify, quantify, and estimate the probable intentions, capabilities, and subsequent threat posed by enemies. The CIA predicted an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait based on satellite photos showing an overnight buildup of Iraqi forces at the Iraq/Kuwait border. Bush used this estimation of the actual threat posed by Iraq in making his decision to go to war.<sup>177</sup> Bush's acceptance of traditional intelligence methods explains why he never mounted a serious challenge against the Intelligence Community. Instead he defended and strengthened it as he had in the '80s when neoconservatives were challenging its legitimacy, "Strengthening rather than diminishing our intelligence capability fits in to a reversal of what I see as a retreat. We have a good intelligence agency today, but it is not as good as it could be . . ."<sup>178</sup> Bush's belief system, responsible for his general approval of the traditional intelligence

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<sup>177</sup> Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1995), 4.

<sup>178</sup> "A Conversation with George W. Bush," 9.

bureaucracy, also explains the absence of politicized intelligence in his foreign policy decisions. He had clear evidence based on probable reports produced by the CIA for his decision to pursue a war in Iraq and therefore had no need to distort intelligence information to achieve his policy objectives.

*A Moderate Liberal Administration: Bill Clinton's Belief System*

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In spite of President Clinton's very different belief system from that of his predecessor, these two presidents shared a general approval of the Intelligence Community's approach to intelligence. Clinton recognized that threats to national security could be less defined than military or economic threats. However, throughout most of his presidency, he perceived and thus dealt with few threats of this kind. Unlike Bush, he saw the need for change in the world, but unlike the neocons, his changes focused on the importance of human rights.

Clinton sought change at home in America, a revitalized moral leadership that would make human rights a priority.

'Today we celebrate the mystery of American renewal. . . . America, to endure, would have to change. . . . The urgent question of our time is whether we can make change our friend and not our enemy. . . . To renew America, we must be bold . . . must revitalize our democracy.'<sup>179</sup>

Clinton and Bush shared a principled belief in the importance of human rights.

However, Clinton associated the importance of human rights to intervention abroad in response to failed peaceful negotiations, an association Bush's belief

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<sup>179</sup> James MacGregor Burns and Georgia J. Sorenson, *Dead Center: Clinton-Gore Leadership and the Perils of Moderation* (New York: Scribner, 1999), 25.

system prevented him from making. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly, Clinton stated the importance of strengthening “the capacity of the international community to prevent and, whenever possible, to stop outbreaks of mass killing and displacement.”<sup>180</sup> Clinton’s belief in the importance of human rights was responsible for the development of the Clinton Doctrine, which established a precedent for U.S. humanitarian intervention based on its intervention in Kosovo.<sup>181</sup>

Clinton, unlike Bush, believed that humanitarian crises like the situation in Kosovo were more than just tragedies. They posed a distinct threat to the United States and to the rest of the world:

[W]e don’t want our children to grow up in a 21<sup>st</sup> century world where innocent civilians can be hauled off to the slaughter, where children can die en masse, where young boys of military age can be burned alive where young girls can be raped en masse just to intimidate their families – we don’t want our kids to grow up in a world like that.<sup>182</sup>

Although Clinton had a broader perception of external threat than Bush, his inclusion of human rights atrocities as real threats to America and his subsequent policy of humanitarian intervention still did not require him to distort intelligence for these political purposes.

Although there were disagreements in America and abroad about pursuing humanitarian interventions, those who opposed intervention still recognized the

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<sup>180</sup> Bill Clinton, “Peace in the New Millennium: Let’s Create, Not Destroy,” delivered on September 21, 1999, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 66 (1999): 3.

<sup>181</sup> Bill Clinton, “The Clinton Doctrine” in Alton Frye, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine, Three Options Presented as Memoranda to the President* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 74.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.



reality of the atrocities occurring abroad. They simply disagreed that intervention was an appropriate way of dealing with the atrocities. The Clinton administration never had to challenge the methods or conclusions of the Intelligence Community in order to pursue policy measures prescribed by the Clinton Doctrine. “In President Clinton’s administration, there was an effort to reach out and coordinate and make sure everybody’s views were heard, [to reach out] to the academic community to make sure that competing views and assessments were brought into the equation as [the] decisionmaking process was moving on . . . there was a concerted effort at that kind of consensus building.”<sup>183</sup> Members of the Intelligence Community under Clinton recognized the compatibility of Clinton’s view of intelligence with their own approach to the process. Clinton wanted probability estimates based on competing viewpoints and contrasting analyses. He did not have to politicize intelligence to achieve his policy goals.

*A New Threat and a New Challenge to the Intelligence Community:*

*Neoconservatives in the ‘90s*

While George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton spent the ‘90s pursuing foreign policies that they believed effectively dealt with the threats posed to the United States, the neoconservatives grew more concerned. Cold war hawks “lamented

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<sup>183</sup> United States Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Roundtable Report on Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship* (Georgetown University: Washington D.C., November 10, 2003), 14.

the ‘ambiguity’ of President Bill Clinton’s post-Cold War grand strategy.”<sup>184</sup>

They began to call the 1990s the *second* “decade of neglect,” a name originally applied to the 1970s in reference to Nixon and Carter’s commitment to a policy of détente. The early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union was a critical period in American foreign policy requiring those in power to make not just specific foreign policy decisions regarding individual events but foreign policy decisions about the future role for America in international relations. The Bush administration took this opportunity to pursue a New World Order based on America’s decline from global military preeminence and cooperation with Russia and Western Europe.

Neoconservatives who disagreed with this approach passionately defended policy options that were more consistent with their belief system. They argued that the state of “peace” enjoyed by the United States throughout most of the ‘90s was not a lasting peace free from threat:

The United States is at peace, and to most American the threats to that peace seem distant, if not rather contrived. [I contend] that the stakes are, to the contrary, very large. The World faces a choice not unlike the one it faced at the end of the last century. Depending on how we make that choice, the next century could bring unprecedented peace among the major powers, new-found prosperity for hundreds of millions of poor people, and a great expansion of democracy and individual freedom. But if we manage badly, the next century could eclipse the twentieth as the bloodiest century in human history.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Jon Western, *Bush Grand Strategy: The Doctrine of Moral Realism* (Submitted November 3, 2003), 37.

<sup>185</sup> Paul Wolfowitz, “Managing Our Way to a Peaceful Century,” in *Managing the International System Over the Next Ten Years* (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1997), 44.

Neoconservatives who were concerned about the growing threat and the failure of policymakers in power to recognize this threat took it upon themselves, as they did in the 1970s, to raise public awareness of this threat independently of the government. They started a group called the Project for a New American Century.

*Project for a New American Century*

The Project for a New American Century, officially established in the spring of 1997, considers itself to be a non-profit educational organization with the purpose of promoting American leadership.<sup>186</sup> In a 2000 report titled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses,” Thomas Donnelly wrote of a uniquely important opportunity for America since it faced “no global rival” to reassert and strengthen its position of strategic superiority over the rest of the world.<sup>187</sup> The opportunity required a revitalization of America’s military power after the neglectful policies of the 1990s. Donnelly wrote interchangeably of America’s strategic superiority and the “American peace.”<sup>188</sup>

According to the neoconservative ideals of the Project for the New American Century, U.S. strategic superiority is the only means to a peaceful world in the future. Donnelly’s report continually makes this assumption, using it to justify the need for expanding America’s military capabilities, “If an American

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<sup>186</sup> Thomas Donnelly, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century,” *Project for a New American Century* (September 2000), i.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., iv.

peace is to be maintained, and expanded, it must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.”<sup>189</sup> The report justifies necessary increases in the U.S. military budget as “the price of American preeminence.”<sup>190</sup>

America’s role as leader of the free world excluded the possibility of abdicating any of its decisionmaking power to the United Nations. Senator John Glenn noticed the neoconservatives pushing for the omission of the UN from America’s future plans and questioned Colin Powell during the 1991 budget hearings, “‘Is this sort of inadvertent that we’re reading the UN out of our future planning? Because I thought that was going to be one of the key elements of this new world order . . .’”<sup>191</sup> Powell skirted the question, but the truth was that the UN would not have had a place in a new world order if neoconservatives had achieved the level of influence they hoped for in the first Bush administration.

They believed that if America was to be a true global power, it could not be forced to answer to a body that it did not, by itself, control. This view of the UN became strikingly clear during Bob Dole’s 1996 campaign for the presidency. At the Republican National Convention that year, Dole said, “[W]hen I am president, every man and every woman in our armed forces will know the president is his commander-in-chief – not Boutros Boutros-Ghali or any other UN secretary general.”<sup>192</sup> Clinton’s reelection postponed the rejection of UN legitimacy by four years, but the same argument surfaces in the Bush II

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 4, 1.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 21, 1991, quoted in Mann, 204.

<sup>192</sup> Bob Dole, acceptance speech for Presidential nomination August 15, 1996, San Diego, California.

administration, and this time the neoconservatives are in a position to actively undermine the UN's power.

The Project for a New American Century was intended to appeal directly to the American public by raising concerns about a threat posed to America that the Clinton administration was effectively ignoring. While the Project for a New American Century worked on raising public awareness, neoconservative tried another strategy for bringing this threat into mainstream political discourse. Their strategy was not a new one. In fact, they pursued the same project that they had in the 1970s with the Team B experiment. They challenged the threat assessments of the intelligence establishment using assessments produced by an “independent” commission composed of their ideological equivalents: the Rumsfeld Commission.

### *The Rumsfeld Commission*

The Rumsfeld Commission, led by Donald Rumsfeld, assembled in 1998 to fulfill obligations outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997. Its mandate was to:

[A]ssess the nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United States. In carrying out its duties, the Commission should receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and any other United States Government official responsible for providing the Commission with analyses, briefings and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, *Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission*, 104<sup>th</sup> cong., Pursuant to Public Law 201 (online at

Rumsfeld, as the head of this ad hoc intelligence oversight group, shared the belief system of Richard Pipes, the Harvard Soviet historian who was in charge of the B Team during the alternate threat assessment exercise in the 1970s. Not only did Rumsfeld accept Pipes' perspective on external threats as ideological and therefore pervasive and difficult to control, he shared his view of intelligence.

Both men viewed the traditional intelligence establishment with acute suspicion. They believed that intelligence should not waste time trying to estimate the probability of threats. These estimates will inevitably be inaccurate in some respect, so intelligence reports should instead provide policymakers with worst case threat assessments, allowing the policymaker arrive at his own conclusion about the nature and extent of the threat. Both Pipes and Rumsfeld welcomed this view of intelligence because it ensured that a policymaker would tailor his policy measures to the neocon perception of pervasive threat. Even if the policymakers in power are not neoconservatives, the public's fear of a "rising threat" would effectively force policymakers to either pursue a policy measure for dealing with the "threat" similar to one a neocon policymaker would choose or risk appearing to the public to be soft on national security.

The Team B experiment was a response to a National Intelligence Estimate that had, according to members of Ford's PFIAB, underestimated the Soviet threat. Similarly, the Rumsfeld Commission was a response to the CIA's

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<http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress/BMTThreat.htm>; July 15, 1998), page online 1.

underestimation of the ballistic missile threat posed by nations in the Middle East and South Asia. The November 1995 NIE reported that no new nations besides the countries that already had nuclear capabilities would be able to develop ICBMs for at least fifteen years.<sup>194</sup> Also, the United States' development of satellite capabilities would drastically increase the warning time for deployment of ballistic missiles, "making the acquisition of long-range missile capability much harder for any potential U.S. adversary. The missile threat to the United States therefore will be virtually eliminated, even though regional missile threats . . . will most likely increase."<sup>195</sup> The Rumsfeld Commission was created to examine the raw intelligence used to arrive at the conclusions found in NIE 95-19 and ultimately to determine the validity of the conclusions.

Like Team B, the Rumsfeld Commission both provided an independent assessment of the threat facing the U.S. and also examined the methods used by the CIA's to compose its threat assessment report and its ability to warn of threats in the future.<sup>196</sup> The Commission concluded that a number of "hostile" nations were thinking about developing and/or acquiring ballistic missile capabilities with nuclear or biological capabilities. Upon decision to proceed with these programs, North Korea and Iran would be able to "inflict major destruction on the U.S. within five years" (Iraq would take ten years).<sup>197</sup> The problem, according to the Commission, was not so much that the Intelligence Community improperly

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<sup>194</sup> Mikhail A. Alexseev, *Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 261.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, 1-2.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 3.

estimated the time it would take for these countries to develop a ballistic missile program but that they lacked the ability to ascertain when these countries would make the decision to proceed with their programs.<sup>198</sup>

The Commission concluded that, “The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq] is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.”<sup>199</sup> Their reasons for coming to this conclusion are even more important than the conclusion itself. They used worst case analysis, which resulted in the appearance of a broader and more mature threat than the methods of the CIA, which were aimed at producing probability estimates. Their use of worst case analysis not only overstated the ballistic missile threat posed at the United States, it also provided policymakers with an intelligence “justification” for pursuing a foreign policy that would actively undermine regimes that *they deemed* threatening.

The Commission unanimously agreed that, “The Intelligence Community’s ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding. This erosion has roots both within and beyond the intelligence process itself.”<sup>200</sup> They viewed the shortcomings of the Intelligence Community’s assessment as a product of the erosion of the intelligence process.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Neoconservative media sources expressed the same views to readers in the ‘90s. “The policy [of containment] clearly failed [in Iraq], but not through bad luck or unforeseen developments. Rather because it plainly rested on a *serious misjudgment of the character of the regime and of the*



However, the Intelligence Community's assessment only appears to have shortcomings when viewed from the perspective of the neoconservative members of the Commission.

Based on this logic, *any* conclusion arrived at by the Intelligence Community's approach would be rejected because of the dangerous uncertainty inherent in estimates of probability. The Rumsfeld Commission's major recommendation makes its logic very clear:

[W]e unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning.<sup>202</sup>

By insisting that the Intelligence Community *assume* an environment of little or no warning, they were endorsing a fundamental shift in the most basic practices of the traditional intelligence bureaucracy from estimating probable scenarios to estimating worst case scenarios. They were asking for the Intelligence Community to leave probability estimates to the policymakers.

The Rumsfeld Commission Report explains this approach to intelligence from its own perspective in the section on methodology. The commission claimed that it used an "expanded" methodology:

We used it as a complement to the traditional analysis in which a country's known program status is used to establish estimates of its current missile capabilities. We believe this expanded approach provides

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*ambition of its leader* – a misjudgment which lasted for a decade, which no evidence could seemingly shake, or at least induce to reappraise." – Elie Kedourie, "Iraq: The Mystery of American Policy," *Commentary* 91 (1991), 17 (italics added). This article was written in the early '90s. The Rumsfeld Commission reassessment in the late '90s was exactly the sort of reappraisal the author believed was necessary.

<sup>202</sup> The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, 3.

insights into emerging threats that the prevailing approaches used by the Intelligence Community may not bring to the surface.<sup>203</sup>

Although the Rumsfeld Commission endorsed its worst-case assessment approach *in addition* to the Intelligence Community's actual estimates, practices suggests that neoconservatives will pay little heed to the actual estimates, which are of no use to their overarching policy goals.<sup>204</sup> Recall the statement made by a prominent neoconservative intelligence theorist, "truth is not the goal [of intelligence] but rather only a means toward victory."<sup>205</sup> The Rumsfeld Commission endorsed this idea – that when using worst case analysis, truth is what the policymaker needs it to be in order to successfully pursue his policy approach.

If intelligence becomes only a project of estimating extremes, it loses the most fundamental function of intelligence – to inform. It becomes guesswork based on extreme possibility. This logic is the same logic that drove the Team B assessment of the Soviet threat in the 1970s. We now know that Team B overstated the Soviet threat to the United States, and the recently affirmed failure to locate WMDs in Iraq suggests that the Rumsfeld Commission also overstated the threat. More importantly, the method of worst case analysis used to create the Rumsfeld Commission report allowed policymakers in the future Bush II administration who cited this and similar reports as justification for the war in Iraq to effectively *decide for themselves* the status of the *actual* threat posed to the

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>204</sup> Policymakers in the Bush administration accept worst case reports of Iraq and ignore the probability estimates that accompany the worst case reports.

<sup>205</sup> Abram Shulsky, *Silent Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1991), 179.

United States. Also, Congressional leaders were able to use the Commission report to heighten public fears of a WMD attack on America. Newt Gingrich told Americans that the Rumsfeld Commission report was “the most important warning about our national security system since the end of the Cold War” leaving policymakers with little option but to actively seek changes that would undermine the “threat.”<sup>206</sup>

### *Summary and Conclusions*

The 1990s like the 1970s were extremely frustrating for the neocon policymaking elite. They saw their favored policies ignored first by a traditional conservative Republican administration and then by a two-term Liberal administration. Finally in the late ‘90s they took matters into their own hands creating an independent commission to warn the public of the external threat posed to the U.S. and justifying their warnings by creating an alternate assessment of this ballistic missile threat. Neocons used this opportunity to both create an alternate threat assessment and to challenge the methods and findings of the traditional Intelligence Community. Chapter six will examine the role of worst case intelligence reporting in the politicization of intelligence as it relates to the Bush II administration’s foreign policy approach.

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<sup>206</sup> Michael Killian, “Panel Disputes CIA Assessment, Fear Attacks by Rogue States,” *Chicago Tribune*, July 16, 1998, p. 8.

## CHAPTER VI

### *BUSH II: INTELLIGENCE AND THE IRAQ WAR*

The neoconservative belief system has roots in the Truman administration but did not become a coherent political ideology until the late '60s/early '70s when neocons began to challenge the credibility of the Intelligence Community. Under Reagan the neoconservative belief system enjoyed a position of power. The role of intelligence in the Iran-Contra affair supported my argument that the neoconservative belief system predisposes policymakers to politicize intelligence. The neocons failed to have a direct influence on policymaking in the '90s. However, their appeals to public opinion based on overstatements of the external threat posed to America forced non-neoconservative policymakers to remain aware of these "threats" and even occasionally to pursue policies that would address the public's fear created by overstatements of threat. This is the historical framework in which we must view the Bush II administration's tendency to distort intelligence information.

In this chapter I will discuss the intelligence "failures" associated with September 11<sup>th</sup> and relate them to the Bush administration's view of intelligence, including the manipulation of information in order to justify the Iraq War

decision. This manipulation of intelligence is a direct result of the neoconservative belief system held by many policymakers in the Bush administration. Conclusions in both the 9/11 Commission Report and the Senate Intelligence Committee's Iraq Report ultimately support my argument.

*The Bush Administration: A Bastion of Neoconservatism*

Discussions of "universal values" are quite familiar to Americans in the late 20<sup>th</sup>/early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Both Reagan and Bush II have used "universal values" rhetoric to sustain and justify policy decisions. In June 2002 President Bush addressed the graduating class at West Point with a speech titled "A Just and Peaceful World: Moral Truth is the same in Every Culture." He stated that, "Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place."<sup>207</sup> He claimed that peace depends on moral consensus and that the U.S. must play an active role in creating this moral consensus. He reminded the West Point graduates that "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge" to ensure America's role in establishing a cooperative global community.<sup>208</sup>

The Bush administration believes that this is the only way to create a lasting global peace. Without moral consensus we are left in a pervasive and

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<sup>207</sup> George W. Bush, "A just and peaceful world: moral truth is the same in every culture," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 68 (2002): page online (Expanded Academic ASAP).

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

eternal Hobbesian state of threat. Bush's ultimate goal to instill freedom and democracy in Iraq reflects both a desire to improve life for the Iraqi people by making their country free and democratic as well as a self-interested motivation to bring Iraq into America's moral empire. As he stated in a speech to the nation on September 8, 2003, "America today accepts the challenge of helping Iraq . . . for their sake, *and our own*."<sup>209</sup> This required not only the destruction of Iraq's military capabilities but also the complete destruction of Saddam's regime. Because the military threat was never the ultimate motivation for Bush's war, the fact that weapons inspectors never found Iraqi WMDs failed to make the war illegitimate from the administration's perspective.

Bush gave a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 2003 titled "Peace Must Be a Multilateral Cause." This title misrepresented his beliefs. He never intended to suggest that the U.S. ask permission from the UN to intervene in foreign nations. His intention was to suggest to the UN what he suggested to the American public only two weeks before – that peace depended on the existence of a multilateral *moral consensus*. "[A] transformed Middle East would benefit the entire world, by undermining the ideologies that export violence to other lands."<sup>210</sup> The necessity for UN approval of the military action that would make this multilateral peace possible was

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<sup>209</sup> George W. Bush, "Freedom's Cause: We Will not Rest until Terrorism is Eliminated," delivered on September 8, 2003, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 69 (2003): 707.

<sup>210</sup> George W. Bush, "Peace Must Be a Multilateral Cause: We Need Help to Secure Peace," delivered on September 24, 2003, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 69 (2003): 740.

curiously absent from Bush's speech. Multilateralism is only desirable to the U.S. once it has forcefully remade the world in its own image.

### *Mistrusting the Intelligence Establishment*

The Bush administration not only shared many of the general beliefs that are characteristic of the neoconservative belief system, it also shared the mistrust of the intelligence establishment. The chairman of the [Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee](#) claimed that the CIA's Iraq report "isn't worth the paper it's written on."<sup>211</sup> Although Richard Perle is not a member of the Bush administration, this statement exemplifies the Bush administration's perspective of the CIA. In reference to the same report, Bush's Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, said, "'I don't think it's right to use [the] word *failure*.'"<sup>212</sup> However, the unspoken implication from his statement suggested that if the report was not a "failure" it was at the very least seriously mistaken.

Bush's appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense also provides insight into the Bush administration's view of intelligence. Rumsfeld was the leader of the Rumsfeld Commission in the late '90s. The Commission concluded that the Intelligence Community's Iraq assessment – conclusions *and methods* – were seriously misguided. The Bush administration is composed of

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<sup>211</sup> Warren Strobel, Jonathan Landay, and John Walcott, "Some in Bush Administration Have Misgivings About Iraq Policy," Knight-Ridder Newspapers (October 27, 2002), cited in James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (Toronto: Doubleday, 2004), 289.

<sup>212</sup> Federal News Service transcript, press conference of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat, July 15, 1998, cited in Mann, 234.

neoconservative ideologues who mistrust the CIA. This became blatantly clear in the administration's policy choices before and after 9/11. While this tragedy has been labeled a failure of intelligence, it was also a failure on the part of Bush administration officials who distorted and ignored information about the terrorist threat.

### *Distorting Intelligence: 9/11*

The Bush administration's politicization of intelligence related to 9/11 was unique from many past instances of neoconservative politicization in that it *underestimated* rather than *overestimated* the threat posed to America. However, the administration still misconstrued or ignored related intelligence information as a result of beliefs that they held about the type and nature of pre-9/11 threats suggesting a similar mistrust of the Intelligence Community to past instances of neoconservative politicization. The neoconservative view of intelligence considers hard facts to be useful information and probable estimates, especially estimates that depend on cultural sensitivities of foreign nations, as inconclusive and therefore relatively useless in making foreign policy decisions.

Neocons associated the traditional Intelligence Community's attention to nuanced sensitivities of other countries with analysts' liberal tendencies.<sup>213</sup> In the pre-9/11 Bush administration, policymakers focused not on terrorism but on

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<sup>213</sup> Douglas Jehl, "New C.I.A. Chief Tells Worker to Back Administration Policies," *The New York Times*, 17 November 2004, sec. A, p. 1; Robert Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA," *The American Prospect*, 16 December 2002, page online.



state-based threats from countries like Iraq.<sup>214</sup> Neocons recognized a broader definition of threat than traditional conservatives. They clearly allow for the possible existence of non-structural, ideological threats (e.g. communism during the Cold War). However, the realist influence on their foreign policy approach restricts these ideological threats to clashing values with legitimate nation-states. This factor exacerbated by neoconservatives' historical mistrust of the intelligence establishment explains the Bush administration's tendency to ignore pre-9/11 intelligence reports involving the developing terrorist threat.

Between January 20 and September 10, 2001, CIA included more than forty articles on the topic of Bin Laden and possible terrorist attacks in the President's Daily Briefings.<sup>215</sup> On August 6 the president received a memo in his PDB titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S."<sup>216</sup> A senior intelligence official with significant experience in matters related to Afghanistan agreed that the danger to America posed by Bin Laden was obvious:

[Bin Laden is] a growing threat to the United States – there is no greater threat – and . . . we are being defeated not because the evidence of the threat is unavailable, but because we refuse to accept it at face value and without Americanizing the data that comes easily and voluminously to hand.<sup>217</sup>

The failures associated with 9/11 certainly resulted in part from failures on the part of the Intelligence Community to accurately predict details of the attack.

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<sup>214</sup> Bamford, 261.

<sup>215</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, July 2004, 254.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, 260.

<sup>217</sup> Anonymous, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2004), 168.

However, the fact that Bush administration officials ignored the information that the Intelligence Community *was* able to provide sent a signal to the Intelligence Community that threats from terrorists were only a secondary concern to threats from rogue nations.<sup>218</sup> The Intelligence Community had little incentive from policymakers who set the intelligence agenda to make the issue a priority.

The Bush administration's tendency to ignore information relating to the terrorist threat pre-9/11 resulted from a phenomenon that one intelligence official calls imperial hubris, "a way of thinking that America's elites have acquired since the end of World War II."<sup>219</sup> Imperial hubris is essentially the Americanization of events and people that are not (and do not seek to be) American in any way. "Thus, for example, Bin Laden is a criminal whose activities are fueled by money – not a devout Muslim soldier fueled by faith."<sup>220</sup> The intelligence officer's characterization of imperial hubris is a charge against neoconservatives in response to the neocon's allegations that the Intelligence Community is too sensitive to the interests of foreign countries. The intelligence officer argues that

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<sup>218</sup> In an article defending the Bush administration's responses to 9/11, Norman Podhoretz claims that the Bush administration is free from any blame for the 9/11 attacks because, "The attack came, both literally and metaphorically, like a bolt out of the blue." He suggests that because of the surprise nature of the attacks, the administration cannot be held responsible. However, only sentences later he suggests that the attacks were a surprise in the first place because "no one ever took such a possibility seriously enough to figure out what to do about it." Policymakers ultimately set the intelligence agenda, and given the neocons tendency not to take Intelligence Community assessments seriously, there is reason to believe that the Bush administration set the trend for failing to take 9/11 threats seriously as well. – "World War IV," *Commentary* 118 (2004), 18-19.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

the neocon tendency to ignore foreign sensitivities or to view them from an American perspective can be equally if not more dangerous.<sup>221</sup>

After 9/11 the Bush administration had little choice but to recognize Al Qaeda as a significant threat to the United States, but the neoconservative belief system (the “imperial hubris”) of these policymakers dictated their view of the threat. Indeed, the administration’s post-9/11 retaliatory efforts consisted of wars with Afghanistan and Iraq, the ultimate goal being the destruction of regimes that threatened America ideologically and conversion of these states into democracies. In order to justify invasions of these countries as a response to the terrorist threat, the Bush administration followed the neoconservative trend of appealing to the public’s vulnerability:

As discordant notes linger, we are periodically riled by “breaking news” that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has raised the threat-warning indicator from yellow to amber – or is it amber to yellow? – on a tacky traffic-light looking device. Adjusting the street-light-of-death is meant to portray DHS’s judgment that the threat to U.S. interests from someone, somewhere in the world has increased. As the threat level wanders between “don’t worry” and “prepare to die,” we also hear experts warning audiences watching CNN, C-SPAN, or Oprah that the next al Qaeda attack on our country will involve WMD.<sup>222</sup>

The administration’s manipulation of public opinion based on an indefinable, unquantifiable view of threat depended on the administration’s ability to

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<sup>221</sup> The “imperial hubris” of the Bush administration noted by this former intelligence officer is not a new phenomenon. A neoconservative, once a radical liberal himself, gave a speech to his former leftist comrades in the 1980s on the topic of Nicaragua. He expressed similar assumptions about the desirability of American values and beliefs. “As American radicals, the most egregious sin you commit is to betray the privileges and freedoms that ordinary people all over the world would feel blessed to have themselves.” – David Horowitz, “Nicaragua: A Speech to My Former Comrades on the Left,” *Commentary* 81 (1986): 31. He also stated without hesitation that the murderous “democratic leadership” of Somoza was inherently more desirable to the Nicaraguan people than the leadership of communist Sandinistas.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, 164.

manipulate intelligence information. This manipulation allowed them to establish a justification for attacking Iraq. After 9/11, “Terrorism [was] depicted [by neocon-controlled media] as a danger to the human race equal to the potential for mutual nuclear annihilation that threatened humanity throughout the Cold War.”<sup>223</sup> The administration used the 9/11 terrorist attacks to raise public fear of an elusive and indefinable threat in much the same way that the Reagan administration manipulated the public’s fear of communism. Both administrations manipulated intelligence in order to control public perceptions.

### *Distorting Intelligence: Iraq*

My argument that the neoconservative belief system predisposes adherents to politicize intelligence is made only stronger by the fact that this politicization resulted in an *underestimation* of threat relating to 9/11. This departure from the normal tendency of neocons to *overestimate* threat substantiates the notion that the neoconservative politicization of intelligence is not mere coincidence but is instead a result of policymakers infiltrating the intelligence process.<sup>224</sup> In the case of 9/11, this infiltration occurred in the form of the administration’s dismissal of terrorist threat favoring instead a policy aimed at destabilizing Iraq, a measure that administration officials thought would effectively deal with the threat to America as they perceived it.

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<sup>223</sup> Charles William Maynes, “A Closing Word.” *Foreign Policy* 106 (1997): 18.

<sup>224</sup> This is precisely the view that Abram Shulsky defended when he said, “[I]ntelligence assessments that attempt to make predictions (especially contingent predictions) do not differ from the conclusions that policymakers might draw about the same situations.” – Abram Shulsky, *Silent Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1991), 177.

September 11<sup>th</sup> appears to have had little affect on the Bush administration's perception of threat. It altered their public rhetoric forcing them to establish a connection between Iraq and terrorism, but it failed to change the focus of their foreign policy approach. They remained intent on their project to remake the world in the image of America, one country at a time. The fact that an event as momentous as September 11<sup>th</sup> failed to ultimately redirect neoconservative policymakers to a new policy approach speaks to the power and influence of neoconservative ideas and convictions on their foreign policy decisions.

#### THE IRAQI THREAT

In a speech delivered to the nation on March 17, 2003, President Bush boldly asserted that, "Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves *no doubt* that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."<sup>225</sup> Bush's language of absolute certainty is striking especially in light of recent developments; namely, the fact that the U.S. has given up the search for WMDs in Iraq with no success. Hans Blix, the former head of UN weapons inspections stated in January of 2005 that:

'We have believed that there weren't any weapons since around May or June 2003. First came David Kay in September 2003 [who said] that he hadn't found any weapons and that was a big sensation – but he though that there were programmes still,' he told the BBC. 'But then came Duelfer last November [who] said that he hadn't seen any programmes,

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<sup>225</sup> George W. Bush, "President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours: The Final Ultimatum," delivered on March 17, 2003, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 69 (2003): 354 (emphasis added).

but maybe Saddam would have intended to restart the programme, and there is no evidence of that.’<sup>226</sup>

Bush’s justification for war in Iraq depended on both a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda and on Saddam’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Citing the Rumsfeld Commission’s assessment of Iraqi ballistic missile programs as well as more recent worst case assessments of the “Iraqi threat,” the Bush administration decided that military intervention aimed at destroying Saddam’s regime and establishing democracy in Iraq was the best measure to pursue. However, justification for this decision ultimately depended on the administration’s politicization of intelligence.

From the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to early 2003, the Intelligence Community’s estimates on Iraq remained ultimately the same. In spite of Saddam’s unpredictability, aggressiveness, and potential capability to carry out a regional military strike, such an attack did not directly threaten the U.S. nor was it even likely to occur. The CIA based its judgment on the established U.S. presence in the region acting as a deterrent, the fact that Iraqi military capabilities had been decreasing since its defeat in the Gulf War, and the likelihood that these capabilities would continue to decrease with continued economic sanctions in place.<sup>227</sup> In a report on the Intelligence Community’s prewar Iraq intelligence assessments, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that, “The IC’s [Intelligence Community’s] judgments about Iraq’s military capabilities were

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<sup>226</sup> Hans Blix quoted in “US gives up search for Iraq WMD,” *BBC News*, 12 January 2005, online.

<sup>227</sup> Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong, Ordered Reported on 7 July 2004, 377.

reasonable and balanced.”<sup>228</sup> This picture of Iraq, however, is not the picture of Iraq that the Bush administration used to justify military action against the country, and while the SSCI’s report denies all suggestions that the inflated judgments responsible for establishing an “immanent Iraqi threat” were a result of explicit pressure from the administration, this factor alone does not eliminate the possibility that intelligence was subject to some form of political manipulation by the Bush administration.

#### THE 2002 IRAQ WHITE PAPER

On May 8, 2002 Senator Bob Graham, then chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, requested a report on Iraqi WMDs. The results of this report provide a clear substantiation of my argument. The unclassified WMD white paper addressed nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and delivery systems. The important factor related to this report is the curious variation between the classified NIE and unclassified white paper versions of the same report. Virtually all terms that would typically denote uncertainty (i.e. “we think” and “might”) as well as all dissenting footnotes were removed from the unclassified white paper. The unclassified report also excluded the section on likelihood that Iraq would use the capabilities outlined in the White Paper. An intelligence official claimed that the unclassified report left this section out because “the IC had low confidence in those judgments and thought their

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 392.

inclusion would be ‘basically telling Saddam what we think he is thinking, and that just didn’t seem smart at that point in the process . . .’<sup>229</sup> However, the SSCI reviewed a past Iraq WMD white paper and found that the unclassified version did not seek to eliminate all uncertainty like this unclassified 2002 Iraq WMD white paper.<sup>230</sup>

Even if there is no explicit link between the administration and the unclassified version of the Iraq WMD white paper (i.e. direct coercion of IC by the administration), when viewed within the historical framework of this thesis, it seems likely that the Bush administration *used* the report in a way that distorted the information for political purposes. Regardless of the IC’s motivations for removing all terms reflecting uncertainty from the unclassified report, the result of removing all uncertainty from the report including nuanced limitations on Saddam’s intentions and capabilities was a worst case analysis of the Iraqi threat (see attached figure, page 143).<sup>231</sup> The Bush administration took the white paper’s worst case scenario for truth and used it to achieve their policy goals. Their first goal was domestic – to raise public support for a war with Iraq, and their second goal was victory over Iraq itself. Because the white paper was a statement of “fact,” rather than an uncertain estimate, it established an uncertain

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid., 288-9.

<sup>230</sup> “The IC provided an unclassified white paper from February 1998 to the Committee, *Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs*, which contained only one use of the word ‘we,’ but, the 1998 white paper contained other words which expressed the uncertainty behind the IC judgments without using the word ‘we.’ For example, the white paper referred to the world’s experts saying “they believe” and “[the United Nations Special Commission] UNSCOM believes” and used phrases such as “the evidence strongly suggests” and “Iraq could,” “Iraq has apparently,” and “Iraq probably.” – Ibid., 288.

<sup>231</sup> Senate Iraq Report, 294.



threat from Iraq. One might assume that the Bush administration's portrayal of the WMD white paper as true fact would become problematic for the administration when it became clear that there actually are no WMDs in Iraq. However, this is not the case.

Bush's response to the final report that Iraq had no WMDs reflects the idea that WMDs, per se, were never the imminent threat:

'After September 11, America had to assess every potential threat in a new light,' Bush said. 'We had to take a hard look at every place where terrorists might get those weapons and one regime stood out: the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. We knew the dictator had a history of using weapons of mass destruction, a long record of aggression and hatred for America. There was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would pass weapons or materials or information to terrorist networks. In the world after September 11, that was a risk we could not afford to take.'<sup>232</sup>

To the Bush administration, the Iraqi threat cannot be quantified or qualified in terms of weapons stockpiles, terrorism, or any other measurable factor. It eludes all methods of characterization or evaluation but its existence is self-evident. However, administration officials recognize that the threat, while self-evident to themselves, must be portrayed to Congress and the American people in real, quantifiable terms. This is the ultimate purpose of intelligence in the Bush administration - to explain and justify to the unenlightened masses what the enlightened neoconservatives already "know" from their view of the world. However, this project is no small feat; it is like trying to place a square peg (traditional intelligence) into a round hole (the neocon perspective of the world).

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<sup>232</sup> Elmarie Jack, ed., "No WMD, But Bush Unrepentant," *News24.com*, 10 June 2004, page online at [http://www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460\\_1600855,00.html](http://www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460_1600855,00.html).

Traditional intelligence will never be able to portray the world as the neocons see it. The fact that inspectors never found WMDs in Iraq is merely evidence of the threat's elusive nature; it is *not* evidence of politicized intelligence.

#### LINKS BETWEEN SADDAM HUSSEIN AND AL QAEDA

The Senate Report also addressed allegations that Intelligence Community analysts were coerced by the administration into creating links that did not really exist between Saddam and Al Qaeda. The report concluded that analysts were not *explicitly* pressured to create these links but that they were significantly overstated.<sup>233</sup> However, the report also concluded that the Intelligence Community was under extreme pressure post-9/11, especially from the executive branch, to find terrorist connections wherever they existed. The Bush administration has tried to place blame on the Intelligence Community for the failure to predict 9/11, even though it was the administration that ignored Intelligence Community warnings before the attack. Nevertheless, because of the public perceived 9/11 to be a failure of intelligence, the pressure ultimately rests on the Intelligence Community to protect America from another terrorist attack. They are under much greater pressure in their post-9/11 national security role.

This public pressure, manipulated by the neoconservatives in power, forced the Intelligence Community into worst case analysis mode on terrorism in Iraq. "As a result [of post 9/11 pressure], the Intelligence Community's

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<sup>233</sup> Senate Iraq Report, 348.

assessments were bold and assertive in pointing out potential terrorist links.” The Agency was “‘purposefully aggressive’ in drawing connection between Iraq and al-Qaida in an effort to inform policymakers of the potential that such a relationship existed.”<sup>234</sup> Public pressure on the Intelligence Community resulted in worst case assessments of terrorist connections between Saddam and Bin Laden, which allowed administration officials to draw their own conclusions about these connections and still base their conclusions on “factual intelligence information.” Clearly the intrusion of politics into intelligence occurred in a number of different ways relating to the Iraq War decision. One final matter of politicization is the role of intelligence (or lack thereof) in Bush’s decisive plan to instill freedom and democracy in Iraq.

#### A DEMOCRATIC IRAQ?

The Bush administration’s mistrust of the traditional Intelligence Community’s methods (especially its sensitivity to social and cultural concerns of foreign states) led the administration to ignore important open-source information relating to its plan for a democratic Iraq. Because of the administration’s belief in the power of universal values to eventually establish a peaceful existence among the nations of the world, the Bush administration prefers not to pay attention to commentators who suggest that a forced democracy in Iraq will not be real democracy. Their heightened sense of American exceptionalism prevents them

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<sup>234</sup> Ibid., 363.

from recognizing cultural or historical factors as acceptable reasons why Iraq might reject America's imposed democracy.<sup>235</sup> They have established a moral dichotomy similar to the cold war: us vs. them. They are either with us or against us. If a state rejects American values for any reason, it is against us.

Bush's black and white interpretation of the world calls to question the vital importance of open source intelligence information in determining the relative chance particular foreign policy measures have of succeeding. The Intelligence Community uses open source information relating to matters like culture and history in their estimates of the likely success or failure of a policy approach:

OSINT, like all other intelligence sources, is more than information. It represents a careful sifting, selecting, analyzing and presenting of open source material on a timely basis.<sup>236</sup>

The Bush administration certainly uses open source intelligence, but it fails to recognize the vitally important role of open source information focused on cultural or historical sensitivities largely as a result of its heightened sense of American exceptionalism.

Using only open-source intelligence as a resource, history alone would suggest the failure of the Bush administration's goal to force democracy on an

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<sup>235</sup> Recall Kissinger's comments in chapter three on why he rejects moral absolutism or universal values: "[m]oral claims involve a quest for absolutes, a denial of nuance, a rejection of history." - Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 316. Kissinger's critique of moral-based policies applies perfectly to the Iraq War. The Bush administration truly ignored and rejected the lessons of history in its Iraq policy.

<sup>236</sup> Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert D. Steele, *Open Source Intelligence: Private Sector Capabilities to Support DoD Policy, Acquisitions, and Operations* (Defense Daily Network Special Report, posted 5 May 1998 at <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/oss980501.htm> courtesy of Open Source Solutions, Inc.), online.

unstable Islamic country even with the good intention of creating *more* stability. In fact the very project of intervening in a foreign nation with this purpose, its Islamic culture aside, is probably an unreasonable goal. “[F]oreign intervention, if it is a brief affair cannot shift the domestic balance of power in any decisive way toward the forces of freedom, while if it is prolonged or intermittently resumed, it will itself pose the greatest possible threat to the success of those forces.”<sup>237</sup> Even without the unrest present in Iraq, America’s project to intervene in a sovereign nation to forcefully make that nation “free” had little chance of true success from the beginning. Add the factor of Iraq’s Islamic culture, and Bush’s project becomes nothing short of a disaster:

The strength of Islam among Iraqi Shia and Sunnis was known – religion was a refuge from Saddam – and we were aware of fatwas ordering a defensive jihad against the U.S.-led invaders of Iraq that rivaled or exceeded in virulence those greeting the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In short, only a dunce or a man ready to be silent to protect his career could have failed to know the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq would create a “mujahideen magnet” more powerful than Moscow created in Afghanistan.<sup>238</sup>

America’s inability to win the peace in Iraq was perhaps the *most* likely result of the administration’s Iraq policy from its inception, but the administration’s rejection of the Intelligence Community’s probability estimates prevented them from taking this possibility seriously. The miscalculation on the part of the Bush

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<sup>237</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 88; Samuel Huntington makes a similar argument relating to his “clash of civilizations.” Huntington believed that the sheer power required to universalize American values was intrinsically incompatible with the values themselves. - Samuel Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 236-7.

<sup>238</sup> Anonymous, 182.

administration is made only clearer by the constant unrest and continued loss of life in Iraq now even years after the official “end” of the war.<sup>239</sup>

### *Summary and Conclusions*

The Bush administration’s blatant political manipulation of intelligence both leading up to 9/11 and in its aftermath is the most obvious and most severe example of politicization since the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, it still remains only one example among many. Politicization of intelligence since the end of World War II has resulted from the tendency of a group of elite policymakers to mistrust America’s intelligence establishment and to compensate for their lack of confidence in the CIA by taking responsibility for the intelligence estimates that inform their policy decisions. This situation creates “the problem of the Intelligence Community being coopted by the policy community . . . distorting the process to the point that it yields counterproductive results.”<sup>240</sup> The counterproductive results began with an overstated Soviet threat in the ‘70s resulting in a reinvigoration of the arms race, the Iran-Contra affair in the ‘80s, and the overstated WMD threat in the ‘90s that played a significant role in George W. Bush’s Iraq War decision. The usurpation of intelligence functions by

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<sup>239</sup> James Hider, “Iraqi insurgents now outnumber coalition forces,” *Times of London*, 4 January 2005, online at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1425022,00.html>; General Richard Myers, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, said on April 27, 2005 that, “Militants staging attacks in Iraq are as strong now as they were a year ago.” – “Iraqi Insurgency ‘Undiminished’,” *BBC News*, 27 April 2005, obtained online at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4488099.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4488099.stm).

<sup>240</sup> United States Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Roundtable Report on Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship* (Georgetown University: Washington D.C., November 10, 2003), 14.

neoconservative policymakers is, I would argue, one of the greatest problems facing the Intelligence Community in the new century, especially since these policymakers can manipulate public opinion to force distortions of intelligence even when they do not hold powerful decisionmaking positions.

### *Questions, Concerns, and Implications*

My research has implications beyond merely the *analysis and characterization* of the neoconservatives' distortion and manipulation of intelligence for political purposes. It is clear from the instances of neoconservative politicization since the end of World War II that politicization is not a good thing. Indeed, it can have disastrous results. However, the nature of the problem is not something that policymakers generally want to address when reforming intelligence. Liberals hesitate to address the problem as a distinctly "neoconservative" one because it looks like a baseless political allegation aimed at criticizing the opposition. And while some officers and analysts within the Intelligence Community itself have been bold enough to expose the true nature of the problem, others are hesitant to follow suit for fear of the repercussions.<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> In early July 2002 Ambassador Joseph Wilson challenged President Bush's claim that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from Niger. He based his challenge on first-hand information that he reported to the CIA after a trip he had taken to Niger for the express purpose of investigating the validity of these claims. Finding nothing to support the conclusion that Iraq purchased nuclear materials from Niger, Wilson wrote an op-ed in the New York Times suggesting that Bush had no substantial information to back his assertion. By the end of July, the administration leaked information that pegged Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, as a spy for CIA ruining her career. Karl Rove reportedly stated that "'Wilson's wife is fair game'" in the Bush administration's pursuit of

The 9/11 Commission addressed the most recent efforts to reform the Intelligence Community in its July 2004 report. Unsurprisingly, of the six major problems facing intelligence, the Commission failed to list the politicization of intelligence as one of them.<sup>242</sup> Its measures for reform assumed that disorganization and miscommunication were primarily responsible for the “intelligence failures” leading to 9/11. The Commission’s recommendations include the creation of a new intelligence position, Director of National Intelligence, to oversee and coordinate all intelligence functions and hopefully reduce problems of communication. Congress approved this measure and President Bush nominated former Ambassador John Negroponte in February 2005 to serve as the first DNI.<sup>243</sup>

While the Commission’s recommendations for reform were undoubtedly well-intentioned, I find it difficult to believe that bureaucratic reorganization will sufficiently address the problems facing U.S. intelligence, especially as I have characterized them in this thesis. Many intelligence commentators agree that:

Although the 9/11 Commission cited poor cooperation among intelligence agencies as warranting a centralized office overall, that would be an overreaction . . . When we hear of intelligence reform, we should hear

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revenge for Wilson’s challenge to Bush’s questionable intelligence sources. ~ Joseph Wilson, *The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies that Led to War and Betrayed My Wife’s CIA Identity* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004), 1-2.

<sup>242</sup> The six problems they address are: 1) structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work; 2) lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide; 3) divided management of national intelligence capabilities; 4) weak capacity to set priorities and move resources; 5) too many jobs; 6) too complex and secret. – National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, July 2004, 408-410.

<sup>243</sup> In my opinion, the creation of a DNI only exacerbates the problem of neoconservatives politicizing intelligence by placing a policymaker into the most important intelligence post in the country through which all intelligence reports will now pass before reaching the executive branch.



about reform of what is actually wrong, not an intelligence revolution that changes everything without good reason.<sup>244</sup>

Indeed bureaucratic reorganization has historically served as a panacea for any and all intelligence failures, “This pattern has occurred before in American history. The United States faces a sudden crisis and summons a tremendous exertion of national energy . . . Some programs and even agencies are discarded; others are invented or redesigned.”<sup>245</sup> Perhaps if the public becomes aware of the way that neoconservative policymakers twist reality to suit policy measures that are not always in the country’s best interests, they will provide a natural solution to the problem by refusing to elect members of this policymaking elite. However, if the American public fails to recognize the dangers of allowing these policymakers to continue usurping the functions of intelligence, the problem will persist until we can develop an institutional approach to solving it.

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<sup>244</sup> Michael Woodson, “Centralized Intelligence No Guarantee of Success,” *Defense Watch/SFFT* (January 10, 2005), online at <http://www.sfft.org>.

<sup>245</sup> *9/11 Commission Report*, 361.

## Classified NIE (Iraq)

## White Paper (Iraq)

We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations (UN) resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restriction; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these key judgments.)	Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts.	Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts.
In the View of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.	Most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Most analysts believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum for tubes for centrifuge rotors . . . provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assess that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)	Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs.
We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX.	Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.
Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents – much of it added in the last year.	Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agent.
We judge that all key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War	All key aspects – R&D, production, and weaponization – of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.
We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operations	Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operations, including potentially against the U.S. Homeland.
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several developmental programs, including for a UAV probably intended to deliver biological warfare agents.	Iraq maintains a small missile force and several developmental programs, including for a UAV that most analysts assess probably is intended to deliver biological warfare agents.

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